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2ABSTRACT
I f  the la te  1940s and ear ly  1950s were a period o f  close and f r ie n d ly  
re la t ions  between the United States and Egypt, the la te  1950s and ear ly  
1960s mark the de te r io ra t ion  in those re la t ions .
US-Egyptian re la t ions  from the 1952 revo lu t ion  to the Suez c r i s i s  
resembled to some extent a game of chess between Nasser o f Egypt, and 
Secretary John Foster Dulles o f  the US.
The Free O f f i ce rs '  r ise  to power in Egypt in July 1952, raised the 
hope of the American policy-makers in the estab l ish ing of closer and, 
moreover, cord ia l  re la t ions  with Egypt. They f e l t  tha t  i t  was to t h e i r  
advantage to deal with the m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e rs  who were not associated with 
the corrupt ancien regime o f  p o l i t i c i a n s .  Moreover, the Free Of f icers  did 
not have any p o l i t i c a l  commitment nor a predetermined pos it ion  in "* n foreign 
po l icy .  Therefore the Eisenhower admin is t ra t ion ,  espec ia l ly  Secretary of 
State John Foster Dul les, expected tha t  Egypt under Nasser and his m i l i t a r y  
colleagues would help achieve object ives o f  American stra tegy in the area, 
such as the containment o f  Soviet penetra t ion, and peace between the Arab 
states and Is ra e l .  These hopes or asp i ra t ions ,  however, could not be eas i ly  
trans lated in to  p rac t ica l  po l icy .  Dulles looked to Nasser fo r  support o f 
US i n i t i a t i v e s ,  w ithout appreciat ing problems Nasser might face.
Nasser's po l icy  was soon to clash with American strategy in the Middle 
East and Egypt's fo re ign po l icy  would be marked to a great extent by 
recurrent clashes with  the US, especia l ly  from 1955 onwards. Nasser saw 
US po l icy  becoming r e f l e x iv e l y  pro-Israe l  and he f e l t  tha t  Washington was 
jeopardising his leadership of the Arab world, espec ia l ly  a f te r  the 
formation o f  the Baghdad Pact in February 1955. The honeymoon between the
3Free O f f ice rs '  regime in Egypt and the US was now over.
Nasser f e l t  he had to confront the US and the Western powers on t h e i r  
own terms, in a more fo rce fu l  and radical way. Nasser found the Soviet 
Union a w i l l i n g  par tner  in fu rther ing  his aims, even though he s t i l l  l e f t  
his options open regarding his re la t ions with the US.
As fo r  the Eisenhower adminis tra t ion, the tu rn ing -po in t  came in mid-March 
1956 when Secretary o f  the Navy Robert Anderson returned from his mission to 
promote peace between Egypt and Israel empty-handed. Dulles was determined 
to show Nasser how tough he could be. Events then moved rap id ly  to the Suez 
c r i  si s .
The documentary and other evidence proved that Nasser's ambitions fo r  
a regional leadership o f  the Arab Middle East were in c o n f l i c t  with those o f  
the US as a global power in the Middle East. The Eisenhower admin is t ra t ion ,  
fo r  i t s  par t ,  had hoped and intended to contain Nasser's inf luence in the 
area and not to promote him into a major Third World leader, but in vain.
The American po l icy  turned Nasser from a local Arab leader o f  Egypt in to  
the charismatic leader o f  the Arab world and a major p o l i t i c a l  f igu re  in 
the Third World.
This research mainly depends on American documents which were dec lass i f ied  
during the past two years.
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9INTRODUCTION
I t  is man's nature to search the past, fo r  there might have been 
paths and byways not seen which, i f  fol lowed, might have prevented 
tragedy or have made the present safer. No h is to r ian  def in ing recent 
events can ever re s is t  th is  challenge and thereby o f fe r  advice -  
e x p l i c i t  or i m p l i c i t  -  to those making decisions about how the present 
and the future should look. In our case, although United States- 
Egyptian re la t ions  from the 1952 Revolution to the Suez c r i s i s  o f 1956
are a part o f  the past,  there is no doubt that they had an impact upon
the present as well as upon the future of world p o l i t i c s .  Consequently, 
i t  is our purpose through our work to make th is  h is to r ic a l  impact c lear.
US-Egyptian re la t ions  during tha t  period resembled a game of chess 
between Nasser o f Egypt and Dulles of the US. The young Egyptian leader 
was aspir ing at that time to the leadership of the Arab Middle East
region, whi le John Foster Dul les, the American Secretary of State (1953-
1959), was t ry ing  to re in force United States global power. In other 
words, i t  was a kind o f  c o n f l i c t  between a regional and a global power, 
each t ry ing  to outmanoeuvre the other,  bel iev ing i t  might eventual ly  win.
This study aims at proving that in our rap id ly  changing world, small 
nations l ike  Egypt under Nasser have had a growing inf luence on the 
course of world events. I t  became obvious that the major powers could 
no longer be assured of d ic ta t ing  the course of h is to ry .  Nasser's 
foreign po l icy  and his p o l i t i c a l  ambit ions, especia l ly  from 1955-1956, 
had proved that inf luence by the superpowers in cer ta in  regions could be 
constrained by the growing strength of the regional powers. Supposedly 
the most important p o l i t i c a l  development o f tha t  epoch was that US
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policy-makers had become obliged to pay a great deal o f a tten t ion  to 
the in terna l  dynamics of Arab soc ie t ies ,  as a prerequ is i te  to in f luencing 
events there or pro jec t ing  any kind of change in po l icy ,  thus being able 
to defend t h e i r  in te res ts .  Secretary Dulles did not undertake to do 
th is  as he was t o t a l l y  preoccupied by the spread of communist ideology 
and the containment o f  Soviet expansionism in the area. Although the 
US had a p o l i t i c a l  advantage over the Soviet Union in reducing regional 
c o n f l i c t s  and in promoting peace in the area (the US was trusted in most 
o f  the Arab countr ies, especia l ly  in Egypt under Nasser from 1952-1955, 
in a way that the Soviet Union was no t) ,  American strategy was flawed 
because i t s  policy-makers viewed the Middle East region as an arena fo r  
t h e i r  power struggle with the Soviet Union. America entertained the idea 
tha t  smal ler states l i k e  Egypt should accept the in te rna t iona l  g e o -p o l i t ica l  
arrangement tha t  had been establ ished by the end of the Second World War, 
and tha t  they should not d is turb  th is  balance of world power.
I t  is  a combination of reasons rather  than a single reason that 
explains the choice of th is  era to be studied with respect to US-Egyptian 
re la t io n s .  The f i r s t  one re lates to changes in the p o l i t i c a l - a d m in is t ra t i v e  
dynamics of Egypt, the United States of America and also the Soviet Union.
In July 1952 the Free Of f icers  seized power in Egypt and overthrew the 
ancien regime. Not long a f te r ,  in January 1953, the Eisenhower 
adminis tra t ion took o f f i c e  in the US a f te r  twenty years of Democratic 
control  of  the White House. What came to be known as Dul les'  Era in 
American fo re ign po l icy  was i n i t i a t e d ,  and the US attempted to exercise 
a new fore ign po l icy  in the Arab world. Eisenhower's Republican 
admin is tra t ion came to power at a time when the threat of communism,
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and domestic pressure to contain i t ,  had in te n s i f ie d ,  espec ia l ly  a f te r  
the death of S ta l in ,  when his successors attempted to confirm Russia's 
pos it ion  as a superpower.
As we move from the level of the admin is tra t ive  changes to the main 
actors involved, i t  is in te res t ing  to observe that Nasser, who was the 
f i n a l  a rb i t e r  on a l l  Egyptian fore ign pol icy  matters from 1952 up to his 
death in 1970, was regarded by Egypt's young generation and even the Arab 
world as a whole, as representing a new type of national leadership in the 
Third World, whi le in r e a l i t y  ' he was simply a leader of the masses and 
the ch ie f ,  "rayyes",  of the Arab nat ion. Most of the time we were 
t o t a l l y  impressed by the pos it ive  aspects of his foreign p o l i c y ,  neglecting 
completely the negative ones. For eighteen years his popu la r i ty  in Egypt 
was supreme, and in most Arab countries his charismatic leadership was 
unparal le led, never challenged by any other leader in the area. This 
was made obvious when the Arab masses reaf f i rmed, to a large extent,  
t h e i r  lo y a l ty  to him, despite his setback in June 1967. Any attempt to 
judge his po l icy  or his foreign re la t ions  with the superpowers or analyse 
his charisma w i th in  an object ive context became taboo fo r  most Arab 
h is to r ians ,  who did not dare to discuss t h i s ,  probably fo r  fear  o f any 
adverse react ion from the publ ic .  Although a deta i led study of Nasser's 
fore ign po l icy  in general would be beyond the scope and length of th is  
study, we w i l l ,  nevertheless, focus our a tten t ion  on Egypt's re la t ions  
with the US, or in other words, Nasser's re la t ions with John Foster 
Dul les, placing them under close and object ive scrut iny.
Another important reason fo r  undertaking th is  study is  tha t  a large 
number of the w r i te rs  who have treated US-Egyptian re la t ions  during 
th is  period have fa i le d  adequately to consult the primary sources, which are
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essent ial  fo r  the understanding and assessment o f  the p o l i t i c a l  thoughts 
o f the policy-makers and the reasoning behind t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  decisions. 
There is  no doubt tha t these sources c l a r i f y  and lead towards an accurate 
explanation o f  many o f  the p o l i t i c a l  i n i t i a t i v e s .
F ina l ly  as a case study i t  attempts to trace the development in the 
b i la te ra l  re la t ions  between Egypt and the United States, whi le answering 
the fo l lowing quest ions:
1. Were there any ear ly  contacts between the Free Of f icers  and 
the American au thor i t ies  before the revolut ion?
2. What were the main reasons behind the breakdown of US-Egyptian 
re la t ions?
3. Were Nasser's ambitions the main reason fo r  America's f a i l u r e  
in the area, or was i t s  Dul les'  miscalculat ion and his 
misunderstanding o f  the dynamics of Arab p o l i t i c a l  culture?
4. Why were 1953 and early 1956 tu rn ing-po in ts  in America's 
a t t i tu d e  towards Egypt, as was 1955 fo r  Egypt's towards 
America?
5. Did the young Egyptian leader understand the fa c t  that in the 
harsh, p o l i t i c a l  world one must pay fo r  what one gets?
For the purpose of th is  study, a chronological order o f events w i l l  
be fol lowed: the development of US-Egyptian re la t ions  up to 1952, the
road to the revo lu t ion ,  and the early contacts between the Egyptian 
o f f i c e rs  and the US. Subsequently we w i l l  ou t l ine  the US view of and 
a t t i tu d e  to the Egyptian Revolution, the US and the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian 
Agreement, the col lapse of peace, American e f fo r t s  to achieve peace 
between Egypt and Is ra e l ,  and i t s  attempt to make Egypt the f i r s t  Arab 
country to conclude peace with Is rae l .  F in a l ly ,  i t  focuses upon American
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e f fo r t s  to bu i ld  up i t s  m i l i t a r y  network in the area depending upon the 
"Nor the rn - t ie r "  countr ies rather  than Egypt, and culminating with the 
Suez c r i s i s .
A wide range o f  sources was used; primary sources were, o f  course, 
the f i r s t  to be consulted. For the American sources, a l l  mater ials were 
avai lable  e i th e r  in the American National Archives in Washington, DC, which 
cover the period from 1942 to 1954, the National Record Center at Maryland, 
or in the p res ident ia l  l i b r a r i e s ,  such as the Truman L ibrary and the 
Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  where papers and oral h is to ry  co l lec t ions  revealed 
invaluable and l i t t le -know n  information, including Eisenhower's thoughts 
and those o f  his aides, especia l ly  during the Suez c r i s i s  in 1956.
Other sources were ex ten t ive ly  consulted, such as John Foster Dul les'  
oral  h is to ry  co l le c t io n  and his pr ivate papers; also the pr ivate papers 
of the D irec to r  o f  the CIA, Al len Dulles , at Princeton U n ive rs i t y 's ,sa ^ iy ]  
Mudd L ib rary ,  and George A l len 's  papers at Duke Univers i ty  in Durham,
North Carol ina, plus many others. A great deal o f  information, some of 
i t  never publ ished, was gathered by the author through interviews with 
various American pe rsona l i t ies ,  such as ex-ambassadors to Egypt, CIA 
agents in the Middle East, and State Department o f f i c e r s .  The B r i t i s h  
sources were essen t ia l ,  shedding l i g h t  upon the di f ferences in the p o l i t i c a l  
a t t i tudes  between the two major Western a l l i e s ,  especia l ly  in the la te  1940s 
and ear ly  1950s. A l l  mater ials were avai lable e i th e r  in the Public 
Record Of f ice  (PRO) at Kew, or in the Middle East Centre o f  St. Antony's 
Col lege, Oxford. Access to Egyptian archives was impossible as a l l  
documents from 1952-1956 came under the F i f t y  Years' Rule. For tunately,  
interviews with prominent personal i t ies who had par t ic ipa ted  in the 
events before 1952 and a f te r  provided me with a c learer  pic ture of the
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p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere in Egypt in our era as wel l as de ta i ls  on 
US-Egyptian re la t ions .  Also books by Nasser and his speeches, together 
with those o f  Naguib, Baghdadi, Anwar el-Sadat and Mohammed Heikal,  to 
some extent shed l i g h t  on the o f f i c i a l  Egyptian point o f view during 
th is  era.
Taken a l l  in a l l ,  th is  range of sources may enable one to form a 
reasonably balanced judgment on the c r i t i c a l  years under review.
CHAPTER ONE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS UP TO 1952
The Period p r io r  to the Second World War
From the B r i t i s h  occupation of Egypt in 1882 to the ear ly  twent ieth 
century, the United States had had l im i ted  involvement and in te res ts  in 
Egypt. For B r i ta in ,  Egypt represented i t s  most important outpost in 
the Arab Middle East, where the s t ra teg ic  control  o f  the Suez Canal 
maintained i t s  imperial  " l i f e - l i n e "  and world trade in te res ts .  American 
po l icy  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  had espoused the containment o f  any p o l i t i c a l  
involvement w ith in  countr ies under European colonial  ru le .  Being 
f a i t h f u l  to th is  po l icy ,  the United States considered Egypt as a par t  o f  
the B r i t i sh  sphere o f  inf luence, thus confining i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  there to
commercial undertakings as well as to educational, re l ig ious  and
2
phi lanthropic  a c t i v i t i e s .
In the period between the two world wars, American commercial 
in te rests  in Egypt increased, and American missionaries were requested by 
the State Department to negotiate a t rea ty  which would guarantee t h e i r  
r igh ts  in Egypt. Consequently, t rea t ies  of a rb i t ra t io n  and c o n c i l ia t io n  
were signed in August 1929. An agreement o f  24 May 1930 provided American 
in te res ts  with unconditional r igh ts  and gave America most-favoured-nation
3
treatment. During th is  period American enterpr ises such as Kodak, SoCony
Vacuum, Singer Sewing Machines, and General Motors, established branch 
4o f f ices  in Egypt. A l l  these developments led the American State
16
Department to c la s s i fy  Egypt as America's best customer among the Near
Eastern countr ies, espec ia l ly  as American exports to Egypt were in d o l la r
5
volume ten times those going to Iraq. Considering the expansion o f  
America's in te res ts  in Egypt during the inter-war years, i t  did not 
de l ibe ra te ly  seek to weaken, or to replace, the special pos it ion  which 
Great B r i ta in  held there.
In th is  period four ministers o f  widely d i f fe re n t  backgrounds and 
t ra in in g  were representing the United States'  government in Egypt; none 
o f  these had any diplomatic t ra in in g  or had been members of the foreign
g
service. Consequently, no formal American po l icy  towards Egypt had 
been formulated. In the wake o f  the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty o f  1936, at the Montreux Conference o f  1937, the US came to support 
the Egyptian bid to repeal of laws of Capi tu lat ions.^  The State 
Department expressed the b e l i e f  tha t  the Capitulat ions remaining in 
Egypt were not representative o f  the s p i r i t  of  the times, and were not 
essent ial  in protect ing e i th e r  American nationals or American in te res ts  
in Egypt . 8
American-Egyptian Relations during and a f te r  the Second World War
A f te r  the outbreak o f  the Second World War in 1939, Egypt came to
supply B r i t i s h  troops with a l l  the necessary f a c i l i t i e s  as prescribed
in the 1936 Treaty concluded between the two countr ies. Although Egypt
did not declare war against the Axis powers, i t  severed i t s  diplomatic
g
re la t ions  with Germany in 1939 and with I t a l y  in 1940.
5. NA RG 59. 711-83/8-30-45, to Secretary from NEA: "Pol icy of the US
towards Egypt", 30 August 1945.
6 . De Novo, o p . c i t . , p .369.
7. NA RG 59, o p . c i t . , 30 August 1945,
8 . Ph i l ip  Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East 1919-1945,
{Univers i ty  of Pennsylvania Press: Phi ladelphia 1978), p . 183.
9. NA RG 59, o p . c i t . , 30 August 1945, p .4.
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The p r inc ipa l  consequence o f  the foregoing development, in so fa r  as
re la t ions  between Egypt and the US were concerned, was tha t  at the
request o f the Egyptian government, the US assumed charge o f  a l l  Egyptian
in te res ts  in the Netherlands, I t a l y ,  and eventual ly in Germany. This
service was performed whi le the US remained n e u t r a l . ^
Before America's involvement in the war Cairo had become the
headquarters o f  the Middle East Supply Centre (MESC), an organisat ion
established by B r i ta in  f o r  the purpose of maintaining the c i v i l i a n  economies
of approximately eighteen d i f f e r e n t  Near Eastern countr ies. Short ly
a f te r  the bombing o f  Pearl Harbor, the American government was inv i ted
by the B r i t i s h  to j o in  MESC, which became a j o i n t  Bri t ish-American 
11undertaking. This marked a new i n i t i a t i v e  in America's global strategy
and, f o r  the f i r s t  t ime, the United States agreed to undertake defence
commitments concerning the Middle East.
Egypt had become a v i t a l  base f o r  the A l l i e s ’ war e f f o r t  in the
Middle East. Cairo was the centre fo r  A l l ie d  in te l l ige n ce  headquarters,
and fo r  lease-lend d is t r i b u t i o n ,  as wel l as fo r  propaganda operat ions.
B r i ta in  b u i l t  one o f  the world 's most extensive m i l i t a r y  bases on the
12banks o f  the Suez Canal which eventual ly  became the cornerstone of the 
A l l i e d  defence apparatus in the area.
Events moved so quickly tha t  in the summer of 1942, Egypt was very 
nearly lo s t  to the Axis powers when Rommel's desert army advanced deep 
in to  the country 's western t e r r i t o r i e s .  The s i tu a t io n  had become so 
c r i t i c a l ,  threatening not only the B r i t i s h  defence system but also America's
10. I b i d . ,  p .4.
11. I b i d . ,  p .5.
12. Brian Horrocks, "Middle East Defence - a B r i t i s h  Point o f  View",
Middle Eastern A f f a i r s , February 1955, p .33.
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s t ra teg ic  p r i o r i t i e s ,  tha t  the American Minis te r  in Egypt sent a note
to the Egyptian government s ta t ing that henceforth "the defense of Egypt
13has been declared v i t a l  to the defense of the USA". Under these
circumstances, the United States government decided not to intervene in
the confrontat ion which had erupted between the Egyptian king and the
B r i t i s h  ambassador on 4 February 1942. Regardless of his f r iendsh ip
with King Farouk, the American Min is te r  in Cairo explained that "a t  the
present moment there was only one great issue in the world and tha t  was
14the defeat o f H i t l e r " .  The State Department also c l a r i f i e d  America's
posit ion with regard to B r i t i s h  in terests  in Egypt by commenting that
15"Egypt is so c le a r ly  w i th in  the B r i t i s h  sphere o f  in f luence".
During the war America had supported and defended B r i t a in ' s  status quo
in Egypt. Just as the war was coming to an end, however, the special
re la t ionsh ip  with respect to the Middle East in general and Egypt in
p a r t i c u la r ,  was undergoing a change. A weakened B r i t i s h  Empire became
16uneasy over American moves towards a rapprochement with Egypt.
The American government had real ised that as a re su l t  o f  B r i t i s h
m i l i t a r y  defeats in the war the prest ige o f  Great B r i ta in  in Egypt was
on the wane, whi le America's popu lar i ty  among the local population was
being constant ly re in forced. Accordingly,  the Near Eastern D iv is ion
o f  the State Department recommended that " I t  seems c lear  that we must
18continue to assume great re sp o n s ib i l i t y  in the area". Exp lo i t ing
13. FO.115/3864 Conf ident ia l ,  B r i t i s h  Supply Council 1942, from B r i t i s h  
Supply Counci l .
14. FR of the US, 1942, Volume IV, pp.66-7, The Min is te r  in Egypt to
Secretary o f State, Cairo, 4 February 1942.
15. FR i b i d . , memo, by Under-Secretary to the Chief o f  the Div is ion 
of Near Eastern A f fa i r s .
16. FO.115/3864, op.ci  t . , F i le  N0 .PA8 , Conf ident ia l ,  B r i t i s h  Supply Council to
other governments, Eden to Viscount Hal i fax , London, 26 February 1942.
17. US FR 1942, Vo l . IV, pp.76-8, memo, by Chief of the Div is ion of the Near 
East, 8 May 1942.
18. I b i d . ,  p .78.
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American sympathy and the new trend in American po l icy  in the area, the
Egyptian Min is te r  in Washington openly expressed his fears of the
dete r io ra t ion  o f  the B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  s i tu a t ion  in Egypt and the growing
a n t i - B r i t i s h  fee l ing  among the populat ion, asking the American government
19"to use i t s  a i r  force to deter the German invasion of Egypt".
The Egyptian request marked a very important s h i f t  in the balance 
held between B r i t i s h  and American (m i l i t a r y )  inf luence in Egypt, moving 
in favour o f  the l a t t e r .  Although Egypt o f f i c i a l l y  (according to the 1936 
Treaty) was considered as B r i t a in ' s  r e sp o n s ib i l i t y  and w ith in  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  
sphere of in f luence, by 1942 the United States had expanded i t s  m i l i t a r y  
in s ta l l a t io n s  there. The American armed forces established t h e i r  Center 
fo r  the Co-ordination and Control o f  a l l  m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s  re lated to 
the Middle East in Cairo. Moreover, a new American base (Payne Fie ld) 
was establ ished near Cairo, costing the American government approximately 
$2.5 m i l l i o n . 2 0
The United States slowly assumed a new and more fo rce fu l  approach
in i t s  re la t ions  with  Egypt. The American M in is te r  in Egypt during 1943
received sympathet ical ly a request made by the Egyptian government fo r
two aeroplanes, report ing back to his government in the fo l low ing tone:
"The supply o f  these planes would not only ass is t  in the furtherance o f
the war e f f o r t  but would have a benef ic ia l  e f fe c t  on American-Egyptian 
21re la t io n s " .  Although the US was unable to meet th is  request due to
22i t s  spec i f ic  needs in i t s  war e f f o r t ,  the American Secretary o f  State
19. I b i d . , Memo, o f  Conversation, pa r t ic ipan ts  Assistant Secretary o f  
State, Egyptian M in is te r ,  22 June 1942.
20. NA RG S>9, General Records o f  the Department o f  State, December,
F i le  1945, to Secretary from NEA, 30 August 1945.
21. US FR Vol .V I,  pp.66-7, M in is te r  in Egypt to Secretary o f State,
Cairo, 8 February 1943.
22. I b i d . , from Acting Secretary of State to the Min is te r  in Cairo
( K i r k ) , 27 February 1943.
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l e f t  the door open by saying that a more pos i t ive  response to such
requests could be expected in the fu tu re .  The B r i t i s h  were made uneasy
by such American overtures, espec ia l ly  as they enta i led d i re c t  m i l i t a r y
l inks  between the United States and Egypt. To f o i l  such moves the
B r i t i s h  Embassy in Cairo informed the American Legation in Egypt that
they would have to impose r e s t r i c t io n s  on the Egyptian government, and
that a l l  requests fo r  m i l i t a r y  mater ia ls  and other stores from abroad
23should be routed through the B r i t i s h  au tho r i ty  in Egypt.
The American government did not hesi ta te  to challenge the B r i t i s h
posit ion which maintained that the Middle East, and espec ia l ly  Egypt,
should remain exc lus ive ly  w i th in  the B r i t i s h  sphere of inf luence. The
American secretary of State personal ly supported the new po l icy  by
ins t ruc t ing  the American ambassador accredited to B r i ta in :  " I t  is the
po l icy  o f  th is  government to receive d i r e c t ,  enquir ies from the Near
Eastern c o u n t r ie s . . . "  The legat ion in Cairo, moreover, had been
inst ructed to make th is  po l icy  known to both the B r i t i s h  Embassy and
the appropriate Egyptian au th o r i t ie s  i f  at any time th is  question should 
24ar ise . The Secretary's statement out l ined the new American a t t i tu d e
v is -a -v is  l inge r ing  B r i t i s h  ambitions of hegemony in the Middle East,
p a r t i c u la r l y  regarding Egypt. The United States began openly to
c r i t i c i s e  B r i t i s h  po l icy  in Egypt, and p a r t i c u la r l y  B r i t i s h  inter fe rence
25in Egyptian in terna l  a f f a i r s .
23. US FR 1943, Vol.V, p .2, the Secretary of State to Admiral Wi l l iams,
Chief o f S ta f f ,  25 May 1943.
24. I b i d . , the Secretary o f  State to the American Ambassador in the
United Kingdom, 19 June 1943.
25. FO.141/229 USA 1943, from Mr. Campbell, Radio House, Cairo,
15 October 1943.
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Meanwhile, America sought to weaken B r i t i s h  in f luence; yet i t  was
not w i l l i n g  to assume the special pos it ion which Great B r i ta in  had
enjoyed in Egypt. American policy-makers rea l ised tha t  they should
u t i l i s e  America's newly-acquired importance in Egypt instead of being a
passive partner o f B r i ta in .  In order to leg i t im ise  and re in force  American
in te rests  in Egypt, the State Department in 1944 made every endeavour to
promote the American Legation in Egypt to the status of an embassy, but
26the B r i t i s h  rejected th is  i n i t i a t i v e .  In the same context o f
c o n f l i c t in g  p r i o r i t i e s ,  the United States t ransferred t h e i r  M in is te r  in
Egypt, Mr. K i rk ,  to I t a l y ;  he was a man who, in the B r i t i s h  view,
27was the "soul o f Anglo-American s o l i d a r i t y  lo y a l ty  here".
The Americans began a massive propaganda campaign, whi le coming in to
28greater d i re c t  contact with Egypt's local populat ion. They developed
closer commercial t ie s  with Egypt, espec ia l ly  a f t e r  1944 when the State
Department assigned a special economic mission to Egypt in order to increase
29Middle Eastern exports to the United States. Such commercial
undertakings and a c t i v i t i e s  on the part  o f  the United States also involved
30 31the establishment o f banks and the acqu is i t ion  of o i l  concessions.
American i n i t i a t i v e s  were no longer confined to p r iva te  ind iv idua ls
32wi th in  a commercial context,  but became part  o f a nat ional po l icy .
26. NA RG 59, 711-83/8-3045 to SeC from NEA, 30 August 1945. See also 
FO.921-229, USA po l icy  in the Middle East, 28 Apr i l  1944.
27. FO.921/119-1943, Middle East o f f i c i a l  US o i l  in te res ts  in the 
Middle East, Cairo 19 October 1943.
28. FO.954/5, part  3, 1943, from B r i t i s h  Embassy, Cairo, to Eden,
25 June 1943.
29. FO.921/230-1944, US po l icy  in the Middle East, from Shane to Eden,
29 September 1944.
30. FO.921/229-1944, from B r i t i s h  Embassy, Cairo, to FO, 12 Apr i l  1944.
31. FO.921/119-1943, from B r i t i s h  Embassy, Cairo, to FO, 12 December 1943.
32. FO.921/230-1944, o p . c i t . , A i r  Wings B r i t i s h  Mission to B r i t i s h  Embassy,
11 October 1944, "United States government sent a m i l i t a r y  mission to
Egypt to se l l  the American Kittyhawk 'planes to the Royal Egyptian
A i r  Force".
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This marked a c lear s h i f t  from the pattern of previous American po l icy ,  
which used to depend on the endeavours of ind iv idua l  American nat iona ls , 
to a new po l icy  counting mainly on the government's i n i t i a t i v e  or 
involvement. Thus, at the beginning o f  1943 the United States government 
assumed a d i re c t  ro le in various economic enterpr ises. This change in 
the manner o f  American involvement can in large measure be accounted 
f o r  by i t s  increased concern over the development o f  the Middle East 
and the de te r io ra t ion  o f  B r i t i s h  inf luence in the area.
S imilar  American a c t i v i t i e s  led Lord K i l le a rn ,  the B r i t i s h  Ambassador 
to Egypt, to point out in his telegram to the Foreign Off ice tha t  "the
33USA is  v i s ib l y  s t r i v in g  by every means to secure a dominant p o s i t i o n . . . "
In another dispatch to the B r i t i s h  government, he concluded tha t  "a 
potent ia l  danger to our s t ra teg ic  in te res ts ,  the American a c t i v i t i e s . . .
34are in no way comparable to the Soviet penetrat ion in the Middle East".
The B r i t i s h  were in a dilemma, being conscious o f  t h e i r  precarious 
posit ion in Egypt and also of American ambitions to e x p lo i t  th is  
s i tu a t io n ,  thus undermining fu r th e r  the legit imacy o f  the "old B r i t i s h  
Empire". Lord K i l lea rn  foresaw th is  danger, considering tha t  fu r th e r  
American economic and p o l i t i c a l  penetrat ion in Egypt would lead to a 
" c r i s i s " . ^
The Egyptian government welcomed a l l  American i n i t i a t i v e s  in Egypt,
3 6as they would promote the incent ives to "reduce the high cost o f l i v i n g " ,
33. FO.921/230-1944, o p . c i t . , from B r i t i s h  Embassy in Cairo to Eden, 
21 September 1944.
34. . K i l lea rn  Diar ies (FO.921/229-1944, o p . c i t . ) ,  from Cairo to
Foreign O f f ice ,  12 March 1944.
35. FO.921/1929-1944, US po l icy  in the Middle East, from the B r i t i s h
Embassy, Cairo, to Foreign o f f i c e ,  18 February 1944.
36. FO.921/230-1944, o p . c i t . ,  telegram from Lord K i l lea rn  to Eden,
3 July 1944.
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especia l ly  in the post-war period, whi le becoming bargaining points in
any fu ture c o n f l i c t  with the B r i t i s h  government. During his conversation
with King Farouk o f  Egypt, President Roosevelt, in promoting the new
American i n i t i a t i v e s ,  stressed the hope fo r  greater exchanges in a l l
37f ie ld s  between t h e i r  two countr ies whi le he also advised the king to
38i n i t i a t e  social  reforms in order to counter Soviet propaganda.
Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt, was also very keen on maintaining close
l inks  with Egypt, i n v i t i n g  King Farouk to v i s i t  the USA by the end of
1945. He did th is  without informing the B r i t i s h  a u th o r i t ie s  since the
Americans knew that " i f  the B r i t i s h  had known of the i n v i t a t io n  they would
39have t r ie d  to delay or prevent i t " .
I t  was obvious that the Americans had in i t i a t e d  a new chapter in
t h e i r  po l icy  towards Egypt. Mr. Loy Henderson, D irec to r  o f  Near Eastern
A f fa i r s  (NEA), summarised the new i n i t i a t i v e  to the Secretary o f  State
by s ta t ing that "we have never sought to undermine the special pos it ion
which Great B r i ta in  enjoys by t rea ty  in that country [Egypt] ,  but our
f r i e n d ly  inf luence has been on the side of Egypt's progress towards f u l l
40p o l i t i c a l  and economic independence".
To some extent the escalat ion o f  the Cold War between East and West
had i t s  impact also upon American po l icy  towards Egypt. I t  was evident 
41that since 1944 the Soviet Union had increased i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  in Egypt 
by t ry ing  to inf luence Egypt's po l ic ies  in formulat ing extreme demands
37. New York Times, 21 February 1945, p .8 , "White House announcement o f  
New Talk".
38. US FR Vol.V I,  1945, "Roosevelt ta lks  with King Farouk".
39. Truman L ibrary, Papers of Harry S. Truman, White House Central 
F i le ,  17 September 1945.
40. NA RG 59-711-83/8-3045 to Mr. Secretary, from NEA,
30 August 1945.
41. FO.141/1067 Labour S i tua t ion ,  from Labour Counsellor Report 2/1945, Top 
Secret. "The development of Communism in Egypt (4 ) " .  See also
WNRC RG 84, American Embassy, Cairo, f i l e s ,  from the American Legat ion, 
Cairo to Secretary of State, 7 January 1946, No.1260.
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42f o r  a Treaty rev is ion. By th is  time i t  was becoming apparent tha t
the precariousness of the B r i t i s h  pos it ion in Egypt was being accentuated
by the growth o f  "Egyptian nat ional ism" which was determined c h ie f l y  to
terminate the B r i t i s h  occupation o f  Egyptian t e r r i t o r y ,  w h i l s t  also
t ry ing  to achieve a union with the Sudan. The need fo r  a po l icy  of
Anglo-American co-operation was sorely f e l t  by the B r i t i s h  in regard to
the Egyptian demands. In January 1946 the B r i t i s h  government had come
to bel ieve tha t  i t  was necessary to inform the American government o f a l l
43the de ta i ls  concerning t h e i r  negot iat ions with Egypt. By taking such
act ion, the B r i t i s h  began to accept the new American ro le in the area as
a f a i t  accompli ; voices, such as Lord K i l le a rn 1s , raised in order to oppose
the new ro le o f  America in Egypt were s t i l l e d .  The Americans began to
e xp lo i t  th is  trend by extending th e i r  economic and p o l i t i c a l  re la t ions  with
Egypt. By the f i r s t  ha l f  of  1946 the United States government signed a
b i la te ra l  a i r  agreement with Egypt, whereby the American-owned Trans-World
44A i r l i n e  was authorised to operate out o f  Cairo. Moreover, the American 
government also acquired m i l i t a r y  a i r  r igh ts  in Egypt which would grant 
permission fo r  the use o f  "Payne Field by US m i l i t a r y  a i r c r a f t  fo r  a
45period o f  six months, to be renewed i f  necessary by mutual agreement".
Furthermore, in 1946 fo r  the f i r s t  time the American government offered
46a vacancy at the American S ta f f  College to an Egyptian army o f f i c e r .
42. FO.141/897, "Egypt and USSR" 1943 - 633/1/1943, 8 February 1943, 
from Cairo to Foreign Of f ice.
43. FO.141/1081/Defence Anglo-Egyptian negot ia t ions,  from Foreign 
Off ice to Cairo, 26 January 1946.
44. Lord K i l lea rn  Diar ies 1945-1947, 11 Apr i l  1946, Cairo, p . 108, 
Oxford, pr iva te  papers.
45. NA RG 84/542-3, Memo, to Mr. Mattison from Mr. Adams, background 
on US.
46. FO.371/1089, Defence - Egyptian Army, 5 September 1946, from Cairo 
to Foreign Of f ice.
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As a matter o f f a c t ,  the convergence of the Cold War and Egyptian
national ism hastened closer Anglo-American co-operation and si lenced
those, l i ke  Lord K i l lea rn  and Eden, ca l l in g  fo r  the non-promotion to
47embassy status o f  the United States Legation accredited to Egypt.
On 19 September 1946 the United States and the Egyptian governments
exchanged ambassadors fo r  the f i r s t  t i m e , ^
From the foregoing i t  seems c lear  that when the B r i t i s h  appeared
strong in Egypt the Americans adjusted themselves to a secondary ro le
t y p i f i e d  by moderate co-operation on p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  leve ls ,  and
by moderate competit ion on the economic and publ ic re la t ions  leve ls .
When the B r i t i s h  appeared to be weakening or becoming c o n c i l ia to ry ,
espec ia l ly  fo l low ing  the Second World War, the American government saw
golden opportun it ies to e xp lo i t  and compete moderately, and sometimes
49almost in tens ive ly ,  and at every leve l .
American-Egyptian Relations from 1947 onwards
At the beginning of the f i r s t  stage a f te r  the establishment o f  the
embassies, events moved rap id ly  as on 27 January 1947 when the Egyptian
government announced the breakdown o f  the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
50negotiat ions on the question o f  sovereignty over the Sudan.
Furthermore, i t  declared i t s  in tent ion  to present the whole case to the
47. From 1943 to 1945 the B r i t i sh  ( c o a l i t io n )  government always rejected 
American attempts to raise i t s  legat ion to embassy status. See K i l lea rn  
Diar ies (o p . c i t . ) 5 Apr i l  1945, p .106. See also F0.954, Part 5 from Cairo 
to Foreign O f f ice ,  5 Apr i l  1945, 803-1945, Eden comment "pro tes t  against 
proposal to raise US and Egyptian legations to embassies". See also US 
Foreign re la t io n s ,  Vol.V. 1944, Exchange with the UK regarding status of 
diplomatic mission o f  USA in Egypt and Iraq, 25 May 1944.
48. Truman L ib rary ,  O f f i c ia l  F i les ,  No.283, Egypt Memo.for the President,
16 August 1946.
49. P h i l ip  Baram, o p . c i t . ,  p . 199.
50. FO.115/4320 B r i t i s h  Embassy, Washington, Te l.No.77608, 26 January 1947, 
from Bevin to Lord Inverchapel.
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51Securi ty Council. Nokrashy Pasha, the then Egyptian prime m in is te r ,
demanded to ta l  evacuation of a l l  B r i t i s h  forces and proclaimed absolute
52Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan.
I t  is outside the scope of th is  chapter to discuss the d e ta i ls  o f
the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, except in so fa r  as i t  af fected American-
Egyptian re la t ions from 1947 onwards.
The factors governing Anglo-Egyptian re la t ions  had changed rap id ly
during the eleven years which had elapsed between the 1936 Treaty and
Nokrashy's declarat ion of the breakdown o f  the Anglo-Egyptian negot ia t ions.
I t  was wel l known to the planners o f  American po l icy  tha t  the B r i t i s h
posit ion in Egypt was being "completely wiped out and would disappear
e n t i r e l y . . .so the Americans have to stand on t h e i r  fee t  in deal ing with
the Egyptian government and th is  is  j u s t  a l i t t l e  way in which [ they ]  can
53s ta r t  the bal l  r o l l i n g " .  Loy Henderson, the NEA D irec to r ,  confirmed the
above in 1947 when, in his Top Secret Memorandum, he considered tha t
"the continued presence o f  B r i t i s h  troops in Egypt represents a l i a b i l i t y
not only to Great B r i ta in  but to the United States and the Western world
in general. Their  presence is  poisoning the atmosphere o f  the whole Near
and Middle East rap id ly  and to such an extent tha t  unless some ind ica t ion
is given in the near fu ture that B r i t i s h  troops are to be withdrawn from
Egypt uncondi t iona l ly ,  at a set date, that date to be the e a r l i e s t
pract icab le , the re la t ions of the Arab world with the Western world may be
54ser ious ly  impaired fo r  many years to come".
51. WNRC RG 84/710 Box 165, to Secretary o f  State charged to the American 
Embassy, Cario, 28 January 1947. The American ambassador reported that 
a t the appearance o f  King Farouk at the debate the MPs cheered him as 
"King of Egypt and Sudan".
52. For more about the Anglo-Egyptian s i tu a t io n ,  see FO.141/1081 Defence 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, from S i r  Walter Smart to Foreign O f f ice ,  memo.
7 January 1946.
53. R^ 319 Army In te l l igence  pro jec t MD 335.11 Egypt. Conversation between 
Col.Gowling and Mr. Manima, State Department, 13 May 1947.
54. US FR Vol.V, pp.800-02, memo, by Loy Henderson, 28 August 1947, Top secret.
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However, the outbreak o f  the Cold War hastened the consol idat ion of
Anglo-American co-operation and si lenced Henderson's ca l l  f o r  uncondit ional
evacuation o f  the B r i t i s h  troops from Egypt. As usual, i t  is a
combination o f  causes rather  than a single cause that can explain the
American stance v is -a -v is  the dispute between two of i t s  f r iends .  With
the escalat ion of the Cold War and the declarat ion o f  the Truman Doctrine
on 12 March 1947, the United States confirmed i t s  leadership among the
Western powers against Soviet penetrat ion in the Middle East, and indeed
55throughout the world.
Support fo r  the B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  presence at the Suez Canal base was
not viewed in Washington as beinginconsistentwith the United States' stra tegy
in the area. In 1947 Egypt represented fo r  the American s t ra te g is ts  "a
potent ia l  base fo r  operations to counteract threats from the north against
the Suez Canal area of the o i l - r i c h  lands of the Middle East. . .Egypt also
had the necessary housing, a i r  and transporta t ion f a c i l i t i e s  which would be
56a valuable asset fo r  any modern m i l i t a r y  force enter ing the area".
By 1947, and before the Palest ine war, i t  had become apparent tha t  Egypt was
incapable of defending the Suez Canal area, as i t s  armed forces were poorly
tra ined ,  inadequately equipped, and i n e f f i c i e n t l y  led,  therefore 11 [ t jh e y  could
not defend the Suez Canal area against a major adversary without immediate 
57fore ign a id" .  By th is  time American o f f i c i a l s  were c lea r ly  convinced 
tha t  th is  view was correc t ,  as the US Ambassador in Moscow, Walter Bedell 
Smith, warned tha t  Soviet aims would"[ujrge to gain independent access to the 
Mediterranean and Arab world and by determination to sever the B r i t i s h
55. Barry Rubin, The Great Powers in the Middle East, p .228.
56. Harry S. Truman L ib ra ry ,  papers of Harry S. Truman, President Se£ F i les ,  
CIA, "The current s i tua t ion  in Egypt", 16 October 1947.
57. I b i d . , " M i l i t a r y  s i tu a t io n " .
58jugu lar  at Suez". American po l icy was motivated not only by considerations
of supporting the B r i t i s h  pos it ion in the Middle East, but also by i t s  fears
tha t  B r i ta in ' s  weakening posit ion there might tempt B r i ta in  to make a
59separate deal with the Soviet Union, and such a deal from America's point
of view could g reat ly  strengthen the Soviet Union's pos it ion  in the Middle
East, l![w]hile i t  would weaken the B r i t i sh  inf luence and would tend to iso la te
the United States
Another fac to r  tha t was to inf luence American po l icy  was the fear
tha t  Egypt's v ic to ry  at the United Nations would consol idate the posit ion of
Nokrashy's minor i ty  government and the status o f  King Farouk. The B r i t i s h  Foreign
Off ice and the American Embassy in Cairo believed that such a development
would remove a l l  hope fo r  any social  reform in Egypt, and would be an open
61in v i ta t io n  fo r  Soviet propaganda. Nevertheless, the Americans were faced
with the dilemma of t r y in g  to accomplish a va r ie ty  o f  goals, some o f  which
were contradic tory. On the one hand they wanted to support the B r i t i s h
m i l i t a r y  presence in Egypt, yet on the other they t r i e d  very hard not to
al ienate Egypt openly. This could be a t t r ibu ted  to America's desire to
62neutra l ise  Egypt in some way during the Palestine c r i s i s .  The Americans
were hoping that "Egypt w i l l  take the lead in exercising re s t r a in t  in 
63Palest ine" depending upon i t s  leading role in the Arab League.
58. Quoted in Barry Rubin, The Great Powers, o p . c i t . , pp.224-5.
59. Henderson reported to Acheson that " I f  the US f inds i t s e l f  unable to
render ass is tance.. .the B r i t i s h  government may well f in d  i t  w i l l  be 
compelled to approach the Soviet government in an e f f o r t  to work some 
arrangement which would have the e f fec t  o f at least slowing up the Russian 
advance in the Middle East and elsewhere". See NA RG 59, Henderson to 
Acheson, Annex a, 868.00/2-2547.
60. I b i d . , also Rubin, o p . c i t . , p .226.
61. F0.371/62967, Minute by Riches, 14 March 1947: " I f  Nokrashy and the King
triumph i t  w i l l  mean tha t  a place regime o f  wholly anti-democrat ic character 
w i l l  be r iveted on Egypt i n d e f i n i t e l y .  I t  w i l l  do nothing fo r  the fe l la h in  
or the indus t r ia l  workers whi le i t  ex is ts " .  RG 84-710-Box 165, from Cairo 
to Secretary o f State, 25 February 1947. (Nokrashy, l i k e  Sidki led a 
minor i ty  party at odds with the Wafd.l
62. Harry S. Truman. L ib rary, "The .current s i tua t ion  in. the Near East",
17 October 1947, ORE 52.
63. I Harry S. Truman L ib rary ,  Naval aid. 21 - State Dept. B r ie fs .  See 
December 1947, Summary o f  Telegrams.
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As fo r  Egypt, American support was badly needed because in
64Nokrashy's view "without such support Egypt could not win".
Consequently, in February 1947 Nokrashy appointed Mr. Theodore A. Morde
(an American c i t i z e n )  as a "press consultant" to the Egyptian government,
giving him a mandate to do everything possible " . . . t o  win American
65sympathy fo r  the Egyptian side".  Simultaneously, and as a d i re c t
consequence, Egyptian propaganda was in te n s i f ie d  in Amer ica .^
O f f i c i a l l y ,  Egyptian diplomacy began to move in two p o l i t i c a l  d i re c t io n s ;
Nokrashy int imated to the Americans the p o s s ib i l i t y  of more Egyptian
re l iance upon the Soviet Union, in case the United States supported 
67B r i t i s h  demands. But at the same time he was keen to show tha t  the
idea of American-Egyptian m i l i t a r y  co-operation was not discarded. In
pr ivate discussions with the American ambassador in Egypt, the Egyptian
prime minis te r  to ld  him that "He hoped to secure the services o f  American
m i l i t a r y  advisers in Egypt as soon as the B r i t i s h  M i l i t a r y  Mission w i l l
68have been l iqu idated in 1948". By th is  gesture, the Egyptian prime 
min is te r  t r i e d  to convince the Americans th a t ,  i f  Egypt had been in a 
pos it ion to se l l  her favours, she would unquestionably opt f o r  the 
United States.
Despite Egyptian attempts to gain American support fo r  i t s  cause at
64. RG 84 F i le  No.2-1947, Department of State memo, o f  Conv. 1 August 1947, 
Subject: V i s i t  of  Nokrashy Pasha pa r t ic ipan ts ,  Secretary of State, etc.
65. NA RG 84 883, 01 A/3-547, from American Embassy, Cairo, to Loy 
Henderson, 5 March 1947, top secret.
6 6 . F0..371/63035, Egypt and Sudan, Egyptian propaganda in the USA, from ■
UK Delegat ion, New York, 30 May 1947: also in terv iew with Moustafa
Amin, Cairo, 14 January 1985.
67. RG 84, Cairo Embassy, top secret f i l e  710, American Embassy, Cairo, 
to Secretary of State, June 23 1947.
6 8 . RG 59 CR of the State Department, Box 6902, Department o f State, 
incoming telegram from Cairo to Secretary, No.545, 5 May 1947.
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69the UN Security Council, the United States was u nw il l in g  to take such
a step on the grounds tha t they preferred to leave Egypt to B r i t is h
in i t ia t i v e s  while paying greater a tte n t io n  to the "outer r ing "  o f the 
70Middle East. In order, the re fo re , to avoid any r i f t  in the re la t ion s
w ith Egypt, the American adm in is tra tion  did i t s  best to exhaust every
71possible means o f persuading Egypt to resume i t s  negotiations w ith B r i ta in .
From the very beginning the Americans ins is ted  on f o i l i n g  any Egyptian
appeal to the United Nations over the Anglo-Egyptian dispute th a t would
give the Soviet Union a chance to " f is h  in troubled waters". Despite
the American e f fo r t s ,  the American ambassador in Egypt in report ing on
Nokrashy Pasha wrote 1 [h]is motivating ambition is  to go down in h is to ry
72as [ th e ]  man who got [ th e ]  B r i t is h  out o f Egypt". I t  was Nokrashy's
f irm  b e l ie f  th a t the B r i t is h  would not depart from Egypt unless they 
were pressured by world opinion or a consensus o f the member states o f 
the Security Council.
69. In March 1947 Nokrashy pointed out to Mr. Morde, his American "press 
consu ltan t" , th a t he had great fa i th  in the Security  Council, 
obviously basing his b e l ie f  on the fa c t  " th a t America's influence w i l l  
ensure th a t ju s t ic e  is  guaranteed to a l l  na tions". See RG.59, Record 
o f the Department o f State 833 ol/A13-547, American Embassy, Cairo, to 
Henderson, Top Secret, 5 March 1947.
70. FO.371/62970, Egypt and Sudan, from Moscow to Foreign O ff ice , Top 
Secret, 25 A p r il  1947. Marshall pointed out to the B r i t is h  tha t "US 
in te rven tion  in Greece and Turkey would make i t  qu ite  impossible fo r  
them to intervene in Egypt".
71. Akhbar Alyoum, 22 March 1947, "W il l  America help Egypt?" I t  said tha t
the US w i l l  communicate w ith  members o f the Arab League and ask them
to make a la s t  e f fo r t  to induce Egypt and B r i ta in  to reach an amicable 
settlement. From time to time the American policy-makers declared tha t 
they considered the Anglo-Egyptian dispute " . . . a  matter e n t i re ly  between 
the B r i t is h  and the Egyptians". SEE FO.371/62973. Egypt and Sudan 
F ile  No.12, 1947, from Washington to FO, 28 May 1947. See also 
FO.371/62973, from Moscow to FO, 29 May 1947. Soviet newspapers reported 
tha t "King Farouk received a special message from Truman, appealing to 
him to reopen ta lks  w ith the B r i t i s h " .  Moustafa Amin confirmed the 
foregoing; in te rv iew  with Amin, Cairo, Egypt.
72. US Foreign Relations, Vol.V, pp.772-4, Tuck to Marshall, Secret,
7 May 1947.
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This apparent fa i lu re  in the American p o l i t i c a l  ta c t ic  aiming to
induce Egypt not to appeal to the UN did not stop American attempts to
t r y  to persuade Egypt to bring i t s  case before the General Assembly, ra ther
73than the Security Council. As mentioned e a r l ie r ,  i t  was a combination
o f causes ra ther than a s ingle cause which explains the reasons behind
th is  American i n i t i a t i v e .  F i r s t ,  i f  the Egyptian government brought
the controversy w ith the UK before the Security Council, the Soviet Union
74might propose an "immediate withdrawal o f the B r i t is h  troops", thus
giv ing i t s e l f  the "chance to obtain a foothold in the Arab world".
Second, . according to the American Secretary o f S tate, "a US vote
unfavorable to Egypt in the General Assembly was believed to have less
unfavorable e ffe c ts  in Arab world than the same vote in the Security 
75Council". Th ird , the Americans were a fra id  th a t the Soviet Union
would have to p a r t ic ip a te  in any inves t iga tion  committee on the Sudan 
set up by the Security Council, which "would be a matter o f great concern
7 f\to the US government". F in a l ly ,  American in te res ts  in Egypt could 
have been jeopardised as the American ambassador in Cairo c la r i f ie d  
when he said th a t " I f  the Egyptian case be decided by the Council in some
73. FO.115/4320, B r i t is h  Embassy, Washington, from Lord Inverchapel to FO, 
26 A p r il  1947, Te l.No.2515. Also see US FR 1947, Vol.V, pp.790-1.
On 8 August 1947 the American Secretary o f State ins truc ted  the US 
Representative at the UN "to  f in d  some means o f removing dispute from 
the Council as soon as possible.
74. I b id . , pp .770-1, from the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt, 
Washington, 3 May 1947.
75. US Fr Vol.V 1947, p .774, The Secretary o f State to Embassy in Egypt,
16 May 1947. From January 1947 the Arab League press section issued 
a statement in which i t  announced "The support o f the League fo r  
Egypt's cause", see RG 84 Box 165-710, Arab League from American 
Embassy, Cairo, to Secretary o f State, 8 January 1947.
76. FO,371/62978 Egypt and Sudan, from Cairo to FO 4 August 1947. See 
also US FR Vol.V, pp.772-4, from Tuck to Sec. 7 May 1947. In May 
1947 Tass confirmed the Sovie t 's  support o f Egypt’ s s trugg le , and in 
August 1947 Pravda accused the B r i t is h  propaganda o f "s ta t ing  fa ls e ly  
tha t the Soviet Union would not support Egypt's case".
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manner displeasing to Egypt, the US rather than the Security Council 
would receive the blame and American in te res ts  in Egypt would be 
p re ju d ic e d " .^
The Americans faced a d i f f i c u l t  s i tu a t io n ,  since th e i r  diplomacy
had been the subject o f c r i t ic is m  by Egyptian public  opinion to the
e f fe c t  tha t American po licy  was ju s t  fo l low ing  the B r i t is h  lead, pu tt ing
pressure on the Security  Council members to induce them to support the 
78B r i t is h  stand. In these circumstances the immediate and unresolved
question was, what kind o f p o l i t i c a l  ta c t ic s  Washington should adopt in
order to avoid fu r th e r  complications in i t s  re la t ions  with Egypt?
Behind the scenes, American diplomacy began to move in two d ire c t io n s .
I t  t r ie d  hard to e x p lo i t  Egypt's good re la t io n s  with Saudi Arabia by urging
the la t t e r  to mediate to "determine means o f ending the Anglo-Egyptian 
79dispute". S im i la r ly ,  in order to counter the p o s s ib i l i t y  tha t the
Soviet Union or Poland might submit a reso lu t ion  to the Security Council
80c a l l in g  on the United Kingdom "to  evacuate i t s  base from Egypt", 
on 20 August 1947 the Americans enticed the B raz il ian  representative 
on the Security Council to propose a reso lu tion  c a l l in g  on "the governments 
o f the UK and Egypt to resume d ire c t  negotiations and tha t should they 
f a i l  they should re so rt to any other peaceful means o f th e i r  own v o l i t io n  
to s e t t le  th e i r  d ispu te". A d d it io n a lly ,  i t  recommended tha t the Security
77. WNRC RG 84 Box 165-710, F ile  No.3, from American Embassy, Cairo, to 
Secretary o f S tate, 8 August 1947.
78. See a l -K u t la , 26 Ju ly  1947 (US po licy  in the Middle East).
79. WNRC-RG Box 104, F i le  800, from Jedda to American Embassy, London,
16 August 1947. See F0.371/62983, Egypt and the Sudan 1947. From 
Jedda to F0, 15 August 1947, Ibn Saud warned the Americans tha t "the 
d is p u te . . .would lead to great Soviet penetration in the Middle East".
80. RG 84 Box 165, F i le  710/3, Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, from Department o f 
State to Cairo, 15 August 1947.
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81Council be informed o f any progress achieved in th is  regard. The 
B r i t is h  saw the B raz il ian  reso lu tion  as the best way to break the impasse 
in th e i r  re la t io ns  w ith Egypt.
American support o f the B raz il ian  reso lu tion  and i t s  own commitment 
to sustain B r i t is h  m i l i ta r y  hegemony in Egypt was not viewed in 
Washington as being inconsistent w ith the American desire to enhance
i t s  re la t ion s  with Egypt. In September 1947, President Truman inv ited
82King Farouk to v i s i t  the United States. To improve Egypt's f inanc ia l
s i tu a t io n ,  the American government did a l l  i t  could " to  ass is t Egypt in
83exporting more cotton to the USA". Moreover, they agreed to support
84Egypt w ith $5.6 m i l l io n  to finance her imports from the US. The
foregoing fac to rs  encouraged Egypt to request United States m i l i ta r y  a id ,
thus assuring greater s e lf - re l ia n c e  on i t s  defence c a p a b i l i t ie s .
Nevertheless, the State Department and the Defence Department believed
tha t supplying arms to Egypt s t i l l  remained the exclusive r ig h t  of
B r i ta in  as Egypt was considered w ith in  the B r i t is h  sphere o f influence.
The refusal o f Egypt's m i l i t a r y  request occurred only a few weeks
before a United Nations' reso lu tion  regarding the P a r t i t io n  o f Palestine.
Americans thought tha t " i t  would be unwise to encourage or permit the
arming o f the Arab countries w ith American supplies a t least fo r  the time 
85being". By the end o f 1947 i t  was obvious tha t the nascent Jewish
81. FO.371/62981, Egypt and Sudan 1947, from UK Representative UN, 
to FO, 19 August 1947.
82. Papers o f Harry S. Truman, WHG (White House, General) f i l e ,  State 
Department correspondence 46-47, Folder 9, Department o f State memo, 
fo r  Connelly, 17 September 1947.
83. RG 59 General record o f the State Department, F i le  1945-1949,
Box 6902 883-0011-447, 4 November 1947, from the State Department 
to Tuck, Egypt, p .4.
84. State Department B u l le t in , August 1947, see RG 84-800 Egypt, to
Mr. Patterson from J. Pock, US Treasury Representative, 6 August 1947.
85. RG 59 General records o f the State Department, F i le  1945-1949, Box 6902- 
883-0011-447, 4 November 1947, from William Jenkins to Tuck, p .2.
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state would impose i t s e l f  upon the Middle Eastern p o l i t i c a l  scene, and 
have i t s  impact on American po licy  towards Egypt.
The Palestine War
When the war in Palestine erupted in f u l l  force a f te r  the B r i t is h
withdrawal in May 1948, Egypt was ne ither m i l i t a r i l y  nor psycho log ica lly
prepared to confront the new Jewish s ta te . American support o f Israe l
and Egypt's defeat did not cloud the " f r ie n d ly  re la t io n sh ip  which had so
long existed between Egypt and the USA".^ The p r in c ipa l reaction among
educated people was tha t Egypt should henceforth confine her e f fo r ts  to
the pursu it o f her more immediate national in te re s ts .  Although on the
one hand Egyptian public  fe e l in g  was being s t i r re d  up against America by
87the opposition press and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian government
on the other hand was doing i t s  best to avoid any pub lic  h o s t i l i t y  against
the United States. This cannot be be tte r i l lu s t r a te d  than by the le t t e r
o f Mohamed Salah e l-D in ,  the Egyptian Foreign M in is te r during 1950-52,
to the American ambassador to Egypt, v i z . ,  "[As regards] the American
government po licy  regarding the Palestine question and i t s  profound e f fe c t
on the Egyptian peop le ... the  Egyptian government has so acted to r e s t r i c t
88th is  e f fe c t  w ith in  the narrowest possible l im i t s " .  This o f f i c i a l  
pos it ion  can be a t t r ib u te d  to the obvious fa c t  tha t the ru l in g  class in 
Egypt, i f  i t  had to make a choice between Great B r i ta in  and the United 
States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the o ther, would
86. Harry S. Truman L ib ra ry , papers o f Clark M. C l i f f o r d ,  Folder 2, 
telegrams and cables, from Cairo to Secretary, 6 January 1949,
87. RG 84 Box 211-120 350/55 Egypt, pos it ion  o f Great Powers in Egypt, 
Cairo 481 - memo, on pos it ion  o f  Great Powers, 7 March 1950.
88. FO.371/90182-1951, M in is te r des A ffa ires  Etrangers, A lexandria, 
8 October 1951.
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understandably choose the former because o f th e i r  social and economic
s truc tu re . They could have been irrepa rab ly  harmed by adopting a
Soviet o r ie n ta t io n . The American policy-p lanners got the impression
th a t " I t  would be su ic ida l fo r  th is  class to come w ith in  the Soviet
89sphere o f in f luence". The Palestine war had convinced American
planners tha t i t  was d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the Egyptian ru l in g  class to turn
away from the t ra d i t io n a l  pro-Western l in e  to a pro-Eastern one.
Furthermore, Egypt's defeat in the war emphasised two important fa c ts :
F i r s t ,  tha t the danger o f regional war had become more imminent,
espec ia lly  a f te r  the establishment o f Is ra e l ,  and secondly, tha t Egypt
was incapable o f  defending the Suez Canal against a major adversary
w ithout some external a id.
Meanwhile, the fundamental issue in American-Egyptian re la t ion s  was
s t i l l  the preservation o f the B r i t is h  m i l i ta r y  presence in Suez. In
1949 the B r i t is h  and the Egyptians resumed th e i r  ta lks  which had been
90discontinued since 1947. American o f f i c ia ls  remained re lu c tan t to
91commit themselves to the idea o f c o l le c t iv e  ta lk s ,  not wanting to 
in te r fe re  in a dispute between two o f i t s  fr ie n ds . By taking such a 
stand America t r ie d  to avoid the danger o f antagonising e ith e r  party.
The American leadership was well aware tha t w ith the escalation o f the
89. Harry S. Truman L ib ra ry , C l i f fo rd  papers, memo, from C l i f fo rd  
to Truman, Palestine fo ld e r ,  November 1947.
90. FO.371/96931 1952, from B r i t is h  Embassy, Washington, to FO,
28 May 1952.
91. FR of US 1949, V o l.V I, pp.69-70. RG 319 PXO 091 Egypt 7.5 
Anglo-American s ta f f  ta lk  a t Fayid, 13 A p r i l  1949. (See FO 371/73555 
1949 F ile  No.1199, from FO to Cairo, No.371/21-2-1949 (top secre t).
36
92global Cold War and the establishment o f the North A t la n t ic  Treaty
Organisation (NATO) in 1949, any American p a r t ic ip a t io n  in Anglo-Egyptian
ta lks  on c o l le c t iv e  secu r ity  measures could lead to increasing regional
93tension between the two blocs.
Another external fa c to r  th a t was to influence America's non-involvement
was the fear o f the e ffe c ts  tha t th e i r  po licy  might have on the new State
of Is ra e l .  Many believed tha t American p a r t ic ip a t io n  would lead Israe l
94to turn away from i t s  neutral po licy  between East and West. Nevertheless,
America'a unwillingness to p a r t ic ip a te  in the Anglo-Egyptian ta lks  did
not a l t e r  i t s  previous pos it ion  concerning the presence o f B r i t is h  troops
in Egypt. In January 1950, George McGhee, the American Under-Secretary
fo r  Near Eastern A f fa i r s ,  expressed to his B r i t is h  counterpart the view
th a t ,  " I t  did not seem wise to consider evacuating B r i t is h  troops from
Egypt under present circumstances, Russian aggression in the Near East
was e n t i re ly  possible and i t  would be essentia l to our common s tra te g ic
95plan to have the B r i t is h  on the spot".
The Wafd in Power
At the same time, when the Wafd assumed power again in January 1950, 
i t  was c lear th a t i t  would before very long have to j u s t i f y  i t s e l f  both to
i t s  supporters and to i t s  opponents by an attempt to solve the
92. In 1948, the Cold War between East and West was brought to new heights
o f tension w ith the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the defection o f
T i to ,  and the B erlin  blockade.
93. See FR 1948 NSC 20/4, 23 November 1948.
94. See Safran, The United States and I s r a e l , p .218. HT L ib ra ry , NSC
Meetings No.54, 4 June 1950, A Report to the NSC 17 May 1950, See 
also F0.371/73555 1949, 7 March 1949 from the B r i t is h  Co-ordination 
Committee fo r  Chief o f S ta f f .  "Admiral Connolly is  personally agreeable 
to defence discussion between the B r i t is h  and the Egyptians, th is  would 
appear to accord w ith  the State Department insistence tha t there should be 
no apparent defence l ine -up  as between ourselves, US and Egypt fo r  fea r o f 
i t s  m is in te rp re ta t io n  by Is ra e l" .
,95. US FR V o l . I l l  1950, pp .293-5.
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Anglo-Egyptian deadlock. The Americans had placed too much t ru s t  in
the Wafd's sweeping m a jo r ity  to s e t t le  the d ispute, while the Wafd had
overestimated i t s  a b i l i t y  to woo the United States in order to achieve
Egypt's national asp ira t ions . A few days a f te r  coming to power Mohamed
Salah e l-D in , the Wafd fore ign m in is te r ,  on 21 January 1950 t r ie d  to
win over American support by assuring the American ambassador tha t “ Egypt
96has no in ten t ion  o f attacking Is ra e l" .  Salah e l-D in 's  statement
showed a great s h i f t  in the Wafd's po licy  towards Is ra e l.  The Wafd had
ignored the mainstream o f Egyptian public opinion in i t s  h o s t i l i t y  
97towards Israel p re fe rr ing  a new po licy  o f accommodation ye t w ithout
taking any fu r th e r  steps towards f u l l  recognition o f i t .  By doing so
the Wafd t r ie d  to k i l l  two birds w ith one stone. I t  t r ie d  to put an
end to B r i ta in 's  excuses tha t i t s  presence at the Canal base was mainly
98due to the h o s t i l i t i e s  between Egypt and Is ra e l.  The Wafd also t r ie d
to show tha t i t s  po licy  was not in c o n f l ic t  w ith tha t o f the USA,
espec ia lly  when the la t t e r  issued the T r ip a r t i t e  Declaration o f 25 May
1950 aiming a t achieving peace and s t a b i l i t y  in the region. Such a step
would be conducive, moreover, to acting as a bulwark against possible
99Soviet penetration in the region.
In June 1950, the negotiations between Egypt and B r i ta in  resumed. 
Egypt put forward the proposal tha t a l l  B r i t is h  forces should be moved
96. NA RG 59 Box 4013 77 00/1-2250, from Cairo to Secretary o f State,
22 January 1950. Also Salah e l-D in  repeated the same statement on
9 February 1950. See NA RG 84 Box 214 Egypt 310 from Cairo to
Secretary o f S tate, secre t, 10-10-1950.
97. A. e l-Hadidy, "Mustafa al-Nahhas: A Case Study o f  Egyptian P o l i t ic a l  
Leadership", unpublished PhD th e s is , S0AS 1985, Chapter 5.
98. Ib id . , Chapter 5, fn .18. See also o f f ic e  o f M i l i ta r y  Attache,
Embassy o f Ind ia , Report No.14, 15 May 1950, p .3, Oxford Papers.
99. For the T r ip a r t i t e  Declaration see Safran, o p . c i t . , p .219. In order to 
understand the main facto rs  which influenced the US to co-ordinate the 
arms sales w ith B r i ta in  and France and led the US to issue the 
Declaration, see FR o f US Vol.V, 1950, p . 158. Also see i b i d . , pp .135-8; 
F0.371/81955, American Embassy, Cairo, 28 January 1950, p .5.
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to the Gaza S tr ip .  B r i ta in  responded by saying i t  could not move
i t s  forces to Gaza on the grounds tha t the Egyp tian -Is rae li  truce was
not adequate, and a f in a l  peace settlement w ith Israe l must be reached
101before B r i t is h  troops could be moved to Gaza. Despite the B r i t is h
refusal and Egypt's reservation at concluding a peace tre a ty  w ith Is ra e l ,
the United States government was o p t im is t ic ,  accepting tha t th is  "idea
might re s u lt  in a peace settlement between Egypt and Is ra e l ,  simultaneously
102with agreement between Egypt and the UK". But i t  seems tha t th is  was
a mere i l lu s io n  on the part o f the American policy-makers o r, in other 
words, ju s t  w ishfu l th ink ing .
The Korean War
Global events soon followed which had an enormous impact on the
balance o f power. The war in Korea in te n s i f ie d  in June 1950. President
Truman in a special message to Congress on 19 Ju ly , declared:
The attack upon the Republic o f Korea makes i t  p la in  
beyond a l l  doubt tha t the in te rna t iona l Communist 
movement is  prepared to use armed invasion to conquer 
independent nations. We must therefore recognize the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t armed aggression may take place on
other n a t io n s " .1^3
The Americans saw the danger and they began to apply the lessons o f 
Korea to the Middle East. The expansionist aims o f the Soviet Union and 
communist China strengthened Anglo-American co-operation fu r th e r  in the
100. PREM ll —1952 Foreign o f f ic e  1518-1952. RG 59 674/86A/7-2250 A/JT, 
from Cairo to Secretary o f State, 25 July 1950.
101. RG 330-092-3 NA to General Box 242, O ffice  o f the Secretary o f 
Defence, memo, fo r  General Records 26 September 1950, p .4.
102. RG 59 Box 2797-674-86A/7-2750, Department o f S tate, Acheson outgoing 
telegram to American Embassy, London, top secret, 28 July 1950.
103. US FR 1950, V o l . I ,  p .346.
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Middle East, and the Americans became convinced th a t the B r i t is h  m i l i t a r y
presence at the Suez base was v i ta l  to Western global s t ra te g y .104
To some extent the Korean War worked to B r i ta in 's  advantage as there were
attempts by Western powers to re in fo rce  B r i ta in 's  t r a d i t io n a l  status in 
105the Middle East. Egypt's reaction and i t s  abstention from voting
on the Western reso lu tion  condemning the act o f aggression by North Korea100
came to underline a very important fa c t  in Egyptian in te rna l p o l i t i c s .
The Wafd, f ru s tra ted  by i t s  fa i lu re  to obtain any concessions from the West,
was led to assume a neutral pos it ion . Moreover, th is  stance emphasised
Egypt's resentment a t the treatment she had received from the West w ith
respect to her national aims.107 Needless to say, the Wafd's decision to
take a f irm  stand against the Western powers w ith in  the in te rna tio na l
arena gave the m i l i t a r y  regime f iv e  years la te r  (1955 onwards) the formula
to adopt towards what they regarded as Western "pressures".
Egypt's pos it ion  did not sour American-Egyptian re la t io n s .  On
1 August 1950, a l i t t l e  more than three weeks a f te r  Egypt's abstention,
Assistant Secretary George McGhee affirmed tha t "the re la t io n s  between
108Egypt and America are e xce lle n t" .  Apparently American-Egyptian 
re la t ions  during th is  period improved to the po in t o f  c o r d ia l i t y .
Washington considered tha t i t s  support fo r  the B r i t is h  pos it ion  a t the 
Suez base would not be detrimental to i t s  re la t ions  w ith  Egypt. At
104. FO.371/80382, 1950, c o n f id e n t ia l ,  9 May 1950, B r i t is h  Embassy,
Washington, to FO. USFR Vol.V, 1950, pp.288-9.
105. Louis Roger, The B r i t is h  Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951, pp.588-9.
106. Department o f State B u l le t in , 10 July 1950, pp.78-9, "The US in the UN".
107. For a more de ta iled  analysis o f the fa c to r*  and reasons which led Egypt 
to take i t s  stand, see NA RG 84 Box 222 R321 Korea 1950, from Cairo to 
Secretary, 30 June 1950. See also Fo.371/80396 JE 1073/9, Parliamentary 
Question, Monday, 10 Ju ly 1950.
108. RG 59 611.47/8-350, from Cairo to Department o f S tate, 3 August 1950.
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j o i n t  Anglo-United States p o l i t i c a l  discussions in mid-September 1950,
the US Assistant Secretary, George McGhee, once again pointed out tha t
"We had supported the B r i t is h  pos it ion  as fa r  as we were able to do so.
We had turned down a l l  Egyptian e f fo r ts  to get us to intervene and had
emphasised th a t th is  is not the time to jeopardise the secu r ity  o f the 
109area". American policy-makers began to be convinced, espec ia lly  a f te r
the Korean experience, tha t one country should be responsible fo r  a 
p a r t ic u la r  area or t e r r i t o r y  as the Americans had done in Korea. In 
other words, the Far East would be p r im a r i ly  an American re s p o n s ib i l i ty
110and the Middle East would, to some extent, be e ss e n t ia l ly  a B r i t is h  one. 
Nevertheless, the Egyptians had hardened th e i r  a t t i tu d e  towards B r i ta in ,  
resu lt ing  in B r i ta in 's  decision on 11 September 1950 to suspend a l l  exports 
o f B r i t is h  weapons to Egypt. The Egyptian fore ign m in is te r  ca lled  the 
arms embargo part o f a Western "conspiracy" to keep Egypt weak, so tha t
111B r i ta in  would not have to withdraw when the 1936 Treaty expired in 1956.
Furthermore, Mohamed Salah e l-D in ,  the Egyptian fo re ign  m in is te r ,  t r ie d
time and time again to e x p lo i t  American fears o f Soviet penetration by
ind ica t ing  tha t the Egyptians were ready to obtain arms from the Soviet
bloc while also concluding a non-aggression pact w ith  the Soviet Union,
112which would make "the presence o f B r i t is h  troops unnecessary".
Washington did not take these Egyptian threats se r ious ly  because of 
the social composition o f the Wafd. The Wafd Party was s t i l l  hoping to
109. FO.371/80383, 1950, top secre t, memo, o f informal UK-US discussions in 
connection w ith  the v i s i t  to London o f G. McGhee, 19 September 1950, p .2.
110. Louis Roger, o p .c i t ,  p .714.
111. US FR Vol.V, 1950, p .313, 19 October 1950.
112. Ib id . , pp.909-10, the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia to 
Secretary o f State.
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f in d  a face-saving formula to s a t is fy  Egyptian national asp ira t ions  and
113to f u l f i l  i t s  commitments to i t s  supporters. According to the
American ambassador in London, the Wafd was looking fo r  a so lu t ion  to
"enable the government to state p u b l ic ly  tha t old b i la te ra l  l in ks  w ith the
past were broken".1*4 Therefore, on 9 October 1950 the Egyptian ambassador
115to Washington raised the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f Egyptian association w ith  NATO.
The State Department opposed the idea because, " I t  would overburden
the NATO struc ture  and lead to demands fo r  s im ila r  treatment from other 
116sta tes". They considered tha t i f  Egypt desired to co-operate in the
defence o f the Near East area there were a number o f ways open to i t  to do
so, "In p a r t ic u la r  i t  could adopt a more c o n c i l ia to ry  a t t i tu d e  in i t s
discussions with the UK and i t  could co-operate more f u l l y  in the e f fo r ts
117o f the UN to develop an e f fe c t iv e  secu r ity  system ..."  The Americans 
may have re jected the proposal o f Egyptian p a r t ic ip a t io n  in NATO not 
ju s t  because o f the foregoing reasons, but also because o f some secondary 
fac to rs . They would have l iked  to ease global tension, espec ia lly  w ith 
the Soviet Union a f te r  the Korean war while also avoiding any b i t t e r  
fee l ing  by Is ra e l ,  as any Egyptian p a r t ic ip a t io n  in NATO could a f fe c t  the 
m i l i t a r y  balance between regional states in favour o f Egypt.
Frustrated by th is  lack o f progress, Nahas Pasha, the Egyptian prime 
m in is te r ,  in a speech delivered at the opening o f the Egyptian parliament 
on 16 November 1950, declared tha t his government regarded the 1936 Treaty
113. Musa S abri, Qissat Malik wa Arba Wizarat (Par al-Qalam: Cairo 1964), p .13.
114. US FR Vol.V, 1950, p .319, The Ambassador in the UK (Douglas) to the 
Secretary o f S tate, London, 9 November 1950.
115. NA RG 84 Box 218 320, 1950, memo, o f conversation w ith  Mr. Berry,
NEA, w ith Egyptian ambassador, 9 October 1950.
116. US FR Vol.V, 1950, pp.330-2.
117. RG 59 Box 2845, Egypt 611-74/10-1250 A/JT, 12 October 1950, to 
Secretary from NEA, Mr. Berry, subject, Egyptian fo re ign  m in is te r 's  
conversation with you.
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as an unsatis fac to ry  basis fo r  E gyp tian -B rit ish  co-operation and
1 1 Q
threatened to repudiate i t .  On the eve o f Nahas' speech, Ambassador
Caffery t r ie d  to persuade the Egypting acting fore ign m in is te r  “ not to
119denounce the 1936 Treaty". Although C affe ry 's  advice did not go
unheeded and Nahas did not ac tua lly  suggest abrogation in a formal sense,
ye t by committing himself p u b l ic ly  to " to ta l  immediate evacuation", Nahas
120was emphasising the crux o f the problem as i t  was a race against time.
Ambassador Caffery saw the danger, judging th a t a compromise with the
Egyptians should be undertaken in the Sudan i f  the s i tu a t io n  in Suez was
to be salvaged. In his opinion the s i tu a t io n  had so de terio ra ted  tha t
the most important th ing to be done was "keeping the Egyptians ta lk in g
in order to r ide  out the storm". There was s t i l l  a p o s s ib i l i t y ,  according
to him, o f f ind in g  something tha t the Wafd could s e l l  to i t s  "clamorous 
121c l ie n ts " .  Meanwhile, on 2 December 1950, the State Department had
instructed the American ambassador to Jedda to urge King Ibn Saud to
mediate between Egypt and the UK during his ta lks  w ith  King Farouk o f 
122Egypt. On 21 December 1950, the Egyptian government secre tly  agreed
to renew w ith the United States the "Agreement fo r  Blanket Landing Rights
fo r  [MATS] A i r c r a f t  o f the M i l i ta r y  A ir  Transport Service" which had been
123suspended because o f the Palestine question in  June 1948. This po licy  
o f improving re la t io n s  with the United States led the Egyptian acting
118. A 1 -M is r i, 17 November 1950, p .6.
119. NA RG 84 Folder 320-1A Box 220, to Secretary o f S tate, Washington, 
charged to American Embassy, Cairo, November 1950, 51195.
120. For more information about Nahas' p o s it io n , see A. e l-Hadidy, 
o p . c i t . , Chapter 5, p .222.
121. See US FR V o l.v , 1950, Caffery to Acheson, 25 November 1950, and 
11 December 1950. See also Louis, o p . c i t . , p .717.
122. NA RG 84 Box 218 320 Egypt 1950, from Secretary o f  State to Jedda,
Cairo 505, 2 December 1950.
123. NA RG 59 Box 4026 774-56/12-2150, from Cairo to Department, top
secret, 21 December 1950. See also RG 330-092-2, Egypt Foreign 
Service o f the US, 21 December 1950.
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fo re ign m in is te r to inform the American ambassador tha t Egypt was going 
"to  support the General Assembly Resolution o f January 3, 1951,
124declaring the Peking regime to be the aggressor" in the Korean war.
Neither Egyptian attempts nor the d e te r io ra t ing  s i tu a t io n  a lte red
American po licy  concerning the Anglo-Egyptian d ispute, which was based on
the premise th a t "any las t in g  agreement must be a rr ived  a t f re e ly  through
125the d ire c t  negotiations o f the p a r t ie s " .  By adopting such a po licy
the Americans wanted to h ig h l ig h t an important fa c t :  th a t they considered
the B r i t is h  should maintain th e i r  pos it ion  in Egypt on the basis o f the 
1261936 Treaty, and tha t America should support those B r i t is h  demands
which in f l i c te d  minimum damage to Western in te res ts  in the area. I t  was
obvious tha t there were s l ig h t  d ifferences between the American s tra te g ic
in te res ts  in the Middle East and those o f B r i ta in .  For the former the
containment o f any Soviet penetration, espec ia lly  in the "ou te r- r in g
127area" (which had become known as the northern t i e r  and la te r  known as
the Baghdad Pact, espec ia lly  a f te r  the Iraq i p a r t ic ip a t io n  in February
1955) was the main p r io r i t y ,  thus securing America's footho ld  in Saudi
128Arabia w ith i t s  vast o i l  reserves. The B r i t is h  were mainly preoccupied 
w ith strengthening th e i r  own pos it ion  in the " inner r ing "  o f the area - 
most notably Egypt.
124. NA RG 59 693-95/55 T. from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate, No.684,
5 January 1951.
125. NA RG 84, Box 2181-320, memo, o f conversation, 9 October 1950, memo, 
o f conversation, pa r t ic ipan ts ;:E gyp tian  Ambassador, Mr. Bury, NEA.
126. Harry S. Truman L ib ra ry , papers o f Truman, fo ld e r ,  meeting o f the 
President w ith Congressional leaders, 13 December 1950, p .6.
127. Interview w ith Mr. G. McGhee. See George McGhee, "The US po licy
towards the Middle East", Department o f State B u l le t in , 30 Ju ly 1950, p .175,
128. NA RG 59 Box 4039 780-512-1051, Department o f State to Embassy,
London, 9 March 1951, top secret.
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The Abrogation o f the 1936 Treaty
In general the s i tu a t io n  had so de terio ra ted and the Wafd government
was becoming so in tra ns ig e n t,  tha t l i t t l e  or no p o s s ib i l i t y  was l e f t  o f
129resolv ing the c o n f l ic t  w ith the B r i t is h .  The pos it ion  became even
more complex in the Middle East when, in 1951, spectacular demonstrations
130of a n a t io n a l is t ic  nature were organised in Egypt against the West.
In March 1951 the American Secretary o f State, Dean Acheson, apprehended 
the danger c le a r ly ,  espec ia lly  a f te r  the Iranian events, when he wrote a 
le t t e r  warning the B r i t is h  tha t "We believe i t  is  important tha t agreement 
be reached w ith  Egypt the soonest otherwise a dangerous and explosive
131s i tu a t io n  might create consequences which would be d i f f i c u l t  to counter".
While the Americans were continuing th e i r  e f fo r ts  to persuade Egypt
132not to abrogate i t s  trea ty  w ith the UK, the Anglo-Egyptian negotia tions 
were fu r th e r  complicated when, on 11 A p r i l ,  the Wafd re jected the new
133B r i t is h  proposals on the Sudan and the evacuation from the Canal Zone.
As a consequence, on 6 August 1951, Salah e l-D in ,  the Egyptian fore ign
m in is te r ,  in a public  speech threatened to abrogate the "1936 Treaty
134before the end o f August". Twenty days a f te r  th is ,  Nahas, the leader
135o f the Wafd and the nation, re ite ra ted  the same po s it io n . Salah
129. US FR Vol.V, 1950, pp.329-30, from the American ambassador, Cairo,
to Secretary o f State, 11 December 1950.
130. See Campbell^Defence o f the Middle East. (Prager: New York I960), p .41.
131. NA RG 84 Box 220 320-1-Anglo-Egyptian nego tia tions, from Secretary
of State, sent London, 23 March 1951.
132. NA RG 59, 641-84/4-151, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate, 2 A p r i l
1951, p .4. See also Caffery 's  e f fo r ts  NA RG 59, i b i d . , No.1056, from 
Cairo to Secretary o f State. See 641-74/6-1651 from Cairo to 
Secretary o f State, No.1336, 16 June 1951.
133. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p .722.
134. NA RG 84 Box 220-320, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 7 August 1951, from
Secretary o f State to Cairo, 185.
135. New York Times, 27 August 1951, p .13.
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e l-D in 's  and Nahas’ statements were made in a very d i f fe re n t  atmosphere 
from tha t o f 1950 when the Anglo-Egyptian trea ty  had la s t  been questioned.
1 *3 f \
Egyptian public opinion l e f t  no a lte rn a t ive  fo r  Nahas, so th a t fo r  the
f i r s t  time during his negotiations w ith  the B r i t is h ,  he went so fa r  as to
declare p u b l ic ly  his in ten t ion  to abrogate the 1936 t re a ty .  I t  became
obvious tha t w ith  the moderate elements in ec lipse , Egyptian nationalism
was being whipped up to fever p itch  and was d irected e n t i r e ly  against
B r i ta in .  The abrogation o f the tre a ty  became imminent.
By now there was a real race against time and the Americans were
eager to gain some breathing space in order to convince Egypt not to
abrogate the tre a ty .  Thus on 10 August Ambassador Caffery suggested
tha t the B r i t is h  government should in v i te  the Egyptian fo re ign  m in is te r
137to London to break the impasse. The United States was alarmed about
the s itu a t io n  in Egypt, espec ia lly  as the B r i t is h  had not presented any 
new proposals to a l le v ia te  i t .  In September George McGhee, the American 
Assistant Secretary fo r  Near Eastern A f fa i r s ,  pointed out to the B r i t is h  
th a t:
We were now faced with what might be our la s t  
chance to obtain an agreement w ith Egypt on the 
s tra te g ic  f a c i l i t i e s .
Moreover,
. . . i n  his opinion the s tra te g ic  f a c i l i t i e s  in Egypt 
were the most important and i f  i t  took the Sudan to 
obtain Egyptian agreement perhaps the Sudan should
be sa c r if ice d . ^ 8
136. A. el-Hadidy, o p . c i t . , p .22.
137. NA RG 59 641-74-8 1051, from Cairo to Secretary o f S ta te, No.193,
10 August 1951.
138. FO.371/96931, B r i t is h  Embassy, Washington, to Mr. Bowker, FO, 28 May 
1952. The d ra f t  o f Minute o f ta lks  which Bowker held w ith
Mr. McGhee on 7 September 1951.
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But the stalemate continued despite a l l  these e f fo r t s .  On 25 September
George McGhee t r ie d  to persuade the Egyptian government not to take
139p re c ip ita te  action with respect to the negotiations o f the t re a ty .
Five days la te r  Ambassador Caffery asked the Egyptian king " i f  he could
140hold o f f  the abrogation u n t i l  we come up with something".
Neither the B r i t is h  nor the Americans o ffered the Wafd a new face-saving
formula, and Nahas was l e f t  w ith no other choice but to terminate the
tre a ty .  As expected, on 8 October 1951 Nahas concluded his speech before
parliament by saying, " I t  was fo r  Egypt I signed the Treaty, and i t  is  fo r
141Egypt tha t I abrogate i t " .  Most o f the reasons behind the Wafd's
142decision have been amply recorded in the secondary l i t e r a tu r e .  What
is in te res t ing  in th is  context is ,  did Nahas abrogate the t re a ty  w ith  the
143B r i t is h  because o f American policy? Most o f the evidence re fu tes any
such explanation. I t  maybe tha t American p o lic y ,  as orchestrated by
George McGhee, was a source o f i r r i t a t i o n  to the B r i t i s h ,  espec ia lly  when
144the former paid his second v i s i t  to Egypt between 29 March and 1 A p r i l .
Viewed by the Wafd leadership, i t  was an ind ica t ion  o f  US support and may 
have led the Egyptian government to en te rta in  fa lse  hopes, th ink ing  tha t 
the United States government appreciated Egypt's tough stance against
139. NA RG 84 Box 219-320 AH secret, Department o f S tate, Memo, o f Conv. 
subject: v i s i t  o f Egyptian ambassador - p a r t ic ip a n ts  Moh. K. Abd e l-  
Rahim, Mr. McGhee, 25 September 1951.
140. NA RG 59 641-74/9-3051, from Cairo to Sec. No.387, 30 September 1951.
141. A1-Ahram, 9 October 1951. See also A. e l-Hadidy, o p . c i t . ,
Chapter 5, p .44, footnote.
142. Sabri, Musa ~ o p . c i t . , a l -R a f r i ,  Muqadimat th o u ra t . 23 Yulyu 
Sanat 1952.
143. See S. Marai, Awraq S iyas iya , al-Maktab a l-M is r i  a l-H a d ith , a l-Q ahira , 
V o l . l ,  p .183; Sabri, o p . c i t . , p.40.
144. F0.371/90108, 1951, Cairo p o l i t i c a l  summary, from Cairo to F0, 4 A p r i l  
1951. McGhee in his p r iva te  conversation said "he appeared to have 
been much impressed by the Egyptian Foreign M in is te r"  (arguments on the 
Anglo-Egyptian problem). See also F0.371/90130 JE 1051/47 from Cairo 
to FO, Mr. Chapman Andrews, No.248, "Mr. McGhee was pleased w ith  Nahas 
Pasha's a t t i tu d e " .
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the B r i t is h .  In re trospect, i t  seems tha t th is  was mere i l lu s io n  on
the part o f Nahas and his fore ign m in is te r ,  Salah e l-D in ,  fo r
according to the American and the B r i t is h  papers, no so l id  evidence was
145found to support such an idea. Maybe, when Nahas and Salah e l-D in
146c ircu la ted  these rumours ju s t i f y in g  th e i r  ac tions, i t  was because o f
the well-known fa c t  tha t the Wafd had not prepared the country to face
147the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f a B r i t is h  counter-action. I t  was much easier and
more useful fo r  the Wafd to place the blame fo r  i t s  fa i lu re  upon the
p o l i t i c a l  ta c t ic s  o f the United States. By taking such ac tion , the Wafd
leadership was try in g  to k i l l  two birds with one stone. F i r s t ,  i t  could
show i t s  supporters tha t i t  had never betrayed the national cause or i t s
h is to r ic  mission regardless o f the form o f leadership. Second, by claiming
American support, Nahas hoped to s t i l l  the voices o f d issent, such as
those o f King Farouk and the moderate elements in the Wafd (e .g . ,  Faud
S ira j e l-D in) who were opposed to the idea o f the term ination o f the tre a ty
148because they feared the consequences.
In fa c t ,  the American government was scandalised by the Egyptian ac t ion ,
149considering i t  " to  be w ithout v a l id i t y " .  Nevertheless, the United 
States government t r ie d  a l l  possible means to resolve the problem peacefully . 
American diplomacy attempted to construct a framework fo r  continued B r i t is h  
hegemony in Egypt "under a changed name as a part o f MEDO forces" to which
145. George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World, pp.365-87. In terv iew  
with Mr. McGhee, Washington, D.C.
146. A. el-Hadidy, o p . c i t . , Chapter 5, p .43. See a l - R a f i i ,  o p . c i t .
See also P.J. V a t ik io t is ,  The Modern H istory o f  Egypt, p .369.
147. A l -R a f i i ,  o p . c i t . , p .35.
148. About Faud S ira j e l-D in  and the moderate elements in the Wafd, see 
Sabri, o p . c i t . , p .38; about the King's a t t i tu d e  see NA RG 59 Box 4039- 
641-74/10-951, from Cairo to Sec.of State, 9 October 1951, 8 pm (secre t) .
149. Department o f State B u l le t in , 29 October 1951, Statement by Secretary 
o f State Acheson (released 17 October).
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150Egypt would acquiesce. On 13 October 1951, the ambassadors o f the
United States, B r i ta in ,  France and Turkey presented the Four-Power
proposals fo r  a Middle East Command to Egypt. These emphasised the po in t
th a t "Egypt belonged to the free world and, in consequence, her defense
and tha t o f the Middle East in general is  equally v i t a l  to other democratic
nations". Furthermore, the proposals inv ite d  Egypt to p a r t ic ip a te  ( in
the projected A l l ie d  Middle East Command) as a founding member with
B r i ta in ,  the United States, France and Turkey on the "basis o f equa lity  
151and partnersh ip". The United States showed a greater w il l ingness
to support the proposals on the grounds tha t "the proposals o f fe r  the
152best prospect o f  re l ie v in g  the present tension in Egypt". Further,
in Dean Acheson's view "[MEDO] w i l l  give Egypt and other Arab states
something more productive to th ink  about than th e i r  feud w ith  Israe l
153and thus pave the way fo r  an eventual peace settlem ent".
Events had moved fa s te r  than was expected. American hopes were 
dashed when, on 15 October, the Wafd rejected the Four-Power proposals.
On the same day the Egyptian parliament adopted decrees u n i la te ra l ly  
abrogating the 1899 and 1936 t re a t ie s ,  and Farouk was declared King o f 
Egypt and the Sudan.
Instead o f  Egypt becoming the f i r s t  Arab country to jo in  an a n ti-S ov ie t 
co l le c t iv e  secu r ity  network, i t  provided the Arab states w ith the formula
150. Truman L ib ra ry , Acheson papers, Princeton Seminar, Box 76 15-16 May 
54, Folder 2, Reel 6, Track 2, page 3.
151. Department o f State B u l le t in , 22 October 1951, p .647.
152. RG 59 Box 2845-611-74/1-21 52, 21 January 1952, to Secretary from 
NEA, subject: v i s i t  o f  the Egyptian ambassador, top secret.
153. NA RG 59 780 519-1251, 17 September 1951, from the President, by 
Acheson, top secre t, subject: Importance o f  Egypt to MEC s t ru c tu re .
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fo r  non-alignment. To some extent, American p o l i t i c a l  c i rc le s  were
convinced tha t Egypt's po licy  towards the West and Is rae l would become
154the model to be emulated by a l l  other Arab states.
As fo r  Egypt, nothing could i l l u s t r a te  be tte r  why the Wafd did
re jec tthese proposals than the le t t e r  from the Egyptian fore ign m in is te r ,
Salah e l-D in , to Caffery, on 28 October 1951:
The Egyptian Government found nothing new in these 
proposals. . .  these proposals maintained the B r i t is h  
•viewpoint and deny Egyptian r ig h ts .  In fa c t  i t  
could even be said tha t the recent proposals were by 
fa r  worse than the 1936 Treaty i t s e l f  since, according 
to them the provis ional and l im ited  occupation by one 
state is  substitu ted  by an occupation o f fou r powers 
or more states w ithout any l im i ta t io n  as to time or 
number. 155
In add it ion  to the above, the timing o f the Four-Power in v i ta t io n
was i l l -co n ce ive d . On 10 October 1951, and ju s t  three days before the
in v i ta t io n ,  most o f the opposition leaders warned the Egyptian nation
156against any j o i n t  defence agreement with Western powers. The
157s itu a t io n  in Iran and the success o f the n a t io n a l is t  movements elsewhere 
in the region had hardened the Egyptian stance v is -a -v is  the Four-Power 
proposals and Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s . In the circumstances, i t  was 
d i f f i c u l t  fo r  Nahas and the Wafd leadership to appear as i f  they were 
y ie ld in g  to Western pressure, while s a c r i f ic in g  Egypt's national demands. 
Moreover, the abrogation o f the trea ty  and the re je c t io n  o f the Four-Power 
proposal offered a good opportun ity  fo r  the Wafd to strengthen i t s  popu la r ity
154. Truman L ib ra ry , McGhee papers, Department o f S tate, memo, o f 
conversation from Ankara to State Department, 21 May 1952.
155. FO.371/90182, B r i t is h  Embassy, Cairo, to FO, 7 November 1951,
Alexandria, 28 October to American Embassy.
156. New York Times, 11 October 1956, p .6.
157. NA RG 59 641 74/10351, from Cairo to Secretary o f State No.39,
9 October 1951. See also RG 59 674 88/9 751, from Tehran to Secretary o f 
State, No.933, 7 September 1951. "Local press today reports Mossadeq 
sent t e l .  to Nahas Pasha expressing sympathy Iran people and government 
fo r  e f fo r ts  o f Egyptian people to achieve th e i r  national a sp ira t ion s " .
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and to prove to i t s  opponents tha t i t  remained the le g it im a te  leader
o f the nation. S im ila r ly ,  by adopting th is  stand, the Wafd demonstrated
to the other p o l i t i c a l  parties tha t they were lagging behind with respect
to the national asp ira tions o f th e i r  country.
In th is  context, the Wafd1 s p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvres put the United
States in a d i f f i c u l t  pos it ion . The American dilemma was obvious,
well described by Mr. Lovett, the American Secretary o f Defence, in a
telephone conservation w ith Dean Acheson. Lovett said th a t "There is
no p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  our being in a posit ion to commit troops, but i t  was
genera lly  f e l t  th a t we could support the B r i t is h  po s it ion  in the UN and 
158in te rn a t io n a l ly " . On 16 October, Dean Acheson re ite ra te d  the same
159pos it ion  in his press conference. The American leadersh ip 's  lack
o f zeal in taking a f i rm  stand in support o f the B r i t is h  view and the
Four-Power proposals can be a t tr ib u te d  to a number o f fa c to rs .  American
policy-makers wished to avoid creating the impression th a t the Western
powers were ganging up against a small nation l ik e  Egypt, and so
adversely a f fe c t in g  the re la t io nsh ip  between the Western powers and
160other Middle Eastern countr ies. Furthermore, American policy-makers
were warned th a t under these circumstances any fu tu re  American pressure
upon Egypt would have led the la t t e r  to conclude "a non-aggression pact
1 ft 1with the Soviet Union". Such an action no doubt would undermine
American stra tegy aiming to bu ild  up Middle Eastern regional defence 
against Soviet penetration. I f  Egypt could conclude such a pact with
158. Truman L ib ra ry ,  Dean Acheson papers, memo, o f  telephone conversation 
between Mr. Lovett and Acheson, 16 October 1951.
159. FO.371/90182 ME Command 1951, from Washington to F0.No.3355, 17 O c t .1951.
160. NA CIA National In te l l igence  estimate, the B r i t is h  pos it ion  in Egypt,
15 October 1951.
161. NA RG 59 77-00/10-2951 o f f ic e  memo.weekly summary 22-29 October 1951.
NA RA 84 320-1 1951 Box 220 from Secretary o f State to  Egypt,
26 October 1951 (telegram received).
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the Soviet Union i t  could mean th a t most o f the Arab states might turn 
from th e i r  t ra d i t io n a l  pro-Western l in e  to one o f n e u t ra l i ty .
The Egyptian c r i s is  appeared to cement Anglo-American co-operation
and on 18 October 1951, in an American cabinet meeting, Dean Acheson
stated tha t the "US is  backing the B r i t is h  pos it ion  in the Egyptian
c r i s is " .  Ambassador Caffery re ite ra ted  the same pos it ion  to the
158Egyptian a u th o r i t ie s .  However, beneath the surface o f th is  support
and c o r d ia l i t y ,  there remained serious differences between the B r i t is h
and American p o l i t i c a l  outlooks. The Americans' view was tha t the
B r i t is h  should s a c r i f ic e  the Sudan in re turn fo r  Egyptian p a r t ic ip a t io n
in the Middle East Defence Organisation. This American po licy  appeared
1to  be based on the b e l ie f  th a t such a "package deal" could s a t is fy
16 Sboth Western m i l i t a r y  needs and Egyptian national asp ira t ions .
The B r i t is h  view was tha t the American strategy was t ry in g  to undermine
B r i t is h  in te res ts  in  the Middle East, especia lly  in Egypt and the 
Sudan Furthermore, by estab lish ing the Middle East Defence
Organisation (MEDO), the United States was aiming to change B r i ta in 's
162. Truman L ib ra ry , Truman papers, Matthews-Connelly, Set 11, Box 2, 
cabinet meetings 1951, 18 October 1981.
163. NA RG Box 220 320/Anglo-Egyptian Relations, to Secretary o f State 
from Cairo, secret to Secretary, 19 January 1952.
164. See Eden, Full C irc le ,  p .230. F0.371 /96919-1952, 10 January 1952, 
from Cairo to FO. See also Acheson papers, memo, of conversation, 
Box 67-F9 January 1952, Acheson-Eden, 6 January 1952.
165. NA RG 84 Box 220 320.1 Anglo-Egyptian, 19 December 1951, from 
Caffery to Secretary. NA RG 84 Box 220, to Secretary, Washington, 
22 December 1951. The Egyptian fore ign m in is te r and Hasan Yusuf 
informed Caffery tha t "they are ready to discuss MEC proposals but 
only on condition  th a t  agreement is  reached on Sudan".
166. See Eden, o p . c i t . , p .230. Acheson, o p . c i t . , pp.726-7. See 
also Acheson papers, memo, o f conversation, Box 67, Truman- 
C hu rch il l ,  6 January 1951. FO.371 1951/JE 1051-519, conversation 
between the Secretary o f State and US ambassador, 16 December 1951.
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pos it ion  in Egypt from tha t o f an imperial power to th a t o f a surrogate
fo r  America, and the B r i t is h  m i l i ta r y  presence in  Egypt would become an
167in tegra l part of American global s trategy.
In Egypt the s i tu a t io n  was de te r io ra ting  while g u e r r i l la  a c t i v i t ie s  
against the B r i t is h  forces in the Canal Zone were gaining popular 
support. Caffery in Egypt saw the danger by comparing the s i tu a t io n  in
1 6ftEgypt w ith th a t in Iran. Egyptian voices were raised demanding
the severing o f  d ip lomatic  re la t ions  with B r i ta in ,  and increased
169g u e r r i l la  a c t i v i t ie s  had forced the B r i t is h  to send reinforcements.
The outlook in Egypt was not b r igh t.-  B r i t is h  intransigence and domestic
fac to rs  in Egypt were preventing a compromise. From 7 December 1951
onwards, Ambassador Caffery t r ie d  to persuade the Egyptian government
1 70not to  break i t s  d ip lomatic  re la t ion s  with B r i ta in ,  and the American
government pointed out to Egypt th a t "such action would be a f u t i l e
171gesture from which in the long run Egypt could gain noth ing".
Egypt heeded th is  advice, and did not reach the po in t o f no re turn  in 
her re la t ion s  w ith B r i ta in .  The atmosphere was very tense, and news
167. RG 330 CD 337 (Defense) top secret, memo, o f conversation, sub ject, 
Anglo-Egyptian negotia tions NE., Mr. S t a b l e r . and G reenh il l,  F i rs t  
Secretary, B r i t is h  Embassy. Ib id . , CD 092-2 Egypt. The JCS memo, 
to Secretary o f  Defense, 29 August 1951, The importance o f the 
B r i t is h  m i l i ta r y  pos it ion  in Egypt.
168. See NA RG 84 Box 220 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian Relations to  Secretary, 
Washington from Cairo 7 December 1951.
169. Eden, o p . c i t . , p .226. See also in te rv iew  w ith Egyptian acting 
fo re ign  m in is te r ,  Ibrahim F a ra j, Cairo.
170. NA RG 84 Box 220 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian nego tia t ions , from Caffery 
to Secretary, 8 December, 13 December and 15 December 1951.
171. I b id . , from Secretary o f State to Cairo, 12 December 1951.
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o f the a c t iv i t ie s  o f the g u e r r i l la s  and the countermeasures taken by
172the B r i t is h  inflamed an already excited population. I t  was c lea r
tha t now the c r is is  might well reach the po int of no re tu rn .  On
23 January 1952 the State Department urged King Ibn Saud to mediate
between Egypt and B r i ta in ,  thus promoting some type o f construc tive  
173"dia logue". But a l l  e f fo r ts  were in vain as events were to show.
Three days la te r  on 25 January 1952, a b a tta l io n  o f armed Egyptian
a u x i l ia ry  po lice  ( boulouk nizam) a t Ism ailia  was surrounded in i t s
barracks by B r i t is h  forces and ca lled upon to surrender. Si ra j  a l-D in ,
the Egyptian M in is te r o f  the In te r io r ,  ordered them to refuse th is
ultimatum and instead to re s is t .  In the unequal armed struggle tha t
followed about f i f t y  Egyptians were k i l le d  and more than a hundred
in ju red . News o f the event caused a serious outbreak o f  violence in
Cairo which was la te r  to be ca lled  "Black Saturday", and 26 January 1952
was to become a watershed not only in Egypt's p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry ,  but
also in American stra tegy towards Egypt. The mob violence in  Cairo
indicated tha t the Wafd and a l l  other Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s ,  instead
o f leading the masses, were lagging fa r  behind them p o l i t i c a l l y .
Joining a Western m i l i ta r y  pact had become a taboo subject fo r  most
o f the Egyptian p o l i t ic ia n s  who did not dare to accept what the Wafd had
1 74refused in October 1951. The removal of the Wafd did not re l ie ve
172. The Times, 1-28 December 1951. See Hamrush, Vo l. I , pp .165-6.
173. FO.371/9692 from Washing to FO, 24 January 1952, S ir  O live r Franks, 
No.158.
174. NA RG 84 Box 220 320/Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 19 December 1951, 
from Caffery to Secretary.
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the tens ion, despite American hopes fo r  tha t re s u l t .  Nahas 1 successors
proved to be a disappointment, unable to develop any concrete and v iab le
social programmes or to restore Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s  to normality .
The precarious s i tu a t io n  o f American stra tegy a f te r  the events o f
"Black Saturday" can best be seen in Caffery 's  telegram to the State
Department on 26 January 1952, v i z , ,  " I am sure i t  is  not necessary to
emphasize th a t yesterday's events have lessened the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  of
having any defense proposals accepted by a percentage [o f  the Egyptian
government]. . . .A few days ago I was s t i l l  saying tha t i f  we accepted
King o f Sudan t i t l e  Egyptians would accept defense proposals w ith a
175few m odif ica tions but today I wonder". To some degree the 
25 January events had marked the f in a l  confirmation th a t any Egyptian 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in Western m i l i ta r y  pacts was u n l ik e ly  fo r  some time.
In other words, the idea o f estab lish ing  a defence system centred on 
Egypt was tem porarily  shelved a t th is  stage. US or Western global 
s tra tegy would now depend on a t t i tu d es  and decisions o f ind iv idua l or 
regional governments and p o l i t i c a l  forces.
With the dismissal c f  the Wafd on 28 January 1952, a new era in
Egyptian p o l i t i c s  began which could be described as the f in a l  days of
the old p o l i t i c a l  s truc tu re . Yet none o f the actors on the scene were
aware o f the consequences o f recent events fo r  they continued to act
1as i f  nothing had happened. I t  can be said w ith  some confidence
th a t there were some p a r t ic ip an ts  behind the scenes who were well known 
to the American a u th o r i t ie s  and who were waiting fo r  the su itab le  opportun ity  
to  come along fo r  them to play th e i r  cruc ia l ro les in  Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .
175. NA RG 84 Box 229 Egypt 350, January-February, from Cairo, 
26 January 1952, to Secretary,
176. A1 e l-Hadidy, o p . c i t . , pp.236-7.
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Although there was some American recognition o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s
which t ie d  the hands of both the Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  leaders and the
B r i t i s h ,  the American policy-makers were a fra id  tha t the continued
fa i lu r e  to resolve the dispute would lead to another c r i s i s ,  and th is
1 77might lead to  a communist takover. Therefore i t  would be misleading
to conclude at th is  stage tha t the United States was a mere passive
spectator o f the de te r io ra t in g  s i tu a t io n  in Egypt. This kind of
speculation is  substantiated when i t  is  seen th a t in the days a f te r  the
Wafd's removal, the United States t r ie d  to act as an "honest broker",
not w i l l in g  to antagonise e ith e r  side in the dispute. From January
to June 1952 the American government asked the Egyptian government at
178various times not to break i t s  d ip lomatic re la t ions  w ith B r i ta in .
During the same period i t  began to press B r i ta in  to adopt a more
179c o n c i l ia to ry  a t t i tu d e  regarding Egypt. Repeatedly i t  t r ie d  to
persuade B r i ta in  to concede the Sudan to Farouk. In C a ffe ry 's  view
" I f  the Sudan issue is se tt le d  we should be able to answer to th is
too (MEC)".1^  The Americans would assess th e i r  p o l icy  depending upon
the Egyptian view tha t "Egypt and B r i ta in  were near enough on defence
question to warrant negotiations but on the Sudan question we were too 
181fa r  apart" . Neither the t r i p  by the NEA ch ie f ,  Henry Byroade, to London
and the Middle East in May and June, nor Acheson's discussions with Eden
177. New York Times, 27 January 1952, p .27. See also NA RG 84 Box 229, 
Egypt 35U, January-February .1952, from Cairo to Secretary 26 January 
1952, and o p . c i t . , Folder Egypt 360, from Cairo to Secretary,
28 January 1952.
178. NA RG 84 Box 229 Egypt, January-February 1852, From Cairo to 
Secretary, 27 January 1952. See ib id . , 321-1, from Caffery to 
Secretary o f State, 5 May 1952.
179. See Acheson, o p . c i t . ,  p .727.
180. NA Rg 84 Box 221, to Sec.of State from Cairo, 8 March 1952, pp.6-7.
181. FO.371/96930 1952, From Cairo to FO, 9 May 1952. At various times the 
Egyptian government re ite ra te d  i t s  pos it ion  to the American ambassador. 
See FO.371/96932 1952, from Alexandriato FO, 19 July 1952.
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in la te  June convinced the B r i t is h  to a l te r  th e i r  a t t i tu d e  v is -5 -v is  the
Sudan question. B r i t is h  stubbornness fru s tra te d  Byroade, and on
16 July 1952, ju s t  a week before the coup-d 'g ta t, he pointed out to
the B r i t is h  ambassador tha t the "B r i t is h  must understand th a t we cannot
b l in d ly  support them". The United States was more alarmed about the
s itu a t io n  in Egypt than the B r i t is h  who entertained fa lse  hopes about
turn ing the clock back. On 21 July Byroade saw the danger th a t B r i t is h
po licy  would lead to r io ts  and disorder which the Egyptian a u th o r i t ie s
183might not be able to co n tro l.  Forty-e ight hours la t e r ,  the Free
O fficers  overthrew Egypt's monarch and came to power.
I t  would seem from th is  analysis tha t the B r i t is h  continued to view 
themselves in terms o f post-war power on an equal foo t ing  w ith the 
Americans, and persisted w ith the same po licy ,n o t taking in to  account 
e i th e r  America's in te res ts  as the new dominant world power, or the 
in te re s t  of the Western a l l ia n ce  as a whole in the region o f  the Middle 
East. B r i t a in 1 s .intransigence; and self-deception or delusion adversely 
a ffected America's long-term stra tegy in Egypt, while  also weakening 
American support fo r  any o f B r i ta in 's  expectations to  continue or extend 
her hegemony in the Middle East. In terna l conditions and events in 
Egypt were to define not only the re la t ionsh ip  and the p o l ic ie s  between 
two great powers, but also to a f fe c t  the whole range o f th e i r  fo re ign  
p o lic ies  towards Egypt. I t  is  necessary therefore to study in  d e ta i l  in 
che next chapter, the in te rna l s i tu a t io n  before the coup d 'e t a t , and i t s  
influence on American po licy  towards Egypt in general.
182. NA RG 84 Box 221, Folder 320, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, from 
Secretary to Cairo, 16 July 1952.
183. NA RG 59 774-00/7-21-52 from Washington to Cairo, 21 July 1952.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION AND THE EARLY 
CONTACTS BETWEEN THE OFFICERS AND THE USA
The Internal S itua tion
In the la te  fo r t ie s  and early  f i f t i e s ,  the United States focused 
i t s  a tten tion  on the in te rna l s i tu a t io n  o f Egypt and i t s  Central 
In te l l ig e nce  Agency (CIA) began to compile reports on i t .  In one o f 
these published re p o r ts , Kermit Roosevelt o f the CIA estimated tha t the 
Egyptian king and the ru l in g  c lass, who constitu ted less than 5 per cent
A
o f the population, were holding 95 per cent o f the country 's  wealth. 
Roosevelt concluded his study, which was e n t i t le d  "Egypt Cake fo r  Fate", 
by saying tha t in Egypt, "the poor grow poorer and the r ic h  grow r iche r
n
and everyone grows nervous".
However, the State Department and the B r i t is h  Foreign O ffice  were 
expecting a class c o n f l ic t  between the "haves" and the "have-nots" due 
to corruption and poverty which had become more evident in  Egyptian
■3
socie ty  during th a t time. Moreover, the American embassy in  Cairo 
reported over s ix  weeks from 24 July u n t i l  30 August 1950 on in te rna l 
developments, producing twelve reports , a l l  o f them dealing w ith the 
de te r io ra t ion  o f the in te rna l s i tu a t io n  in Egypt. The American 
ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, perceived the dangers o f  a possible class 
c o n f l i c t .  In one o f h is reports he warned the State' Department th a t i t
1. Kermit Roosevelt, Arabs, Oil and H istory (London: V ic to r  Gpllancz
1949), p .94.
2. I b id . ,  p .87.
3. The FR of the US 1949,volume, V o l.V I, p .187 (secre t) :  from the
chargd d 'a f fa i re s  in the UK to Secretary o f State, 7 January 1949;
FO 371/80600, 1950, B r i t is h  Embassy, Washington, 19 Apr il  1950,
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was be tte r  fo r  them "to  give a careful review of an evacuation plan"
fo r  American c i t ize n s  on account o f the d e te r io ra t io n .^  The unrest,
i t  was reported, had even spread among the fa l la h in  who were always
s a t is f ie d  w ith th e i r  own t ra d i t io n a l  l i f e ,  and i t  became obvious th a t
sooner or la te r  Egypt was going to face a social re v o lu t io n ,  s ta r t in g
{?
w ith  assassination, loo t ing  and mob violence.
A few months before the m i l i t a r y  coup o f 23 July 1952, an American 
observer submitted a de ta iled  report to the State Department on the 
Egyptian in te rna l s i tu a t io n ,  saying tha t "there was evidence o f growing 
discontent among the peasants, workers, middle-class and in te l l e c tu a ls . . .  
one heard much o f poverty". At the end of his report he pointed out 
th a t the "poverty and the corruption were going to produce Communism".^
Two public Egyptian f ig u re s ,  Ahmed Husayn Pasha, the former 
M in is te r of Social A f fa irs  in the la s t  Wafd government (1950-1952), 
pointed out to the American ambassador tha t " revo lu tion  is  a matter of
Q
months, not years, unless something is  done", and Mohamed Heika l, the 
well-known Egyptian jo u r n a l is t ,  re ite ra ted  the same p o s it io n . Both 
showed th e i r  deep concern about the de te r io ra ting  s i tu a t io n .^  Ambassador 
Caffery did not hes ita te  to w r ite  an extensive secret report to the 
State Department, e n t i t le d  " S ta b i l i t y  and In s ta b i l i t y  in  Egypt". In
4. NA RG 59 Box 4014 774-009-851, from Cairo to Dept, o f S tate, 13 
September 1951, sub jec t, "Reporting on the de te r io ra t io n  o f the 
s i tu a t ion  in Egypt".
5. NA RG 59 Box 4014 774-110-851., o f f ic e  memo. Summary o f Egypt, 2 August 1951
6. FR of US 1949, V o l.V I,  pp .187-8, from the American Embassy, London, to
the Secretary o f State.
7. NA RG 59 Box 2847-6480/4-452, to the o f f ic e  o f the Chief o f NEA Dept,
o f State, sub ject, Report on t r i p  to the Near East, January", 30 March
1952, reported to the Department on 4 April 1952.
8. NA RG Box 4041 774-0019-451, from Cairo to Dept, o f S tate, 19 August 
195! (secret) 361 - 2 Husayn ;; 4 September 1950, from Cairo to 
Department o f State. ’
9. NA RG 84 Box 206, F i le  350-1 Egypt, from American Embassy, Cairo, to 
D iv is ion o f the Near East, 26 August 1949.
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i t s  conclusion he raised a very important question, namely, "What can we
10do about s t a b i l i t y  in Egypt?" I t  is obvious therefore  tha t American 
policy-makers were preoccupied with s t a b i l i t y  and i n s t a b i l i t y  in Egypt.
In order to understand the Egyptian in te rna l s i tu a t io n ,  we should 
id e n t i fy  the main actors and th e i r  impact upon the s t a b i l i t y  or i n s t a b i l i t y  
o f Egyptian in te rna l a f fa i r s .  Furthermore, and w ith respect to our 
emphasis on American po licy  towards Egypt, we should also examine the US
view o f each one o f them.
I t  is a commonplace tha t the p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry  o f Egypt in the period 
extending from the B r i t is h  declaration o f independence in 1922 u n t i l  
the m i l i ta r y  revo lu tion  o f  1952 was dominated by three main powers: the
B r i t i s h ,  the k ing, and the Wafd.
In th is  case we are going to leave aside the f i r s t  power,
concentrating mainly on the second and th i r d ,  which in our opinion were
the most decisive factors  in Egyptian in te rna l a f fa i r s .
The King
Ever since 1945, the American had rea lised th a t the k ing 's  popu la r ity
11had reached i t s  lowest ebb, and looked on Farouk as no more than a
12reactionary landowner, who could not be re l ie d  upon to i n i t i a t e  any 
kind o f social reform tha t would fo re s ta l l  or neu tra l ise  any possible 
popular upheaval.13 In 1947, in a top secret discussion with the
10. NA RG 59, 774-008/1351, from Cairo to State Department, 13 August 1951.
11. RG 59 General Records o f the Dept.of State, FW 711-83-15 549 SF Dept,
o f S tate, May 1945, po licy  statement, Egypt (se c re t ) ,  p .7.
12. F. Relations o f US, Vol.VI 1949, p .187. Also see Murtada al-Maraahi.
Gharab Min Ahad Farouk, wa Bidayat al-Thawrat a l-M is r iy a h'/Beirut 1976/J3G
13. NA RG 59 General Records o f the Dept.of State 883.00(W) 2, 1949
19 February 1949, from Cairo to Sec.of State No.1811 482, army message. 
Also RG 59 Control 3806 Record 11 December 1948, from Cairo to Sec., 
Unpopularity o f King Farouk g rea t ly  increased by adverse reaction to 
his divorce.
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B r i t i s h ,  the Americans did not hesitate to put forward the idea of
14get t ing  r id  of Farouk, by saying, "There ought to be a new king" .
Simultaneously, i t  was understood that there was a conspiracy among
15the army o f f i c e rs  "against the throne". Farouk's prest ige had declined
in the army, and there was a p o s s ib i l i t y  that the army was going to work
against him, especia l ly  a f te r  i t s  defeat in Palest ine.
A f te r  the Palest ine (1948) war, rumours began to c i r cu la te  in Egypt
tha t  King Farouk had no in ten t ion  of remaining on the throne i f  he was
16going to face disorder or troub le . Farouk confirmed th i s  to Kermit
17Roosevelt, who was a close f r iend  of his at tha t t ime.
The West began to look fo r  another man, with d i f f e re n t  q u a l i f i c a t io n s
to replace Farouk. They looked fo r  another "Moustafa Kemal to secular ize
his co u n t ry . . .and d i re c t  the p o l i t i c a l  energies of the people away from
the B r i t i s h  towards the reconstruct ion of t h e i r  economy and social  
18s t ruc tu re " .  Neither Farouk as a king, nor the monarchy as a regime
19was viab le fo r  Western needs or demands in Egypt. The West, and 
espec ia l ly  the United States, considered Farouk a major obstacle to 
reform in Egypt.
14. FO.371/62989, to Foreign Off ice from Lord Inverchapel, 26 October 
1947, top secret,  p .3.
15. WNRC RG 59 General Records of the State Department, Decimal F i le  
1945-1949: from Cairo to Secretary of State, 26 November 1947,
RG 59 Record o f  the Department of State 883.00(W) 12-10-1948 
(Secret) control army message, "The unpopulari ty of the King great ly  
increased especia l ly  among army o f f i c e r s " .
16. WNRC RG 84 Box 2 (Top Secret) F i le  361-1 1948, from the American 
Consul-General, Alexandria to J. Patterson, Alexandria, 26 July 1948,
17. K. Roosevelt, o p . c i t . ,  pp.24-7.
18. F0.371/90148, D.'Bendaif sCairo, 1 December 1951, to Foreign Of f ice  
( secre t ).
19. K. Roosevelt, o p . c i t . , p .96. Also see F0.371/96927, from 
Austra l ian Embassy, Washington, to Secretary, Department of 
External A f f a i r s ,  21 March 1952.
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Thus a f te r  the Cairo r i o t s  in January 1952, Western p o l i t i c a l
c i r c le s  were keen to have a strong and honest government in  Cairo tha t
could el iminate corrupt ion at a l l  leve ls .  They thought Ahmed Naguib
e l - H a l i l y  would be the man most q u a l i f ie d  to head such a government
and achieve t h e i r  purpose in reforming the country and purging i t  of
corrupt ion. But Farouk dismissed him as prime m in is te r ,  in return
fo r  a £1mil l ion br ibe, paid to him by the Egyptian i n d u s t r i a l i s t ,  Ahmed
20Abboud, who was anxious to avoid paying £5mi11ion in tax.
The Abboud scandal was a turn ing point in Farouk's re la t ions  with
21the Americans. Ambassador Caffery considered him a "hopeless case".
The king, i t  would seem, lo s t  most o f his c re d i t  with the West in general
and the United States in p a r t i c u la r  because of his corrup t ion ,  He was
surrounded by a weak entourage whose corrupt ion had become outrageous,
and i t  was hard fo r  someone l i k e  him to put an end to the ro le and
inf luence that th is  entourage had over him. The B r i t i s h  ambassador
perceived the danger of the s i tu a t io n .  He asked his American counterpart
to intervene in order to induce the king to r i d  himself  of  Karim Thabet
22and others who were mainly responsible fo r  Abboud scandal. Caf fe ry 's  
in tervent ion went unheeded. I t  became c lear  tha t  Farouk was not ready 
to s a c r i f i c e  his weak entourage at any cost.
In March 1952, four months before the revo lu t ion ,  Kermit Roosevelt 
v is i te d  Egypt. During his v i s i t ,  he asked Hassan Youssef Pasha, the 
deputy chamberlain o f  the cour t ,  to choose fo r  him some Egyptian publ ic
20. Mousa Sabr i , Malik wa Arba'a Weizrat; interview with Mustafa Amin, 
Cairo, 28 January 1985.
21. Al-Maraghi, o p . c i t . , p .200. See also interv iew with Mustafa 
Amin, Cairo, 28 January 1985.
22. FO.371/96876, 1952, Minute FOJE 1018/174, Mr. A l len ,  2 July 1952; 
FO.371/96876, 1952, from Foreign Off ice to Alexandria, No.050, 
(secret) 1 July 1952.
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f igures to become members of a proposed American-Egyptian society.
The king gave the names o f  Karim Thabet and Elias Andarwawes i and as a
re s u l t  Kermit Roosevelt hastened to t e l l  Youssef Pasha "to drop i t  and
23fo rge t  i t  f o r  ever". In the same month, the Americans gave Farouk
a l a s t  chance: they urged him to re d is t r ibu te  part  o f  his land, as had
24been done in Iran, but Farouk ignored t h e i r  suggestion.
Al l  the evidence pointed to the fac t  that by 1952 Farouk was a major
obstacle in securing United States interests  in Egypt. Yet Farouk
himself  t r i e d  very hard to woo the United States by nominating A1i Maher
on 28 January 1952, who was on good terms with the Americans, to succeed
25the l a s t  Wafdist government. On 28 January 1952, A l i  Maher formed 
his cabinet from pro-Western elements such as Hassouna Pasha, Mohamed 
Hassan Pasha (formerly ambassador to Washington), and Shousha Pasha, who 
had good connections with American organisat ions in Egypt, such as the 
Naval Medical Research Uni t ,  No.3. Thus the Soviet newpaper, Pravda, 
accused a l l  o f  them of being instruments o f  the Americans and the 
B r i t i s h . ^
But Farouk deceived himself .  He did not rea l ise  one important f a c t ,
to  w i t ,  tha t  the Americans wanted social  reform and s t a b i l i t y  in order to
avoid any upheaval in the country. Thus Caffery and the Americans
27considered Farouk responsible fo r  a l l  the troubles in Egypt, and the 
ch ie f  obstacle to the formation of a major i ty  government which would accept
23. Interview with Hasan Yusuf Pasha, Cairo, January 1985.
24. Al-Maraghi, o p . c i t . , p . 199; interv iew with K. Roosevelt, 
Washington, D. C. ,  May 1984.
25. FO.371/96870, 1952, from Cairo to Foreign O f f ice ,  No.210,
28 January 1952.
26. FO.371/96872, 1018/65, from Moscow to Afr ica  Department, j o i n t  
press reading serv ice, Pravda, 3 February 1952.
27. " in terv iew with Mustafa Amin, Cairo, January 1985.
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28the B r i t i s h  defence proposals. The Americans, in f a c t ,  expected
29Farouk to be overthrown soon.
The P o l i t i c a l  Part ies : the Wafd
In 1949 a few months before the Wafd's assumption of i t s  
re s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  as the ru l ing  par ty ,  the American embassy in Cairo 
began to study the Wafd's programme concerning social  reform. They 
concluded tha t  the previous Wafdist government, which lasted fo r  two
years from 1942 to 1944, "had not shown great in te res t  in social  and
30 ^economic reform", because "many of i t s  leaders had much to l o s e . . ; "
that social and economic reform was not consistent with the in te rests
and images of the leading members o f  the Wafd par ty ,  who were mainly
big landowners, and pa r t ly  from notable fam i l ies .  But they also
discovered tha t  corrupt ion had spread amongst Wafd leaders to the point
where i t  had become hard to uproot i t .  The Americans became convinced
tha t  the Wafd leaders were more concerned with the problem "of making
32personal fortunes rather than introducing social  reform". But they 
were s t i l l  hoping that the corrupt Wafd of 1950 could lead the nation 
(al-umma) to s e t t l e  the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Nevertheless, the 
Americans were themselves ignoring the fa c t  that the leadership o f the 
Wafd at tha t  time was quite  d i f f e re n t  from tha t  of 1936; tha t between 
1936 and 1950 Egyptian society had experienced h is t o r i c  changes which
28. D.D. Eisenhower L ib rary , Eisenhower Col lec t ion , oral  h is to ry ,  
interv iew with J. Wesley Adams (second secretary, Cairo, 1950-52), 
oral  h is to ry  interv iew No.155, Copy 3.
29. Interv iew with K. Roosevelt, Washington, D.C., and interv iew with 
David Evans, Washington, D.C.
30. NA RG 85 Box 206, F i le  350-1, Egypt, American Embassy, Cairo, memo, 
to Ireland from P.J. Hel la ,  16 February 1949.
31. NA RG 84, F i le  361-1, from Ireland to Patterson, 17 February 1949;
K. Roosevelt, o p . c i t . , p .94.
32. NA RG 59 Box 4014, 774/00/5/950, to Department of State, from Paris, 
1037, 9 May 1950.
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had t h e i r  impact not only on the leadership of the Wafd, but also on 
tha t  of other p o l i t i c a l  organisat ions. Thus extremist and n a t io n a l i s t  
groups began to impose themselves upon the Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  scene, 
and great ly  inf luenced the shaping of Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  In 
these circumstances, i t  was d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the Wafd of 1950-1951 to 
assume the same role at the head o f  the National Front as in 1936, w ithout 
e l i c i t i n g  objections from elsewhere. S im i la r ly ,  i t  was d i f f i c u l t  f o r  
Moustafa el-Nahas Pasha at th is  stage to play the ro le  o f  "leader o f  the 
nat ion" without taking a hard l in e  v is -5 -v is  the B r i t i sh  demands and 
Western m i l i t a r y  needs, especia l ly  since the Wafd, as a popular par ty ,  
was having setbacks and in a decl ine.
I t  seemed imperative, there fore ,  f o r  the Wafd to do i t s  utmost to 
compensate fo r  i t s  loss of popu lar i ty  during the Abdin palace inc ident 
o f  1942, by pursuing more radical po l ic ies .  The Wafd leadership needed 
to demonstrate i t s  extremism vis-cf-vis the B r i t i sh  in order to cover up 
i t s  weakness. I t  was also in i t s  in te res t  to a t t r a c t  people's a t ten t ion  
from the de te r io ra t ing  in terna l  s i tua t ion  by concentrat ing on the 
Anglo-Egyptian dispute.
The Wafd under the secretary-general ship of Fouad Si rag e l -D in ,  and
the inf luence o f  Mohammad el-Wakeil and Ahmed Hamza, was very d i f f e re n t
from the Wafd under the old guard. The new leadership t r i e d  very hard
to strengthen i t s  re la t ions with the Palace, since they had a d i f f e re n t
33conception o f  the Wafd's re la t ionsh ip  with the king. In order to make
33. NA RG 59 Box 4014 774.00/4-2850, secret f i l e ,  from Cairo to the 
Secretary o f  State, No.916, 8 Apr i l  1950. I t  was noticed tha t  
the Wafd would allow Farouk to " ru le  as well as to re ign" .  
Concerning the re la t ions  between Farouk and the Wafd, see NA RG 84, 
36-11, from Cairo 1241, 31 May 1950. See also M.A. el-Hadidy, 
"Mustafa el-Nahhas", unpublished PhD thes is ,  SOAS, Univers i ty  of 
London 1985, pp.227-30.
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up fo r  t h e i r  s h o r t fa l l  in popu la r i ty ,  they bound themselves to the Muslim
Brotherhood, considering th i s  a l l iance  as one of the most important
34factors o f the Wafd's e lec t ion  v ic to ry  in January 1950.
From the very beginning, however, the American policy-makers real ised
the nature of these changes in the Wafd's character,  but they s t i l l  hoped
tha t  the Wafd, as the majo r i ty  par ty ,  would se t t le  the Anglo-Egyptian
dispute fo r  ever, or a t least achieve a modus vivendi to ease the s i tu a t ion
fo r  both sides, thus s ta r t in g  a new chapter in Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s .
But as soon as the Wafd assumed i t s  re s p o n s ib i l i t i e s ,  a l l  the American
expectations were dashed. Thus in June 1950, six months a f te r  the
Wafd came to power, the o f f i c e r  at the Egyptian desk in the State
Department perceived the danger tha t  the Wafd under these circumstances
"would insp i re  a v io le n t  press campaign against the US and UK in order
35to cover up i t s  i n e f f i c ie n c y " .  Thus Moustafa el-Nahas, instead of
easing the s i tu a t ion  between Egypt and the UK, had begun, according to
Ambassador Caf fery, to act as "a s t ree t  p o l i t i c i a n " .  I t  was
consequently hard to convince Nahas to accept any formula which did not
lead to "evacuation and the un i ty  of the Ni le Valley". Nahas in fa c t
had become a pr isoner o f  the promises he had made to the Egyptian people,
who accepted Wafd corrupt ion in return fo r  i t s  a b i l i t y  to achieve 
37national goals.
34. NA RG 59 Box 4014 4-00/2/050, to Department of State from Cairo,
Caffery No.240, 10 February 1950, "The status o f  the Muslim Brotherhood 
Society".  The American policy-makers viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as 
more dangerous than communism. See US FR Vol.V, 1950, pp.271-8 (a 
po l icy  statement prepared in the o f f i c e  of Near Eastern A f f a i r s ) .
35. US FR Vol.V, 1950, Egypt, pp.289-99 (top secre t ) ,  memo, by the 
o f f i c e r  in charge of Egypt to the Director of the A f r ica  and Near 
East Of f ice.
36. US FR Vol.V, 1950, pp.322-3.
37. New York Herald Tr ibune, 9 September 1851, "Matters of Fact",  by 
Stewart A Vs op,' "The three pashas and a king".
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In one o f  the Anglo-American discussions about the Middle East
s i tu a t io n ,  the American Assistant Under-Secretary o f  State pointed out
to his B r i t i s h  counterpart  tha t  the Wafd was "the main obstacle to
38
achieving any sett lement" .  Ambassador Caffery re i te ra ted  the same
posit ion in an analysis o f  why the Wafd should have become more ex tremis t
39than others in the Anglo-Egyptian discussions. Being on the spot,
Caffery saw the danger of the extremist Wafd not a l lowing "any fore ign
troops to stay at the Canal Zone during peace-time", a po l icy  which
40con f l ic ted  with American s t ra teg ic  plans in the area. Even before 
the Wafd's abrogation of the 1936 Treaty, Stewart Alsop, the famous
American columnist, wrote, " I t  is  absolutely hopeless to  t r y  to arrange
. . 41with the present Egyptian government any kind of compromise sett lement".
The Anglo-Egyptian confrontat ion  had thus reached the point o f  no
re turn .  Nahas Pasha abrogated the 1936 Treaty, and would not accept
the four-power proposals. The s i tu a t ion  had dete r io ra ted and tension
had increased, together with mounting animosity towards the B r i t i s h  and
Americans. The Egyptians were l i v i n g  on the top o f  a volcano which
threatened to erupt.
The eruption arr ived on 26 January 1952. On th a t  day mobs r io ted
and burned Cairo. These r i o t s  merely indicated tha t  the Wafd had lo s t
control  as well as i t s  leg i t imacy as the majo r i ty  par ty .  On "Black
Saturday" King Farouk conferred with Ambassador Caffery, and on the same
38. US FR Vol.V, 1950, pp.296-7, memo, o f informal conversation, US-UK 
discussion, London, 19 September 1950.
39. US FR Vol.V, 1950, pp.302-3, American Embassy, Cairo, to Secretary 
o f  State, 3 October 1950.
40. US FR Vol.V, 1950, pp.329-30, from the American Ambassador, Cairo, 
to the Secretary o f  State, 11 December 1950.
41. New York Herald Tr ibune, 9 November 1950.
42night he dismissed Nahas1 government f o r  the l a s t  t ime. However,
before the dismissal o f  Nahas, Caffery prevai led upon him not to sever
p o l i t i c a l  re la t ions  with the UK, and immediately before his removal
from power, Nahas' government proclaimed a "s tate of emergency". A f te r
gaining some c re d i t  from t h i s ,  i t  was be t te r  fo r  the Americans to
accept tha t  the corrupt Wafd must go, having fa i le d  e i th e r  to resolve
43the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, or to i n i t i a t e  social  reform. The
overwhelming majo r i ty  of the Wafd and the popu lar i ty  o f  i t s  leadership 
ne i the r  served American in terests  nor met Western needs in th i s  very 
important area.
Out o f  power, in Apri l  1952 the Wafd suggested the drawing up of
a secret agreement between the United States and the Wafd's secretary-
general. In his proposed agreement, Fouad Si rag e l-D in  demonstrated
his readiness to sign an agreement with the B r i t i s h  w i th in  two weeks,
o f fe r in g  Egyptian p a r t i c ip a t io n  in the Middle East defence organisat ion
(MEDO). He went on to say tha t  "He would br ing Egypt openly to the
side o f  the West in general and the US in p a r t i c u la r " .  The American
embassy in Cairo did not take the o f fe r  ser ious ly ,  not considering i t  a
"bona f id e "  o f f e r ,  since they believed that Sirag e l-D in and his
colleagues were manoeuvring in to  a pos it ion where they hoped f o r  American
44support in the next e lect ion against e l-H i 1a l y . The Wafd's p o l i t i c a l  
manoeuvres and i t s  conspi ra to r ia l  plans in handling i t s  re la t ions  with 
the other p o l i t i c a l  powers were c lea r ,  and i t s  desire to reassume
42. FO.371/96872 JE 110/8 1656, from Moscow to A fr ica  Department,
3 February 1952; FO.371/96872 JE 1081/61, B r i t i s h  Embassy, Prague,
6 February 1952, to Foreign Of f ice  ( c o n f id e n t ia l ) .
43. Interview with Ibrahim Faraj Pasha, Cairo, 17 January 1985.
44. NA RG 59, 611-747-552, American Embassy, Cairo, to Department,
No.2947, 5 Apri l  1952.
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r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  as the ma jo r i ty  party was wel l known. Al l  ind icat ions
proved tha t  the Wafd, regardless of i t s  corrupt ion, had restored i t s
popu la r i ty ,  so the ancien regime would have to be done away w ith .
The Americans soon discovered that the dismissal o f the Wafd was
not the so lu t ion  fo r  Egypt's problems when they rea l ised tha t  Egypt had
begun a new chapter in i t s  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  character ised by quick changes
o f  government from January u n t i l  23 July 1952. Four cabinets fol lowed
each other in quick succession, one of them las t ing  only f o r  a day, and
i n s t a b i l i t y  was a l l  too apparent. Ambassador Caffery described the
s i tu a t ion  in a telegram to the State Department, saying tha t  "Egypt has
45entered once more in to  the type o f  musical cha i rs " .  "The sho r t - l i ved  
46governments" became outrageous, and the i n s t a b i l i t y  and i r r e g u l a r i t y
demonstrated the nature of Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  which had an impact on a l l
47
aspects o f Egyptian society .  In May 1952 th is  led Ambassador Caffery to 
re je c t  s trong ly  any idea of giv ing Egypt f inanc ia l  support from the World Bank 
Caf fe ry's a t t i t u d e  can be a t t r ib u te d  to the i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  the Egyptian 
s i tu a t ion  and also to his wi l l ingness to exert  pressure on the ancien 
regime - as the Americans did at the end o f  Mossadegh' sera in Iran - and 
to  allow i t  to f a l l  in to  an ir revocable decl ine, thus paving the way fo r  
new blood, which could be responsible f o r  the next stage o f  development, 
and would have the a b i l i t y  to work along l ines tha t  favoured Western
45. NA RG 84, 36, from Cairo to Secretary of State, 28 June 1952.
46. FO.371/9695 1952, B r i t i s h  Embassy, Cairo, to Foreign O f f ice ,  "Note 
on the economic aspects o f  the Anglo-Egyptian/American po l icy  
towards Egypt".
47. A l i  Amin, HakadhaTuhkam Misr , 2nd edn. (Dar Akhabar a!-Yum: Cairo 
1952), pp .172-88; NA RG 59 Box 5398, o f f i c e  memo. 28 January 1952, 
Economic Report f o r  w/e 25 January 1952. See also Box 5398, Economic 
Report f o r  w/e 16 March (17 March 1952). Also, FO.371/96956, 1952, 
Foreign O f f ice ,  14 March 1952, B r i t i sh  Embassy, Cairo, May 1952.
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i n te res ts .  The Egyptian s i tu a t ion  was such a f r u s t r a t i n g  one fo r  the
American government tha t  i t  played an important par t  in the American
48cabinet meeting discussions. They viewed Egypt as being " in  a state
4P
of  impasse". '  A l l  evidence showed that something was about to occur.
The Young Army O f f i c e rs
There were other elements that began to impose themselves on 
Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  and had t h e i r  own impact on the in ternal 
Egyptian s i tu a t io n .  On return ing from the Palest ine campaign in
50March 1949, most o f  the young o f f i c e rs  showed signs o f  b i t t e r  discontent.
Their  undisputed lo y a l ty  to the king began to be questioned in d i f fe re n t
c i r c le s .  I t  was known fo r  many years that the Egyptian army had been
used by the king as his praetor ian guard against predominantly c i v i l i a n  
51p o l i t i c i a n s ,  or any possible upheaval, but the Egyptian army's 
humil ia t ing  defeat in Palestine was a turn ing point not only in i t s
re la t ions  with and a t t i tu d e  towards the king, but also towards the
u i . 5 2  whole regime.
The American embassy in Cairo observed that by January 1949 the 
young army o f f i c e rs  had already begun to c i rcu la te  pamphlets voicing 
t h e i r  resentment a t the p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n ,  concluding tha t  "only an 
army can save Egypt and i t  should assume the largest ro le  in the coming
48. H.S. Truman L ib ra ry ,  Matthew J. Connelly, Notes on cabinet meetings, 
January 1952, 28 March-25 Apr i l  1952.
49. I b i d . ,  27 January 1952.
50. P.J. V a t i k i o t i s ,  The Egyptian Army in P o l i t i c s ,  p .59.
51. I b i d . ,  p . 6 6 .
52. Interviews with Mustafa Amin, Cairo; A1i Sabr i , Cairo.
Naguib, Kal imati  L i !  Tar ikh, p .25, Gama! Abd el-Nasser, The 
Phi1osophy of the Revolution, p. 1 1 - 1 2 .
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53renaissance". This development led the inner c i r c le  o f  the American
embassy in Cairo, three days l a t e r ,  to consider the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a
54m i l i t a r y  coup d 'e ta t  in Egypt. Although the idea o f  the rumoured
m i l i t a r y  overthrow had in fa c t  been shelved, the discontended army
o f f i c e rs  did not stop the c i r c u la t io n  o f  these pamphlets, which re f lec ted
55th e i r  resentment of the arms scandals and the whole p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n .
At the end o f  1950, the American embassy in Cairo began to c o l le c t  a
number of reports from re l i a b le  sources which indicated the increasing
gap between the young army o f f i c e rs  and the king. As th is  grew, i t  was
56hard fo r  the king to restore t h e i r  confidence. During that time the
Americans i d e n t i f i e d  three main issues which dominated the p o l i t i c a l
atmosphere of Egypt, namely the high cost o f l i v i n g ,  the Anglo-Egyptian
quest ion, and most important ly ,  the open t a l k  by ju n io r  army o f f i c e rs  
57of  a coup d ' e t a t . The American embassy in Cairo gradual ly  came to
the conclusion tha t  th is  group of army o f f i c e rs  was about to impose
58i t s e l f  upon Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  I t s  members were no longer
passive spectators of the p o l i t i c a l  scene, and i t  was concluded that
59"they must be watched as a potent ia l  source o f  a coup d ’ e t a t 11.. The 
fo l low ing year,  the State Department also s tar ted to pay greater  
a t ten t ion  to the Egyptian army s i tu a t io n .  This matter was one of the
53. NA RG 84 Box 206 F i le  350-1, Egypt, from American Embassy, Cairo, to 
Secretary o f  State, 15 January 1949, "Second Manifesto by the Army O f f ice rs '
54. I b i d . , to Patterson, M i l i t a r y  Attache, from P.J. Hal l a ,  18 January 1949, 
subject,  "Future de ta i ls  on rumoured m i l i t a r y  coup d ' e t a t ".
55. NA RG 59 Box 4014 774.00/7-2550, from American Embassy, Cairo, to 
Secretary of State, 25 June 1950, i b i d , 26 June 1950. Interviews with 
Abdel Monim Amin, Cairo, and Ihasan Alxlul Kuddus, Cairo.
56. NA RG 59 Box 4014 774 774.5/1/135, from American Embassy, Cairo, to  
Secretary o f  State, 13 November 1950, conversation with Gallad Pasha, 
i b i d . ,  6 October, to Department o f State, from Cairo, "Present 
atmosphere o f  I n s t a b i l i t y " .
57. I b i d . , Cairo No.1105, 11 November 1950, to Department of State, subject ,  
"Harold Hoskins' repor t  on the Middle East t r i p " .
58. I b i d . , Box 4026 774-551/9-1450, from Cairo to Department of State,
14 September 1950, "Army d is s a t is fa c t io n " ,  , ~ c+n4.„59. I b i d . ,  774-55/9-1450, from Cairo to Department of State,
11 September 1950.
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main issues in the exchange o f  top secret reports and telegrams between
fiflthe Department and the American embassies in Cairo and London. The
interna l  s i tu a t io n  in Egypt was worsening and the Cairo r i o t s  were ample
demonstration o f  th i s .  The American and B r i t i s h  embassies real ised tha t
61the army "has the s i tu a t ion  in hand at the present t ime".  The Cairo 
r i o t s  showed tha t  the Egyptian army was the most decisive fa c to r  in 
Egyptian in terna l  a f f a i r s .  The king was handicapped and the p o l i t i c a l  
par t ies  had proved t h e i r  i n a b i l i t y  to handle the s i tu a t io n .  A f te r  the 
Cairo r i o t s ,  the inner c i r c le  o f the American government showed i t s  
in te re s t  in Egyptian s t a b i l i t y ,  considering "the in terna l  securi ty  in 
Egypt to be o f  great in te res t  to US secur i ty  in te res ts  in the Near 
East " . 62
Al l  the developments which showed tha t  the army was the most powerful
element pushed American in te l l ige n ce  to contact the young army o f f i c e r s .
Abd el-Moneim el-Naggar, a m i l i t a r y  in te l l ige n ce  o f f i c e r  before the 1952
revo lu t ion ,  r e c a l l s ,  "The B r i t i s h  and Americans contacted the young army
o f f i c e r s ,  asking them about t h e i r  in tent ions and a t t i tudes  towards the
next stage". Abd el-Moneim Amin, a former member o f  the Revolutionary
63Command Council , re i te ra ted  th is  statement.
For the West the o f f i c e rs  were sympathetic to t h e i r  cause, and 
t h e i r  opposit ion to communism was crysta l  c lear  to American diplomatic
60. NA RG 59 Box 4014 774.00/3 2151, from London to Secretary of State,
No.957, 21 August 1951 (top secre t) .
61. PREM91/1T1952, from Cairo to Foreign O f f ice ,  telegram No.91, 27 January 
1952; F0.371/96870, 1951 , from Cairo to Foreign O f f i c e r ,  S i r  Ralph 
Stevenson, No.195, 27 November 1952. See also Baybars e l-D in ,
Fathi Radwan Yarwi Asrar Hukummat Yulyu, p . 101, al-Baghdadi, Mudhakkirat 
pp.43-4.
62. NA RG 59 Box 5384 874-50/5-652, memo, by Maj.-Gen.Olmsted to Secretary 
o f  State, 5 May 1952, "Training of Egyptian pol ice o f f i c e r s " .
63. Ahmad Hamrush, Shuhud Thawrat Yulyu, p .392; in terview with Abdil 
Monim Amin, Cairo,
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c i r c le s . * ^  This evaluation seemed to be confirmed by the various 
a r t i c le s  which had been w r i t ten  by General Fouad Saddek, who was 
considered a leader o f  the Free Of f icers by the West, in .Akhab&r 
al-Yom. 65
The r i f t  between the young army o f f i ce rs  and the king became wider 
and the c o n f l i c t  between the king 's  in terests  and the young army 
o f f i c e r s '  demands became more defined than before. The o f f i c e rs  did 
not hesitate to challenge the king openly in the o f f i c e r s '  club e le c t io n ,  
which was considered from the o f f i c e r s '  point of view as the f i r s t  tes t  
o f t h e i r  strength vis-ci-vis the king, and was described by Ahmed
fi fiHamrush as "publ ic  confrontat ion between the king and the Free o f f i c e r s " .  
The American embassy in Cairo, in one o f  i t s  secret telegrams to the 
State Department, showed i t s  sympathy f o r  the young army o f f i c e r s ,
"who general ly have a u n ive rs i ty  education and often an advanced degree 
in engineering and law", and at the end of the telegram the embassy made 
c lear  i t s  favouring o f  the young army o f f i c e r s '  candidates as opposed 
to the king's c h o ic e . ^
I t  is easy to understand how the American a u th o r i t ie s  were a t t rac ted  
by the straightforwardness o f  the army o f f i c e r s ,  who were less l i k e l y  
to give in to corrupt ion. I t  was more to the Americans' advantage to 
deal with the m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e rs  on account of t h e i r  army t ra in in g  to 
obey orders without ob ject ion. Furthermore, the group o f  army o f f i c e rs
64.. US For.Rel. Vol.V, 1950, pp.221-5: US General Pol icy in the Near
East, paper drafted by the o f f i ce rs  in charge o f  Egypt.
65. FO.371/96873, 1952, from War Off ice to Foreign O f f ice ,  record of 
conversation between m i l i t a r y  attache and Ahmed F. Saddek, Cairo,
1 January 1952. Also interview with Mustafa Amin.
6 6 . Interview with A l i  S ab r i , Cairo; Hamrush, Qissat Thourat 23 
y u l io ,  Vo l .1, p . 165.
67. NA RG 59 Box 4016 774-55/1, 1952, 19 January 1952, from Cairo to 
Department of State, " Incident concerning the Egyptian Army O f f i ce rs '  
Club annual e le c t io n " . .  ' . " „ " - - ' ,
In fact, the only young free officers who had a university 
education were Mohamed Naguib and Khalid Mohey el-Din.
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was l im i ted  in number, so i t  was easier to persuade them. Also, the 
army o f f i c e rs  did not argue too much between themselves, because argument 
requires presenting d i f f e r e n t  points o f view to be debated, accepted or 
re jected. On the other hand, the professional p o l i t i c i a n s  in the 
d i f f e re n t  p o l i t i c a l  par t ies were swayed by t h e i r  vo te rs ,  by t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  s i tua t ion  and previous commitments to t h e i r  supporters. The 
army o f f i c e r s ,  in th is  case, did not have such commitments, nor a c lear  
a t t i tu d e  towards the people except in the manifestos which re f le c te  
t h e i r  own discontent.
I t  is c lea r ,  then, tha t  the American a u th o r i t ie s  looked towards the 
m i l i t a r y  establishment in Egypt to achieve at least  par t  o f  American 
po l ic ies  in Egypt. Furthermore, the p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere in Egypt did 
not encourage the American embassy to take any act ive  measures to support 
the c i v i l i a n  elements in restor ing the p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  was 
understandable from t h e i r  previous experience tha t  i t  was hard fo r  them 
to support any reforming c i v i l i a n  group vis-et-vis the Wafd, which had 
gained a great deal o f  popu la r i ty  on account o f  i t s  abrogation o f  the 
1936 t rea ty  and i t s  re jec t ion  o f  the Four-Power proposals, thus making 
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  any other c i v i l i a n  power to compete with  the Wafd in 
popu la r i ty ,  regardless o f  i t s  corrupt ion.
Nevertheless, the Americans did not hesitate to contact some of the 
c i v i l i a n s  who demonstrated t h e i r  eagerness fo r  reform and t h e i r  re jec t ion  
o f  the corrupt ion o f  the regime. However, these elements rejected 
any p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  deal ing with the Americans on the grounds tha t  
"they advocated the monarchical regime and were not going to  work
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against i t ;  simultaneously, they were not ready to accept American
68condit ions f o r  land reform".
So the Americans found that i t  was in t h e i r  in te res ts  to look fo r
an a l te rn a t ive  in someone or some group who would accept t h e i r
condit ions and achieve th e i r  ends. These e f f o r t s ,  in addi t ion to those
mentioned above, def ine the Americans' a t t i tu d e  towards the professionals
in Egypt. This became c lear ,  when Dr. Ahmed Husayn, the former Wafd
m in is te r ,  t r i e d  very hard to induce them to support a "popular reform
government". The American embassy was f i rm  in showing i t s  reluctance
to take fu r th e r  steps in the Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  game, declar ing that
69"the US is not in the game o f  making or breaking governments". At 
the end o f  th i s  conversation between Dr. Husayn and the representative 
o f the American embassy in Cairo, the l a t t e r  asked about the re la t ions 
between the king and the young army o f f i c e rs .  Dr. Husayn confirmed to 
him h.is knowledge tha t  the "young army o f f i ce rs  hate the k i n g " . ^
Theo re t ica l ly ,  the re fo rmis t p o l i t i c i a n s  in Egypt, and those against 
the regime, showed th e i r  eagerness fo r  a change, which would face up to 
communist penetra t ion, but p ra c t i c a l l y ,  i t  was u n r e a l i s t i c  to achieve 
tha t  without s a c r i f i c i n g  the whole p o l i t i c a l  regime, which was inconsis tent 
with t h e i r  po in t o f view. Nevertheless, a few of these c i v i l i a n  
elements, l i k e  Dr. Ahmed Husayn and the newspaper publ isher Mustafa 
Amin understood American object ives and aims in Egypt. They real ised that
‘ 6 8 . Ahmed Hamrush, Shuhud ThouratYul ia, Mustafa Merai to Hamrush,
Vol.V, 4, p .458.
69. NA RG 59 Box 4014 774/001/10. 551, from Cairo, No.882, October 1951, 
to Department of State, Continued a c t i v i t i e s  o f  former Min is te r  of 
of Social A f f a i r s .
70. I b i d . , p .4.
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the Americans were looking fo r  new forces that were not p o l i t i c a l l y
corrupt or who were prepared to reform the social  system. They sought
new players who were not loyal to the king or to the t ra d i t i o n a l
p o l i t i c a l  pa r t ies .
Kermit Roosevelt confirmed to the researcher tha t  Ahmed Husayn
and Amin contacted him secre t ly  at the end o f  1951 and t r i e d  to induce
him to meet " the representat ive of the discontented young army o f f i c e r s " .
Roosevelt was re luc tan t  to do th is  since his government, especia l ly
before the Cairo r i o t s ,  s t i l l  hoped that the Wafd would ease the tension,
and that the king remained a f r iend of the United States, Therefore,
they did not see any need to take any covert act ion to topple him at
th is  stage, or to support his opponents. Despite a l l  t h i s ,  Kermit
Roosevelt began to c o l le c t  some information about the discontented young
army o f f i c e r s ,  and did not close the door completely on fu r th e r  contacts
71with Husayn and Amin.
The Cairo r i o t s  const i tu ted a turn ing poin t in Egyptian p o l i t i c a l
l i f e ,  as ne ither  the king nor the Wafd were able to control  the s i tu a t io n ,
and the Americans began to th ink  seriously about a ro le  fo r  the army in 
72p o l i t i c s .  This assessment by the American and B r i t i s h  diplomatic
missions in Cairo was the key fac to r  behind Kermit Roosevelt 's t r i p  to
Egypt where he stayed f o r  three months. During his stay in Cairo, he
t r ie d  to induce the king to achieve a peaceful revo lu t ion  by i n i t i a t i n g
land reform, but the k ing 's  reluctance to accept Roosevelt 's advice was
73the beginning of the end o f  his ro le .
71. Interv iew with Kermit Roosevelt, Washington, D.C., 1984.
72. FO.371/96879, 1952, from Cairo to Foreign O f f ice ,  S i r  Ralph 
Stevenson, No.195, 27 January 1952.
73. Interv iew with Kermit Roosevelt; al-Maraghi,  o p . c i t . ,  pp .195-6.
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The Early Relations between the CIA and the Free Of f icers
The American in te l l ige n ce  service began to look fo r  other p o l i t i c a l
actors who had the a b i l i t y  to handle the s i tu a t io n .  Most o f  the
scholars and w r i te rs  were not able to substant iate the theory tha t  there
were previous contacts between the Free Of f icers and the Americans before
the coup d 'e ta t  o f  23 July 1952. This is the view held by Mohammed
Heika l,  Nasser's f r iend  and conf idant,  who asserted tha t  the re la t ionsh ip
between the USA and the m i l i t a r y  sta r ted on the n ight of the revolu t ion 
74and not before. Moreover, Mohammed Naguib, the nominal leader o f
the jun ta ,  asserted that the Free Of f icers contacted the American embassy
through A l i  Sabri on the eve o f  the revo lu t ion ,  to ask the embassy to
75inform the B r i t i s h  tha t  the coup was purely an internal a f f a i r .  On
the other hand, Miles Copeland, a former CIA agent, maintained in his
book The Game of Nat ions, tha t  Kermit Roosevelt did everything in his
power to pave the way fo r  a strong leader to assume con t ro l .  Copeland
asserts tha t  Kermit Roosevelt held meetings with selected members of the
76Free Of f icers as ear ly  as March 1952. Various sources have confirmed
th is  s to ry . In an in terv iew with the researcher, Kermit Roosevelt, the
head o f  the Middle East section in the CIA, said tha t  " in  December 1951,
Nasser contacted them through Mustafa Amin and Ahned Husayn and was
therefore known to the American in te l l ige n ce  services as the leader o f  the
77Free O f f ice rs '  o rganisat ion" .
74. Mohamed Heikal,  Cairo Documents, p .34; h i s  B ook^  Nahnu wa Amrika
75. Mohamed Naguib, Egypt's Dest iny, p p . i 18-9.
76. Copeland, Game of Nat ions, pp.51-3; Hamrush, o p . c i t . ; Maraghi, 
o p . c i t . , p."2 0 0 .
77. Interview with Kermit Roosevelt, Washington, D.C., 1984.
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Mustafa Amin stated to the researcher tha t he "had met Nasser f o r
the f i r s t  time a f te r  the Palest ine war at one o f  the o f f i c e r s '  par t ies
which had been held in honour o f  those o f f i ce rs  who had fought in
Palest ine".  During the par ty ,  Mustafa Amin noticed tha t  there was a
big d i f fe rence between Nasser and his colleagues, and tha t  they respected
him more than anyone else, although he was not of the highest rank amongst
them. In his discussions with Nasser, the l a t t e r  mentioned that
"corrupt ion is everywhere and the so lut ion is not to be sought in words 
78but in deeds". A f te r  th a t ,  Mustafa Amin wrote a long a r t i c l e  in
79Akhbar al-Youm on 9 September 1951, e n t i t le d  "Looking f o r  a Leader".
This information is  consistent with Roosevelt 's s tory about Amin's
l ia is o n  between him and the Free O f f ice rs ,  and th is  is also confirmed in
Mohamed Heika l 's  book, Bain al Saha.fa fa wa al-Si,yasah. One may term th is
stage which extends from 1951 to March 1952 as the period of overtures
or i n i t i a l  contacts between the two sides. The CIA knew about the
Free O f f i ce rs ,  and the Free Of f icers  had t h e i r  covert  contacts with them
through secret mediators.
A f te r  the de te r io ra t ion  o f  the in terna l s i t u a t i o n ,  the CIA agents had,
by March 1952, resumed th e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  in Egypt. This time Kermit
Roosevelt knew more about the Free Of f icers :  f o r  example, t h e i r  names,
80th e i r  a t t i tudes  and in ten t ions .  At the same t ime, the Free Of f icers
drafted the movement's famous s ix  p r in c ip le s ,  thus at least proclaiming
81the aims o f  t h e i r  intended revo lu t ion .  According to  Khaled Moheidin,
78. Interv iew with Mustafa Amin, Cairo, 28 January 1985.
79. Akhbar al-Youm, 9 September 1951.
80. Interv iew with Kermit Roosevelt (as above).
81. P.J. V a t i k i o t i s ,  Nasser and his Generat ion, p . 107.
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the l e f t i s t  o f f i c e r  and former member o f  the RCC, Nasser asked him to
omit any mention of the Americans and to concentrate on the B r i t i s h  in
the publ icat ions o f  propaganda fo r  the movement. Nasser asked him
not to al lude to  any l inks  in the pamphlets between American and B r i t i s h
82imperial ism, since he was keen to avoid American anger at th is  stage.
We may assume th a t  in March 1952 Nasser had not met Kermit
Roosevelt personal ly .  This is  not to deny the b i l a te ra l  re la t ions
83between the two sides dependent upon secret mediations. Then, i f  
we compare Khaled's statement to tha t  by Hamrush to the e f fe c t  that 
Nasser, since March, was keen to woo the Americans with Kermit Roosevelt 's 
statement to the researcher tha t by March 1952 he knew more about the 
Free O f f i ce rs '  organisat ion, we w i l l  see that Nasser, to some extent,  
began to move in two p o l i t i c a l  d i rec t ions .  He t r i e d  to in te n s i fy  his 
campaign against the B r i t i s h  occupation and the regime's corrupt ion in 
order to gain popular support f o r  his movement. Further ,  he developed 
his re la t ions  with American in te l l ige n ce  through "secret channels" in 
order to  c u r ta i l  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  in ter fe rence on 
behalf  of  the king and the ancien regime. An examination o f  the reasons 
fo r  Nasser's ta c t i c s  leads us to discover that he t r i e d  to re ly  on the 
Americans se c re t ly ,  but was at the same time careful  not to l i n k  the 
movement with Anglo-American imperial ism, since tha t  would have been in 
contrad ic t ion  with t h e i r  images, namely, "the destruct ion of co lon ia l ism".
The Americans understood th is  very w e l l ,  and Kermit Roosevelt 
established close contacts and conducted exploratory  ta lks  with Nasser's
82. Hamrush, Vo l .4, p . 150; Hamrush, Vo l .1, p .187.
83. Interv iew with Kermit Roosevelt, Washington, D.C., 1984.
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group in secret.  I t  is  a combination of reasons, ra ther  than one 
alone tha t  explains why both sides t r i e d  to keep t h e i r  contacts secret.
I t  was a f te r  a l l  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  someone l i k e  Kermit Roosevelt, known as
84 85a CIA agent to Egyptian secu r i ty ,  and under t h e i r  su rve i l lance ,  to
approach the discontented army o f f i c e rs  d i r e c t l y  and openly at f i r s t ,
espec ia l ly  since the l a t t e r  were considered the most powerful opposit ion
elements in Egypt. Any kind of open contact would have led to the
a l iena t ion  of the sovereign on the grounds that i t  would have been seen
as American in terference in Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s .  The discovery
o f  these contacts would have complicated American-Egyptian re la t ions  at
a time when i t  was necessary to include Egypt in Western defence pacts.
Moreover, there is  no comparison between Roosevelt 's task in Iran against
Mossadegh and his mission in Cairo. In Iran he t r i e d  to help the Shah to
restore his au tho r i ty  v is -a -v is  Mossadegh. In the Egyptian case, he was
p lo t t i n g  against the sovereign and his leg i t imate  au th o r i ty .  As fo r  the
consp i ra to rs , i t  was d i f f i c u l t  fo r  them to have d i re c t  contacts with
fore ign in te l l igence  agents fo r  fear  tha t  i t  would lead to the discovery
o f  t h e i r  conspiracy. Some of them were known fo r  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s
86against the monarchy, espec ia l ly  since the O f f ice rs '  Club e lect ions.
87Furthermore, some o f  them were under su rve i l lance. Thus both the 
Americans and the o f f i c e rs  had to be cautious in t h e i r  contacts.
84. Although Roosevelt came to Egypt at tha t  time as a p o l i t i c a l  adviser 
to the President,  he was known to Egyptian secur i ty  c i rc le s  as a CIA 
agent. See al-Maraghi,  o p . c i t . , pp .199-200, in terv iew with Ibrahim.F. 
(Messiha) Pasha.
85. Murtada al-Maraghi asked his secur i ty  o f f i c e rs  to observe American 
businessmen's a c t i v i t i e s  in Egypt, and to put Kermit Roosevelt 
under surve i l lance. I b i d . , pp.200.
8 6 . Hamrush, Qissat Thoyrat 23 Y u l ia , Vol.1 , pp.143-7.
87. Interviewswith Al i Sabri , Cairo', 6 February 1985 and Abdil Monim Amin, 
Cairo, 21 January 1985; Hamrush, o p . c i t . , pp .146-7, 192.
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Nasser's Tactics to avoid the Discovery o f  his Conspiracy
As a leader o f the Free O f f i c e rs '  organisat ion, Nasser was keen
not to take any open act ion which would lead to the discovery of his
ro le .  He reported p u b l i c ly  on 23 July 1953 tha t  in the summer of 1949
the premier, Ibrahim abd e l-Hadi,  accused him of unlawful p o l i t i c a l
a c t i v i t i e s  in the presence o f  General Osman Mahdi, the army ch ie f  o f  
88s t a f f .  I t  thus became unsafe fo r  him, or fo r  any of those in the 
inner c i r c le  o f  the Free O f f ice rs '  organisat ion, to contact the Americans
89openly since they were under the survei l lance of various secur i ty  forces.
He therefore chose some o f f i c e rs  and publ ic  f igures from amongst those
whose lo y a l t y  to the king and the status quo were unquestioned to make
these contacts. One of these was A l i  Sabr i , the ch ie f  o f  a i r  force
90in te l l ig e n ce  and a member of a wealthy fami ly .  Sabr i 's  pos it ion and
his social  background were of great advantage to the movement. King
Farouk t rus ted Sabri enough during his b i t t e r  dispute with the discontented
young army o f f i c e r s  over the O f f i ce rs '  Club e lec t ions ,  to nominate him
91as a member o f  the governing board of the Club on 17 Ju ly ,  assuming 
th a t  the trusted in te l l ige n ce  o f f i c e r  was not going to betray him as his 
predecessor had done. Murtada al-Maraghi, the M in is te r  o f  I n te r i o r  and 
War, pointed out in his memoirs tha t  A l i  Sabri doublecrossed him and did 
not give him any information about the Free O f f ice rs '  movements, an 
omission tha t  was inconsistent with his pos it ion as ch ie f  o f a i r  force
8 8 . Hamrush, o p . c i t . , V o l . I ,  p . 138. See also P.J. V a t i k i o t i s ,  The 
Egyptian Army in P o l i t i c s , p .60.
89. I b i d . ,  p .62; H am ru sh o p . c i t . , pp.137-8; Naguib K a l im a t i , Li 1 
T e r ikh , pp.28-9.
90. Gal 1al Keshk, Kal imati  1 , 1 -mughaffal in,  pp.11-12. See also Maraghi, 
o p . c i t . , pp .156-7.
91. Hamrush, o p . c i t . , V o l . I I ,  p . 188.
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in te l l i g e n c e .  Thus Maraghi preferred to re ly  upon the p o l i t i c a l  pol ice
to keep t h e i r  eye on those he suspected.
As usual, normal regular contacts between the in te l l ig e n ce  services
92o f  the f r i e n d ly  s ta tes ,  Egypt and the USA, existed at tha t  t ime.
Through his pos i t ion ,  there fore ,  Al i Sabri had good re la t ions  with Colonel
David Evans, the American a i r  force attache who concentrated his a t ten t ion
on the j u n io r  army o f f i c e r s ,  considering them to be the source of any
93p o l i t i c a l  upheaval tha t  might occur. Sabri and Evans exchanged 
information about the status quo and the young o f f i c e r s 1 a t t i tu d e s .
Whether Sabri gave Evans de ta i ls  o f  the Free O f f i ce rs '  organisat ion or no 
i s  not important.  What was o f  great advantage to the revo lu t ionary  
elements was knowing the extent to which the Americans would accept t h e i r  
movement. Advance knowledge of American a t t i tudes  and reactions 
towards the projected coup d 'e ta t  would give the movement some kind of 
guarantee against any possible counter-a ttack. On the other hand, i t  
gave the Americans the opportunity  to gain a grasp o f  Egyptian in terna l 
a f f a i r s ,  and the p o l i t i c a l  and ideological background o f  the revo lu t ionary 
elements. Thus the exploratory contacts which took place e a r l i e r  helped 
both sides to  some extent to assess t h e i r  respect ive posit ions f o r  what 
was to come l a t e r .
The second mediator between the Free Off icers and American 
in te l l ig e n ce  was Colonel Abd el-Moneim Amin. An examination o f  the 
reasons fo r  Amin's mediation helps us to understand his success in the
92. P.J. V a t i k i o t i s ,  Nasser and his Generat ion, p . 108.
93. Interview with Colonel Evans, Washington, D.C. 17 December 1984.
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94task he undertook. Amin's appearance and his wealth did not lead
anyone to suspect tha t  he was working to topple the s o c io -p o l i t i c a l
system. He had good connections with the Americans and as A l i  Sabri
pointed out to the researcher, "Amin had good re la t ions  with Mr. Lakeland,
95the CIA o f f i c e r  in the American Embassy in Cairo".  This raises an 
important question. Was there any connection between Lakeland and the 
revolut ion? In the l e t t e r  from Mustafa Amin to Nasser we f in d  tha t  
"Lakeland, who was working under the cover o f his d ip lomat ic  immunity, 
protected the revo lu t ion  by sending a secret telegram on 23 July to 
Dean Acheson, confirming tha t  he knew of the revo lu t ionary  elements
and denying any re la t io n  between them and the communist organisat ions
c . ii 96 in Egypt".
I f  we compare Amin's statement with the account o f  A l i  Sabri,  we 
f in d  tha t  i t  is  consistent with the l a t t e r ' s  asser t ion th a t  "Nasser 
contacted the Americans through in te rmed iar ies" ,  which to some extent 
confirms Abd el-Monim Amin's ro le  as a middle-man. Amin's wealth and 
his social  prest ige provided a good cover under which he was able to 
contact the Americans without arousing any suspicions concerning the 
nature of his re la t ionsh ip  with them. Needless to say, Nasser u t i l i s e d  
to the f u l l  Amin's p r iv i leged  posit ion  in order to achieve his goals.
94. Interview with Abil Monim Amin, and in terv iew with Mustafa Amin. 
When Sadat became president,  he t r i e d  to e x p lo i t  Amin's previous 
re la t ions  with the Americans by asking him to renew his approaches 
to the Americans secre t ly  in order to improve American-Egyptian 
re la t ions  a f te r  1971. Interv iew with Abdi1 Monim Amin. See also 
Abdullah Imam, Engilab 15 Mayo, p . 157.
95. Interv iew with A l i  Sabr i .
96. Heikal Bein, Al Saih afa wa a l-S iyasa, p . 188.
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I t  also explains why Nasser had chosen him to be a member o f  the
Revolutionary Command Council although he was not a founder member of
97the Free O f f icers '  movement.
Nasser used the regular contacts between the American in te l l i ge n ce
service and the Egyptian one, fo r  example, in choosing Abd el-Monim e l -
98Naggar, an Egyptian in te l l igence  o f f i c e r ,  who was re la ted to Queen
Narriman. He was therefore u n l i ke ly  to be suspected. From time to
time Naggar asserted to the Egyptian queen that according to his
information the Free Of f icers were working to support the king, not to 
99get r id  o f him.
The fourth  intermediary was Hassan el-Tohami, whose ro le  is  mentioned 
in most o f  the published and unpublished sources as a mediator between 
Nasser and the CIA before and a f te r  the r e v o l u t i o n , ^  and who also 
played the same ro le  under Sadat, Nasser's successor.
The Egyptian M i l i t a r y  Mission to the United States
Leaving aside the story of the re la t ionsh ip  which existed between the 
Free Of f icers  and the American CIA, d i re c t  contacts took place between the 
Egyptian m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e rs  and American m i l i t a r y  s t a f f ,  which were to have
th e i r  e f fe c t  upon the Egyptian army o f f i c e r s '  image of and a t t i tudes  to ,
+ , . . .  101the ancien regime.
97. P.J. V a t i k io t i s ,  The Egyptian Army in P o l i t i c s , Table 1, pp.47-8. In 
his tab le, V a t i k io t i s  mentions that there were eleven founder members 
of the Free O f f i c e r ' s  movement, and Naguib was not one of them. I f
we added Amin, we would f ind  tha t  neither  of them was a founder member,
but they la te r  became members of the RCC.
98. Interviews with A l i  Sabri , Hamrush, Abd e l-Fat tah Abu e l-Fade l ,  the
former Deputy D irecto r  of Egyptian In te l l igence  Service, London 1985.
99. Murtada al-Maraghi, o p . c i t . , pp .191-3.
100. Miles Copeland, The Game o f  Nat ions; Eveland, Ropes of Sand; Hamrush, 
V o l . I ;  interviews with A l i  Sabri, Abdi1 Monim Amin, Ahmed Hamrush, 
Kermit Roosevelt, and Mustafa Amin.
101. Interview with Colonel David Evans.
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In 1950, Egypt star ted a new m i l i t a r y  t ra in in g  programme, espec ia l ly
102a f te r  the B r i t i s h  withdrew th e i r  m i l i t a r y  mission from Egypt in 1949.
103Egypt then sent 300 o f  i t s  m i l i t a r y  o f f i ce rs  to the USA. The American
government encouraged th is  po l icy  by o f fe r ing  some vacancies in i t s
104advanced m i l i t a r y  schools to the Egyptian o f f i c e rs .  In view o f  the
escalation of the Cold War and weakening of the B r i t i s h  pos i t ion  in 
Egypt, as well as the consequence of th e i r  w i l l ingness to safeguard 
Western s t ra teg ic  needs in Egypt, fo l lowing the Truman Doctr ine, the 
American policy-makers were anxious to strengthen re la t ions  with Egypt.
With the de te r io ra t ion  of Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s ,  the US was keen to
105avoid any p o s s ib i l i t y  o f Soviet-Egypt ian contacts in the m i l i t a r y  f i e l d .
The US was also motivated by a desire to c u r ta i l  any communist penetrat ion
in to  the area. This inspired the Americans to add a secret item to the
Four-Point programme agreement whereby Egypt was allowed to send i ts
i nfim i l i t a r y  s t a f f  on a t ra in ing  programme to the USA. In re turn fo r  the
above, Egypt had signed the “ Batt le  Act L is ts "  which forbade Egypt from 
"exporting any ba t t le  items to the Soviet count r i es" . Ever since tha t  
po l icy  was formal ised, Egypt continued to send large numbers of i t s  
m i l i t a r y  o f f i ce rs  to the USA. According to American papers, Egypt sent 
more than f i f t y  o f f i ce rs  from d i f f e re n t  branches to study there, where they
102. P.J. V a t i k i o t i s ,  Nasser and his Generation, p . 106.
103. Interview with David Evans, Washington, D.C., 17 December 1984.
104. NA RG 59 Box 24023 774-5/5-251, from American Embassy, Cairo, to 
State Department (top secret).
105. Interview with Ibrahim Faraj, the former Wafd m in is te r :  “The US did 
i t s  best, especia l ly  a f te r  the abrogation o f  the 1936 Treaty to 
prevent Egypt from asking the Soviet Union fo r  m i l i t a r y  aid which 
would be fol lowed by the a r r iv a l  of  m i l i t a r y  experts".
106. NA RG 84 Egypt 500 1953-1955, from American Embassy, Cairo, to 
Department of State, Washington, 4 March 1953.
107. NA RG 59, to American Embassy, Cairo, from Department o f  State,
11 January 1952, NA RG 59 Box 5367 874/Q0TA/2-2 352, from Cairo to 
Secretary of State, 23 February 1952.
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were impressed by the American way of l i f e  and began to compare the
108dif ference between t h e i r  commanders and those of the Americans.
A few months before the revo lu t ion ,  the US offered the Egyptian
m i l i t a r y  students a new posit ion w ith in  the American m i l i t a r y  schools,
which were normally given only to o f f i ce rs  of NATO countr ies. A l i  Sabri,
the Egyptian a i r  force o f f i c e r ,  one of the Free O f f ice rs ,  was given that
opportuni ty.  He attended a six-month in te l l igence  course at Colorado
a i r  force base where he became q u a l i f ied  to be the Chief of In te l l igence
109in the Egyptian a i r  force upon his return to Egypt. The American
government made a s im i la r  o f fe r  to Captain Essam M. Khal i l  (Free O f f ice r )
who sho r t ly  a f te r  his return home fol lowed in A l i  Sabr i 's  foots teps,  and
was nominated his ass is tant ,  l a te r  replacing him when Sabri was given
new r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  under Nasser's r e g i m e . ^
I t  is d i f f i c u l t  to establ ish the exact number o f Free Of f icers  who
went to the US before the revo lu t ion. Most of the books and o r ig ina l
sources do not l i s t  them. None of the sources which e x is t  have been
111substant iated. Nevertheless, we shal l compare Baghdadi's l i s t  and tha t  
112of Hamrush, with the American sources which mention the o f f i c e r s '  
names. In doing so, we f ind  tha t  at least six out o f f i f t y  o f  the 
o f f i c e rs  who were attending courses in the American schools were members 
of the Free O f f ice rs '  movement; fo r  example, Moslim Mahmud Nofa l ,
Galal Mohammed Ibrahim Zeid, A l i  Samir e l -T a rz i ,  Captain Tahar Zak i ,
Youssef Saudi and Abd el-Monim Soleiman el-Assar.
108. NA RG 59 Box 4026 774-551/8-452, from Cairo to Department o f  State,
4 August 1952 (meeting between Major Al i Sabri and Col.D. Evans); 
in terv iew with David Evans, Washington, D.C., December 1984.
109. Interv iew with A l i  Sabri , Cairo, February 1985. Also see NA RG Box 4019 
774/111/2-551 CS/E, from Egyptian Embassy, Washington, to Department
of State, December 1951.
110. Yaccov Caroz, The Arab Secret Service, pp.20-1.
111. Baghdadi, op. c i t . ,  V o l . I I .
112. Hamrush, o p . c i t . , Vo l . V I (5).
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The American sources do not give too much assistance to a researcher
looking fo r  the o f f i c e r s '  names. For example, in the "Top Secret"
correspondence between the American embassy in Cairo and the State
Department, no mention is made of the names of the o f f i c e r s .  This is
c lear  in one of Caf fery's  telegrams in which he says, " I t  is noted tha t
several a i r  force o f f i ce rs  have recent ly  been receiving t ra in in g  in the
113USAF schools, and each of them has an excel lent record". In August
1141951, he restated the same pos it ion .  I t  is therefore d i f f i c u l t  to
estab l ish the id e n t i t y  of the o f f i c e r s ,  and whether they were members of
the Free Of f icers  or not. Despite t h i s ,  Abdil Monim Amin, the former
RCC member, confirmed to the researcher that Hassan Ibrahim and Abdel
L a t i f  Baghdadi, both members of the RCC, received t h e i r  t ra in in g  in the
115USA before the revo lu t ion.  We may assume tha t  even i f  they were not
approached by the American in te l l igence  serv ice, they were impressed by the 
American s ty le  o f  l i f e  as the others were. Furthermore, Gamal Salem, 
one of the founder members of the Free O f f ice rs ,  went to the USA fo r  
medical treatment. While he was recuperating, he studied land reform
1 1 f \
and demonstrated his in te res t  in the American way of l i f e .  I t  is
c lear  that a t least three RCC members out o f eleven of the execut ive 
committee of the Free O f f ice rs '  movement had been to the USA fo r  d i f f e r e n t  
reasons. I f  we add A l i  Sabri to them, we f ind  that four  of the key f igures 
in the revolu t ion were in the USA shor t ly  before the revo lu t ion  took place.
113. NA RG 59 Box 4023 774.5/5-251 (top secre t) ,  from American Embassy, 
Cairo, to Department o f State, 2 May 1951.
114. I b i d . , 774.00(W) 8551, from Cairo to USHA (top secre t ) ,  to State 
Department, 5 August 1951.
115. Interv iew with Col. Abdil Monim Amin.
116. F0.371/96986, 1952, B r i t i s h  Embassy, Cairo, 20 September 1952, to 
Foreign O f f ice ;  NA RG 59 Box 4019 774.01/11/12-551 CS/E, from 
Egyptian Embassy, Washington, D.C., to Department of State,
1 December 1951.
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The American insp i ra t ion  and impact on the revo lu t ionary  elements
in the Egyptian forces was viewed as most important by A l i  Sabr i ,  a close
f r iend  of David Evans, when he stated to Evans, "The attendance of many
Egyptian o f f i ce rs  at US service schools during the past two years has had
a very d e f in i te  inf luence on the coup d 'e ta t  in Egypt, and a f te r  a whi le ,
the o f f i c e r s '  decision was made to take action w i th in  the army, to r i d
the armed forces of corrupt ion and i n e f f i c ie n c y " . ^ ' 7
A combination of reasons oriented the Egyptians, and espec ia l ly  the
young army o f f i c e r s ,  from l ieutenants to 1 ieu tenant-co lone ls , towards
favouring the USA. One of these was that in a l l  of  i t s  h is to ry ,  the USA
had not had any colonia l  ambitions in the Middle East region, and had not
t r i e d  to gain a foothold in Arab countr ies, as had France and B r i ta in .
Since the Second World War, American propaganda had had i t s  e f fec ts  upon
the Egyptians. The US began to e xp lo i t  the s i tua t ion  by in te ns i fy in g
i t s  propaganda in the area, presenting the US as a supporter o f  democracy
118and freedom throughout the world. The American image a t t rac ted  the
a t ten t ion  of the Egyptian people who were keen to gain American support 
in t h e i r  b a t t le  against' the B r i t i s h  who were considered as t h e i r  ch ie f  
enemy because of t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  presence in the Canal base, and t h e i r  
refusal to accept Egyptian demands fo r  t h e i r  evacuation o f  the Ni le Val ley.
The lower- and middle-ranking o f f i ce rs  always had bad memories of 
and b i t t e r  fee l ing  towards the B r i t i s h  M i l i t a r y  Mission, which had been 
in charge o f  t h e i r  t ra in ing  u n t i l  1949. The fee l ing  of humil ia t ion
117. NA RG 59 Box 4026 774.55/8-452, from American Embassy, Cairo, to 
Department o f State, 4 August 1952 (secre t ) ,  memo, of conversation 
between A l i  Sabri and David Evans.
118. Mohamed Heikal,  Nahnu wa Amrika, p .55.
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which resulted from the B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  presence in Egypt had escalated
and spread among the young army o f f i c e r s ,  who considered the B r i t i s h
presence to be the main reason behind the weakness of the Egyptian army
119and the ignorance of t h e i r  senior o f f i c e rs .
The Egyptians in general, and the young o f f i c e rs  in p a r t i c u la r ,  did
not consider the USA to be the main outside power responsible fo r  t h e i r
defeat and humil ia t ion  in the Palest ine war of 1948. They viewed the
B r i t i s h  as being responsible fo r  the d isaster ,  since they considered that
120i t  was the l a t t e r ' s  po l icy  which led to the Palest ine c r i s i s .  On
the Palest inian b a t t l e f i e ld s  the Egyptian army o f f i c e rs  also discovered
that there were regular Soviet troops f ig h t in g  against them among the 
121Jewish troops. This doubtless alienated Egyptian army o f f i c e rs  from
the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. The young Egyptian o f f i c e rs  
ne ither fo rgot nor forgave th e i r  defeat in the Palest ine war, which was 
considered a turn ing point in t h e i r  hos t i le  a t t i tudes  towards the ancien 
regime and the B r i t i s h  occupation.
In reassessing t h e i r  pos i t ion ,  the American policy-makers f u l l y  
understood tha t  the army was the only power which could change the status 
quo. The young army o f f i c e rs  became the potent ia l  source of upheaval, 
fo r  they no longer supported the monarchy. The king was no longer a 
symbol of national sovereignty and d ign i ty  fo r  them as he was before 
1942. The re la t ions  between them and the king reached a po int of no 
return a f te r  t h e i r  triumph over his candidates in the O f f i ce rs '  Club 
elect ions in December 1951, and th is  triumph was considered the
119. Ahmed Hamrush, Qissat Thourat 23 Yul i a ,pp. 9 1 . 1 3 7  ^Naguib, Kal imati  l i l  
Tar ikh , p .22; in terview with Abdil Monim Amin, Cairo; e l -R a fa i ,  
M u g a d d im a t  Thourat 23 Y u l ia , pp.165-66.
120. Heikal, Nahnu wa Amrika, p .56.
121. WNRC RG Central Records of the Department of State, Decimal F i le ,  
1945-49, Control 2709, 5 February 1949, from Cairo to Department of 
State, Army Message No.5 (secret ) .
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beginning of the end of the monarchy in Egypt. Their  v ic to ry  was
122viewed by the Americans as an ind ica t ion  that King Farouk had lo s t  
his leg i t imacy as ru le r  of Egypt.
The young o f f i c e r s '  social  and p o l i t i c a l  background inf luenced t h e i r  
a t t i tu d e  towards the Wafd and other p o l i t i c a l  pa r t ies .  The lower-middle- 
class o f f i ce rs  had been impressed by the p o l i t i c a l  concepts and p r inc ip les  
of the Young Egypt movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, as wel l as 
communist groups. Furthermore, the de te r io ra t ing  p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t ion
123to some extent defined th e i r  a t t i tude  towards the Wafd and the others.
The Road to Revolution
The sequence of events moved rap id ly .  The dismissal of the Wafd
in January 1952 brought A l i  Maher's government to the fo re ,  but i t
lasted only a short  t ime, and by March 1952, Naguib e l-H i  1a l i , the former
124Wafd d iss ident ,  had succeeded Al i  Maher. The composition o f  e l -
H i l a l i ' s  government was appreciated by the American ambassador in Cairo.
In Caffery 's  view, " H i l a l i ' s  government is composed of honest p a t r i o t i c
men favourable to the Western world in general, and the US in 
125p a r t i c u la r " .  The State Department was equal ly o p t im is t i c ,  considering
i  n r
e l - H i l a l i  as the only one who could save Egypt from corrupt ion.
The e l - H i l a l i  government fo r  i t s  par t ,  t r i e d  to woo the Americans in 
d i f f e r e n t  ways, by putt ing the purge of Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  at the 
top o f  i t s  agenda.
122. Interview with David Evan's, Washington, D.C., 1985.
123. P.J. V a t i k i o t i s ,  Nasser, p . 114; see also Hamrush, Qissat Thowrat 
23 Y u l ia , pp .149-51, 244.
124. Mousa Sabri , o p . c i t . ,  pp.66-7.
125. NA RG 84 Box 4015 774.00/7-152, 1 July 1952, from Cairo to 
Secretary of State (secret) .
126. NA RG 84 Box 22 1  Folder 320.1, Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s ,  from 
Secretary of State, to Cairo, 21 July 1952.
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Nevertheless, in s i t u . Ambassador Caffery, instead of supporting
these re fo rmis t elements, l e t  the government f a l l  over i t s  f a i l u r e  to
deal with corrup t ion ,  informing the State Department, tha t  he "refused
127to intervene to save H i ! a l i " .  Caffery accused the B r i t i s h  of being
mainly responsible fo r  the f a l l  of  H i l a l i ' s  government, and the
de te r io ra t ion  o f  the Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t ion  in general. In
Caf fe ry 's  view, as a re su l t  of  B r i t i s h  p o l i c ie s ,  Egypt was going to face
another state of chaos, as had occurred at the end of 1951 and beginning 
128of  1952. Assistant Secretary Byroade in his meeting with his
B r i t i s h  counterpart  put forward the view that the fa i l u re  of H i l a l i ' s
government meant tha t  Egypt would " return to a period o f  disturbance
129such as occurred la s t  w in te r " .
Although the Americans saw the danger, they did not t r y  to save the
Hi 1a l i  government, which was regarded as the las t  resor t  by the West.
On 2 July 1952, the State Department informed i t s  representat ive in Cairo
tha t  "We do not bel ieve that the US should involve i t s e l f  in the Egyptian
130p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  as the UK suggested". The American attempt to play
a peripheral ro le  and not get openly involved in Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  
a f f a i r s  re f lec ted  how the United States was less concerned than B r i ta in  
in safeguarding the ancien regime. The American policy-makers t r i e d  
to convince the B r i t i s h  that t h e i r  po l ic ies  had fa i le d  to produce the hoped 
fo r  resu l ts ,  and that the American ro le would become the decisive fac to r  
in shaping both Western po l icy  in te rests  and strategy in the Middle East, 
which used to be regarded fo r  a long time as a B r i t i s h  sphere of in f luence.
127 NARff- 59 Box 4020 -  774 /-317-252. From
128. FO.371/96876, 1952, from Foreign o f f i c e  to Washington, j uuiy 1952; also 
NA RG 59 Box 4015 774.00/6-3052, Weekly Summary of events, Egypt
24-30 June, "New government being formed".
129. FO.371/96930, 1952, from Cairo to Foreign Of f ice, 10 May 1952; 
Anglo-Egyptian negot ia t ions, JE 1052/329.
130. NA RG 84 Box 221 Folder 320, Anglo-Egyptian negot ia t ions,  from 
Secretary of State, to Cairo, 2 July 1952.
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The United States was no longer prepared to fo l low  in B r i t i s h  footsteps
nor to play a passive ro le in the region. Whatever the reasons behind
i t ,  the American's reluctance to save the H i l a l i  regime no doubt paved
the way fo r  the young army o f f i ce rs  to take control  twenty days a f te r
the resignat ion of the f i r s t  H i l a l i  government.
A f te r  the Cairo r i o t s  in January 1952, the US played a covert ro le
behind the scenes in holding up the IMF's loan to Egypt and in
131reducing American investments there. The American Treasury Department
foresaw the dangers. A few weeks before the coup d 'e ta t  i t s  reports 
signal led alarm th a t ,  " I f  the de ter io ra t ion  in the economic and f inanc ia l  
s i tu a t ion  continues progressively,  the resu ltan t  social  and economic
132pressure w i l l  correspondingly increase and might become very serious" .
However, t h e i r  recommendations went unheeded, and instead of supporting
Egypt's request to obtain f inanc ia l  a id, Caffery pressed hard to hold 
133i t  up. The United States po l icy  held to the assumption tha t  i t s  economic
pressure might lead to the destruct ion of the ancien regime, and would
help another fac t ion  to come to power eas i ly ,  w ithout the p o s s ib i l i t y
of publ ic  resistance. The economic pressure on the ancien regime no
doubt had i t s  impact on the s t a b i l i t y  o f Egypt, which the Americans were
keen to maintain. Simultaneously, a f te r  the Cairo r i o t s ,  the Free
Of f icers  began to pay a tten t ion  to the question of s t a b i l i t y .  As Baghdadi
reca l ls  in his memoirs, " I t  was hard to predic t  what was going to happen.,..,
134we had to move qu ick ly " .  The advent of the revo lu t ion  became a 
matter of days.
131. NA RG 59 Box 5398, o f f i c e  memo. 28 January 1952, from Cooper to Dorsey, 
Economic Report fo r  week ending 25 January 1952.
132. NA RG 84 Egypt 501/63/52, to the Ambassador from J.F.L. Ghiardi ,
"Egypt, f inanc ia l  s i tu a t io n " ,  3 June 1952.
133. NA RG 59 Box 5398, o f f i c e  memo, to W. Stabber from Economic Report of 
week ending 16 March, 17 March 1952,
134. Baghdadi, o p . c i t . , V o l . I ,  pp.43-4.
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The ancien regime was under attack from a l l  quarters. Akhbar el -
135Youm, the pro-American newspaper, organised a big campaign against
the establishment, especia l ly  the Wafd party.  I t  maintained tha t
corrupt ion had spread in Egypt, becoming f lag ran t  espec ia l ly  from
136January 1950 to February 1952. This kind of campaign, which had been
n 31well organised by Mustafa Amin,1 no doubt resulted in the de te r io ra t ion
of the Wafd's popu lar i ty  and reputat ion amongst the Egyptians, espec ia l ly
amongst the younger generation, whether or not that was Mustafa Amin's
in ten t ion .  His contr ibut ions undermined the Wafd par ty 's  prest ige to
some extent,  and paved the way fo r  new blood to come to power.
At the same t ime, the American press, especia l ly  the New York Times,
138re i te ra ted  the posit ion of Akhbar a 1-Youm. On 22 Ju ly ,  j u s t  a few
hours before the revo lu t ion ,  i t  indicated that the army could move to
139topple the king and his regime. The revo lut ion became inev i tab le .
David Evans, the American a i r  force attache in Egypt, asserted to the 
researcher that on 13 July 1952, he obtained information confirming 
tha t  the Free Of f icers  were going to move in the next few days to achieve 
th e i r  ends. He passed th is  information on to Ambassador Caf fe ry . ^
On 20 Ju ly ,  Caffery took the unusual step of issuing a statement 
which confirmed th a t ,  "The po l icy  o f the United States is  not to in te r fe re
135. Heikal,  Bain al-Sahafa wa al-Siyasah, M. Amin's message to Nasser, 
Amin pointed out the development o f  his re la t ions with the Americans.
136. Akhbar al-Youm, 9 February 1952. For more de ta i ls  see A l i  Amin, 
HcikadKdiTukatn M is r , March 1952.
137. Interview with K. Roosevelt, Washington, D.C.
138. New York Times, 23 July 1952, p .31.
139. I b i d .
140. Interview with Colonel D. Evans, 5 September 1984.
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in the domestic p o l i t i c s  o f  another country, and th is  po l icy  has been
141s t r i c t l y  adhered to in th is  embassy". On the fo l lowing days, and
fo r t y -e ig h t  hours before the army took over, Caffery repeated the same
"* 142posit ion  to Mr. Creswell , the B r i t i s h  charge d 'a f fa i r e s .
This re p e t i t io n  has d i f fe re n t  s ig n i f i c a n t  meanings: f i r s t l y ,  tha t
the Americans t r i e d  very hard to deny that they had had previous contacts
with the conspi rators, or ,  secondly, that they would take covert measures
to topple a f r i e n d ly  regime. I t  was a kind of camouflage that had been
used by the Americans to hide th e i r  ro le ,  since in the event o f the
discovery of t h e i r  involvement and the fa i l u r e  of the conspirators to
achieve t h e i r  aims, i t  would have resulted in a complete de te r io ra t ion  of
American-Egyptian re la t ions  fo r  a long time to come. I t  is also
possible tha t  the Americans t r i e d  to a l lay  the fears o f  the conspirators
tha t  there would be no foreign in ter fe rence, espec ia l ly  from the B r i t i s h .
F in a l l y ,  the Americans t r i e d  to h in t  to the B r i t i s h  that i f  anything
occurred, there would be no need fo r  t h e i r  in terference in Egyptian in te rna l
a f f a i r s .  From the very beginning, the Americans demonstrated t h e i r
opposit ion to any possible B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  in terference to abort the
operation on the grounds that i t  was a purely Egyptian in terna l  matter. A l l
143ind ica t ions showed that the revolut ion was j u s t  a matter o f  hours away.
141. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-00/17-353, from Cairo to Secretary of State, 
No.24, 20 July 1952.
142. FO.371/195877, from Alexandria to Foreign O f f ice ,  21 July 1952.
143. NA RG Box 234, 361.2 S i r ry  CAB/1952, from American Embassy, London, 
to Paris,  21 July 1952. See also, New York Times, 22 July 1952.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION:
The Safety o f  the Coup d 'E ta t
On the eve of 23 Ju ly ,  a group of young army o f f i c e r s  seized 
power in Cairo with a minimum of bloodshed and resis tance. The c i t y  
was occupied and the reins o f  power were f i rm ly  in the hands o f  the 
Free Of f icers .
The story  of the 23 July 1952 revolu t ion has been to ld  several
times. However, what is s ig n i f i c a n t  fo r  our purpose here, is the
i m p l i c i t  and e x p l i c i t  react ions of the United States in deal ing with
the revo lu t ion.  One question may be put forward, why did the Young
Army O f f ice rs ,  despite t h e i r  ear ly  contacts, openly approach the American
embassy in the f i r s t  hours o f  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  coup? The answer l ie s  in
what Sadat said when he wondered, "Would the B r i t i s h  intervene on behalf
o f  the king?" S im i la r ly ,  Mohamed Naguib, the nominal leader o f  the
jun ta ,  said in his published memoirs, Egypt's Dest iny, "We are determined
to give the B r i t i s h  no excuse whatever f o r  acting against us, as they
2
have acted against our revo lu t ionary predecessors in the past".
In Alexandria reports were reaching the palace that B r i t i s h  troops, 
mobi l is ing in the Canal Zone were preparing to advance towards Cairo. 
These reports were c i r c u la t in g  everywhere.^ The Free Of f icers t r i e d  to 
cu r ta i l  the p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  in ter fe rence and also to
1. Anwar el-Sadat,  Revolt on the Ni le (London: A l lan ,  Wingate 1957),
pp .117-8.
2. Mohammed Naguib, Egypt's Destiny (London: V ic to r  Gollancz 1955),
p . 121.
3. B. McBride, Farouk of Egypt: A Biography (London: Robert Hale
1967), pp. 19TPT
4. Interview with Abdil Monim Amin, Cairo, 12 January 1985. Also 
see Heikal,  Bain al-Sahafa wa al-Siyasah (Be iru t 1984), p . 188.
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a l la y  the fears of the B r i t i s h  and other foreigners who suspected the
conspirators of acting on behalf  of  the Communists or the Muslim 
5
Brethren.
At three o 'c lock in the morning, the Free Of f icers openly contacted 
the American embassy. They sent t h e i r  f i r s t  message to the B r i t i s h  
embassy through David Evans, the American a i r  force attache. In the 
message they informed the B r i t i s h  tha t  "the coup was purely an in ternal 
matter a f fe c t in g  Egyptians on ly " ,  and that they would organise resistance 
to any B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  in te rven t ion .^  Needless to say, these early 
contacts between the Free Of f icers  and the American embassy were of 
great importance to the revolu t ionary o f f i c e rs .
On 23 Ju ly ,  US Ambassador Caffery met the B r i t i s h  charge d 'a f fa i r e s  
to ask him about B r i t i s h  in tent ions in the event tha t  King Farouk would
Q
ask fo r  t h e i r  in tervent ion to save him. The American embassy in Cairo
was not only concerned fo r  the safety o f  the coup d ' e t a t , but the American
State Department did not hes itate to point out from the very beginning to
g
the B r i t i s h  tha t  " fo re ign in te rvent ion  would be d is a s t ro u s . . . "  Acheson
also indicated to the B r i t i s h  representative in Washington th a t ,  "According
to the State Department ana lys is ,  the army action was purely an in terna l  
10a f f a i r " .  Furthermore, the Americans o f f i c i a l l y  informed the B r i t i s h
5. Naguib, Egypt's Dest iny, o p . c i t . , p . 110.
6. A l i  Sabri met David Evans and Abdel Monim Amin went to the American 
embassy. Interviews with David Evans, former American a i r  force 
attache in Egypt, 1951-55, and A l i  Sabri and Amin. See Naguib, 
Egypt's Dest iny, p . 119; al-Baghdadi, o p . c i t . , V o l . I ,  pp.55-6.
7. Interv iew with David Evans, Washington, D.C., 17 December 1984; 
Naguib, o p . c i t . , p . 119; FO.371/96877-1952, from Alex, to Foreign 
O f f ice ,  23 July 1952, Mr. Creswel l , No.1060. Also in terv iew with 
‘I r. Ihasan Abdel Koudous, Cairo, 9 November 1985.
8. FO.371/96877-1952, 23 July 1952, from Alex to Foreign Of f ice .  The 
B r i t i s h  charge d 'a f f a i r e s  sa id, " I  repl ied my personal view was 
tha t  th i s  was a purely in ternal quest ion".
9. NA RG 59 Box 4015 , 774-00/7-2 .'352 , 23 Ju ly ,  outgoing telegram from 
Acheson to Cairo and London.
10. Ib id .
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Foreign Of f ice tha t  the "United States would not intervene with B r i t i s h
11troops on behalf  o f  King Farouk". C lear ly ,  from the very outset o f
the coup, the US did everything possible to prevent the B r i t i s h  from.
taking any act ive measures that might have led to the f a i l u r e  of the Free
O f f ice rs '  task. Nevertheless, American policy-makers were a f ra id  tha t
the B r i t i s h  might intervene m i l i t a r i l y  against the coup d 'e ta t  on the
grounds that i t  was led by the Muslim Brethren or the communists. The
Americans' concern over th is  made them endeavour to assure the B r i t i s h
of the non-involvement o f e i the r  communists or the Muslim Brethren.
Once again, to prevent any p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  B r i t i s h  in te rven t ion ,
the Americans assured the B r i t i s h  o f  the ideological pos i t ion  of the
Free O f f ice rs ,  and the State Department countered the B r i t i s h  impression
that the Muslim Brethren or the communists were behind the coup, and
informed the Foreign Off ice on 24 July tha t  "they knew everything about
12the revo lu t ionary elements and were aware of t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s " .
Furthermore, Henry Byroade, the US Assistant Secretary o f  State, did
his best to  convince the B r i t i s h  ambassador in Washington tha t  i t  was
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  someone l i k e  A l i  Maher, the nominated prime m in is te r ,  " to
13be used as f r o n t  by the communists". I t  thus became obvious tha t
the US was sid ing with the o f f i c e r s .  Indeed, according to  Colonel Abdil
Monim Amin, the Americans asked the B r i t i s h  some time before rebel
14troops were sent in to depose Farouk, not to "smash the revo lu t ion " .
11. FO.371.98677-1952, from Washington to Foreign O f f i c e ,  S i r  Ol iver  Frank' , 
telegram No.1404 o f  23 July .
12. FO.371.7896878, Egypt and Sudan, from State Department, Washington, 
to Foreign O f f ice ,  24 July 1952.
13. FO.371.96878-1952, from Washington to Foreign O f f i ce , 'A ;  m i*. r
24 July 1952. ‘ . u i i v e r  Hank
14. Interview with Col. Abdel Monim Amin, Cairo.
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Regardless o f  t h e i r  previous re la t ions  with the Free O f f i ce rs ,
the American policy-makers reassessed t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  decis ions, which
were dependent upon a number of studies, such as secret in te l l ige n ce
reports , one o f  which was e n t i t le d  "Probable Consequence of a B r i t i s h
M i l i t a r y  Occupation of Cairo and Alexandria". This secret report
revealed tha t  m i l i t a r y  action would lead to a growth and strengthening
of extremist groups. For example, the Americans thought tha t  the
communists would move considerably closer to t h e i r  propaganda goals o f
winning wide acceptance fo r  t h e i r  proposit ion that the "West is
im p e r ia l i s t  and is p lo t t in g  a m i l i t a r y  occupation to dominate the Near 
15East". This was consistent with American po l icy  at the t ime. A
month before the revo lu t ion ,  Acheson warned Anthony Eden during t h e i r
m in is te r ia l  ta lks  in London in June 1952, th a t ,  "The use of force in
the Delta would have consequences in the rest of the Middle East which
16would be inca lcu lab le" .  The American pol icy-p lanners were well aware 
tha t  poverty and s o c io -p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  were the surest causes o f  
revo lu t ion ,  and that any attempts to go against the popular w i l l  would 
lead to d isas ter .  As a re s u l t ,  the State Department and the American 
embassy were unw i l l ing  to l e t  the B r i t i s h  destroy the coup, especia l ly  
since the coup i t s e l f  did not c o n f l i c t  with American in te res ts .  The 
American adminis tra t ion was preoccupied with bu i ld ing  up a defence system 
in the Middle East area, and was not prepared to s a c r i f i c e  i t s  long-term 
strategy on behalf  o f  the B r i t i s h .  F in a l l y ,  the Americans showed t h e i r  
w i l l ingness to secure the success of the coup d 1e t a t .
15. NA In te l l igence  Report No.5977, 29 July 1952.
16. Truman L ib ra ry ,  Acheson papers, memo, of conversat ion, m in is te r ia l  
ta lks  in London, 24 June 1952.
From the ear ly  hours o f  the revo lu t ion ,  the m i l i t a r y  elements t r i e d
to show the pro-Western and anti-communist character o f  t h e i r  cause.
This was obvious when the Free O f f ice rs '  spokesman went to the American
embassy on 24 duly 1952, and he confirmed tha t  "the in terna l
secur i ty  would be maintained at a l l  costs and emphasised the to ta l  a n t i -
17communist nature of the coup". Moreover, on the same day, Naguib
18re i te ra ted  th is  pos it ion  at his press conference. Furthermore, a 
few hours before deposing King Farouk, Major Hussain Naggar, the spokesman 
fo r  General Naguib and the Free O f f ice rs ,  conveyed a message to the 
American embassy to the e f fe c t  th a t ,  "The army's po l icy  is to c lear  up 
the in terna l  s i tu a t i o n " .  He added th a t ,  "Newly-organised in te l l ige n ce  
branches of the army and po l ice [were] intended to e n l i s t  the help of
19the Americans and the B r i t i s h  in organising an anti-communist campaign".
By adopting such a p o l icy ,  the Free Of f icers t r i e d  not only to confirm 
American support, which was essent ial  f o r  the success o f  t h e i r  operat ion, 
but also to stop a po ten t ia l  B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  in te rven t ion .
The chain of events had moved ra p id ly ,  and the o f f i c e r s  rea l ised 
tha t  the monarch had to be challenged. The revo lu t ionary  elements 
understood very wel l tha t  Egypt was s t i l l  a monarchy, and King Farouk 
was recognised as the ru l ing  monarch. I f  he were to escape before his 
abdicat ion, he could become a problem fo r  the new regime. Although 
the o f f i c e rs  were not agreed among themselves over what to  do with 
King Farouk, on 25 July 1952 Major Naggar gave the American representat ive
17. NA RG 59, Box 4105-774-00/7-2552, from Cairo to Secretary o f 
State, No.182, 25 July 1952 (secre t ) .
18. Naguib, Egypt's Dest iny, p .128.
19. NA RG 59 Box 4105-774-00/7-2652, from Alexandria to Secretary of 
State, Washington, 26 July 1952 (secret ) .
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the impression tha t  they were going to get r i d  of the King in the next 
20few hours. Before the army gave i t s  ultimatum to the monarch, on
26 Ju ly ,  i t  was understood by the Americans tha t  the king had played his
la s t  card and had lo s t  his leg i t imacy. The army showed i t  had the
s i tu a t ion  in hand, even though the king was s t i l l  negot ia t ing with the
Free O f f ice rs .  On 25 July 1952, Acheson inst ructed Caffery to t e l l  A l i
Maher, the prime m in is te r  nominated by the Free O f f ice rs ,  tha t  the United
States regarded the events o f  the past few days as " in te rna l  a f f a i r s ___
At the same time the US desires to make clear tha t  i t  is fo l low ing  the
s i tu a t ion  with close a tten t ion  and expects cons t i tu t iona l  au tho r i t ies
w i l l  cont inue In th is  connection we are encouraged by statements
a t t r ib u te d  to Naguib tha t  fo re igners '  l ives  and property w i l l  be given 
21f u l l  p ro tec t ion " .  With th is  the Americans burned t h e i r  bridges with
Farouk. Accordingly,  Caffery conveyed a message to the king from the
State Department some twenty- four hours before his abdicat ion. This
message presented the American view: "We do not wish to become involved
22in th is  s i tu a t io n " .
With th i s  message the United States, to a cer ta in  extent,  gave de
facto recognit ion to the new regime. The l a t t e r  had proved i t s  a b i l i t y
to keep the s i tu a t io n  in hand. The Americans, however, wanted to keep
the king a l i v e ,  and showed t h e i r  wi l l ingness to avoid unnecessary
23bloodshed before the operat ion. They had no other option in th is
20. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-00/7-2652, from Alexandria to Secretary
of State, 26 July 1952.
21. NA RG 84 Box 229, Folder 350 Egypt, July-August, from Secretary of
State to Cairo, No.151, 25 July 1952.
22. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-00/7-2552, telegram from American Embassy, 
Cairo, from Acheson to Caf fery , 25 July 1952.
23. Interview with Col. A. Amin. Also in terv iew with David Evans, 
Washington, D.C.
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c r i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n .  They understood that any harm to the king might
p re c ip i ta te  B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  in te rvent ion  to protect him and res ident
fore ign communities. That is  why the Americans were eager to prevent
the operation from f a l l i n g  in to  B r i t i s h  hands, and thus jeopardis ing
the m i l i t a r y  coup.
Farouk's in tent ions regarding keeping his throne were obvious.
Anthony Eden wrote in his memoirs th a t ,  "From 8.00 am onwards, the king
was f requent ly  on the telephone to the US ambassador. He repeated each
time more c lea r ly  that only fo re ign in tervent ion  could save him and his 
24dynasty". The la s t  straw was loaded onto the camel's back. Caffery
conveyed Farouk's message to the B r i t i s h ,  who then confirmed to Farouk that
"Her Majesty's Government could not intervene with force in what appears
25to be an interna l Egyptian problem". Ambassador Caffery was f i rm
with Farouk and did not lead him to indulge in fa lse  hopes. The ambassador
pointed out to the king that there was "no question o f  B r i t i s h
in te rv e n t io n . . .unless such in te rvent ion  became necessary fo r  the pro tect ion
26of fo re ign l ives  and property" .  Needless to say, Farouk l o s t  a l l  hope
of any B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  assistance. He fa i le d  to understand tha t  i t  was
pr im ar i ly  the American con t r ibu t ion  behind his own demise.
Accordingly, King Farouk, on 24 Ju ly ,  asked Caf fery , " I f  an American
27naval vessel could be suppl ied to get him out of Alexandria".  On the 
fo l low ing day, Farouk repeated his request to Caffery and the State
24. Eden, Full C i r c le , p .240. See also NA RG 59 4015 774-00/7-2352, 
from Alexandria to Secretary of State, 23 July 1952.
25. NA RG 59, Box 4015 774-00/7-2352, No.416, 23 July 1952, from London
to  Secretary of State (top secre t) .
26. NA RG 59 Box 4026 774-55/7-3052, from Cairo to Department o f State,
30 July 1952, "The m i l i t a r y  take over".
27. NA RG 59 Box 2040 774-11/7-2452, from Cairo to Department of State,
24 July 1952.
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Department. The Americans did not hesi ta te  to po int out to the king
90
tha t  "No American warship or plane could come to Egypt fo r  th is  purpose". 
Farouk was caught between his desire to preserve his l i f e  and his 
in ten t ion  to keep his throne f o r  his son. Under the present 
circumstances, however, the potent ia l  dangers of m i l i t a r y  in tervent ion 
confronted him. With a l l  the doors closed, he yielded to the demands 
of the so ld ie rs  uncond i t iona l ly .  Farouk claimed in his memoirs,
29published in the Empire News that Caffery asked him "to f i g h t  f o r  t ime".
I f  Caffery had asked him to do th a t ,  i t  meant nothing more than a way of
demonstrating to the king his i n a b i l i t y  to face the coup.
The Americans may not have helped Farouk to escape, but they also
c le a r ly  contr ibuted to the collapse o f  the monarchy. Yet despite the
pressure of the so ld ie rs ,  Ambassador Caffery did his best to ensure the
30k ing 's  personal safety.  Abdil Monim Amin, a member of the RCC,
confirmed tha t  "Caffery asked Farouk to abdicate his throne in return
31 32f o r  keeping his l i f e " .  David Evans repeated the same s to ry .  I f
we assume tha t  Caffery did his utmost to save the k ing 's  l i f e ,  he also
averted the p o s s ib i l i t y  of a B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  in te rven t ion .  In th is
way Caffery k i l l e d  two birds with one stone. F i r s t l y ,  he kept the coup
safe from any B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  in te rven t ion ,  which without doubt would
have affected i t s  success. Secondly, he made cer ta in  tha t  the coup was
28. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-7/2552, outgoing telegram. Also see Acheson 
papers, 24 July 1952. F0.371/96878-1952, from Washington to Foreign 
O f f ice ,  25 July 1952.
29. Empire News, 12 October 1952, "Farouk", p .6.
30. FO.371/9687-1952, from Alexandria to Foreign, 26 July 1952, Caffery 
to his B r i t i s h  counterpar t ,  " I  have again contacted Naguib who has 
repeated his e a r l i e r  assurance re. k ing 's  personal sa fe ty " .  Mohamed 
Heikal,  Cairo Documents, p .46.
31. In te rv i  ew wi th Co1. A. Ami n .
32. Interview with  David Evans.
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a bloodless a f f a i r .  In th is  sense the coup was unique in comparison 
with other m i l i t a r y  takeovers in the Third World. Had the leaders of 
the coup allowed themselves to be dragged through a bloodbath, i t  would 
no doubt have led to a s i tu a t io n  in which many opponents would have 
demanded revenge. Later th i s  would have led to chaos. On 26 Ju ly ,  
the king abdicated his throne in favour of his six-month-old son,
Prince Ahmed Fouad I I .  The revo lu t ion  had triumphed.
Egypt and the United States in the Revolutionary Era
Mohamed Heikal , in his book Cairo Documents, considers the American 
ro le  in the new regime. He says, "Her representat ive was the l a s t  man to
33see the remains of the old regime, and the f i r s t  in contact with the new".
In his published memoirs, Naguib described Caffery as "One of the few
34fore ign diplomats [ i n ]  who[m] [we be l ieve] we could t r u s t " .  The
Soviet press grumbled about the l inks  between the Free O f f i ce rs '  coup
35and "Anglo-American im p e r ia l i s t s " .  The m i l i t a r y  leaders showed t h e i r  
w i l l ingness to co-operate with the West from the very s t a r t .  In te l l igence  
reports and ear ly  contacts between the two p r io r  to the coup stressed the 
moderation tha t  was l i k e l y  to  character ise a jun ta  formed by the young 
army o f f i c e r s .
From the beginning the revo lu t ionary elements understood tha t  i t  was 
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them to gain Western confidence and to bu i ld  up t h e i r  image
33. Heika l,  Cairo Documents, p .36.
34. Naguib, Egypt1s Dest iny.
35. Tass quoting Middle East l e f t i s t  jou rna l .  I t  was f e l t  tha t  the
advent o f  the new m i l i t a r y  d ic ta to rsh ip  would open the Egyptian 
entry in to  MEDO. The Current Digest of Soviet Press, Vo l . IV , 
No.30, p . 13, September 1952.
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na t ion a l ly  and in te rn a t io n a l l y ,  especia l ly  i f  they cut a l l  re la t ions  with 
the past. Therefore they chose General Mohamad Naguib as the f igurehead 
f o r  th i s  movement, and raised him to the summit. S im i la r l y ,  they 
designated A1i Maher, a former pr ime;minister at the outbreak of the war, 
as prime min is te r  of the f i r s t  revo lu t ionary government. During the
war A1i Maher had been forced to resign because o f  his un fr iend ly
36 37a t t i tu d e  towards the B r i t i s h .  The monarchy was p ro v is io na l ly  reta ined.
The revo lu t ionary elements asserted by th e i r  deeds tha t  they were not
38inf luenced by the Muslim Brethren's asp ira t ions. The Communist Party
remained outlawed, and workers1 r i o t s  in Kafer el-Dawar during August
1952 were b r u ta l l y  suppressed. As a re su l t  o f  a l l  these events, Dean
Acheson, the American Secretary of State, expressed his optimism about
39the new regime by saying, " In Egypt, things are going w e l l " .
Each side had i t s  own reasons to be hopeful .  For the new leaders 
i t  was understandable that the Americans were sympathetic to Egyptian 
goals of complete independence, which was consistent with the Free 
O f f i ce rs '  aims. The Americans, concerned with containing Soviet
penetrat ion in the area, considered Egypt as a regional power tha t  would
40become a cornerstone in any an t i -Sov ie t  c o l le c t i v e  secur i ty  network.
They thought tha t  the re a l i sa t io n  of Egyptian national aspira t ions could
41persuade Egypt to be the f i r s t  Arab state to make peace with Is rae l .
36. Beer i , Army Off icers in Arab P o l i t i c s  and Society (Prager 1970),
pp .101-2.
37. Gail Meyer, Egypt and the United States (New Jersey: Associated
Univers i ty  Press 1980), p .44.
38. The Times, 19-23 August 1952; Hamrush, Qissat thawrat 23, V o l . I ,  
pp.287-92.
39. Truman L ib ra ry ,  M. Connelly papers, notes on cabinet meetings,
5 September 1952.
40. NA RG 59 774-5 MSP 12-2952, from Acheson to Harriman, Washington,
31 December 1952.
41. NA RG 49 774-00/7-3152, memo.of conversation between Abba Eban and 
Mr. Hart, sub ject,  I s ra e l ' s  view on Egyptian s i tu a t io n ,  31 July 1952.
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One American scholar has remarked th a t ,  "At the outset of the revo lu t ion
there was much sympathy fo r  the new regime, which appeared to be the
42long awaited answer to Egypt's most serious in te rna l  problems".
Five days a f te r  the abdicat ion of King Farouk, Mr. Hart,  the c h ie f  of
the Near East Division in the State Department, to ld  the Is ra e l i
ambassador in Washington tha t  "The Department had been encouraged by the
43order ly  way in which th is  whole coup had developed". In a survey o f
American publ ic  opinion, the major i ty  o f e d i t o r ia ls  and banner headlines
considered General Mohamed Naguib as fo l lowing "the example of Turkey's
Kemal Ataturk , rather than tha t  of I ran 's  Mossadegh", and many of the
comments emphasised the "US o f f i c i a l  a t t i tudes  toward Naguib w i l l  have
44an important inf luence on his o r ien ta t ion  toward the West".
The American adminis tra t ion was, on the whole, favourably impressed
by the developments in Egypt. Moreover, Acheson in his press
conference on 3 September 1952 mentioned that "There had been some
45encouraging developments in Egypt". Furthermore, American support o f 
the new regime in i t s  ear ly  days worried the B r i t i s h  who dea l t  with the 
m i l i t a r y  leaders, f o r  the l a t t e r  looked to American support as carte
AC
blanche, a means to achieve t h e i r  radical p o l i c ie s .  Naguib in return 
t r i e d  to woo the West. "He was ready to extend the hand o f  f r iendsh ip  to 
the B r i t i s h " ,  but th is  was in vain at th is  early  stage of the re v o lu t io n .47
42. John Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World (London 1968), p . 100.
43. NA RG Box 4015 774-00/7-3152, Department o f Sta te, memo, o f  
conversation, Hart, Eban, 31 July 1952.
44. Truman L ib ra ry ,  Elsey papers, Box 60. FR per iod ica ls  monthly survey 
of American opinions, Survey No.136, Development o f  August 1952,
pp.55-6.
45. US Department of State B u l l e t i n , No.690, 15 September 1952, p .406, 
u Development in Egypt"*
46. F0.371/9689-1952, from Cairo to Foreign O f f ice ,  21 August 1952, No.1252.
47. F0.371/9688-1952, Minute, Egypt, E 0/8/362, 11 September 1952.
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In the ear ly  days o f  the revo lu t ion ,  the balance between the
B r i t i s h  and the Americans turned in favour o f  the l a t t e r  in Egypt.
Ambassador Caffery mentioned on 28 August 1952 to Acheson tha t  " I  regret
to state that the B r i t i s h  are showing signs of being a l i t t l e  unhappy
with the fac t  tha t  they have p ra c t i c a l l y  no re la t ions  with the Egyptian
48m i l i t a r y  and our re la t ions  with them are so c o rd ia l " .  During the
American cabinet meeting on 9 September 1952, Dean Acheson re i te ra ted  
49the same pos i t ion .  The favoured American pos it ion  in Egypt under
the m i l i t a r y  regime had reached a peak, and as Caffery said, " I t  is  at
50i t s  greatest height in recent years".
What is  genera l ly  agreed upon here is not the Anglo-American 
competit ion over Egypt, but the development o f American-Egyptian re la t ions  
in the f i r s t  era o f  the m i l i t a r y  regime. The events led both sides 
astray. Each party overestimated t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to manipulate the 
s i tu a t io n .  Thinking they could achieve th e i r  goals without paying the 
p r ice ,  Washington t r i e d  to accomplish a va r ie ty  o f  goals, some of which 
contradicted t h e i r  re la t ions  with the new regime. For example, Washington 
wanted to show i t s  readiness to support Egyptian national asp ira t ions and 
at the same time wanted to maintain i t s  h is to r ic a l  a l l iance  with 
B r i ta in .  I t  was keen to keep Arab f r iendsh ip ,  but not prepared to take 
any decisive act ion against Is rae l .  What is  s ig n i f i c a n t  here is how the 
new ru le rs  in Egypt t r i e d  to convince the American policy-makers of t h e i r  
primary concerns in Egyptian in ternal a f f a i r s  in accordance with American 
in te res ts  and aims.
48. NA RG 59 Box 4105 774-00/8-2852, from Cairo to Secretary o f State, 
28 August 1952 (secre t ) .
49. Truman L ib ra ry ,  Connelly papers, Box 2, notes on cabinet meetinqs,
9 September 1952.
50. Truman L ib ra ry ,  McGhee papers, Box 1, Department of State, Nov-Dee. 
McGhee papers, Egypt, 19 September 1952, from Caffery to McGhee.
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The .M i l i ta ry  in Power and the USA (The Regency Council and the Wafd)
The m i l i t a r y  were facing a series of potent ia l  problems. One was
the cons t i tu t iona l  issue. According to A r t i c le  51 of the 1923
Egyptian Const i tu t ion ,  the Regency Council could not assume o f f i c e
except a f te r  swearing an oath of al legiance before both chambers of 
51parliament. This meant that the Wafd would have to assume i t s  
re s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  as the major i ty  party in the la s t  parl iament.  I t  was 
d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the Young Army Off icers  to compete with the old popular 
p o l i t i c a l  party .  I t  was l i k e l y  tha t  had the Wafd party assumed i t s  
re s p o n s ib i l i t y  and the dissolved parliament been reconvened, i t  might 
have led to the decl ine of the m i l i t a r y  role in Egypt. The matter of 
the Regency Council was a warning sign to both the m i l i t a r y  and to the 
Americans. Ambassador Caffery did not hesitate to express his fears 
that " I t  would however seem inescapable tha t  both houses must be convened
before the Council of Regency can take over  A session of the former
Wafd party con tro l led  Parliament and th is  time i t  might not be in our 
in te res t "
In the ear ly  days of the coup, the s i tua t ion  was unpredictable.
A l l  the evidence reveals tha t  the balance between the old p o l i t i c i a n s ,
espec ia l ly  the Wafd under Nahas and the Young Army Of f icers  was turn ing 
in favour of the former. The Americans began to be worried that they 
were going to face a d i f f i c u l t  s i tu a t ion .  Getting r i d  of Farouk did
51. See Hamrush, o p . c i t . ,  p .322. See also Refat Wahid, Fusul min 
thourat 23.,(Par al-Shuruq al-Qahirah 1978), pp. 120-5.
52. NA RG 59 774-11/7-2752, from Department o f  State (Acheson) to
American Embassy, Cairo, 30 July 1952. Caffery re i te ra ted  the same
meaning in his telegram of 29 July 1952. He wrote th a t ,  " I t  would 
be best f o r  us a l l  round i f  Wafd did not return to power", NA RG 59 
Box 4016 A 774-00/7-2952, 29 July 1952.
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not mean abol ishing the ancien regime. The corrupt Wafd was s t i l l  
53popular. Nahas s t i l l  enjoyed more advantages than Naguib and his
colleagues. Nothing could i l l u s t r a t e  th is  be t te r  than Achseon's comment
on one of Caf fe ry 's  telegrams to him on 30 July 1952, "Of course, then
54he [Nahas] would have no competi t ion as prime m in is te r " .  * This
s i tu a t io n  prompted the American embassy in Cairo to compare the Wafd
and the proposed m i l i t a r y  government. I t  found tha t  the " m i l i t a r y
government could possibly be useful in fu r ther ing  the concept o f  a Middle
East Command, e t c , . . . b u t  i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the Wafd government
55to present a reasonable pos it ion  on these issues".
The contrad ic t ion  between the Wafd and US po l icy  is  c lea r .  I t
became a 1i fe-and-death struggle f o r  both sides. Ambassador Caffery
watched the s i tu a t io n  very c a re fu l l y  and informed the State Department
about developments. On the day a f te r  Farouk's abdicat ion, Caffery
wrote, " I  am informed from Cairo legal experts who, at the prime
m in is te r 's  d i rec t ion  are making an intensive study o f  th i s  cons t i tu t iona l
problem in the obvious hope tha t  somehow convocation o f  Parliament in the
56near fu tu re  may not be found necessary".
American fears o f  the Wafd return ing to power at t h i s  ear ly  stage 
o f  the coup led Dean Acheson to express the State Department's view to 
his representat ive in Egypt tha t  he should "...make c lear  to the PRIMIN 
and in d i r e c t l y  to Naguib our hope that the cons t i tu t iona l  problem can be
53. NA RG 59 BOX 4020 774-11/7-2752, from Alexandria to Secretary 
o f  State, No.37, 27 July 1952 (secret ) .
54. NA RG 59 774-11/7-2752 from Acheson to Caf fery , 30 Ju ly 1952.
55. NA RG 84 Box 229-350 Egypt, July-August 1952, memo, o f  Alexandria 
fromMtCl in tock ,  subject,  possible development in Egypt, Cairo,
30 July 1952, "The Regency Council , the p a r t ie s " .
56. NA RG 59 Box 4020 774-11/7-2752, from Alexandria to Secretary of 
State, No.37 , 27 July 1952 (secret ) .
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resolved as soon as p o ss ib le . . .[and] our concern at the possible return
57of the Wafd, who are f u l l y  impl icated in g ra f t  and co r rup t ion " .
The Americans began to encourage the r i f t  between the two sides
by s t i r r i n g  up competit ion between the young, middle-class army o f f i c e rs
who belonged to anti-Wafd organisat ions, and the Wafd Party. On
28 July 1952, the New York Times t r i e d  to provoke the anger o f  the new
regime against the "corrupt Wafd" by saying tha t  " . . . t h e r e  were no
reports o f any move against members of the Wafd Party as par t  of the
58promised dr ive against corrupt ion" .
The o f f i c e rs  received the w i l l i n g  co l laborat ion of leading j u r i s t s
such as Suleiman Hafez and Dr. Abdel Razek a l-Sanhur i ,  who in t h e i r
legal o p i n i o n  afforded the o f f i ce rs  a golden opportun ity f o r  the
destruct ion o f  the Wafd and the whole cons t i tu t iona l  system. Their
59legal in te rp re ta t io n  tha t  there was no need to convene Parliament, 
len t  a legal a u tho r i ty  to the o f f i c e r s '  acts o f power. With such 
backing, i t  was natural  that the army was going to make the most of 
th is  powerful pos it ion  and to assert i t s  au tho r i ty  over Egypt.
The above-mentioned State Council decision was much appreciated 
by Caffery and the Western p o l i t i c a l  c i r c l e s . ^
Many explanations can be given f o r  the American support o f  the new 
regime v is -a -v is  the Wafd Party. F i r s t l y ,  the Wafd Party was swayed 
by i t s  voters and by i t s  previous commitments to them. I t  has been
57. NA RG 59 774-11/-2752, from Acheson to Caf fery , 30 July  1952,
58. The New York Times, 28 July 1952, p .5.
59. Interv iew with Ibrahim Faraj (Pasha), Cairo, 17 January 1985.
60. F0.371/96878, Egypt and Sudan, from Alexandria to Foreign O f f ice ,  
27 July 1952, No.131, Mr. Creswell. Also see NA RG 84 Box 234 
Folder 361-22, the State Department viewed was tha t  " the 
convocation of parl iament was unnecessary".
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said that the Wafd was a pr isoner o f  i t s  own promises and i t s  previous
p o l ic ie s .  On the other hand, the army o f f i c e rs  did not have any such
commitments - except t h e i r  published manifestos. Secondly, the American
a t t i t u d e  towards the Wafd Party was consistent with the Anglo-American
desire to undermine the Wafd Party and el iminate i t  from the p o l i t i c a l
61arena, especia l ly  a f te r  i t s  abrogation of the 1936 Treaty. The 
American pos i t ion ,  to some extent,  was furthermore a kind o f  punishment 
fo r  Wafdist n e u t ra l i t y  during the 1951 Korean War. George McGhee, 
the American Under-Secretary of State fo r  Near East A f f a i r s ,  hinted in 
one of his a r t i c le s  w r i t ten  in 1951, tha t  "The events o f  the Middle East 
are moving ra p id ly .  The US cannot a f fo rd  to al low the force of
cn
neutral ism and anti-Western sentiment to gain any fu r th e r  ground". 
T h i rd ly ,  i t  was simple f o r  the US to deal with a small group of o f f i c e rs  
as opposed to a p o l i t i c a l  par ty .  With a party l i k e  the Wafd, i t s  
members argued too much fo r  comfort and the debate presented points of 
view then to be accepted or re jected. Their  behaviour and actions would 
be too d i f f i c u l t  to p red ic t .  F in a l l y ,  the existence o f  the Wafd with 
i t s  "crushing m a jo r i ty "  and popu la r i ty  would not give the m i l i t a r y  
junta  a chance to gain any popular support as long as the Wafd was s t i l l  
ac t ive in p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .
Needless to say, American support f o r  the new regime helped i t  in 
i t s  f i r s t  te s t  o f power with the Wafd and with the old p o l i t i c a l  
establ ishment. The disbanding o f  p o l i t i c a l  part ies  on 17 January 1953 
was the re su l t  of  the events at the Regency Counci l, which spe lt  the
61. FO.371/96918-1952, from Cairo to  Foreign O f f ice ,  6 January 1952.
62. State Department B u l le t in ,  6 August 1951.
1 1 0
end of the p a r t ies '  leg i t imacy.  Since the p o l i t i c a l  par t ies  did not
defend the c o n s t i tu t io n ,  the m i l i t a r y  junta understood tha t  they could
play one p o l i t i c a l  party o f f  against the other. The p o l i t i c a l  pa r t ies ,
especia l ly  the Wafd despite i t s  h is to r ic a l  leg i t imacy,  had revealed
th e i r  weakness and u l t imate submission to the m i l i t a r y  regime. These
events gave the new regime the chance to declare tha t  the p o l i t i c a l
par t ies  were deemed incapable o f  r idd ing themselves o f  corrupt ion. As
63a re s u l t ,  they were disbanded. I t  was the United States tha t  assisted
the Free O f f i ce r  junta to become the undisputed power in the country f o r
over twenty years. Later i t  was rumoured in Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  c i r c le s
and a r t i cu la te d  in some newspapers tha t  "The US advocated a one-party
system fo r  E g y p t " . ^
This calcu lated American help can be traced from the i n i t i a l
honeymoon between the new Free Of f icers  regime and the US. In his
f i r s t  evaluation of the new regime, Ambassador Caffery considered the
Free Of f icers to be an amorphous group without any programme, "bound
together by common disgust at t h e i r  super io rs . . . t h e i r  f igure-head leader,
the Popular General Mohamed Naguib was not a p a r t i c u la r l y  strong or
i n t e l l i g e n t  leader . . .never the less, the o f f i c e rs  seemed f r i e n d l y  to the 
65US". As predicted, the new regime began to court  the US. Naguib
and his colleagues emphasised t h e i r  desire to be p a r t i c u la r l y  " f r ie n d ly  
66with the US". Soon a f te r  the new regime took over power, the m i l i t a r y  
ru le rs  and the nation faced each other.
63. Hamrush, o p . c i t . , Vol.1, p .275; Naguib, Egypt's Dest iny, p . 181.
64. NA RG 59 611-74/8-2753, from Cairo to Department o f  State,
27 August 1953.
65. NA RG 59 774-00/7-2452, from Caffery to Acheson, 24 July 1952. See
also Box 4105 0018-2052, from Cairo to Secretary of State,
20 August 1952.
66. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-00/8-152 from Cairo to Secretary o f  State,
No.2831, 1 August 1952.
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The New Regime and Communism
From the beginning the new regime committed i t s e l f  to an a n t i ­
communist po l icy .  The communists believed that the answer to Egypt's 
problems was to be found in Moscow, or be t te r  s t i l l ,  in Peking. Which 
no doubt would c o n f l i c t  with the o f f i c e r s '  re la t ions  with the United 
States. Five days a f te r  the revo lu t ion ,  Naguib's spokesman pointed 
out to Western m i l i t a r y  attaches,
Egypt's m i l i t a r y  wish to establ ish an u n o f f i c ia l  
committee to f i g h t  the communist a c t i v i t i e s  and 
propaganda. The m i l i t a r y  hope tha t  the committee 
w i l l  consist  of representatives of Egypt.. .and 
m i l i t a r y  representatives from the French and US 
embassies
In the fo l low ing  meeting between Naguib's spokesman and the representat ive
of the American embassy, the former defined the powers of the American-
Egyptian Committee: “The j o i n t  M i l i t a r y  Committee w i l l  have as i t s  main
funct ion the planning of in ternal propaganda to f i g h t  communist a c t i v i t i e s
69and to swing over to a pro-US pos i t ion " .
Within two weeks the establ ished power began to face serious trouble  
(12 August 1952). The workers at K a f f  el-Dawar demonostrated not 
against the regime, but against t h e i r  manager. The m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s  
viewed the s i tu a t ion  as an open challenge to t h e i r  a u th o r i t y .  The r i o t s  
led to strong government action and two of the workers were hanged. By 
adopting th i s  brutal  po l icy ,  the o f f i c e rs  asserted by t h e i r  deeds tha t  
they were not inf luenced by communist ideology. Nothing would i l l u s t r a t e  
tha t  be t te r  than Naguib's statement on 9 September 1952 tha t  "The army
67. Lacouture, Egypt in T ra n s i t io n , p .207.
68. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-00/8-1952, from Cairo to Secretary o f  State,
No.2831, 1 August 1952.
69. NA RG 84 Box 229 Folder 350, Egypt, memo, to Ambassador from
D. Evans, 11 August 1952.
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would crush anyone spreading l ie s  that the army was inf luenced by
communism".^ I t  was a blow to the l e f t  at  the end of August. Hadeto,*
the only communist group to show confidence in the Free O f f ice rs ,
71withdrew l e f t i s t  support from the "people movement".
In order to ensure t h e i r  support f o r  the m i l i t a r y ' s  e f fo r t s  to
combat communist a c t i v i t i e s ,  the US designated one o f  i t s  embassy
attaches in Cairo to be the l ia iso n  o f f i c e r  in the proposed "anti-communist
committee" on an u n o f f i c ia l  basis. As a re s u l t  o f  th is  development
Caffery pointed out to the State Department that "Some progress has
72already been made in uncovering and arrest ing communist agents".
The above co-operation and co-ord inat ion reached a peak. Egyptian
a u th o r i t ie s  did not permit the holding of the "pro-communist congress
73of the peoples o f  the Near East" in Cairo. I t  was feared tha t  they
might attack US po l icy  in the area. At least two o f  the RCC members
belonged to the communist movement; they were Lieutenant-Colonel Yousef
Siddiq and Major Khalid Mohey e l-D in .  They did not,  however, protect
74the communist movement from attack and suppression.
Ambassador Caffery urged the State Department to ask the Department
o f  Defense to release po l ice equipment and send i t  to Egypt. I t  had
75been ordered in March 1952 a f te r  the Cairo r i o t s .  The State Department,
70. Lacouture, Egypt in T ra n s i t io n , pp .165-6.
* National Democratic L iberat ion Movement.
71. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-00/81-1952, from Cairo to Department o f  State, 
(sec re t ) ,  subject ,  Egypt's new era, the f i r s t  three weeks, August 1952.
72. NA RG 59 Box 4038 780-0011/8-1952 (top secre t ) ,  incoming telegram 
from Cairo to Secretary o f  State, No.394, 19 August 1952.
73. NA RG 59 a i r  attache cable 199, 19 August 1952 "Rate th i s  information 
F6".
74. Lacouture, Egypt in T ra n s i t io n , p .257.
75. NA RG 59 774-5T1SP/9-252, from Deputy Under-Secretary to R. Lovet t ,  
Secretary o f  Defense, 2 September 1952.
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in i t s  tu rn ,  supported Caf fe ry 's  request and pointed out to the Defense 
Department that " I t  is in the in te res t  o f  the US tha t  A l i  Maher be 
supported and the in terna l  secur i ty  o f Egypt be strengthened. . . .E f fo r ts
by the present Egyptian government to s ta b i l i z e  the s i tu a t io n  have been
7 6encouraging". In November 1952, the American embassy in Cairo informed 
Mohamed Naguib that they were going to send from US government stock one
77m i l l i o n  d o l la rs '  worth o f  m i l i t a r y  equipment " fo r  special  po l ice u n i t s " .
Such quick American act ion was prec ip i ta ted  f i r s t l y ,  by the new regime's
demonstrated wi l l ingness to c u r ta i l  communist a c t i v i t i e s ,  and secondly,
because the Americans were assured on various occasions tha t  the new
regime did not intend to wage war against Is ra e l ,  and was prepared to
se t t le  the Anglo-Egyptian d ispute.
Not only did the new regime re ly  on American m i l i t a r y  equipment in
order to confront communist a c t i v i t i e s ,  they also asked the American
embassy in Cairo to fu rn ish them with anti-communist "pamphlets fo r
78d is t r ib u t i o n  by the po l ice " .  The Egyptian side was anxious to win 
American support during the Anglo-Egyptian negot ia t ions,  and sought to 
do so by appealing to the American pol icy-makers'  obsession with t h e i r  
anti-communist campaigns. The Free O f f ice r  regime, in  other  words, began 
to show i t s  a b i l i t y  to handle the s i tu a t ion  in accordance with 
American aims and in te res ts .
76. Ib id .
77. NA RG 59 Box 4107 774-00(w) 11-2952, 29 November 1952, from 
USARMA, Cairo to Department.
78. NA RG 59 Box 4108 774-001/9-553, from Cairo to Department, 
September 1953.
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The American ambassador began to make his inf luence f e l t  upon the
new regime v is -a -v i s  the th rea t  o f  communism. He also reported to Dean
Acheson that 'the Egyptian a u th o r i t ie s  have not released fourteen hard-core
79communists because I asked them not to do so". Ahmad Hamrush in his 
Qissat Thourat 23 Yul io about the Egyptian revo lu t ion  o f  1952, sheds l i g h t  
upon in d i re c t  American in ter fe rence against communist a c t i v i t i e s  in
on
Egypt a f te r  the revo lu t ion .
The American anti-communist impact affected Abd el-Nasser himself .
When a special m i l i t a r y  t r ibuna l  was established in July 1953 under the
chairmanship o f  a high-ranking o f f i c e r  to t r y  people accused of communist
a c t i v i t i e s ,  Nasser to ld  the American ambassador tha t  "This represents a
beginning o f  an operation to get a l l  act ive communists f i r m l y  behind 
81
bars". The new regime regarded communist a c t i v i t i e s  as a cr iminal 
offence, and i t  often showed a s k i l f u l  use of i t s  power. A few incidents 
i l l u s t r a t e  how the m i l i t a r y  regime t r i e d  to prove th a t  i t  was a n t i ­
communist. Before ge t t ing  r i d  o f the l e f t i s t  L t . -C o l .  Yousuf Siddiq, 
Abdil- Monim Amin to ld  the representat ive of the American embassy that 
the M i l i t a r y  High Committee "had decided to drop Siddiq because of his 
anti-Western a t t i t u d e  and because he considered 'po in t  IV' as American 
co lon ia l  ism"
During the f i r s t  two years the regime conducted an act ive a n t i ­
communist po l icy .  I t  depended on US information to discover areas of
79. NA RG 84 Box 320, Folder 350, Egypt, November-December 1952, 
from Cairo to Secretary, 18 November 1952.
80. Hamrush, Vo l.1, pp.290-3.
81. NA RG 59 Box 4018 774-00/117-953, from Cairo to Secretary o f  
State, 9 July 1953.
82. NA RG 59 774-00/112-2952, from Cairo to Secretary o f  State, 
29 December 1952.
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communist a c t i v i t y  in  the country,  especia l ly  in the Egyptian media.
Wagih Abaza, the former in te l l igence  o f f i c e r  who was in charge of publ ic  
guidance in the Egyptian army a f te r  the revo lu t ion ,  "asked whether the
embassy could supply him with a l i s t  of  communists on al-Goumhurya1s
83s t a f f ,  which was the se m i-o f f ic ia l  d a i l y  newspaper". The new regime
also depended on American expert ise in organising the Egyptian in te l l i ge n ce
serv ice, which had been modelled a f te r  the American CIA and sta ffed by 
84Free Of f icers . Heikal in Cairo Documents says tha t  " . . . t h e  US 
increased the number o f diplomats at the embassy; some of them belonged 
to the CIA".85
I t  was during the f i r s t  two years o f  the m i l i t a r y  regime that
American and Egyptian co-operation and co-ord inat ion against communism
reached i t s  zenith. Thus, Jean and Simone Lacouture commented th a t ,
"The regime was unpopular with  the p o l i t i ca l ly -m inded  masses from Kafr e l -
Dawar August 1952, to the t r i p  to Bandung in Apr i l  1955; publ ic opinion
was sure tha t  there were close connections between the m i l i t a r y  d ic ta to rsh ip
and the Americans. This was not a l together wrong, and the connections
Rfidated from the very f i r s t  minute o f  l i f e  of the new regime".
The US appreciated the o f f i c e r s '  new trend in solving the country 's 
87in terna l  problems. Needless to say, the suppression o f  p o l i t i c a l  par t ies
83. NA RG 59 Box 40388 from American Embassy, Cairo, to Department of 
State, 2 May 1954. Wagih Abaza was a member of a secret group of 
the o f f i c e rs  formed in  1939. Wagih and his colleagues were "dazzled 
and impressed by Nazi organizat ion and propaganda", see
P.J. V a t i k i o t i s ,  Nasser and his Generat ion.
84. Miles Copeland, The Game o f  Nat ions, p . 97T Also see Hamrush, Vo l .4. 
C i ta t ion  from Ibrahim Baghdadi, p . 12, and Abdel Monim el-Nagear. 
In terview with Abdal Fatah A. Abu e l -Fad l ,  Deputy D irec to r  o f the 
Egyptian In te l l igence  O f f ice ,  London.
85. Heikal,  Cairo Documents, p .47.
86. Lacouture, o p . c i t . ,  pp.214-5.
87. Harry Howard, "The development of US pol icy in the Near East during 
1954", part 1, Department of State B u l le t in ,  February 1955, p .260.
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espec ia l ly  the Wafd and the communist organisations which were considered 
p o l i t i c a l  a g i ta to rs ,  gave the m i l i t a r y  regime a free hand in handling 
Egyptian fo re ign po l icy  with minimum in ter fe rence. According to A l i  
Maher, from the ear ly  hours o f  the coup, the m i l i t a r y  expressed t h e i r  
desire to control  the in te rna l  secur i ty  department as th is  would enable
D O
them to have a f i rm  g r ip  on in terna l  matters.
Whether the above was a ta c t i c a l  manouevre by the m i l i t a r y  regime 
or not, the new regime had proved i t s  goodwil l  towards the West, especia l ly  
towards the United States, and the US achieved part  o f  i t s  po l icy  and 
ambitions through the new regime. The e l im inat ion of communist inf luence 
under the new regime was s ig n i f i c a n t .  The communist movement had been 
crushed by "the people's movement".
Agrarian Reform
In t h e i r  struggle fo r  power with the old p o l i t i c a l  part ies and the 
communists, the Free Of f icers  promulgated the Agrarian Regorm Law on 
9 September 1952.^ Large estates accounting fo r  over one m i l l i o n  feddans
owned by 2,000 people disappeared, thereby reducing s l i g h t l y  the degree
90o f  inequa l i ty  in land ownership. Al-Maraghi, the former M in is te r  o f 
the In te r i o r  in his published memoirs states tha t  "before the coup there
was a gentleman's agreement between the Free Of f icers and the CIA to
91achieve a land reform in Egypt".
88. F0 371, from Alexandria to Foreign Of f ice,  27 July 1952, 
from Crossoul.
39. Baghdadhj,,o p . c i t . , Vol.1, p .67.
90. P.J. V a t i k i o t i s ,  Nasser and his Generation, p .205.
91. Al-Maraghi, o p . c i t . ,  pp.£02-3.
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92The story  of land reform has been to ld  several t imes. What is
s ig n i f i c a n t  is the American con t r ibu t ion  behind the Free O f f i ce rs '
ear ly  promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Laws in September 1952. By
the end o f  the 1940s and in the ear ly  1950s, the US government gave
considerable a t ten t ion  to the idea of land reform, espec ia l ly  in Third
World countr ies. In September 1951, the United Nations Economic and
Social Council in Geneva approved a reso lu t ion esse n t ia l ly  in the form
proposed and fought f o r  by the US, endorsing land reform as a "means of
93ra is ing  the standard of l i v i n g  in the underdeveloped countr ies" .
The inner c i rc le s  in the Truman adminis tra t ion were not re luc tan t
in  t h e i r  local seminar to emphasise the importance o f  land reform as a
means to combat communist ideology, especia l ly  since the end of the Second
World War. Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State, supported the
idea of land reform and used the occasion of the Wisconsin seminar to
poin t out tha t  " I t  means secur i ty  o f  tenure, improvement o f working
co n d i t io n s . . .establ ishment o f  co-operat ives, increase of y i e ld s ,  and 
so on" .94
Coming back to Egypt, the Truman adminis tra t ion had, before the coup, 
begun to show some concern regarding the interna l s i tu a t io n .  In Apr i l  
1951, one of the American experts in land reform suggested that " . . . t h e  
most important con t r ibu t ion  can be made in f a c i l i t a t i n g  the increase of
cu l t iva b le  land. We should, of course, hedge such assistance with 
providing an equitable d is t r ib u t i o n  of the new, so tha t  the landless
92. See M a r ie i , Sayyid Ahmed, Awraq Siyyasia; P.J. V a t i k i o t i s ,  Nasser
and his Generation; Nut t ing, Nasser; fflohamed Udah, Meillacl 
Thourat 23 Yul ia ,  p . 110; Lacouture, o p .c i t .
93. Truman L ib ra ry ,  papers o f  George Elsy, Box No.60, Foreign
Relat ions, land reform, 12 September 1951.
94. Truman L ib ra ry ,  papers o f  George Elsy, Box No.60, memo, of conversation
23 August 1951; publ ic  statement of US land reform po l icy ,  copies to 
Elsy, admin is tra t ion ass is tant  to the president.
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95peasants and very small landholders would benef i t  from i t " .  Moreover, 
in December 1951 the US submitted to the In ternat ional  Agency Committee
on Land Reform in the NEA countr ies, spec i f ic  papers deal ing with "The
96US pol icy  towards land reform in Egypt".
The American in te res t  grew even stronger in br inging about land 
reform in Egypt. We must bear in mind the fac t  tha t  i t  was d i f f i c u l t  
f o r  the Egyptian ru l ing  class to i n i t i a t e  an agrar ian reform programme 
which would undermine th e i r  personal status and power. Meanwhile, the
Americans approached the re fo rmis t elements, such as Moustafa Marei, to
97submit a land reform b i l l  to Parliament, One month before the coup, 
in t h e i r  m in is te r ia l  ta lks  Eden and Acheson discussed the idea o f  land 
reform in Egypt, on the grounds tha t  the re d is t r ib u t io n  of the land
go
would "d ive r t  the publ ic a t ten t ion  from the Anglo-Egyptian d ispute" .
Al l  ind icat ions showed tha t  agrar ian reform had become 
inev i tab le .  Even Mourtada al-Maraghi the Egyptian Min is te r  o f  the 
I n te r i o r  (1952), mentioned to the B r i t i s h  ambassador tha t  the
99re d is t r ib u t io n  of land was essential  to ease the in te rna l  s i tu a t io n .
The m i l i t a r y  coup was a tu rn ing point in the social reform programme. 
The revo lu t ionary elements represented the spearhead of the urban lower 
middle class in i t s  c o n f l i c t  with the more t r a d i t i o n a l  landowning and 
upper middle class. Hamrush wrote tha t  none o f  the former was a son
of a pasha nor had in his fami ly  more than f i f t y  feddans. They were from
95. NA RG 59 Box 5375 874-16/4-2541, from Swayzee E/C, Mr. Haulsley, NEA 
land reform in Egypt, 24 Apr i l  1951.
96. NA RG 84, Box 237/500 Mutual secur i ty  programme, to Mr. Lewis Jones 
from S.P. Dorsey, 14 December 1951.
97. Hamrush, Vo l .4, p .458.
98. Truman L ib ra ry ,  Acheson papers, memo.of conversation, 4 July 1952, 
Box 6; m in is te r ia l  ta lks  in London 23 June 1952: present UK Eden, 
Ol iver  Franks, Ambassador Stevanson, US Secretary Acheson.
99. FO 371/96875 , 1952, JE/018-1952» from Cairo to Foreign O f f ice ,
18 May 1952.
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the middle c lass,  and some from the lower s t ra ta  o f  th is  class.
Needless to say, the social  background of the o f f i c e r s  was a primary
fa c to r  behind t h e i r  social  reform po l icy .  Social reform, moreover,
was consistent with American in te res ts  and also with the o f f i c e r s '
images. There were no contradict ions between these two pos i t ions ,
since both were t ry ing  to achieve the same end.
According to the Foreign Off ice papers, "The State Department was
101already putt ing forward ideas on the question of land reform".
Ambassador Caffery, in one of his f i r s t  meetings with General Naguib
and his m i l i t a r y  colleagues, stressed in his conversation with them that
102they must begin land reform. On 20 August 1952, he re i te ra ted  the
same posit ion in his meeting with A1i Maher and General Naguib, po int ing
out to them tha t  "Agr icu l tu ra l  reform is not only overdue, i t  is 
103essent ia l " .  Caffery was worried tha t  the new regime was going to
lose i t s  reputat ion as a dynamic group with a re fo rm is t  and progressive
out look. He therefore s trongly  opposed A l i  Maher's i n c l in a t io n  to
postpone the declarat ion o f  the Agrarian Reform Act,  on the grounds
tha t  " . . . i t  w i l l  be a mistake to postpone i t  very much. I t  w i l l  be
be t te r  to come out with something tha t  sounds dramatic a t an ear ly  
104date". Nevertheless, Caffery t r i e d  very hard to keep the American
contr ibu t ion  behind the Agrarian Reform Act out o f the l im e l ig h t .  He 
asked the State Department tha t  " . . . t h e re  .can be no suggestion of a j o i n t
100. Hamrush, Vol.1, pp.212-5.
101. F0.371/96945-1952, Foreign O f f ice ,  c o n f id e n t ia l ,  5 September 1952.
102. F0.371/96889, JE 325, from Cairo to Foreign O f f ice ,  20 August 1952, 
No.1246, S i r  Stevenson.
103. NA RG 84 Box 242, 502 Egypt 1952, from Cairo to Secretary o f 
State, 20 August 1952.
104. NA RG 84 Box 242, 502 Egypt 1952, from Cairo to Secretary of 
State, 21 August 1952,
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announcement o f  Charter. The Department w i l l  be quick to re a lise  tha t
nothing could jeoDardize the TCA [the  Technical Co-operation Agreement]
in Egypt or elsewhere in the Middle East more than i f  land reform [ i s ]
105linked with Point Four, espec ia lly  [should] p u b l ic i t y  ba ck f ire " .
I t  is  c lea r then tha t the US government used i t s  economic and 
technical aid to the new regime as a means of pressing fo r  the i n i t i a t i o n  
o f agrarian reform as qu ick ly  as possib le. The American embassy 
understood th a t the discovery o f  these connections would a f fe c t  the new 
regime's prestige  v is -a -v is  i t s  adversaries and would im plicate  the 
American government in Egyptian in te rna l a f fa i r s  which no doubt would 
a f fe c t  the o f f i c e r s '  po pu la r ity  and p restige . Nevertheless, the
American embassy observed the d a i ly  development o f agrarian reform, and
as Caffery wrote, "The American embassy is  kept c lose ly  informed as to
u + • • ii 106what is going on .
Three weeks a f te r  the m i l i t a r y  took over, they approached the
Americans with a request fo r  advice and assistance on the question o f
107agrarian reform. , . Because o f the o f f i c e r s '  request, Ambassador
Caffery designated one o f the embassy o f f i c i a l s  to be th e i r  consultant 
108on land reform. Another example o f American concern in th is  respect 
was i t s  nomination o f an a g r ic u l tu ra l  expert, Paul M orris , who had been 
stationed in Iran where "he advised on the d is t r ib u t io n  of the Shah's
105. NA RG 59 Box 5375 874/16-18-2052, from Cairo to Secretary o f 
S ta te, 20 August 1952.
106. NA RG 59 847/618-2552, from Cairo to Secretary o f State, 25 August 1952.
107. FO 371/96880-1952, 324 from Cairo to Foreign O f f ic e ,  19 August 1952.
108. NA RG 59 Box 5367 874.00 TA/8-1352, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate,
14 August 1952, Also see NA RG 85 Box 242 502 Egypt from Cairo to 
Secretary o f S tate, sent to Dept.345, 13 August 1952.
109. NA RG 59 Box 5398 880.00/8-2052, o f f ic e  memo, to NE Hart,
20 August.
121
A s e m i-o f f ic ia l  j o in t  committee was established by the Government o f
Egypt, the representatives o f the TCA and the American embassy in Cairo.
The Egyptian m in is te r o f  finance, Emary, conferred d a i ly  w ith the Americans
110to  put the f in a l  touches to the Agrarian Reform Act. Yet when the r i f t
between the Free O ff icers  and A1i Maher became more apparent over the issue
of land reform, on 19 August 1952 the State Department informed i t s
representative in Cairo tha t "The Government o f the US w i l l  give encouragement
111and assistance to  land reform". From the American po in t of view,
agrarian reform would "lessen the causes o f agrarian unrest and p o l i t i c a l  
112i n s t a b i l i t y " .  The Americans began to place th e i r  weight behind the
m i l i ta r y  ru le rs  to achieve land reform, and Caffery asked the Secretary of 
State to emphasise in his public  statement the importance o f m i l i t a r y  ru le  
in  Egypt. L i t t l e  wonder then, tha t A1i Maher, the c i v i l i a n  prime m in is te r ,  
complained to the B r i t is h  ambassador th a t ,  " . . . t h e  frequent contacts between 
the US embassy and the m i l i ta r y  jun ta  are being in te rp re ted  by the la t t e r
113as meaning tha t they have US support fo r  a l l  th e i r  ideas and a c t i v i t ie s " .
The White House s ta f f  in t h e i r  monthly survey o f American public
op in ion, emphasised to President Truman tha t agrarian reform " is  a golden
114opportun ity  fo r  the US". Encouraged by these developments, Acheson
persuaded President Truman to make a favourable statement about the 
115Naguib regime. Despite B r i t is h  reservations, such a dec la ra tion
110. NA RG 59 from Dorsey to Hart, 29 August 1952, sub ject, Economic 
report fo r  week ending 26 August 1952.
111. P,J. V a t ik io t is ,  Nasser and his Generation, p p .130-1.
112. NA RG 59 Box 5367 874.00 TA/8-1352, from Department o f State to 
American Embassy in Cairo, 19 August 1952.
113. FO.371/96880-1952, from Cairo to Foreign O f f ic e ,  27 August 1952.
114. Truman L ib ra ry ,  Elsey papers, Box No.60, fo re ign  re la t io n s ,
Survey No.136, Developments o f August 1952, p .4.
115. Truman L ib ra ry , Acheson papers, August 1952, Box No.67A, meetings 
with the President, Item 2, Egypt, 8 September 1952.
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116h in t in g  at fu tu re  American aid was made on 3 September, and was
117favourably received in Cairo.
I t  is  c lea r  th a t the American con tr ibu tion  was a primary fa c to r
behind the ea r ly  declara tion  o f the Agrarian Reform Act. Early
American support gave the m i l i t a r y  jun ta  p o l i t i c a l  c re d i t  v is -a -v is
the c i v i l i a n  elements, espec ia lly  in the eyes o f the prime m in is te r ,
A1i Maher, who was a man of the old p o l i t i c a l  world and one who belonged
to the r ich  landowning bourgeoisie. Professor P.J. V a t ik io t is  w rites
th a t ,  "He and his colleagues stood to lose a great deal as a re s u lt  of
118the Agrarian Reform Law, whereas the so ld iers  did no t".
Various reasons can be given fo r  the American in te re s t  in  agrarian
reform. One was the determination to put an end to the influence of 
the old p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s ,  espec ia lly  among the rura l population. Another 
was to combat communist propaganda among the lower and middle classes.
A th i rd  reason was to es tab lish  f i rm ly  the new regime's popu la r ity  w ith 
the Egyptian masses. A fourth  and f in a l  reason was the assumption
th a t the Land Reform Act and other social reforms would strengthen the
po s it ion  o f the new regime regarding the professional p o l i t ic ia n s  and 
the p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s .  Consequently, there would be few complications 
fo r  the m i l i t a r y  regime i f  i t  was to conclude a p o l i t i c a l  tre a ty  w ith 
the West.
On 7 September, the Free O ff icers  r id  themselves of A1i Maher, 
the la s t  shadow o f the former regime. Two days la t e r ,  on 9 September,
116. FO.371/96880-1952, 347-2618-1952.
117. NA RG 59 611-74/9-1952, from Cairo to Department o f S tate,
7 September 1952, press reaction to statement by Secretary o f 
State, Dean Acheson, o f 3 September.
118. P.J. V a t ik io t is ,  Nasser and his Generation (London: Croom Helm
1978) , p . 131.
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they declared the Land Reform Act. These two p o l i t i c a l  moves by the
o f f ic e rs  neutralised the old p o l i t i c a l  oowers, and w ithout doubt
119contributed to the RCC's in e v ita b le  march to power.
Naguib's Cabinet
Throughout the month of August re la t ions  between A1i Maher and
the RCC continued to worsen. The prime m in is te r and the m i l i t a r y
committee were opposed in every respect. From the very beginning,
the Americans a l l ie d  themselves with the m i l i ta r y  elements against A1i
Maher and his c i v i l i a n  colleagues. The American embassy moved ra p id ly
to strengthen the o f f ic e r s '  prestige  and sta tus ; the re fo re , Ambassador
Caffery suggested to Washington th a t "more prominent mention should be
120given to the prime m in is te r 's  m i l i t a r y  colleagues". Despite B r i t is h
reservations and A li Maher's complaints, the Americans did not conceal
121th e i r  wide support fo r  the so ld ie rs .  Thus i t  became c lear tha t they
were taking sides. The m i l i t a r y  jun ta  appreciated American support,
122and as Caffery sa id , " I t  was even more than they hoped fo r  th is  e a r ly " .
In order to get r id  o f A l i  Maher, Zakeria Mohey e l-D in  and Abdil
Monim Amin informed the representative o f the American embassy tha t
"they look forward to the c losest co-operation fo r  mutual advantage
123between the USA and Egypt". A fte r  forty-seven days, A l i  Maher
119. P.O. V a t ik io t is , i b i d . , p . 132.
120. NA RG 84 Box 229, FoTder 350, July-August from Cairo to Secretary o f 
State, 19 August 1952. Also see F0.371/96886-1952, from Cairo to 
Foreign O ff ice ,  21 August 1952. Stevenson shed l i g h t  upon the 
American a t t i tu d e  towards A l i  Maher and the c i v i l i a n  elements.
121. FO.371/96880-1952, No.347, from Prime M in is te r ,  Minute dated 
26 August 1952, the comment o f the A fr ica  Department.
122. NA RG 59 Box 4075-774-00/9-552, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate,
No.560, 5 September 1952.
123. Ib id .
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resigned. This early  res ignation re f lec ted  a s ig n i f ic a n t  s h i f t  in 
the m i l i t a r y 's  path towards power. On the fo llow ing  day, the State 
Department commented th a t ,  "We were interested more in p r in c ip le  than 
p e rs o n a l i t ie s . . .and there is  no change in the a t t i tu d e  o f the Government 
o f the US". ^
However, other problems had to be resolved. The m i l i t a r y  junta
125chose Dr. Sanhouri to be A l i  Maher's successor. The American embassy
moved rap id ly  to thwart th is  attempt. Ambassador Caffery warned them
th a t the choice o f Sanhouri as prime m in is te r "would produce a deplorable
impression in  the US owing to  his having been a s ignatory o f the Peace
126Campaign Manifesto". According to the CIA reports , Dr. Sanhouri
opposed fo re ign  c u ltu ra l  penetra tion . This a t t i tu d e  brought him in to
c o n f l ic t  w ith  ce rta in  American missionary educators: "They regarded
his every move, however earnest and apparently sincere as s trong ly
127coloured by Moslem c u ltu ra l  t r a d i t io n s " .  Needless to say, C affe ry 's  
in te rfe rence in  Egyptian in te rna l a f fa i r s  and his e f f o r t  to exclude 
Sanhouri as A l i  Maher's successor re f lec ted  America's new pos it ion  in 
Egypt, the balance between B r i t is h  and American in f luence , s h i f t in g  in 
favour o f the l a t t e r .  A ll the evidence shows tha t American influence 
in Egypt under the new regime had increased. A few hours a f te r  
C affe ry 's  warning was received, the O f f ic e rs ' choice o f General Naguib 
to be prime m in is te r  was a turn ing po int in the h is to ry  o f Egypt.
124. NA RG 59, 611-74/9-1752, from Cairo to Department o f S tate,
17 September 1952.
125. Hamrush, Quissat thwrat 23, Vo l.1 , pp.238-9.
126. NA RG Box 4015, 774-00/9-652, No.581, 6 September, from Cairo to 
Secretary o f State, secre t; '■FO.371/96996-1952, from Cairo to Foreign 
O ff ice ,  9 September 1952; Interview with Ahmad Hamrush, 18 January 1985.
127. NA R/A:0/R Report No.443, 18 June 1947, "Biographic Reports on the 
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By taking such ac t ion , there was no longer any doubt as to who the
exclusive ru le rs  o f Egypt would be.
The American embassy was the f i r s t  to be informed of th is  dec is ion,
even though the key o f f ic e rs  o f  the Egyptian army were kept in the dark
128regarding Naguib's nomination. A ll evidence ind ica ted tha t the
m i l i t a r y  jun ta  was then keen to gain American support a t any expense.
On 7 September and before announcing the new cab ine t's  programme p u b l ic ly ,
the Free O ff ice rs  submitted the o u t l in e  o f the cab ine t 's  domestic programme
to the American embassy with the statement th a t ,  "The cabinet w i l l  carry
out th is  programme and a l l  members o f the cabinet w i l l  have agreed to
129every s p e c if ic  po in t p r io r  to acceptance o f th e i r  p o r t fo l io s " .  The 
programme showed the O ff ic e rs ' eagerness to attack corrup tion  and social 
in ju s t ic e .  In view o f i t s  in te re s ts ,  such a programme was a t t ra c t iv e  
to the US.
Events fu r th e r  encouraged American expectations, because the 
O ff ice rs  had no experience in p o l i t i c a l  and economic m atters, and also 
had no popular support. Thus, according to in te l l ig e n c e  re p o r ts ,
130"They may seek the advice o f our representatives more than before".
131Ambassador Caffery became more in f lu e n t ia l  than prev ious ly . The
Americans created the impression th a t they would back the new regime,
"Whatever i t  does". From the B r i t is h  po int o f view, the Americans would
do th a t as long as the new regime "does not introduce suspected
132communists in to  the government". Following C affe ry 's  advice, the
128. NA RG 59 774-00/9-752, from Cairo to Secretary o f  S ta te , 7 September, 
top secre t; in te rv iew  w ith  Abd el-Moneim Amin.
129. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-00/9-752, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate,
No.596, 7 September 1952.
130. NA RG 319/091 Egypt, memo, the Chief o f S ta f f ,  sub jec t, the res ignation 
of PM A1i Maher, 8 September 1952, secret.
131. FO.371/96881-1952, JE 372, Foreign O ffice to Stevenson, Cairo,
11 September 1952.
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State Department urged the B r i t is h  to make a favourable statement on
133Naguib's cab ine t, which they d id . This statement was favourably
. . . P . 134received in Cairo.
A fte r  the formation o f Naguib's cabinet, the m i l i t a r y  ru le rs  and
the nation came face to face, and the dup lica t ion  o f the RCC and the
government was somewhat reduced. The revo lu tion  was about to pass through
a t ra n s i t io n a l  period. The m i l i t a r y  elements began to feel more
con fiden t, and American support had encouraged them to believe tha t
135they could act w ithout re s t ra in t .  The American policy-makers
considered the revo lu tionary  elements as a dynamic group w ith  a re fo rm is t
outlook which did not c o n f l i c t  w ith Western in te re s ts .
Henry Byroade, the American Assistant Secretary fo r  the Near East
area, explained to the B r i t is h  the main reasons behind strong US support
fo r  Naguib's government. Byroade pointed out to the B r i t is h  th a t because
o f the d e te r io ra t io n  o f th e i r  own pos it ion  in Egypt, i t  was essentia l th a t
the US "should do everything possible to maintain the good pos it io n  which
i t  had w ith the Egyptian m i l i t a r y  to achieve the Western common
s tra te g y " ,  and also "to  keep the new regime from excess in  the execution 
136o f i t s  programme". The American policy-makers showed the B r i t is h  
th a t  Egypt was no longer in  th e i r  sphere o f in f luence . They seized 
every opportun ity  to demonstrate th e i r  new pos it ion  in Egypt, which they 
believed gave them a mandate to handle the Egyptian question on behalf 
o f the Western nations.
133. F0.371/96896-1952, from Washington to Foreign O f f ic e ,  8 September 
1952, No.1714.
134. Egyptian Gazette o f 12 September 1952.
135. F0.371/96882-406-1952, FO Minute, Mr. A l len , 25 September 1952.
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1952, Sri S te e l , No.1721.
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Everything had been changed. A1i Maher's res ignation re f lec ted
a s ig n i f ic a n t  s h i f t  in Egypt's re la t ions  with the US and the UK. The
Americans accepted and appreciated the army's ro le  in  Egypt, But, on
the other hand, the B r i t is h  were very cautious and worried since they
had linked themselves with the old a r is to c ra t ic  p o l i t ic ia n s .  I t  was
d i f f i c u l t  fo r  them to turn the clock back, and Egypt was now being ruled
by a group o f o f f ic e rs  who came from a d i f fe re n t  social background.
The Americans understood tha t and began to es tab lish  cordia l
re la t io n s  with the o f f ic e rs .  The o f f ic e rs ,  in tu rn ,  did th e i r  best to
manipulate th is  trend in American po licy . As Caffery reported, the
o f f ic e rs  showed th e i r  w il l ingness to a l l y  themselves with the US "to
the exclusion o f the UK. In any event, they recognized th e i r  need of
137a strong fr ie n d  and we are nominated". Just three days a f te r  becoming 
prime m in is te r ,  General Naguib sent a warm message to the American people,
stressing the importance o f the mutual re la t io nsh ip  between the two
. . 138co u n tr ies .
The o f f ic e rs  did everything possible to woo the USA. Naguib in his
f i r s t  cabinet was keen to present a d i f fe re n t  type o f m in is te r with a
re fo rm is t and progressive outlook. Examples were men l ik e  R*ud Galal
who became M in is te r o f National Guidance, Dr. Abbas Ammar, who took the
139p o r t fo l io  fo r  Social A f fa i r s ,  and Farag Tahia, the M in is te r o f Foreign
1 £0A f fa i r s ,  who had a good reputation in American c i r c le s .  ’ But the
American embassy in Cairo expressed i t s  d is s a t is fa c t io n  with the presence
137. NA RG 50 Box 4015, 774-oo/1-952, from Cairo to Secretary o f State,
9 September, secret security  information.
138. FO.371/96881-1952, from Cairo to Foreign O ff ice , S ir  Ralph Stevenson, 
No.83, 10 September 1952.
139. P.J. V a t ik . io t is ,  The Egyptian Army in P o l i t i c s ; both o f them were
members o f Pioneers Movement (cil ruwwad)
140. FO.371/96896-1952, from Cairo to Foreign O ff ice ,  10 September 1952.
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141of Ahmed Hasan el-Bakoury, Fathi Radwan, and Dr. Nur e l-D in  Tarra f
in the Naguib cabinet, because the f i r s t  was a member o f  the Muslim
Brethren, and the second was an extreme u l t r a -n a t io n a l is t ,  and considered
142to be a p o l i t i c a l  a g ita to r .  The th i r d ,  Dr. T a rra f ,  was a founding
member o f Young Egypt ( la te r  the S o c ia l is t  Party) which ca lled  fo r
rad ica l reforms in the struggle against B r i ta in ,  and he also had a public
143record of "anti-American pronouncements". The ru l in g  o f f ic e rs
considered the matter serious ly  and worked hard to a l la y  American fears
tha t the new cabinet would be extrem ist. Nasser assured the
representative o f the American embassy tha t "they were chosen on the basis
o f a m i l i t a r y  estimate o f th e i r  a b i l i t i e s .  Also, th a t the army was
keeping a sharp eye on them". Nasser stressed th a t "Bakury had jo ined
the cabinet despite the objections o f the Moslem Brotherhood Supreme 
144Guide, Hudaybi. and the Egyptian Foreign M in is te r ,  Farrag, re ite ra te d
the same story to the representative o f the American embassy, describ ing
145"el-Bakoury as a l ib e ra l  and progressive as I am". Furthermore,
General Naguib as prime m in is te r made a commitment to the Americans th a t
146the above-mentioned three had "no influence on h is overa ll p o l ic y " .
141. Ahmad el-Bakouri was a member o f "Fellah Society" under Ahmad Pasha 
Husavn., see Ikhbar al -Youm, 9 September 1952. In terv iew  w ith e l - 
Bakourj, Cairo, January 1985. Bakoury asserted th a t "he had good
re la t io ns  with the Americans before the re vo lu t io n " .
142. In terview with Fathi Radwan, Cairo; he was a co-founder o f "Young
Egypt" with Ahmad Hus«x.y,n in 1933, then l e f t  in 1944 to jo in  the 
(extrem ist) National Party, whose manifesto was "No negotia tions 
before the B r i t is h  to ta l  evacuation", in other words, "The B r i t is h  
should withdraw w ithout p r io r  cond it ions".
143. NA RG 59 Box 4020, 774-/3/9-/052, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate, 
No.644, 10 September 1952; also in te rv iew  with Fathi Radwan, o p . c i t .
144. NA RG 59 Box 4020, 774-/3/9-/052, from Cairo to Secretary, No.646,
10 September 1952.
145. I b id . ,  No.657, 10 September 1952.
146. Ib id . , from Cairo to Secretary, No.664, 10 September 1952.
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By th is  time, the American embassy appeared to be exerting
extraord inary influence over Egyptian in te rna l a f f a i r s .  I t  is  i ro n ic
th a t American in terference in Egyptian in te rna l a f fa i r s  in 1952 was not
so d i f fe re n t  from B r i t is h  involvement in the early  1940s. The B r i t is h
in te rfe rence was obvious, but American involvement was vague and was from
behind the scenes. There were three reasons fo r  the American ob jection
to the inc lus ion  o f extremist elements in the Naguib cabinet. F i r s t l y ,
the Americans were a fra id  th a t these elements would have th e i r  own
impact upon cabinet p o l ic y ,  and tha t they would influence the cabinet
in the wrong d ire c t io n .  Secondly, from the very beginning, the Americans
did th e i r  utmost to a l la y  B r i t is h  fears tha t the revo lu t iona ry  elements
were influenced by the extrem ist a sp ira t io n s , and they found th a t th e i r
inc lus ion  would have led to the opposite. T h ird ly ,  they had encouraged
the regime to maintain a moderate image at any expense. I t  was
unacceptable in te rn a t io n a l ly  fo r  the new regime to be seen as extrem ist
from i t s  inception.
In order to strengthen th is  doctr ine  and to free  m i l i t a r y  leaders
from B r i t is h  suspic ion, Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary o f the American
State Department, to ld  the B r i t is h  th a t the Naguib regime was "not
ex trem is t, although im patien tly  re fo rm is t and deserved our general 
147encouragement". The Americans policy-makers were t ry in g  "to  walk
on eggs and not break them". A fte r  assuming his re s p o n s ib i l i ty  as
prime m in is te r ,  Naguib turned f i r s t  to the United States fo r  he lp , and
his fo re ign  m in isters voiced w il l ingness to have the "US pa tien t
148understanding and aid to make the grade".
147. NA RG 59 Box 4020 774-02/9-1952, from Department o f State to American 
Embassy, Cairo, 10 September 1952.
148. Ib id . ,  774-13/9-10-1952, from Cairo to Secretary, 10 September 1952, 
Farrag in his conversation w ith Spark.
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The m i l i ta r y  jun ta  did i t s  best to woo the United States, As
expected, Naguib requested American m i l i ta r y  supplies and economic
assistance, o f fe r in g  in exchange "secret w r it te n  or verbal assurances
concerning long-term ob jectives o f movement inc lud ing Middle East Defence
149Organization (MEDO) and partnership with the US". Naguib from time
to time hinted tha t the America-Egyptian co-operation "would be
150in t e n s i f ie d . . . in many ways". According to State Department papers,
under the m i l i t a r y  regime the Egyptian government showed encouraging
signs o f becoming a p i l l a r  o f strength in favour o f US and Western
objectives towards the improvement of US-Saudi Arabian re la t io n s .
"Co-operative in regard to the Gaza S tr ip  problem.. .Egypt has p u b l ic ly
recognized the communist menace as the number one external th re a t to the
reg ion ...has  p u b l ic ly  ind icated an absence o f aggressive in te n t ion  
151towards Is ra e l . "
Each o f the two countries believed the other would serve as an
instrument fo r  the achievement o f  i t s  immediate goals. Events belied
Egyptian expectations.
At the time i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to obtain American m i l i t a r y  a id .
The Truman adm in is tra tion  was caught in a dilemma. I t  considered
B r i t is h  fr iendsh ip  as a top p r io r i t y .  However, a t the same time i t
152did not wish to see the new regime collapse. The Egyptians
149. NA RG 59 BOX 4015, 774-00/9-1852, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate,
18 September 1952; also 774-5MSP/11-152, memo, fo r  the Ambassador 
from Army Attache, Truman papers, Foreign A f fa irs  F i le ,  DE Box 175, 
telegram Department o f  State from Cairo to Secretary, 18 September 1952.
150. NA RG 59 774-1319-1-452, from Cairo to Secretary o f  S tate, 24 September 
1952, press in te rv iew  with Naguib.
151. NA RG 59 Box 4024, FW 774-5MSP-10-2654, to NEA Byroade, from Hart,
26 October 1954, Egyptian a id .
152. FO.371/96896-1952, from Foreign O ffice  minutes, 6 September 1952;
F0.371/96933-1952, from B r i t is h  Embassy,Cairo, to Foreign O ff ice ,
17 November 1952.
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overestimated th e i r  a b i l i t y  to manipulate th e i r  co rd ia l re la t io n sh ip  w ith
the United States. They did not f u l l y  understand th a t n e ithe r the
Secretary o f  State nor the President could sustain a d e f in i te  po licy  
153towards Egypt. The Truman adm in is tra tion  was handicapped, because
i t  was being replaced by the newly-elected Eisenhower adm in is tra t ion .
Economic Co-operation
Nevertheless, there was one area in which American-Egyptian re la t ion s
advanced during th is  early  period, and tha t was the area o f  economic
co-operation. Soon a f te r  the new regime took power, the American
government showed i t s  w il l ingness  to expand i t s  economic and technical 
154aid to Egypt. Ambassador Caffery reported to the State Department
th a t American economic assistance "would be a dramatic and popular
gesture and would reach every element o f the Egyptian populace whose
155support Naguib so badly needed". The American government had a free  
hand to  handle i t s  economic assistance to Egypt. There was no B r i t is h  
ob jection  or reservation regarding American economic p o licy  towards
The nature o f th is  assistance was defined in a series o f  agreements
157based on the May 1951, Point Four, Technical Co-operation Agreement.
153. Interv iew w ith  Mustafa Amin, London 23 May 1983. See Badeau,
"US and UAR: C r is is  in Confidence", Foreign R e la tions , Vol.43,
January 1962, p .292.
154. NA RG 59 Box 5367 874-00-TA/8-1952, outgoing telegram Department o f 
State, to  American Embassy, Cairo, 15 August 1952.
155. NA RG 59 Box 874-00/11-2752, economics, Department o f  State, o f f ic e  
o f the Secretary, memo, fo r  SS, 17 November 1952, sub jec t, Egypt: 
Eden-Acheson conversation.
156. NA RG 59 Box 5368 874-00 TA/12/1752, memo, o f conversation, Economic 
Assistance to  Egypt, 17 December 1952, p a r t ic ip a n ts :  NEA Defense, secre t.
157. Middle Eastern A f f a i r s , "Chronology", 21 February-20 March 1953.
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The American decision was based on a careful study o f  Egypt's economic
problems and i t s  impact upon the s t a b i l i t y  o f the new regime and "the
158secu r ity  o f the US". In February 1953, the re fo re , the American
President extended $10 m i l l io n  worth o f f in a n c ia l assistance to Egypt
159fo r  the purchase o f wheat. In re tu rn , the Egyptian government
appreciated American help, and Naguib stated th a t "Without US help,
160Egypt would be in serious economic t ro u b le " .
The change in the American adm in is tra tion  did not a f fe c t  American 
po licy  towards Egypt. The new Republican adm in is tra tion  under
161Eisenhower continued i t s  predecessor's po licy  towards tne new regime.
On the f i r s t  anniversary o f the Egyptian re vo lu t io n , Eisenhower wrote
to Naguib, "By the events o f July 23, 1952, Egypt crossed the threshold 
162to a new era .
From the f i r s t  day o f the re vo lu t io n , the Egyptian government o f f i c i a l l y
requested from the American government the services o f  a team o f economic
163and in d u s tr ia l  experts. The American government responded p o s it iv e ly  
on th is  request. For example, in November 1952 the State Department 
announced th a t a group o f American experts would a s s is t  an Egyptian group 
in a j o in t  survey to assess the po ten tia l fo r  rapid development o f 
Egypt's resources, c h ie f ly  i n d u s t r ia l . 16^
158. NA RG 330 CD 091-3 A to E 1953, c o n f id e n t ia l ,  se cu r ity  in fo rm ation , the 
White House to D irec to r fo r  Mutual Security , 6 January 1953.
159. I b id . , 19 February 1953, to Assistant D irec to r fo r  programme, o f f ic e  
of D irec to r fo r  Mutual Security .
160. NA RG 59 Box 5368 874-00 TA/3-853, from Cairo to Secretary o f State,
18 March 1953.
161. NA RG 59 Box 4023 774-5MSP/2-2753, Secretary o f State message to Dr. 
Fawzi, 14 February 1953; D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Dulles papers,
Special Ass.Chron.Series, Box No.2, 17 March 1953.
162. US Department o f State B u l le t in , 10 August 1953, " F i r s t  Anniversary o f 
Egypt' s 'L ib e ra t io n  Day'1.
163. NA RG 59 BOX 5367087 400-TA/8-2252, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate,
22 August 1952.
164. US Department o f State B u l le t in , 9 February 1953, pp .223-4, "Point Four 
Mission to Study Egyptian Indus try " .
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In March 1953 a new Point Four programme agreement was reached
between Egypt and the United States. This agreement made ava ilab le
technical assistance to the value o f $10 m i l l io n  fo r  reclamation o f
16580,000 acres o f land in Egypt. I t  had been described "as the most
166important o f i t s  kind so fa r  entered in to  in the Middle East".
Moreover, the experts o f the TCA furnished th e i r  assistance and 
experience to the Egyptian government in studying the f e a s ib i l i t y  o f 
bu ild ing  the Aswan High Dam. American technical co n tr ib u t io n  had i t s  
e f fe c t  upon the Egyptian economy during tha t time and simultaneously upon
O
the leaders o f the new regime. Thus, Naguib wrote, "With the help of
TCA, we can learn to use our water more e f f i c i e n t l y .  There is  a good
chance I th in k  o f s ta b i l iz in g  the Egyptian economy a t a r e la t iv e ly  high
167standard o f l iv in g  w ith in  two generations".
American support fo r  the new regime was remarkable. I t  did not
confine i t s e l f  to technical and economic assistance, but extended to
c ruc ia l p o l i t i c a l  support. The US also played a primary ro le  in
reorganising Egyptian governmental in s t i t u t io n s .  For example, Egyptian
m in is te rs  sought American advice " to  improve the e f f ic ie n c y  o f th e i r
168m in is ters  and a t the same time to reduce expenditures".
Needless to say, the American co n tr ibu t io n  was a primary fa c to r  
in helping the m i l i t a r y  junta  to seize power by every means, overt and 
cove rt, by the pen and by the gun. The American government supported
165. The Times, 20 March 1953.
166. US Department o f  State B u l le t in , 6 A p r i l  1953, p .498.
167. Mohamed Naguib, Egypt's Destiny, pp .168-9.
168. NA RG 59 Box 2848, Egypt 611-7718-2753, from Cairo Department 
o f  State, Washington, 27 August 1953.
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169and approved the abrogation o f  the 1923 C ons t itu t ion . I t  took a
s im i la r  pos it ion  towards the a b o l i t io n  o f the monarchy and the
170dec lara tion  o f the Republic on 23 June 1953.
On i t s  p a r t , - th e  Egyptian government t r ie d  to  show i t s  goodwill
towards the US and le n t i t s  moral and material support to American aims
and in te res ts  in Egypt and in the other Arab countr ies , despite some
popular ob jection and opposition.
Yet the "honeymoon" between the two sides, which f lou r ished  from
the very beginning, did not las/t fo r  very long. The cord ia l
re la t io n sh ip  between the two sides followed a trubu len t course. As one
American scholar wrote, "Washington t r ie d  to accomplish a va r ie ty  o f
goals, some o f them c o n tra d ic to ry . On the one hand, i t  wanted to show
a w il l ingness  to a l l y  w ith and then o f fe r  partnership to the new Arab
nationalism , while bu ild ing  a MEDO against Soviet in t ru s io n .  On the
other hand, Washington wanted to maintain i t s  important a l l ia n ce  with
B r i ta in  and France and promote a settlement o f the A rab -Is rae li  c o n f l i c t " ,
171"or achieve an Egyp tian -Is rae li  modus v iyen d i".
The American policy-makers were skating on th is  ice . Each side 
overestimated i t s  a b i l i t y  to manipulate the other. I t  was hoped tha t 
the honeymoon would la s t  longer, but there were two basic unresolved 
problems generated by the 1952 revo lu tion  which eroded the optimism.
169. NA RG 84 Box 2-F.500 TCA January-June 1953, American Embassy, 
Cairo, Report o f Point Four.
170. NA RG 84, Box 1, Egypt 1953-1955, from American Embassy, Cairo, 
to M in is te r  o f Foreign A f fa i r s ,  Cairo, 23 June 1953.
171. Barry Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution 1950-1957", 
P o l i t ic a l  Science Q uarte r ly , V o l.97, No.1, Spring 1982.
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The f i r s t  one was the Anglo-Egyptian d ispute, which had i t s  adverse
e f fe c t  upon American-Egyptian re la t io n s . The second was the continuation
o f the s ta te  o f war between Egypt and I s r a e l , which placed the United
States in a dilemma. On the one hand, i t  wished to support the new
regime m i l i t a r i l y  in order to ensure i t s  regional leadership in  the area;
on the other hand, the special re la t io n sh ip  w ith Israe l influenced US
decision-making in the wider Middle Eastern area. In the end, as
A lbert Hourani wrote about great-power p o lic y ,  "Any action  i t  takes
must necessarily  be a compromise and sometimes the search fo r  a compromise
172leads i t  in to  a c o n tra d ic t io n " .
172. A lbe rt Hourani, "The Middle East and the C ris is  o f 1956",
St. Antony Papers, Middle East A f fa irs  (Oxford U nivers iry  Press 
1958), p .19.
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CHAPTER FOUR
UNITED STATES AND THE 1954 
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT
The story  o f the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations leading up to the
1954 Agreement has been amply recorded in the secondary l i t e r a tu r e .^
What is  in te re s t in g  in th is  context, is the pos it ion  taken by the
Americans in the midst o f a dispute between two o f i t s  fr ie n ds , B r i ta in
and Egypt, as well as th e i r  e f fo r t s ,  both overt and covert, to meet or
a t leas t reconcile  the demands o f the two parties in c o n f l ic t .
In the view o f the B r i t is h  M in is te r o f State, Selwyn Lloyd, the
Suez Canal base in 1952 had lo s t  i t s  s tra te g ic  importance, because as
he said, "The advent o f the hydrogen bomb had a lte red  the p os it io n .
The l ike l ih o o d  o f large-scale land operations requ ir ing  a large base
was considerably reduced. Turkey's entry in to  NATO had made a move
2
forward possible on Turkey's r ig h t  f la n k " .  He also believed tha t 
because o f shortages o f men and money, i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to maintain 
the Suez Canal a t a standard tha t would prevent i t s  d e te r io ra t io n  
in d e f in i t e ly ,  and also because o f the awkward in te rna t iona l
3
repercussions growing out o f Egyptian h o s t i l i t y .
The B r i t is h  m i l i t a r y  presence in Egypt was based on the t re a ty  o f 
1936, and i t s  provis ion fo r  the maintenance o f the B r i t is h  m i l i t a r y  
base remained in force u n t i l  1956. A fte r  tha t date Great B r i ta in  would
1. Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956. A Personal Account (Jonathan Cape 1978); 
S ir  Anthony Eden, Full C ir c le , V o l.3 (Cassell 1960); John Marlowe, 
Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 (Frank Cass 1965);
P.J. V a t ik io t is ,  Modern H istory o f Egypt, 3rd e d it io n  (John Hopkins 
Press 1985).
2. Selwyn Lloyd, o p . c i t . , p .21.
3. John Marlowe, o p . c i t .
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have had to seek permission from the United Nations to keep i t s  troops 
in Egypt, and i t  was doubtful whether such permission would be 
forthcoming. From the B r i t is h  po in t o f view, the re fo re , there were 
cogent reasons fo r  negotiating a reasonable settlement and thus saving 
face p r io r  to the expiry o f the arrangement in 1956.
As fo r  Egypt, the new regime faced considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s .  This 
regime had to confront the ine v ita b le  popular demand fo r  the settlement 
o f  the Anglo-Egyptian dispute on terms sa t is fa c to ry  to Egyptian national 
asp ira t ions . But th is  did not diminish i t s  eagerness to s e t t le  the 
dispute w ith  B r i ta in ,  and nothing could i l l u s t r a te  th is  be tte r  than 
Naguib's speech a t the Arab League when he stated th a t "The B r i t is h  were 
not the enemies o f the Arabs'1.^ As fo r  B r i t is h  po licy-makers, espec ia lly
Eden, they viewed the base in Egypt as desirable but no longer absolute ly
• 5essentia l to  th e i r  in te re s ts .  What remained was the negotia tion  o f an
agreement between the two sides.
A few days la te r ,  fo l low ing  the Egyptian revo lu t io n , the American 
representative in London urged the B r i t is h  to begin ta lk s  w ith the new 
regime.^
In th is  early  stage o f the revo lu tion  and before Dulles ' t r i p  to 
the area in 1953, American policy-makers t r ie d  to achieve several goals 
simultaneously, some of which were contrad ic tory  in nature. On the one
4. FO 371/96933, 1952, the B r i t is h  Legation, Damascus, 3 October 1952, 
to B r i t is h  Embassy, Cairo.
5. FO.371/96892 JE, from Eden to S ir  Ralph Stevenson, Cairo,
31 October 1952.
6. F0.371/96933, 1952, c o n f id e n t ia l ,  Egypt and the Sudan, JE 1052/400, 
Foreign O ffice  Minutes,
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hand, American policy-makers wanted to  demonstrate support o f Egyptian 
national a sp ira t io n s , while on the o ther, they were also keen to bu ild  
a Middle East defence organisation against Soviet penetration o f the 
area and maintain th e i r  t ra d i t io n a l  a ll ia nce  with B r i ta in .
Washington formulated i t s  po licy  in accordance w ith th e i r  
s t ra te g is ts '  recommendations, who " l i k e  to see MEDO set up as soon as 
possible and they believe th a t fo r  th is  purpose we need Arab,
7
p a r t ic u la r ly  Egyptian, co-operation".
The State Department a f te r  assessing Western s tra te g ic  needs, 
pointed out to the B r i t is h  th a t "The United States Government s t i l l  
believes tha t Egypt, not Iraq , is  the key to th is  question and th a t no
other Arab sta te  would be w i l l in g  to consider p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the
Middle East defence organization u n t i l  the present d i f f i c u l t i e s  between
O
Egypt and the United Kingdom are s e t t le d " .  The United States 
concluded, the re fo re , th a t the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute 
was an urgent matter, and thus i t  resolved to secure the re c o n c i l ia t io n  o f 
le g it im a te  Egyptian in te re s t  w ith Western s tra te g ic  requirements fo r
Q
the region.
On 7 September General Naguib was appointed prime m in is te r .  His 
acceptance gave the RCC complete control over both po licy  and 
adm in is tra t ion . US Assistant Secretary of State Byroade expressed his 
optimism to President Truman tha t "There was some ind ica t ion  tha t the
7. NA RG 59 FW 774 5MSP/12-2952, to the Secretary from NEA, 30 December
1952, sub jec t, Conversation w ith  General Bradley on Israe l and
grant arms assistance fo r  Egypt.
8. NA RG 330 CD 337, New York ta lk s ,  aide memoires, Department o f
State, Washington, 5 November 1952.
9. US Congress Hearings 1957, p . 197, Dulles' statement.
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group in power might be w i l l in g  to  separate the question o f  the k ing 's  
t i t l e  to the Sudan and the question o f the Suez base and the defense of 
the a r e a " . ^
On his second day in o f f i c e ,  the Egyptian prime m in is te r ,  General
Naguib, showed the American embassy h is readiness to "es tab lish  some
sort o f  re la t io n s  w ith the B r i t i s h " .  Ambassador Caffery welcomed the
11advent of the m i l i ta r y  ru le rs  as an opportun ity  to break out o f the
impasse tha t had troubled Anglo-Egyptian re la t ions  fo r  a long time,
and policy-makers in the United States t r ie d  to e x p lo i t  the s i tu a t io n
in order to achieve th e i r  goals, thus in October 1952 the American
e f fo r t  became a "determining fa c to r "  behind the B r i t is h  decision to
12release £5m to Egypt. The B r i t i s h ,  under American pressure, showed
th e i r  goodwill towards Egypt by withdrawing th e i r  troops from el-Ferdan
13Bridge which spanned the Canal near Ismalia. The s i tu a t io n ,  however, 
was complicated by a statement by Mr. Antony Head, the B r i t is h  Secretary
o f State fo r  War, regarding B r i ta in 's  r ig h t  to re ta in  the Suez Canal
14- 15base. This prompted Naguib to a ttack the Western powers.
The m i l i ta r y  jun ta  was well aware th a t any compromise would be
in te rpre ted  by the local opposition fo rces, such as the Wafd and the
16Muslim Brethren, as s a c r i f ic in g  important national in te re s ts .
10. NA RG 59 Box 4037, 78000/8-52, top secre t, Department o f S tate, memo,
o f conversation, meeting w ith  Truman, p a r t ic ipa n ts  Byroade and Murphy.
11. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-00/9-1852, from Cairo to Secretary o f State,
8 September 1952.
12. NA RG 84 Box 221 Folder 320, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, memo, of
conversation, Col.Amin and Mr .Me Cl in toe k, 11 October 1952; The
Times, 10 October 1952.
13. Ib id .
14. FO.371/96977, 1952, JE/1194/89, from FO to Cairo, 1 October 1952.
15. FO.371/96978, 1952, from Cairo to F0, 2 October 1952.
16. Ib id .
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Naguib's f ru s t ra t io n  as a re su lt  o f his fa i lu re  to obtain any encouragement
from the West - whether m i l i ta r y  or economic - led him to warn the
representative of the American embassy in Cairo tha t some members of
his cabinet were in touch with Russia, "who would o f fe r  anything tha t
Egypt wanted in order to take a d e f in i te  stand against an Anglo-American 
bloc and MEDO".17
The Americans were pressing hard on the B r i t is h  to s e t t le  th e i r
dispute with the new ru le rs  on the grounds tha t i f  tha t regime collapsed ■
the next one would be much worse. In these circumstances Ambassador
Caffery did his utmost to influence the B r i t is h  towards a compromise.
Caffery informed the State Department tha t "Egypt w i l l  not pa r t ic ip a te
as partner w ith B r i ta in  in any MEDO concept unless B r i t is h  announce
19acceptance p r in c ip le  o f evacuation Canal Zone". The American 
eagerness fo r  Egypt's p a r t ic ip a t io n  in an an ti-S ov ie t c o l le c t iv e  
secu r ity  network pushed i t s  policy-makers to do everything possible to 
save the ju n ta 's  reputation as well as th a t o f  the B r i t is h .
At th is  junc tu re , the American pos it ion  in a dispute between two 
o f i t s  fr iends B r i ta in  and Egypt, allowed Washington to act as a 
mediator, although th is  carr ied  the danger th a t both a l l ie s  might 
become antagon is tic  towards the United States. The American task was 
d i f f i c u l t .  United States policy-makers were caught in a dilemma.
On the one hand, th e i r  global s tra teg ic  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  and B r i t is h
17. NA RG 84 Box 221, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s ,  from 
American embassy, London, to Secretary, 25 October 1952.
18. Copland, o p . c i t . , p .72; Department of State B u l le t in ,
15 November 1952, p .2.
19. NA RG 59 Box 4041-780 5/10 2152, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate, 
No.1007, 21 October 1952, secret security  information.
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a ll iance  constitu ted  a major p r io r i t y ;  on the o ther, they did not
wish to see the m i l i t a r y  regime in Egypt collapse. In the meantime, the
o f f ic e rs  began to re a lise  th a t the Americans were in a s ta te o f  confusion.
According to the United States counse llo r, th is  made them "extremely 
20depressed". The United States government feared tha t a delay, or 
renewed deadlock, in the withdrawal negotiations might escalate the 
tension between the Egyptians and the B r i t is h ,  and have a serious e f fe c t  
upon the new regime's pos it ion  and prestige v is -a -v is  strong domestic 
opposition.
The American embassy in Cairo took steps to ease the tension and to
consolidate the ju n ta 's  po s it ion . Ambassador Caffery found i t  h igh ly
important, before discussion the process of the nego tia t ions , th a t the
21m i l i ta r y  junta should send one o f th e i r  representatives to B r i ta in .
A fte r  a meeting w ith  Colonel Abdel Moneim Amin, a member o f the m i l i t a r y  
committee, Eden emphasised to his top advisers tha t "the Egyptian 
government showed i t s  readiness to co-operate w ith us and the United States 
in organising Middle East defence". Colonel Amin was emphatic th a t
22evacuation was a p re requ is ite  fo r  any arrangement fo r  such co-operation.
Caffery in his turn made i t  c lea r to the Free O ff icers  th a t Egyptian
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the Middle East Defence Organisation was the pr ice  fo r
23the withdrawal o f B r i t is h  toops from the Canal base.
20. FO.371/96896, 1952, from Cairo to FO, 9 October, S ir  Ralph Stevenson,
No.1493.
21. NA R6 4026 774-55/10-2552, from Cairo to Secretary o f S ta te, 25 October 
1952, top secre t, in te rv iew  w ith  Col.Abdel Moneim Amin, Cairo, Egypt.
22. FO.371/96979-1, 1952, from Secretary o f State FO, Eden, to F ie ld -  
Marshal Viscount Alexander, 7 November 1952.
23. FO.371/96897-1952, from Cairo to FO, 10 October 1952, copy o f US memo, 
handed to High M i l i t a r y  Committee on 6 October 1952. NA RG 59-611, 74/11- 
1052, from Cairo to Secretary o f State, "We to ld  Naguib and members of
his m i l i ta r y  committee.. .US aid so urgently asked fo r  by Naguib cannot 
be forthcoming in any quan tity  unless we have f irm  assurance as to 
Egypt in te n t io n * 're  MEDO).
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As already ind ica ted , the new m i l i ta r y  regime i n i t i a l l y  showed
i t s  readiness to co-operate w ith the United Kingdom and the United
24States in organising Middle East defence. But one could already
detect a divergence between the Egyptian and the Anglo-American concepts
or perceptions o f th is  defence organisation. The junta  nevertheless
knew th a t i t  stood to gain from the key pos it ion  assigned to Egypt
by the West, and espec ia lly  by the United States who was anxious to
see Egypt jo in  i t s  "camp". But the s i tu a t io n  was complex. The
Egyptian m i l i t a r y  ru le rs  requested American m i l i ta r y  supplies and economic
25aid in re turn fo r  Egypt's p a r t ic ip a t io n  in MEDO. The State Department 
expressed i t s  goodw il l,  when Under-Secretary o f S tate, Henry Byroade, 
pointed out to the Defence Secretary tha t " . . . t h e  important con tr ibu tion  
which an o f fe r  o f United States m i l i t a r y  aid to Egypt would make to the
pc
s a t is fa c to ry  conclusion o f the Anglo-Egyptian nego tia t ions".
Events, however, belied Egyptian expectations. In October the 
Egyptians were asked to submit a l i s t  o f th e i r  m i l i t a r y  needs to the 
American m i l i t a r y  attache in Cairo. In November the United States 
sent W illiam Foster, the Under-Secretary o f Defence to Egypt. He gave 
the Egyptian leaders a fa lse  impression tha t the United States was 
planning to supply Egypt w ith i t s  m i l i ta r y  demands. Egypt was inv ited
24. FO.371/96892, 1952, from Cairo to FO, 19 September 1952. FO.371/96934, 
1952, conversation between Secretary o f State and the Egyptian 
Ambassador, from Eden to Stevenson, 22 December 1952. Truman L ib ra ry , 
McGhee papers, Department o f State, memo, o f conversations 1952, June- 
October. From Ankara to State Department, 29 October 1952;
Middle Eastern A f fa i r s ,  chronology November-December 1952, 1Q December 
1952.
25. FO.371/16892 1024-2 from Cairo FO, 19 September 1952.
26. NA RG 59 611-74/11-1052 to Robert Lovett, Secretary o f Defence, 
from Byroade, 14 November 1952, sub ject, US con tr ibu t ion  to Anglo- 
Egyptian settlement.
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to  send a m i l i t a r y  mission to  the United States to fo l lo w  up i t s  
71request. The Egyptian government sent A1i Sabri and al-Naklawi to 
Washington. The American embassy in  Cairo was, as Caffery wrote, "not 
to  d ivulge the nature o f the Egyptian mission to his B r i t is h
po
colleagues". On the spot Caffery saw the immediate danger. Naguib
and his o f f ic e rs  in C affe ry 's  opinion were "pu tt ing  themselves very much
29in  our hands by sending two o f th e i r  best men to Washington".
Caffery did not hes ita te  to po in t out to the State Department and the
Defence Department the pos it ive  and negative impact o f  A1i S a b r i ‘ s
mission upon the whole s i tu a t io n .  He commented tha t " I  t r u s t  Department
o f Defence and Department a u th o r i t ie s  w i l l  rea lize  how d i f f i c u l t  the
s i tu a t io n  w i l l  become here should these o f f ic e rs  re turn  empty-handed.
Conversely, i f  they are given encouragement in Washington our hand w i l l
be immensely strengthened here in negotia ting defense and MEDO
probably w ith Naguib".
The State Department was impaled on the horns o f a dilemma.
C affe ry 's  recommendation went unheeded because London warned Washington
31th a t  American aid to  Egypt might defeat the B r i t is h  p o s it io n .
Furthermore, the Jewish lobby pressed the Truman adm in is tra tion  not to
32fu rn ish  Egypt with arms p r io r  to a peace settlement w ith Is ra e l .
27. Interview with Abedl Monein Amin, Cairo, and with A1i Sabri,
Cairo, 6 February 1986.
28. NA RG 774-5 MSP/12-1752, from Cairo to Secretary, No.1456, 17 Dec.1952.
29. NA RG 59 774-5 MSP/12-1652, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate,
No.1448, 16 December 1952.
30. Ib id .
31. NA RG 59 Box 4027 774 56/12-352, Cairo to Secretary, 3 December 1952; 
FO.371/96896-23, 1952, FO to  Washington, 30 December 1952.
32. FO.371/96896 23, 1952, Washington to FO, 30 September 1952; 
in terv iew  with Abdel Moneim Amin, Cairo, January 1985.
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Washington's hes ita t ion  disappointed the m i l i ta r y  ju n ta ,  and i t  became 
c lea r to them tha t Caffery 's  sweet words and William Foster's  prompt 
acceptance o f Egypt's arms requirements did not r e f le c t  the real 
in ten t ions  o f the American adm in is tra tion .
The Egyptian fa i lu re  to s e t t le  i t s  dispute with the B r i t is h  and 
i t s  fa i lu re  to obtain American m i l i ta r y  assistance, f ru s tra te d  Nasser 
and his colleagues. In an in terv iew  with the New York Herald Tribune, 
Nasser stated th a t "the leaders of the Revolution w i l l  withdraw from 
the government to lead the people in war against the B r i t i s h . . . .  I t  
w i l l  be a g u e r i l la  war". Naguib re ite ra ted  the same pos it ion  as 
did Anwar e l-S a d a t^  and Salah Salem.^ Caffery informed the State 
Department th a t "the fa c t  is  B r i t is h  have already completely destroyed
or
Egyptian confidence in them". During the months o f December 1952,
January and February 1953, Caffery pointed out to the State Department
th a t "any delay in fu rn ish ing  aid to Egypt would re s u lt  th a t Egyptians
37w i l l  surely lose th e i r  present perhaps exaggerated fa i th  in us".
Simultaneously he warned tha t the d e te r io ra t ion  o f the American pos it ion
38in Egypt would re s u lt  in "No Anglo-Egyptian settlement and no MEDO". 
While Anglo-Egyptian negotiations dragged on, Caffery indicated to the 
State Department th a t " I t  is  absolutely essentia l th a t Egyptians not be 
rushed on MEDO and tha t the evacuation be p u b l ic ly  portrayed as
33. FO.371/96934, 1952, from Cairo to FO, 30 December 1952, c ited  in 
aT/NKhabar, Cairo 29 December 1952, and The Times, 31 December 1952.
34. NA RG 59 Box 4017 774-00(W) 12 1952, 19 December 1952, from Usarma, 
Cairo, to Washington.
35. The Times, 5 February 1953.
36. NA RG 59 Box 4026 774-56/1-2353, from Cairo to Secretary of State, 
23 January 1953.
37. NA RG 59 Box 4026 774-56/1-2253, from Cairo to Secretary o f State, 
22 January 1953.
38. Ib id .
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39uncond it iona l" . In his recommendation Caffery l e f t  the door open.
He did not exclude the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f Egyptian co-operation w ith  the
West once a settlement had been reached. But i t  was c lea r th a t the
American was orien ta ted  towards the Egyptian formula ra ther than the
B r i t is h  one. He supported the evacuation as a p re requ is ite  fo r  any
Egyptian co-operation.
A d i f fe re n t  explanation could be given fo r  C affe ry 's  new a t t i tu d e .
Caffery received many ' in te ll igence  reports which claimed tha t i f  the
Anglo-Egyptian negotia tions should break down, the new regime would
probably seek to  cover "the fa i lu re  o f i t s  fo re ign p o licy  by assuming
anti-Western a t t i tu d e " .  Furthermore, these reports assumed tha t i f
the m i l i t a r y  regime were faced with in te rna l dissension, increased^,
opposition and the possible th rea t of being taken over, the government
would probably seek arms and increased trade from the Soviet b loc, and
renewal o f g u e r r i l la  warfare against the B r i t is h  garrisons would be
undertaken .^  Caffery rea lised tha t the danger o f war was not remote.
Time was running out f o r  the Truman adm in is tra tion and i t s  status to
some extent forced i t  to be a mere passive spectator as regards the
Anglo-Egyptian dispute waiting  fo r  the newly-elected Eisenhower
Republican adm in is tra t ion  to manipulate the Egyptian m i l i t a r y  demands
41and to s a t is fy  B r i t is h  strategic needs in the Suez base. Nothing 
could describe the s i tu a t io n  be tte r  than these words by the American
39. NA RG 59 774 5/1-853 LWC from Cairo to Secretary o f  State,
22 January 1953.
40. NA RG 59 Box 4016 774.00/4-153, Cairo to the Secretary, summary o f 
national in te l l ig e n c e  estimate 76, 25 March 1953, probable 
developments in Egypt.
41. FO.371/96942, 1952, from Washington to FO, 12 December 1952.
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Secretary of S tate, Dean Acheson, when he said tha t "January and our
la s t  week in o f f ic e  came with no one in sa t is fa c to ry  shape fo r  secret
ta lk s  to b e g in . . .and .. . .There was no more progress in 1952 in breaking
the Anglo-Egyptian impasse than there had been in 1951 ... the
Conservatives being no improvement over Labour. Our successors were
42to prove no more productive than we had been". Nevertheless, the 
United States' ro le  as mediator, orchestrated by Caffery and the State 
Department, became a source o f great annoyance to B r i t is h  policy-makers, 
who maintained th a t the United States and especia lly  i t s  representative 
in Egypt were t ry in g  to undermine B r i ta in 's  negotia ting  pos it ion  in 
favour o f Egypt.
Sudan
The fa i lu r e  by the US at th is  stage to accommodate B r i t is h  m i l i ta r y
needs and Egypt's p o l i t i c a l  demands over the Suez Canal did not
discourage i t  from e xp lo it in g  other matters where B r i ta in  and Egypt were
in  agreement, l ik e  the fu tu re  status o f the Sudan.
Sudan was an explosive issue throughout the course o f  the Anglo-
Egyptian negotia tions beginning in 1946. The m i l i t a r y  jun ta  re jected
the slogan o f the "ancien regime" o f "Evacuation and the u n ity  of the
N ile Va lley". In order to fu r th e r  the negotia tions, the m i l i t a r y  junta
decided to drop Egypt's demand fo r  u n if ic a t io n  with the Sudan in favour
43of Sudanese se lf-de te rm ina tion . Furthermore, they abandoned the ancien 
regime‘ s ta c t ic s  which had linked the Sudan issue with the defence question.
42. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (W.W. NortonrNew York 1969),pp.727-8.
43. The Times, 27 October 1952, "Talks on Sudan Concession".
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The Western press appreciated the Egyptian a t t i tu d e ;  The Times under
i t s  banner headline commented th a t "What seems to  have happened is
th a t Egypt has offered the Sudan a l l  the B r i t is h  o ffered and m o re " .^
Several reasons could be given fo r  the o f f i c e r 's  Sudanese i n i t i a t i v e .
According to John Marlowe, General Naguib and his colleagues had the
good sense to re a lise  tha t Egypt's p r inc ipa l and indeed v i ta l  in te re s t
in the Sudan was the question o f access to the N ile  water. Access was
more l i k e ly  to be secured through a f r ie n d ly  independent Sudan than
45through a h o s t i le  one. A second explanation and the most s ig n i f ic a n t  
was Caffery 's  ro le  behind the scenes where he began to e x p lo i t  the 
o f f ic e r s '  w il l ingness  to compromise on the Sudan. In October 1952 
he pressed them "to  enter in to  informal contact w ith resprsentatives . 
o f the B r i t is h  Embassy".^
When the negotiations were resumed in October 1952, i t  seemed tha t 
a reso lu tion  on Anglo-Egyptian d ifferences was in s ig h t .  Nevertheless 
the Americans could foresee th a t B r i ta in 's  p o l i t i c a l  ta c t ic s  in  the 
negotiations would hamper i t s  success. Therefore on 29 November, and 
even before the negotiations had broken down, the State Department 
pointed out to the B r i t is h  Foreign O ffice  tha t "We are ce rta in  tha t i f  
th is  opportunity fo r  agreement is  to s l ip  out o f hand we shall not soon 
have another opportun ity to s e t t le  the Sudan problem and open a way to 
an agreement w ith Egypt on other matters" . ^  However, the American
44. Ib id .
45. John Marlow^Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956, pp.392-3.
46. NA RG 84, Box 231 Folder 350-52, Sudan, from Cairo to Secretary 
o f S tate, 1 October 1952.
47. NA RG 84, i b i d . , from Secretary o f State to London (3645),
29 November 1952, to Cairo No.1211.
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advice went unheeded. Consequently the s i tu a t ion  was enormously
complicated between the B r i t is h  and Egyptians.
Therefore, the United States policy-makers then decided to adopt tough
diplomacy v is-c t-v is  B r i t is h  p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvres. Dean Acheson pointed
out to them th a t  " . . . i f  Sudan negotiations break down and defense
negotiations cannot be undertaken, US must f u l l y  reserve i t s  freedom o f
48action with respect to Egypt".
To resolve the impasse, and to  avoid fu r th e r  d e te r io ra t io n  o f the 
Anglo-Egyptian s i tu a t io n ,  in February 1953 Ambassador Caffery pressured 
the Egyptians to  accept a f in a l  B r i t is h  proposal on the Sudan, and they 
eventually  did accept i t . ^  The Americans had imposed th e i r  influence 
upon the two parties  which led to a resumption of the negotia tions.
Soon afterwards an agreement was reached on the Sudan. One o f the two 
major stumbling blocks troub ling  Anglo-Egyptian re la t ion s  was removed 
a f te r  nearly a quarter century o f heated debate.^0 Naguib recognised 
C affe ry 's  ro le  in the a f fa i r s  and praised him fo r  "bring ing c loser 
the two viewpoints". In Naguib's view the agreement "opened a new
51page in Egypt's re la t ions  w ith  Great B r i ta in  and the United States".
The Free O ff ice rs ' pragmatism in handling the Sudan issue led them 
to indulge in fa lse  hopes, th ink ing  th a t the Sudan accord might break 
the impasse tha t had troubled th e i r  re la t ions  with B r i ta in  in general and
48. NA RG 59, Box 3588, 745 W-00/1-1353, from the Department o f State 
to  American Embassy, London, Acheson, 3 January 1953.
49. NA RG 59 774-5/2/1853, from Cairo to Secretary No.1890, 19 February 1953; 
Documents on In te rna tiona l A f f a i r s , 1952 (London: OUP 1954),
pp.315-324 fo r  "The Sudan Agreement Text"; Naguib, Egypt, pp.242-3.
The Times, 13 February 1953. Also see, State Department B u l le t in ,
A rthur Z. Gardiner, "Problems o f Trade with the Middle East",
23 March 1953, pp.432-3.
51. Naguib, Egypt, p .244.
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the United States in p a r t ic u la r .  However, Anglo-Egyptian re la t ions  
remained deadlocked. This impasse in Egypt's re la t ion s  with the West 
was fu r th e r  re inforced by B r i ta in 's  v ir tu a l  power o f veto over the 
shipment o f arms to Egypt. In view o f the continuing B r i t is h  embargo 
and in l ig h t  o f the United States desire not to undermine a Cold War 
a l l y ,  the lack o f progress on economic and m i l i ta r y  aid to Egypt was 
almost ce rta in  ,
There were numerous ind ica tions tha t the above p o l i t i c a l  ta c t ic s  
fru s tra te d  Nasser and forced him to attack the United States openly fo r
r  p
the f i r s t  time, considering i t  a supporter o f " im p e r ia l is t ic  powers".
The American representative in Cairo saw the danger, and several 
in te l l ig e n c e  reports claimed tha t the Muslim Brotherhood might resort 
to  g u e r r i l la  warfare against the B r i t is h  garrison in the Suez Canal base. 
In order to remove any doubt on the Sudanese score and to ease the 
tension, Ambassador Caffery did not hesitate  to in te r fe re  when he to ld  
Fawzi tha t "This was an ideal time fo r  Egyptians to keep th e i r  mouths 
sh u t" . in return,Fawzias a h ighly-motivated diplomat, promised to "take
steps including in s t ru c t io n  to  censors to  put an end to  a l l  discussion
54 55on evacuation sub jec t" . Nasser re ite ra ted  the same p o s it io n , as
rc
did Sal ah Salem. In order to prevent fu r th e r  de te r io ra t io n  in the 
Anglo-Egyptian s i tu a t io n ,  American embassy representatives approached
The Times, 3 March 1953 ("No co-operation with B r i ta in ,  Nasser.
Col’. Nasser on 70 years o f  h u m il ia t io n s ") .
53. NA RG 84 Box 221 Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s ,  December 1952,
12 December 1952, from Cairo to Secretary o f State.
54. NA RG 59 774-5/2 1853, from Cairo to Secretary No.1890,
19 February 1953.
55. NA RG 84 Box 248 Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 20 March 1953, 
from Cairo to Secretary, event. Department No.2114.
56. NA RG 59 Box 4023 774-5/2 1952, from Cairo to Secretary No.1892,
19 Ffebruary 1953.
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two prominent members o f the Muslim Brotherhood, t e l l i n g  them th a t 
" I t  would be unfortunate in the extreme i f  ir respons ib le  elements 
should intervene and cast away a l l  chances o f these achievements being 
re a l is e d " . ^
The American policy-makers understood tha t because o f the
d e te r io ra t io n  o f the Anglo-Egyptian s i tu a t io n  the balance between the
moderate and the extremist elements might turn in favour o f the la t t e r .
I t  was obvious to them tha t the m i l i t a r y  regime needed to consolidate
i t s  power at home. In th is  context, Nasser showed his goodwill towards
the West, and made i t  c lea r th a t the new regime was "anti-communist"
In order to  break the impasse, Nasser demonstrated h is  readiness to
give a secret verbal assurance th a t "Base f a c i l i t i e s  w i l l  be a t disposal
o f the West in case o f war which threatens the Middle E a s t " . ^  As a
response, the United States government signed an economic agreement with
the Egyptian government o f fe r in g  the l a t t e r  $10m to finance i t s  technical 
fi np ro jec ts , such as h yd ro -e lec tr ic  p lants and land reclamation. In 
th is  way, despite the continued f r i c t i o n  between Egypt and B r i ta in ,  
American-Egyptian re la t io ns  did not d e te r io ra te ,  and the honeymoon between 
the two countries was extended. One o f the reasons fo r  th is  was the fa c t
tha t the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  began to take a “ new look" a t the
61Middle East sho rt ly  a f te r  his inauguration in January 1953.
57. NA RG 84 Box 221, Folder 320-1, memo, o f conversation 18 December 1952.
58. RG 59 774-5 MSP/2-1453, from Caffery to Byroade, 14 February 1953, 
discussion between Nasser and Lakeland.
59. NA RG 59 Box 4014 780-5/3 1853, from Cairo to  Secretary o f State 
No.2092, 18 March 1953.
The Times, 20 March 1953 ("United States aid fo r  Egypt").
61. Department o f  State B u l le t in , 9 February 1953, pp.213-4, Dulles,
TIA survey o f our fo re ign po licy  problems".
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Eisenhower Admin istra tion and the Dispute
The new American adm in is tra tion  was p a r t ic u la r ly  concerned by the 
marked decline in Western and, w ith i t  American, prestige  in the Middle 
East. The region as a whole also appeared to co n s t i tu te  a major gap in
C O
the Western defence system. The Eisenhower adm in is tra t ion  began to
frame a new American strategy towards the Middle East, in  which Egypt
" is  obviously the key" in the defence issue. The American National
Security Council reported in March 1953 confirming t h i s ,  and fu r th e r
recommended th a t " [ the  US]. . . should develop Egypt as "a po in t o f
s t r e n g th " . ^  Such American assessments were u n re a l is t ic ,  not taking
in to  account the fa c t  tha t the absence o f a sound Anglo-Egyptian
settlement was undermining American in i t i a t i v e s  in the area. On
16 March 1953 Eisenhower placed on B r i ta in  a great part o f  the blame
fo r  America's fa i lu re s  in the Middle East, B r i ta in  in his view "had
65handled the Egyptian issue badly".
By ea r ly  A p r i l  1953 the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  was in a quandary.
On the one hand i t  wanted to show i t s  w il l ingness  to  support Egyptian 
national a sp ira t io n s , while bu ild ing  a Middle East regional defence 
system against the Soviet th re a t.  On the other hand, Washington wished 
to maintain i t s  important a l l ia n ce  with B r i ta in  and other co lon ia l powers.
62. Dulles statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
25 May 1953; Steven L. Spiegel, The Other A ra b - Is ra e l i  C o n f l i c t ,
p .60; Campbell, Defence of the Middle East, p .49.
63. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers (Ann Whitman F i le  1),
Dulles Herter series Box No.1, A p r i l  1953, memo, from Eisenhower
to Acting Secretary o f S ta te, 23 A p r il  1953.
64. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower papers (Ann Whitman f i l e ) ,  NSC 
papers, summaries o f discussions, special meeting o f  NSC, 31 March 
1953, p .14.
65. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , papers o f J.F. Dulles, telephone c a l l  series 
Box No.10, fo ld e r  White House, telephone conversation 16 March 1953, 
memo, o f conversation with the President.
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The adm in is tra tion  therefore could hardly acquiesce to the B r i t is h  
pos it ion  in Egypt w ithout s a c r i f ic in g  i t s  p r inc ip les  against co lon ia lism , 
and w ithout jeopard is ing i t s  e f fo r ts  to promote close re la t io n s  with 
Egypt.
During tha t time the CIA and the American embassy in Cairo compiled
many reports about the d e te r io ra t io n  o f Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s ,  which
they believed could lead to a resumption of v io lence. Thus, on
9 March 1953, The Times wrote on i t s  f ro n t  page th a t "Egypt opens army
57camps fo r  c i t iz e n s " .
Despite the fundamental problems which marred Anglo-Egyptian 
re la t io n s ,  both sides enterta ined hopes o f making quick progress 
towards a settlement. But the United States was the only country with 
enough p o l i t i c a l  c lo u t in  Egypt a t th a t time. C hurch ill h imself 
recognised the American pos it ion  by asking Washington to designate a 
m i l i t a r y  man o f higher rank to engage in the Anglo-Egyptian defence
CO
discussions and to ass is t Caffery. A fte r many pre lim inary contacts,
Eisenhower chose; General'j.Hull , the Deputy Chief o f  S ta f f ,  to
respresent the American side in the projected Anglo-Egyptian defence 
69ta lk s .  Simultaneously Eisenhower pointed out to  Naguib and Eden 
th a t the United States could not come in to  the negotiations unless
66. NA RG 59 774-00/653, Weekly Summary, events of Egypt, 31 December- 
January 1953, 6 January 1953. I b id . , 780-5/3-1153, from Cairo to 
Secretary o f State No.2030, 11 March 1953. I b id . ,  59 774/5-25/5323, 
Summary o f In te l l ig e n ce  Estimate 76, 25 March 1953, probable 
Development in Egypt.
67. The Times, 9 March 1953.
68. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry  papers (Ann Whitman f i l e ) .  NSC Series 
Box No.4, Folder 133, meeting o f NSC, 24 February 1953; NA RG 59 
Box 4023, 774/5-2553, from Department o f State outgoing telegram 
to Cairo, 25 February 1953.
69. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower papers Box No.8, Folder 4,
Egypt, 11 March 1953,
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in v ite d  by the Egyptian government,^ providing the venue fo r  American
unwillingness to be placed in a "no-win" s i tu a t io n .
Shortly th e re a f te r ,  the Egyptian did not hes ita te  to  re je c t the
71American o f fe r  to pa r t ic ip a te  in the negotia tions. This is
demonstrated well by Nasser's words to Caffery tha t the m i l i t a r y  junta
"wishes to avoid having the United States placed in a pos it ion  to share
72public  h o s t i l i t y  now directed against the B r i t i s h " .  But Mohammed
Naguib t r ie d  very hard to e x p lo i t  the Egyptian re je c t io n  to enhance the
n a t io n a l is t  image of the regime in Egypt by attacking p u b l ic ly  the
i n i t i a l  American o f fe r ,  declaring tha t " . . .w e  have enough with one ...
I w i l l  not accept any in te rfe rence whatever w ith the independence o f 
73th is  country". Secretly Naguib and Mahmoud Fawzi to ld  Caffery tha t 
"You can accomplish more in  your behind-the-scene ro le  than you could 
have accomplished as an active  n e g o t ia to r " . ^  I t  is  not so much th a t 
the m i l i t a r y  jun ta  excluded the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f an American p a r t ic ip a t io n  
in  th e i r  negotiations w ith the B r i t i s h ,  but ra ther th a t they feared th a t 
the American overt ro le  a t th is  stage o f the ta lk s ,  espec ia lly  a f te r  
the Sudanese agreement, would be in te rp re ted  by the opposition as
7 c
American in terference in Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s .  I t  might also
70. Eden, Full C i r c le , pp .150-3. D.D. Eisenhower papers, In t .s e r ie s  
Box No.8, sent to American Embassy, Cairo, from the President to 
General Naguib, 24 March 1953; D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Dulles 
papers 51-59 J. Foster Dulles, chronological series Box No.1,
17 March 1953, 16 March 1953, memo, o f conversation.
71. M. Naguib, K a l i m a t i L .  T a r ikh , pp .132-33; RG 59 A fr ica  50-54, 
Egypt 28 45-611-74/4 353, aide memoire, Secret Security In form ation, 
24 March 1953; The Times, 12 May 1953.
72. NA RG Box 248, Folder 320-1 , Anglo-Egyptian, January, March, from 
Cairo to Secretary, 18 March 1953.
73. The Times, 12 May 1953, and 19 March 1953, "Cairo Policy on Canal 
Zone Evacuation".
74. NA RG 59 Box 4023, 774-5/3-1553, from Cairo to Secretary o f  State 
No.2064, 15 March 1953.
75. NA RG 84, Boc 248 Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, 18 March 1953, from 
Cairo to Secretary, sent department 2097.
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confirm Soviet rumours th a t  the m i l i ta r y  regime would open the way to
Egyptian p a r t ic ip a t io n  in a Middle East defence o rgan isa tion , something
th a t had been re jected  by i t s  Wafdist predecessors. S im i la r ly ,
the m i l i ta r y  ju n ta 's  eagerness to court the United States and to encourage
negotiations was re f le c te d  in Nasser's statement to  Lakeland th a t
"Naguib w i l l  give secret verbal assurance tha t base f a c i l i t i e s  w i l l  be
at disposal o f  the West in case o f war which threatens the Middle
E a s t " , ^  and h is readiness to discuss the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  o f  an Egyptian-
77Is ra e l i  peace, a f te r  the settlement o f the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.
But nevertheless the American pos it ion  as a whole was fa r  from
c lea r to Egypt. Mohamed Heika l, Nasser's trus ted  adv ise r, and the
pro-American p o l i t i c a l  commentator, raised an obvious question with the
Eisenhower adm in is tra t ion  in one o f his a r t ic le s  published on 8 Apr il
781953, "Tell us fra n k ly  and c le a r ly  where you stand". Events moved
ra p id ly  and the American policy-makers perceived the danger. Therefore5
by the end o f March and the beginning of April the American adm in is tra tion
encouraged Church ill  to begin negotiations with Neguib as soon as 
79possib le. The Egyptians demonstrated th e i r  readiness to  s ta r t  ta lks
80with the B r i t i s h ,  although they were not hopeful o f a successful outcome.
76. NA RG 84 Box 248, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, 28 March 1953.
77. NARG 50 Box 4023 774-5/3 from Cairo to Secretary o f State No.2141,
26 March, top secret.
78* Akhir LUza (weekly magazine, Cairo) 8 April 1953, c ited  in tra n s la t io n
in the State Department F i le  RG 59-611 74/4 11/53, from Cairo to 
Department, 4 November 1953.
79. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers as President (Ann Whitman 
f i l e ) ,  Dulles Herter series Box No.1, fo ld e r ,  Dulles, A p r i l  1953, 
Personal and Secret, 7 A p r i l  1953, Dulles to C hu rch i l l .
80. NA RG 59 774-5/4-953, from Cairo to Secretary o f S ta te , No.22/6,
9 April 1953.
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The degree o f moderation was a new trend in the Egyptian camp. This
moderation was in evidence when, on 11 A p r i l ,  Nasser made a statement
reported in The Observer, "You ask what is  our po licy  - i t  is complete
independence. But we also want the Canal Zone base to function
e f f i c i e n t l y . . . .We know tha t we w i l l  want techn ic ians : ' since i t  is
81B r i t is h  equipment in the base we w i l l  need B r i t is h  techn ic ians".
The American embassy and the B r i t is h  a u tho r i t ie s  welcomed Nasser's
0 9
statement, considering i t  most helpfu l and encouraging. In th e i r  
frequent meetings w ith the representatives o f the American embassy, 
Nasser and Salah Salem did not exclude the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f Egypt 
p a r t ic ip a t in g  in regional defence arrangements w ith the United States
o o
and B r i ta in ,  once a settlement had been reached. The m i l i ta r y
regime's moderation and i t s  w il l ingness to compromise can be a t tr ib u te d
to i t s  need fo r  American m i l i ta r y  a id . This was required in order to
ensure the m i l i t a r y 's  lo ya l ty  to the regime, and to consolidate i t s
power against domestic opposition.
The American government used i t s  support as a trump card to
manipulate the Egyptian a u th o r i t ie s .  By the end o f March 1953 the
United States declared Egypt e l ig ib le  fo r  m i l i ta r y  g rants , but th is
84was " l im ite d  to t ra in in g  on ly " . C learly th is  decla ra tion  did not 
s a t is fy  a l l  o f the Egyptian m i l i ta r y  requirements as i t  was q u a l i f ie d
81. The Observer, 12 April 1953.
82. NA RG 84 Box 248, Folder A 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, A p r i l -  
June 1953, from Cairo to Secretary o f State, 13 A p r il  1953.
83. NA RG 59 Box 404, 780-5/3-553 from Cairo to Secretary o f State,
5 March 1953; RG 84 Box 248 Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, 
from Cairo to Secretary, 10 A pril 1953.
84. NA RG 330 DC 092, Greece-Ita ly 1953, Box No.8, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense, 6 April 1953.
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by a r e s t r ic t iv e  l im i ta t io n .  I t  was perceived by the Egyptian government
as a stepping-stone which might be followed by requests fo r  more
supplies. I t  ce r ta in ly  did not exclude the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f fu tu re
aid once a settlement had been approved by both sides.
A c tu a l ly ,  the American inducement was a primary fa c to r  behind the
Egyptian decision to resume ta lks  w ith the B r i t is h .  In order to
avoid any setback in the negotiations and to encourage a po s it ive
outcome, Caffery advised Nasser and his colleagues not to in s is t  upon
complete evacuation at th is  early  stage o f the negotia tions. He f e l t
85th a t "the B r i t is h  w i l l  not agree to  such a demand".
Needless to say, American e f fo r ts  enabled the negotiations to 
resume on 28 A p r i l .  The pa rt ic ipan ts  met s ix  times and once again the 
process reached a stalemate. According to Naguib and Baghdadi, Great 
B r i ta in  took the pos it ion  tha t Egypt must f i r s t  agree to some sort o f 
m i l i t a r y  a l l ia n ce  before i t  could safe ly evacuate the Suez Canal Zone.
The Revolutionary Command Council ins is ted  tha t independence was a 
fundamental p re requ is ite  to any formal a ll iance  w ith  the West. The 
government o f an occupied country was no more able to  negotiate a
oc
tre a ty  o f a l l ia n ce  with the occupying power.
In any event, the m i l i ta r y  o f f ic e rs  kept th e i r  options open by 
refusing the B r i t is h  formula, and at the same time approaching "the 
American President w ith an o f fe r  to co-operate w ith Washington in a
85. NA RG 84, Box 248 Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, 20 A p r i l  1953, 
from Cai^o to Secretary.
86. Mohamed Naguib, Egypt Destiny, p .251: Baghdadi, o p . c i t . ,  p .75.
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87Middle East defense pact". Even though f l e x i b i l i t y  and pragmatism 
characterised Egyptian diplomacy, Nasser however pointed out to one 
o f the American embassy o f f i c i a ls  tha t "The base must be an Egyptian 
base, under Egyptian con tro l.  We are w i l l in g  fo r  the B r i t is h  to leave 
th e i r  s ta f f  in our custody and we are w i l l in g  to accept th e i r
88te ch n ic ia ns .. .contro l over technicians must be in our hands". The 
Americans soon realised th e i r  plan fo r  a Middle East defence system was 
becoming unatta inable. Dulles decided to inves t iga te  the s i tu a t io n  
personally, and tra ve lle d  to the Middle East. The Americans believed 
the B r i t is h  pos it ion  was de te r io ra t in g  ra p id ly ,  and State Department 
b r ie f in g  papers complained tha t "Colonial and im p e r ia l is t ic  p o lic ies
on
are m ills tones around our neck".
Dulles' Trip  to  the Middle East
Four days p r io r  to Dulles ' t r i p  to the Middle East, the Arab fore ign
m in is te rs , a f te r  th e i r  meeting on 6 May 1953, declared th e i r  support fo r
the Egyptian cause and ca lled  on B r i ta in  to  withdraw i t s  troops from
QflEgypt w ithout any preconditions. At around the same time, Naguib gave 
an uncompromising speech in the s ty le  of his Wafdist predecessors. He 
declared tha t "Independence cannot be granted by a piece o f paper. I t  
can be achieved only by s a c r i f ic e  and blood".
87. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower papers In t .s e r ie s ,  Box No.8, 
Egypt/memo, o f conversation, the President and the Egyptian 
Ambassador, 4 May 1953.
88. NA RG 84 Box 248, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, April-June 1953, 
from Cairo to Secretary, dated 6 May 1953.
89. Ib id .
90. New York Times, 10 May 1953; The Times, 11 May 1953, "Arab 
League's Po licy , Support fo r  Egypt".
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I t  appears tha t the support given by the Arab League provided 
Egypt w ith an opportun ity  to harden i t s  po s it io n . And th is  was done 
p r im a r i ly  in order to impress upon Dulles the urgency o f  the s i tu a t io n ,  
and persuade the United States to exert pressure on the B r i t is h  to be 
more f le x ib le .  According to th is  hypothesis, Egypt believed tha t the 
support given by the Arab League fo r  th e i r  cause might spur the United 
States to lend i t s  backing to an Arab c o l le c t iv e  se cu r ity  pact in which 
Egyptian hegemony would be assured. This way American support would 
also a fford  Egypt the opportun ity  to extend i t s  in fluence w ith in  the 
Arab region.
Four days before his a r r iv a l  in Cairo, Dulles received a personal
message from the B r i t is h  prime m in is te r ,  Winston C h u rc h i l l ,  requesting
the United States to delay providing Egypt with any m i l i t a r y  
• 91assistance. Dulles considered th is  B r i t is h  request as part o f a 
po licy  intended to handicap the American defence plans fo r  the region 
and to  weaken Dulles ' pos it ion  at the bargaining tab le  w ith  the 
Egyptians. Thus the Eisenhower adm in istra tion  warned Church ill o f 
what i t  could expect should Egypt's m i l i ta r y  demands remain u n f u l f i l l e d ,  
and tha t the American pos it ion  was tha t "We fee l th a t i t  may not be 
possible to continue these d i lu to ry  ta c t ic s  w ithout serious consequences
no
in our re la t io ns  with Egypt and charges of bad f a i t h " .  On the eve 
o f Dulles ' v i s i t  to Egypt, there fo re , the s i tu a t io n  was indeed 
complicated, espec ia lly  when Naguib declared th a t bargaining over the 
Canal Zone was "Shameful"
91. RG 59 11.011/DU B/-853, sent to American Embassy, Cairo, from
Department o f  State, 8 May 1953.
92. I b id . ,  verbal te x t  to C hurch il l .
93. The Times, 11 May 1953.
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Three major issues occupied the a tten tion  o f  Secretary Dulles
p r io r  to his departure to Cairo on 11 May 1953: the settlement o f
94the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Egyptian p a r t ic ip a t io n  in an an t i-S ov ie t
c o l le c t iv e  security  network, and persuading Egypt to become the f i r s t
Arab state to conclude a peace agreement with Is rae l .
On 11 May 1953 Mahmoud Abul Fath, a leading Egyptian jo u r n a l is t ,
and e d ito r  o f the a l-M is r i newspaper, published an open le t t e r  to
Secretary Dulles s ta t ing  tha t " I f  America wants secu r ity  in the Middle
E a s t . . . le t  her leave the Arab people to o rg an ise ,th e ir  own defence and
le t  her supply them w ith the arms". He added tha t "Dulles has not
come here to hear our ideas but to force us to accept a so lu t ion "
95agreed upon by both the American and B r i t is h  governments. In
al-Akhbar, published by the Amin bro thers, Moustafa Amin asserted tha t
Egypt could hardly be expected at th is  time to concern i t s e l f  with
communism, "which is  a probable th re a t,  while the B r i t is h  occupation
96is  an actual danger and an act o f aggression". Al-Dawa, o f
the Muslim Brotherhood took a hard l in e  in c r i t i c i s i n g  the Dulles 
mission. An e d i to r ia l  stated th a t "The emissary o f  the d o l la r  w i l l  
not l is te n  to the voice o f to rtu red  humanity. The only force which
push the idea o f bargaining out o f  the mind o f Dulles is our own
97steadfastness".
94. NA RG 59 Box 2848 611-8016-1253, from American Embassy, Ankara, 
12 June 1953, memo, o f conversation between McGhee and Turkish 
Foreign M in is te r ;  RG 59 F i le  6 110-11/DU/5-453, from Cairo to 
Secretary o f  State, 4 May 1953.
95. A l -M is r i , 11 May 1953.
96. Al-Khabar, 11 May 1953.
97. Al-Dawa, 11 May 1953.
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I t  was in these circumstances tha t Dulles began his ta lks  with
the Egyptians. He held one meeting with Naguib and another with
Nasser. According to Mohamed Heikal and the American papers, three
main top ics were discussed: the B r i t is h  occupation, the need fo r
armaments, and the Western proposals fo r  a Middle East defence
organisation. During the Naguib-Dulles ta lk s ,  the former re ite ra ted
his po in t several times tha t "no government in any Arab country can
now go against the w i l l  o f the people who hate the B r i t is h  and feel
b i t t e r  against the United States". At the end o f h is statement,
Naguib asked Dulles rh e to r ic a l ly  to "Free us from the B r i t is h
98occupation f i r s t ,  and we can then negotiate in good f a i t h " .  But
Naguib t r i e d  to keep the door open fo r  a possible m i l i t a r y  a l l iance .
He to ld  Dulles tha t "No country can stand alone", and expressed the
view tha t 'Russia is  not our f r ie n d " .  In short, Naguib did not exclude
the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f Egyptian p a r t ic ip a t io n  in a Middle East defence
network once the B r i t is h  had evacuated. At the end o f th e i r  ta lks
Naguib indicated to Dulles th a t th e i r  fa i lu re  to reach an agreement with
the B r i t is h  would adversely a f fe c t  his government's pos it ion  and
perhaps another "revo lu tion  would take place w ith inca lcu lab le  
99re s u lts " .  In his meeting w ith  Dulles on 12 May 1953, Nasser 
re ite ra ted  Naguib's p o s it ion . Furthermore, he pointed out to Dulles 
tha t "the Egyptian people th ink  o f  MEDO as a perpetuation o f occupation". ^
98. NA RG 59 Box 4037-78-0015 2953, Dulles ' t r i p  to  the Near East, 
Secretary o f  S tate, memo, o f conversation between Dulles and 
Mohamed Naguib, 5 pm, 11 May 1953, p .5*
99. Dulles-Naguib conversation, o p . c i t .
100. RG 59 Box 4037, Dulles' t r i p  to Near East, mem. o f conversation 
between RCC and Dulles, 12 May 1953; Heikal, Cairo Documents, pp.43-5.
I t  is  c lea r tha t the issue on which agreement was sought and the
goals which Dulles set out to achieve had an important bearing on his
chances o f success. Unfortunate ly , events did not develop as expected.
Because o f Egypt's resentment, Secretary Dulles did not hes ita te  from
the very beginning to t e l l  Naguib tha t he f e l t  tha t the o r ig in a l  MEDO
proposal no longer met the s i tu a t io n  and was outdated; and he thought
something else could be in i t ia te d .  The exclusion o f the MEDO issue
from the discussion led Dulles to point out to Naguib th a t the "United
101States cannot equip Egypt to  f ig h t  the B r i t i s h " .  In his ta lks  w ith
Naguib, Dulles and his aides focused on the Anglo-Egyptian dispute in
the hope th a t a settlement o f the controversy would strengthen th e i r
pos it ion  in the Arab world and undermine the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f Soviet
penetration in the region. American po licy  was aimed a t more l im ite d
goals which presumably were less d i f f i c u l t  to achieve. Thus Dulles
emphasised to Egyptian m i l i ta r y  leaders tha t "e f f ic ie n c y "  is  the key
102word in th ink ing  o f  the base, and confirmed tha t i t  was very important
to the United States tha t "the change in the status o f  the base should
not a f fe c t  i t s  u s a b i l i t y  in war o r on short no t ice " . He added, "No
one could a ffo rd  to have a power vacuum in the Base". At his
meeting with Fawzi and Naguib, Dulles re ite ra ted  the American pos it ion
with respect to the technical maintenance o f the Suez base. He stated
1 03tha t the base should be maintained a t a high level o f e f f ic ie n c y .
But a t the conclusion o f his v i s i t  to Egypt, Dulles did his utmost to
101. I b i d . , 11 May 1953, p .14, Secret Security Information.
102. Memo, o f conversation between Dulles and Naguib, i b i d . , p .13.
103. I b id . , p .9.
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correc t the Egyptian impression tha t "the United States is  b l in d ly  and
104f u l l y  supporting the B r i t is h  po licy  in Egypt". Thus the controversy
with America's a l l y  did not cool America-Egyptian re la t io n s  at th is
time. In order to prove th e i r  goodwill in th e i r  e f fo r ts  to reach a
sa t is fa c to ry  settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian d ispute, the o f f ic e rs  in
th e i r  turn guaranteed th a t they would take no d ras t ic  measures against
the B r i t is h  u n t i l  Dulles returned to the United States, when he would
105have an opportun ity  to review the s i tu a t io n .
The fa i lu re  o f Dulles to secure Egyptian p a r t ic ip a t io n  in a 
Western Middle East defence organisation did not a f fe c t  the American 
hope tha t Egypt might become the f i r s t  Arab state to make peace with 
Is ra e l .  Egyptian m i l i ta r y  leaders, fo r  th e i r  p a r t ,  overestimated 
th e i r  a b i l i t y  to play o f f  the United States against B r i ta in .  Each 
actor was keen to manipulate his "opponent" th ink ing  th a t events might 
lead to the achievement o f i t s  aims w ithout paying a high p r ice .
Dulles ' t r i p  nevertheless gave him the opportun ity  to reassess the 
American pos it ion  and ro le  in  the dispute between B r i ta in  and Egypt.
At the end o f May 1953 Secretary Dulles returned from his mission. 
He submitted an extensive secret report to the American president 
explaining the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and his personal analysis o f i t .
He recommended tha t "the United States must convince the B r i t is h  to 
re lax th e i r  p o s it io n " .  He concluded tha t "the days when the Middle 
East used to re lax under the presence o f B r i t is h  p ro tec tion  are gone",
104. NA RG 59 Box 4016 774.00/5-1953, Weekly Summary o f Events, Egypt, 
13 May 1953; also in te rv iew  with A l i  Sabri.
105. NA RG 59 Box 4016 774.00/5-1953, Weekly Summary o f Events, Egypt, 
13-19 May 1953.
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and "such B r i t is h  troops as are l e f t  in the area are more a fa c to r  o f
106in s t a b i l i t y  ra ther than s t a b i l i t y " .
X 7  D u lle s1 assessment o f the s i tu a t io n  can be a t t r ib u te d  p r im a r i ly
to in te l l ig e n ce  reports which confirmed that the Anglo-Egyptian
h o s t i l i t y  provided "a real te s t  of Arab s o l id a r i t y " .  The reports
raised an obvious question, "W ill the Arab League declare an economic
blockade against B r i ta in ? "  How many volunteers would come from the
Arab world to f ig h t  beside th e i r  Egyptian brothers against the B r i t is h  
107
troops? I t  was also strengthened by other reports compiled during
Dulles ' stay in Cairo, many o f them suggesting tha t the d e te r io ra t io n
of Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s  would lead to a m i l i ta r y  confrontation
108between the two sides. Any B r i t is h  m i l i ta r y  action against Egypt 
would cons titu te  a th rea t to pro-Western regimes in the region and 
thereby increase the l ike l ih o o d  o f Soviet penetration in the Arab world. 
I t  was well known tha t any B r i t is h  m i l i ta r y  in terference would put an 
end to American attempts to conclude peace between the Arab states and 
Is ra e l .
On a broader f r o n t ,  a f te r  his re turn to the United States, Dulles 
attempted to resolve the problems which prevented the re a l is a t io n  o f 
a Middle East defence system. His approach was tw o-fo ld : to f a c i l i t a t e
an agreement which would end the Anglo-Egyptian d ispute, and to resolve
106. Princeton U n ive rs ity ,  J.F. Dulles papers, Box 73, Near East T r ip ,  
Important po in t by Dulles, pp .1-2. See also McGhee papers, Box No.1, 
Department o f S ta te, from American Embassy, Ankara, to Department o f 
State, Washington, 28 May 1953, subject: Secretary v i s i t  to Ankara.
107. RG 84 Port Said, Egypt, 1950-54, con fiden tia l f i l e  1953, Box No.1, 
from American Consulate, Port Said, 16 May 1953 to American Embassy, 
Cairo, to State Department, and see a lso, Eisenhower papers (Ann 
Whiteman f i l e )  Dulles Herter series, Box No.1, fo ld e r  Dulles May 1953, 
fo r  the President from the Secretary, 18 May 1953, Secret Security 
In form ation.
108. Executive session o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vo l.V I,
83, Congress, Second Session, Statement of Secretary Dulles, 1954, p .688.
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the A rab -Is rae li  controversy, or a t least reach a modus v iv e n d i. But
the idea o f estab lish ing  a defence system centred on Egypt was temporarily
shelved, pending a so lu t ion  o f these other problems. Dulles now
perceived the success o f the Middle East defence organisation as a
remote p o s s ib i l i t y .  Many o f the Arab peoples "are more fe a r fu l  o f
Zionism than communism", and they were so engulfed w ith th e i r  quarrels
with Great B r i ta in  and France th a t they paid l i t t l e  heed to  the Soviet 
109th re a t.  His assessment o f the Middle East defence organisation and
Egypt's ro le  can be a t t r ib u te d  to a number o f fac to rs . According to
110Dulles ' top secret f i l e ,  the "Suez Canal base was not important".
I t  became evident to American and B r i t is h  s tra te g is ts  th a t the defence 
o f the Middle Eastern countries ca lled  fo r  several bases in the northern 
t i e r .  Moreover, the existence o f nuclear weapons emphasised the need 
fo r  a m i l i ta r y  dispersal a l l  the more imperatively. Therefore i t  was 
necessary to bu ild  up the northern t i e r .  A new approach to the Suez 
Canal base dispute became possible.
In the meantime, there had been no v is ib le  upgrading o f contacts 
between the B r i t is h  and the Egyptians ,since the break-down of 
negotiations in May. Neither side was able to a r t ic u la te  i t s  in ten t ions  
and reactions, nor to share in common ob jectives. Following Dulles ' 
mission, the Egyptians renewed th e i r  e f fo r ts  to resume negotiations w ith 
the B r i t is h .  On 26 May 1953 Nasser to ld . th e  Austra lian M in is te r in
109. Department o f State B u l le t in , 15 June 1953, Report on the Near East, 
p .833; also Dulles papers, Important points o f t r i p .
110. NA RG 59, Top Secret F i le  (Washington ta lk s ,  July 1953), b i la te ra l  
with the United Kingdom Suez Canal base (11 July 1953), p .9.
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Cairo th a t " I t  would be fo o l is h  fo r  Egypt to attempt to f i g h t  the
B r i t i s h " .  Furthermore, he declared tha t Egypt was prepared to accept
111B r i t is h  techn ic ians, "but not in te rm inab ly". Naguib re ite ra ted
112th is  pos it ion  to the correspondent o f the London Daily Herald.
In order to break the impasse, the Egyptian ambassador in Washington
asked the State Department to work out some suggestions o f  how to resume
the discussions with the United Kingdom. F le x ib i l i t y  and pragmatism
were evident in the Egyptian o f fe r .  In the course o f Ahmed Husayn' s
conversation with the American Under-Secretary, General Bedell Smith,
the former showed Egypt's readiness to accept a small number o f B r i t is h
technicians " fo r  a short pe r iod ", once the B r i t is h  had pulled out th e i r
113troops from the Canal base. On the one hand, the Egyptian proposal
sought to e lim inate some sp e c if ic  obstacles, and on the o ther, the 
Egyptian regime t r ie d  to maintain extensive l inks  with the United States 
in order to use them as a trump card against the B r i t is h  in case o f 
d i f f i c u l t y .  The Egyptian concern to have the United States involved 
in the dispute led General Mohamed Naguib to declare in an interv iew  
w ith Damascus Radio on 12 June, th a t he "had no objection to United 
States intercession in the Canal d is p u te " .11^
111. NA RG 59 Box 2978 674-0015-2753 H, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate, 
27 May 1953.
112. NA RG 84 Box 11, Egypt 1953-1955, Folder 350, Egypt, from American 
Embassy to Department o f S tate, 12 June 1953,
113. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-00/5-553, memo, o f conversation, Ahmed Hussein 
and Under-Secretary Smith, 5 June 1953.
114. NA RG 59 Box 2978 674-00/6-253, 12 June, from American Embassy, 
Cairo, to Department o f  State.
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American E ffo r ts  to Break the Impasse a f te r  Dulles ' T r ip
The Americans now increased th e i r  e f fo r ts  to break the impasse.
In a top secret message o f 17 June 1953, Eisenhower asked his
representative in London to inform Church ill tha t "We believe best
in te re s t  of a l l  w i l l  be served i f  B r it ish -E gyp tian  discussions are
resumed in Cairo". He added th a t "We f e l t  the agreement w ith Egypt
115alone was more practicab le  than broader agreement on MEDO".
116Although the Egyptians and the B r i t is h  resumed th e i r  informal ta lk s ,
C h u rc h i l l 's  rep ly  to Eisenhower on 17 June did not encourage the
Republican adm in is tra tion to take ac tive  steps " in  asking the Egyptians
117to reopen the discussions" fo rm a lly .  Instead, the Americans
hardened th e i r  pos it ion  regarding Egyptian demands, and informed the
Egyptian representative in Washington th a t the United States Government,
because o f s tra te g ic  m i l i t a r y  reasons, considered the "Base should be
ava ilab le  to  Western powers in case o f general war anywhere in the
world". Several considerations brought about a reversal in  the American
118a t t i tu d e  towards the a v a i la b i l i t y  o f the Canal base. One o f these
115. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower papers as President (Ann Whitman 
f i l e ) ,  Dulles-Herter se r ies , Box No.1, Dulles fo ld e r ,  23 June 1953, 
from Dulles to American Ambassador, London, 17 June 1953, top secret.
116. Lacouture , Egypt in T ra n s i t io n , p .206,
117. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Dul1es-Herter se ries , Box No.1, Folder 
Dulles, June 1953, memo, fo r  the President, sub jec t, Egypt, 20 June 
1953.
118. NARG 84 Box 248, Folder 320-1, memo, o f conversation, Mr. el-Labban, 
Egyptian Embassy. NE Mr. Hart, 18 June 1953. During Dulles- 
Naguib ta lk s ,  the Egyptian understood th a t "the base would be 
ava ilab le  to the Arab states and to a l l ie s  o f  the Arab states in 
case o f an attack on Arab states was considered imminent by the 
United States".
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119was the collapse o f American po licy  in Iran which pushed the United
States closer to the United Kingdom's pos it ion  regarding growing
national demands in the Middle East. American policy-makers rea lised
tha t they had to abandon, or at least s h i f t  t h e i r  so f t  diplomacy in
the area as i t  might jeopardise the Anglo-American a l l ia n ce  in the Cold
War era and encourage Soviet penetration.
Another major consideration was tha t ta lks  concerning the
re ac t iva t ion  o f the base in the case o f a global war appeared to be a
su itab le  vehic le fo r  a continuation o f the dialogue w ith  the Egyptians.
This might influence Egypt to accept the B r i t is h  pos it ion  to include
120Turkey and Iran in the " re a c t iva t io n "  clause.
The American proposal regarding the a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  the Suez base 
in case o f general war posed special problems fo r  American-Egyptian 
re la t io n s . , The Counsellor o f the Egyptian Foreign O ffice  protested 
to the American embassy in Cairo by declaring tha t "News from Washington 
has caused great concern in Cairo". Furthermore, he to ld  the American
121charge d 'a f fa i re s  tha t "you seem to want more from us now than before".
Salah Salem, the member o f the RCC and M in is te r o f National Guidance,
hinted in his speeches to  the notion tha t the In d ian -s ty le  neutralism
122would be a feas ib le  fore ign po licy  fo r  Egypt.
119. BarryRubin, Paved with Good In te n t io n s , pp.80-1; Kermit Roosevelt, 
Counter Coup (McGraw 1979).
120. For the B r i t is h  po in t o f view, see Anthony N u tt ing , Nasser, 
pp.68-9, and Anthony Eden, Full C i r c le , p .255.
121. NA RG 84 Anglo-Egyptian Relations, from American Embassy, Cairo 
(Lewis Jones) to Parker Hart, State Department, 6 Ju ly 1953.
122. I b i d . , and The Times, 6 July 1953.
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The American embassy in te rpre ted  Salem's statements as a reaction 
123to th e i r  proposal. In many ways the American policy-makers
understood the dangers accompanying th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  ta c t ic s .  Despite
th e i r  promises to Dulles, Egyotian m i l i ta r y  leaders threatened to
launch a g u e r r i l la  war against the B r i t is h  in the Canal Zone unless
the United States came forward with new proposals fo r  settlement o f
124the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. I t  seems c lear tha t the Egyptians aimed
1 25"to d issociate the United States from the United Kingdom", and to
use American fears o f an Egyptian n e u t ra l is t  po licy  in order to press
B r i ta in  to a r r ive  at a reasonable sett lement.  And th is  would have
the added advantage o f s i lenc ing  or neu tra l is ing  domestic opposition to
the m i l i ta r y  regime. But the search fo r  a so lu t ion  was an arduous
process. Both the Egyptians and the B r i t is h  hardened th e i r  p os it io ns ,
while American policy-makers came to believe tha t the B r i t is h  had lo s t
th e i r  c r e d ib i l i t y  in handling the negotia tions. I t  was obvious tha t
the a v a i la b i l i t y ,  duration o f s tay , and the status o f B r i t is h
technicians were the main obstacles in  the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations
126delaying the Anglo-Egyptian agreement.
On 14 July 1953, the American National Security Council compiled 
a top secret report fo r  Eisenhower which commented on the adverse 
e ffec ts  of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute on American strategy in the area 
as a whole. A statement from the report concludes tha t " . . . i t  could
123. NA RG 84, from American Embassy, Cairo, to State Dept., 6 July 1953.
124. NA RG 59 674.84 A-/7-653, Paris, Egyptian-Is rae li re la t io n s ,  6 July 
1953, American Embassy, Paris, to Department o f State.
125. I b id . , th is  statement has been stated by re l ia b le  Egyptian source 
to the American embassy o f f ic e r  in Paris.
126. Eden, o p . c i t . ,  p .255.
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re s u lt  in inflammation throughout the Arab states to the po in t where
they would endeavour to exclude Western influence from a l l  o f th e i r
s ta tes". In th e i r  f in a l  remarks, a member o f the NSC indicated tha t
"An early  so lu t ion  o f th is  problem is urgently needed to enable the
127West to get ahead with plans fo r  the defence o f the area". In the
meantime, the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  committed i t s e l f  fu r th e r  to
active  involvement in c o n f l ic t  reso lu tion . Shortly  a f te r  the Dulles-
Salisbury ta lks  in Washington, the Americans were w i l l in g  to concede
the B r i t is h  pos it ion  regarding the a v a i la b i l i t y  o f the base in a major 
128war, but they asked the B r i t is h  to modify th e i r  pos it ion  w ith respect
129to Egyptian demands, and to make concessions. The Americans assumed
not only a mediating ro le  but also adopted a new one. As a v is ib le
"pa r tne r" ,  they hoped to break the impasse. On 15 Ju ly 1953, Eisenhower
promised Naguib th a t substantia l economic and m i l i ta r y  aid would be
130forthcoming upon the settlement o f the d ispute, in order to persuade
Egypt to resume the negotiations with the B r i t is h .  At th is  time, in 
re turn  fo r  a t re a ty  to be concluded between the United Kingdom and 
Libya, B r i ta in  was to  acquire the r ig h t  to maintain i t s  m i l i t a r y
127. NANSC papers, Report No.155/1, 14 July 1953, pp .19-20.
128. NA RG, top secret f i l e ,  Washington ta lk s ,  July 1953, b i la te ra l  with 
the United Kingdom, Suez Canal base, 11-15 July 1953. Dulles- 
Salisbury NA RG 84, Box 248 F .320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, 21 July 1953, 
to Secretary from Cairo.
129. I b id . ,  Anglo-Egyptian, Ju ly , memo, o f conversation. General Robertson 
pointed out to  Ambassador Caffery tha t "B r i t is h  feel th a t as a re su lt  
o f Washington ta lks  the United States is  backing them in th e i r  
controversy w ith  Egypt".
130. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower papers, In te rna tiona l se r ies ,
Box No.8, Folder 2, Egypt, from Eisenhower to Naguib, American 
Embassy, Cairo, 19 July 1953.
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131establishment there fo r  twenty years. This development in
neighbouring Libya encouraged the hope tha t ta lks  between B r i ta in  
and Egypt could be resumed with some chance o f success.
In th is  new phase o f ac tive  diplomacy the Americans renewed th e i r  
e f fo r ts  to resume negotia tions. On 17 Ju ly , the State Department 
submitted to Egypt a d ra f t  formula tha t:
1. Recognized the complete sovereignty o f Egypt over a l l  i t s  
t e r r i t o r y ,  inc lud ing the Suez Canal.
2. A l l  fore ign experts including B r i t is h  and American
technicians who might be employed to maintain the Suez
132Base should be placed under Egyptian command.
The d ra f t  formula was rejected as an unsatis factory proposal by the
133RCC members, "who were disappointed" because of i t s  inherent ambiguit ies,
the issues o f a v a i la b i l i t y  and duration had not been approached, and these
134were considered the most d i f f i c u l t  issues in the negotia tions.
Egyptian reservations did not, however, prevent the United States from
fo llow ing  up i t s  e f fo r ts  to resolve the dispute. They approached
Saudi Arabia, a supporter o f the Egyptian government to t r y  and
persuade the RCC to be more compromising in th e i r  a t t i tu d e  regarding
135the issue o f the a v a i la b i l i t y  o f the Suez Canal base.
131. The Times, 13 Julv-18 Autust 1953, "Anglo-Libyan Treaty".
132. NA RC. 5 9 7  Box 4016, 774.00/7-1753, 17 July 1953, Hart N.E. to Byroade.
133. NA RG 84, Box 248, Folder 320, Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, from 
Cairo to Secretary, 11 August 1953.
134. NA RG 84, Box 248, Folder 320-1, from Cairo to Secretary,
26 August 1953.
135. NA RG 59, Box 4038, 780-022/7-2753, memo, o f conversation, 
p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  Saudi Arabian Ambassador, NEA, Byroade, secret, 
p .2, 27 July 1953.
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American Embassy E ffo r ts  to Ease Tension
The American embassy in Cairo expressed i t s  concern about opposition
groups in Egypt, espec ia lly  the Muslim Brotherhood, and th e i r  e f fe c t
upon Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  decision-making. The embassy’ s P o l i t ic a l
O ff ice r  approached the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in order
to estab lish th e i r  a t t i tud es  towards the possible Anglo-Egyptian 
136agreement. This overture gave the American embassy the opportun ity
to reassess i t s  po licy  towards the de te r io ra ting  s i tu a t io n ,  and also to
understand the main fa c to r  behind the Egyptian stubbornness w ith
regard to the issues o f the a v a i la b i l i t y  and duration o f the base. At
the same time, the United States t r ie d  to show i t s  goodwill by promoting
fu r th e r  re la t ions  w ith Egypt. In August 1953 the American government
recommended tha t "the removal o f the United States A ir  Force supply
base from Abu Sue ir" ,bu t the B r i t is h  opposed the withdrawal and requested
the Americans to delay "a t leas t u n t i l  the conclusion o f the United
137Kingdom-Egyptian ta lk s " .  Once again the Americans were t ry in g  a
d i f f i c u l t  balancing ac t.  On the one hand they wanted to maintain th e i r
important a l l ia n ce  w ith  B r i ta in  and to demonstrate th e i r  s o l id a r i t y  
w ith  th e i r  a l l y .  On the o ther, they t r ie d  to support loca l demands 
fo r  independence and development. This ambivalent a t t i tu d e  
made the United States a prime ta rge t fo r  Egyptian suspicion tha t i t  was
135. NA RG 84, Department no .345, Cairo to Secretary, memo, of 
conversation, 5 August 1953.
137. NA RG 339 CD 092, Box No.8, Denmark-France, Office o f Assistant 
Secretary o f Defense, memo, fo r  USD f i l e s .  Subject: use o f 
Abu Sueir A ir  Base, Suez Canal Zone, by USA A ir  Force, 25 August 1953.
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the United States who encouraged B r i ta in  to harden i t s  pos it ion  v is -a -v is
the Egyptian demands.
On the spot, Caffery saw the danger, namely th a t American p o l i t i c a l
1ambiguity undermined "the Egyptian confidence in the United S tates",
and led them to feel tha t the United States had abandoned i t s  t ra d i t io n a l
ro le  o f supporting national movements and had decided to give the
" im p e r ia l is t  powers a free hand in the Middle East and North A f r i c a " . 1^
Caffery recommended strong ly tha t "the United States should take an
increasing ly  responsible ro le  in the Middle East". Moreover, he
suggested th a t the United States should not be a mere passive specta tor,
141handicapped in i t s  re la t ions  with the European " im p e r ia l is t "  powers.
The recommendations went unheeded as the United States had
deferred to Egyptian national demands due to the explosive events in 
142Iran. On several occasions, Egypt repeatedly warned the United
States o f what i t  could expect should Egypt's national asp ira tions
remain u n fu l f i l l e d .  I ts  pos it ion  would then be the "defense o f freedom
143everywhere and p o s it ive  n e u t ra l i t y  between the East and the West".
This th rea t o f  Egyptian n e u t ra l i ty  was re flec ted  in the RCC's impatience 
in the lack o f progress in th e i r  informal discussions w ith the B r i t is h  
and th e i r  a l lus ion  to the p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvres by the United States.
138. NA RG 84, Box 246, Folder 320, in p o l . r e la t io n s , 1953, from Cairo
to Department o f State, 4 September 1953. Also RG 59, 64-74-9-453, 
from Cairo to Eyes Only, fo r  the Secretary, 4 September 1953.
139. NA RG 59, 611-74/9-453, from Cairo to Secretary, 4 September 1953.
140. Ib id .
141. TFTcL
142. Barry Rubin, Paved with Good In te n t io n s , pp.84-6.
143. NA RG 59,Box 1978, 674-00/9-1953, from Cairo to Department of 
State, Washington, 19 September 1953, sub ject, Comment on Egypt's 
po licy  in the United Nations.
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In these circumstances, the State Department was impelled to renew
i t s  e f fo r ts  to bring about the resumption o f negotia tions. The American
Under-Secretary o f State pointed out to the B r i t is h  ambassador tha t they
had the fe e l in g  th a t the "present Egyptian concession on duration given
144to Caffery very close to a l l  tha t could be obtained". Caffery
considered B r i t is h  stubbornness as the main obstacle in  concluding an
agreement. Therefore on 6 October, he asked the State Department to
145urge the B r i t is h  to "modify th e i r  a t t i tu d e "  in th e i r  ta lks  w ith the
Egyptians. At the same time, in order to strengthen the American
pos it ion  and to  prove tha t the United States would f u l f i l  i t s  m i l i t a r y
promises to Egypt once the settlement had been reached, Ambassador
Caffery suggested to the State Department tha t " I t  would be very much
in the national in te re s t  i f  we would in v i te  the en t ire  graduating
146class o f  the Egyptian National War College".
By making th is  recommendation, Caffery may have been f i r s t l y  t ry in g  
to prove to the Egyptian m i l i ta r y  regime tha t once the settlement had 
been reached, the Americans would comply with Egyptian demands fo r  
m i l i t a r y  assistance. He also assumed tha t secondly, th is  kind o f 
m i l i ta r y  mission did not commit the United States to granting Egypt 
any m i l i ta r y  equipment, and tha t t h i r d ly ,  i t  would not provoke the 
B r i t i s h ,  but w ithout doubt i t  would modify the Egyptian pos it ion  at 
the bargaining tab le . F in a l ly ,  such a mission would not a f fe c t  the 
m i l i ta r y  balance between Egypt and Is ra e l.
144. NA RG 84, Box 248, Folder 320-1, from Secretary to Cairo, No.289,
13 September 1953.
145. NA RG 84, Box 248, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, from Cairo to 
Secretary, 6 October 1953.
146. RG 330 CD 092 Egypt, Box No.8, the Secretary o f Defence, sub ject,
V is i t  o f 55 Egyptian o f f ic e rs  to th is  country, 6 September 1953.
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Despite a l l  American e f fo r ts  and the w il l ingness o f the B r i t is h
and the Egyptians to s e t t le  the d ispute, the s i tu a t io n  did not improve.
In October 1953, two main issues created a new deadlock. One was
B r i ta in 's  requirement tha t i ts techn ic ians  be allowed to remain in
m i l i ta r y  uniform, which the Egyptians rejected on the grounds tha t i t
147"would be a symbol [permanence] of fore ign occupation". The other
was the demand tha t B r i t is h  control over the Suez Canal base could be
reactivated in the event of an attack on Turkey and I r a n , 1^  or in
149response to an A rab-Is rae li c o n f l ic t .  I t  was c lear at the end of
October tha t fu r th e r  negotiations were f r u i t le s s .  I t  was d i f f i c u l t  
fo r  the two sides to compromise. B r i t is h  Conservative Party leaders 
were under f i r e  from members o f th e i r  party who alleged tha t the
150Churchill government was ca p itu la t ing  to American and Egyptian blackmail.
Church ill t r ie d  to deny these accusations before the House o f Commons
by declaring tha t "The so lu tion  w i l l  not be d ic ta ted e ith e r  by the
violence o f our fo re ign enemies or by the pressure o f our best 
151fr ie n d s " .  In Egypt the m i l i ta r y  junta i t s e l f  was under a ttack from
the domestic opposition groups, especia lly  the Wafdists, who accused i t  o f
compromising Egyptian national aspira tions and bowing to Anglo-American 
152pressure.
147. Lacouture , Egypt in T ra n s it io n , p .206.
148. Eden, o p . c i t . , p .255.
149. NA RG 84, Box 248, Folder, Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s ,  from Secretary 
to Cairo 529, London 2521, 9 November 1953.
150. Eden, o p . c i t . , pp.256-7; Meyer, o p . c i t . , p .61; The Times,
9 October 1953.
151. New York Times, 18 December 1953.
152. Hamroush, Vol.1, pp .182-3; The Times, 18 October 1953.
La Couture, o p . c i t . , p .175. By the middle o f September 1953 the 
revo lu tionary court began i t s  work by arresting  th i r t y - f o u r  p o l i t ic ia n s  
and bringing them to t r i a l .
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D u lle s1 E ffo rts  to Break the Impasse
During th is  time the Americans sought to promote understanding
by c o n c i l ia t in g  between the two sides. On 3 November, Dulles asked
the B r i t is h  ambassador in Washington fo r  a "d is t in c t iv e  uniform" fo r
the B r i t is h  m i l i t a r y  technicians d i f fe r in g  from the "conventional
m i l i t a r y  uniform". He also urged the B r i t is h  to exclude from the
negotiations "the A ra b -Is ra e li  c o n f l ic t "  as a case fo r  rea c t iva t in g  
153the base. By such proposals Secretary Dulles was aiming to avoid
any fu r th e r  delay in the Anglo-Egyptian negotia tions. Moreover, he
hoped to keep the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez base a separate
issue from the A ra b -Is rae li  c o n f l ic t .  Also Dulles was t ry in g  to a l la y
the Egyptian suspicions tha t the B r i t is h  would involve th is  cause as an
excuse to keep the base under th e i r  control w ithout any r e s t r ic t io n .
Behind the scenes a t the same time, America combined pressure
and inducement to bring Egypt back to the bargaining ta b le .  This
American ta c t ic  was not viewed, in  Washington a t le a s t ,  as being
inconsis tent w ith attempts to  ease the tensions between Egypt and B r i ta in .
Intensive e f fo r ts  were made to stop any Egyptian attempt to negotiate
154fo r  arms from any European country or from NATO members. The United
States did i t s  utmost to prevent such deals e ith e r  by threatening the
153. NA RG 84, Box 248, Folder, Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s ,  from 
Secretary to Cairo, 9 November 1953.
154. NA RG Box 4026 774-56/4-1-553, from Athens to Secretary o f State 
No.3076, 15 April  1953; 774-56/42453, from Athens to Secretary
o f S tate, 24 A p r il  1953. The Secretary o f State pointed out to the 
American ambassador in Athens tha t any Egyptian arms deal w ith 
European countries might weaken the UK, and also tha t the US 
bargaining pos it ion  v is -a -v is  Egypt; see NA RG 59 774-56-4-1553, 
from Dulles to Athens, No.3267, 19 April 1953.
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governments of these countries or by employing various techniques of 
155persuasion. A l l  o f these measures were taken with a view to forc ing
the Egyptians to be more f le x ib le  in th e i r  negotiations w ith the
B r i t is h .  Egyptian ta c t ics  disturbed them since these would help Egypt
harden i t s  pos it ion  at the bargaining tab le  w ith the B r i t is h .  I t  was
in any case d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the Eisenhower adm in istra tion to remain passive
in the face o f Egyptian intransigence, which threatened to turn the
balance o f power between Egypt and Israel in favour o f the former, and
thus undermine American attempts to achieve peace between Egypt and
Is ra e l ,  or a t least a modus vivendi between them.
In a d d it ion , the US had repeatedly deferred i t s  economic and
156m i l i ta r y  aid to Egypt "u n t i l  agreement is  concluded" between Egypt
and the United Kingdom. Caffery continued reporting to the State
Department tha t the RCC suspected th a t the United States was bowing to
B r i t is h  pressure and used "economic assistance to press on Egypt to make
157Suez agreement on B r i t is h  terms".
American hes ita t ion  seemed to  i r r i t a t e  and f ru s t ra te  Nasser, who 
declared before an audience o f Cairo Univers ity  students on 10 November
th a t "We shall re ly  upon ourselves. . .w ithout dependence on aid from
158e ith e r  the Western or the Eastern b loc". Then on 20 November, Nasser
155. NA RG 59 77456/9-1553, Department of State, to American Embassy,
Rome 2726, proposed purchase by Egypt of ce rta in  m i l i ta ry  equipment 
from Firme Carnical, September 1953. From Madrid to Secretary,
No.417-774-56/12-1753, The United States pointed out to Spain "That 
the la t t e r  had no r ig h t  to supply th i rd  parties  w ith any kind o f 
weapons unless the United States m i l i ta r y  representative might be 
consulted with regard to th e i r  d isp o s it ion " .
156. RG 59 774-5MSP/9-2953 CS/G, to Under-Secretary from NEA Mr. Byroade, 
sub ject, current economic and m i l i ta r y  assistance to Egypt, 29 September 
1953; see also D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , papers o f J.F. Dulles, 
telephone ca ll  series, Box No.10, telephone conversation with White House.
157. NA RG 59 Box 5376-874-2H/11-1253, from Cairo to Secretary,
12 November 1953.
158. RG 59 Box 1978 674-00/11-1253, from American Embassy, Cairo, to the 
Department, 12 November 1953, Nasser warns students o f d i f f i c u l t i e s .
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attacked the United States openly, declaring "We must there fore  depend
on ourselves and we must rea lise  tha t our enemy w i l l  not help us but
w i l l  always work to weaken us". He added, "America is  c lose ly  l inked
with B r i ta in  and w i l l  not help us to in fu r ia te  B r i ta in .  Do not believe
159fo r  a moment th a t America w i l l  help us". While the Egyptian
leadership was deeply annoyed with American p o l i t i c a l  ta c t ic s ,  i t  did
not hes ita te  to place i t s  hopes on the outcome of the Bermuda Anglo-
American summit conference which was held in December 1953.
On the eve of the conference the Egyptian ambassador asked Dulles
to exert more pressure upon the B r i t is h  to convince them tha t "an
160agreement was re a l ly  necessary". Secretly, Naguib ind icated his
161w il l ingness to  co-operate with them "since the B r i t is h  w i l l  evacuate".
In his ta lks  with Eden, Dulles emphasised th a t there should be a
t im e - l im i t  to  w ithholding American economic aid to  Egypt, and tha t th is
162time "was rap id ly  e xp ir ing " . But th is  approach was unsuccessful 
since Eden was apprehensive, be liev ing tha t Dulles was ba s ica l ly  t ry in g  
to weaken the B r i t is h  negotiating pos it ion  with regard to  Egypt.
This in te rp re ta t io n  resulted in a tougher B r i t is h  a t t i tu d e  towards 
granting Egypt any concessions, regardless o f a l l  the American attempts 
to break the impasse.
159. RG 59-774/3/11-2153 LWC, from American Embassy, Cairo, to  Department 
o f State, 20 November 1953.
160. NA RG 59 Box 4016 774-00/12-153, memo, o f conversation, 1 December 1953.
161. NA RG 59 Box 4016 774-00/12-1853, memo-for Mr. Dulles, secret 
secu r ity  in formation, 8 December 1953.
162. NA RG 84, Box 248, Folder 320-1, from Secretary Dulles to Cairo 636, 
London 3070,'fo r  Caffery, 9 December 1953; The Times, 12 December 
1953, "Busy week fo r  Mr. Eden".
163. Interv iew with Ambassador Byroade ( in  December 1953). Byroade 
was the Chief o f the NEA in the State Department.
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Consequently, the outcome of the Bermuda summit conference was 
seen as unsatis facto ry  by the m i l i ta r y  regime in Egypt. An American 
diplomat met Egyptian sources " in  close touch with Nasser", and was to ld  
tha t the RCC would review Egypt's fore ign po licy . He confirmed in th is  
connection tha t the "steps cu rren t ly  under consideration" included:
1. Formal declaration of n e u t ra l i ty  and withdrawal o f the 
o f fe r  to make the Suez base available to the West 
under any condition.
2. A campaign to persuade other Arab League states to 
support Egypt.
3. An economic boycott o f the United Kingdom.
1644. Harassment o f B r i t is h  troops in the Canal Zone.
Whether or not Nasser conveyed these po licy  in ten t ions fo r  ta c t ic a l
reasons, tha t is ,  as a way o f exerting pressure on the Americans to
break the impasse, Egyptian antagonism towards the West had increased
sharply. At the same time, Ambassador Caffery 's  reports re f lec ted  his
fears tha t B r i t is h  intransigence would lead to the spread o f
"Mossadegehism" not only among the Egyptian leaders but also among 
165the populace. American policy-makers accepted the view tha t the
m i l i ta ry  junta was under tremendous pressure from the domestic opposition,
and feared that the example in Iran might be followed in Egypt.
164. NA RG 84, Box 248 Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, from Cairo to 
Secretary, No.35, 13 December 1953.
165. NA RG 84, Box 248 Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, from Cairo to 
Secretary, 11 December 1953.
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On 15 December Secretary Dulles sent a personal message to Eden
asking the United Kingdom to prepare a d ra f t  of an agreement which
would cover a l l  the points o f p r in c ip le  including those on "uniform
and a v a i la b i l i t y " .  He also indicated his readiness to play an active
166ro le  to persuade Egypt to accept the B r i t is h  terms. These steps
re f lec ted  American fears tha t the prolongation of the deadlock might 
erode fu r th e r  American-Egyptian re la t io n s . In Egypt, Ambassador 
Caffery resumed his e f fo r ts  to impress upon Dr. M. Fawzi, the Egyptian 
fore ign m in is te r ,  the need to f in d  "an adequate a v a i la b i l i t y  formula", 
confirming tha t "the B r i t is h  are sincere when they ta lk  o f th e i r  
problem .
P o l i t ic a l  tension in Egypt was now mounting, and g u e r r i l la  warfare
168against the B r i t is h  Canal base was resumed. The need fo r  American-
Egyptian co llabora t ion  a t th is  stage, however, led the Egyptian fore ign
m in is te r to t e l l  Caffery tha t " I f  anyone makes peace with Israel i t
169w i l l  be the Egyptians a f te r  they get r id  o f the B r i t i s h " ,  knowing 
tha t the f i r s t  p r io r i t y  o f American strategy in the area was tha t Egypt 
should become the f i r s t  Arab state to  make peace with Is ra e l .
Egyptian policy-makers t r ie d  a t th is  stage to e x p lo i t  th is  trend 
in American po licy  in order to gain more American support against the 
B r i t is h  p os it io n . They took steps to convince the United States tha t 
i t  would be the s ta b i l is in g  fac to r  in achieving peace with Is ra e l.
166. NA RG 84, Box 248, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, from Secretary to 
Cairo 662, and London 3178, 15 December 1953.
167. NA RG 84, Box 248, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian, from Cairo to 
Secretary, Department 703, 22 December 1953.
168. The Times, 18December 1953; Mohamed Naguib, Kuntu Raisan .L-Misr, 
pp.320-1.
169. NA RG 84, Box 248, Folder 321, Anglo-Egyptian, from Cairo to 
Secretary, 22 December 1953.
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Yet th is  Egyptian o f fe r  did not induce the United States to  a l te r  i t s
stand regarding economic and m i l i ta r y  aid to Egypt, since i t  believed
th a t Egypt's advocacy o f neutralism would have an "adverse e f fe c t  in
other Middle Eastern countr ies". State Department analysts believed
neutral ism'Would undercut moderate elements and embolden extremists
17nto demand th e i r  government to  exert s im ila r  pressure". u On the
other hand, Egyptian fa i lu re  to obtain American aid produced a fee l ing
o f despair in Egyptian p o l i t i c a l  c i rc le s .  Caffery reported tha t Dr.
Fawzi, the Egyptian fore ign m in is te r ,  complained b i t t e r l y  against the
171Americans fo r  "using economic pressure in favour o f  the B r i t i s h " .
I t  was nevertheless d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  to 
fu rn ish  Egypt with i t s  economic and m i l i ta r y  needs not only because o f 
the B r i t is h  stance, but also because o f American domestic p o l i t i c a l  
considerations. Therefore, the United States did not provide Egypt 
with economic and m i l i ta r y  aid a t th is  stage o f the nego tia tions.
From the foregoing we can conclude tha t American lack o f support fo r  
Egypt cannot be a t t r ib u te d  to  a s ingle cause or exp lanation, but to a 
va r ie ty  o f diverse fa c to rs .  An added complication to  the overall 
s i tu a t io n  was the power struggle between Nasserand Naguib, which began 
in December 1952, and was now reaching i t s  climax.
Nasser's Role
During th is  period Nasser realised tha t he was at a disadvantage 
p o l i t i c a l l y .  The masses were loyal to Naguib and impatient to  win
170. NA RG 59, Box 5368 874.00 TA/12-353, from Department to American 
Embassy, Cairo, 31 December 1953.
171. NA RG 59, Box 5368 874.00 RA/2854, from Cairo to Secretary o f S tate, 
28 January 1954.
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back co n s t i tu t io na l l ib e r t ie s  once represented by the Egyptian parliamentary
system. Nasser understood c le a r ly  America's aims and objectives in
Egypt and, being a pragmatist, he t r ie d  to strengthen his pos it ion  when,
in January 1954, he ing ra tia ted  himself with the United States in order
172to a t t ra c t  and s o l i c i t  i t s  support. On the other hand, Naguib t r ie d
to side with t ra d i t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  parties and the Muslim Brotherhood.
There is no doubt tha t Naguib's a f f i l i a t io n s  would c o n f l ic t  with American
strategy in Egypt, which was based upon supporting the m i l i ta r y
d ic ta to rsh ip  against the pariiamentary system.
The colonel desperately needed an agreement, fo r  he regarded i t  as
173an essentia l p re requ is ite  to consolidating his power. Thus before
the end o f his struggle w ith Naguib, Nasser decided to take the r is k
o f compromising. In January 1954 he secre tly  o ffered to smooth the
path fo r  negotiations by demonstrating his readiness to include Turkey
in the rea c t iva t io n  o f the base clause, despite the opposition of several
174of his RCC colleagues. In Ambassador Caffery 's  view, "Nasser is the
only man in Egypt w ith  the strength enough and guts enough to put over
175an agreement w ith the B r i t i s h " .  Nasser's sudden f l e x i b i l i t y  and 
pragmatism allowed Caffery to reassess American po licy  in Egypt.
Most American p o l i t i c a l  analyses and assessments o f the s i tu a t io n
considered the removal of General Naguib as opening the door to in terna l
172. Interview with K. Roosevelt. See also NA RG 59 774/12-5-52, from 
Cairo to Secretary, 5 December 1952.
173. Xacouture , o p . c i t . , p .206.
174. NA RG 59, top secret f i l e ,  Dept. CA 6247, 30 A p r il  1954, from
Caffery to Secretary, 10 May 1954
175. NA RG 59, Box 4016 A 774.00/3-3-154, from Cairo to Secretary o f
State No.1218, 3 March 1954, secret.
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176dissension, and predicted fu r th e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in fore ign re la t io n s .
177C affery 's  and the CIA's assessments, however, were to the contrary.
In order to court the United States fu r th e r ,  Nasser showed a
greater w il l ingness  to handle the in te rna l s i tu a t io n  when, on 11 January
1954, he arrested a large number of the Muslim Brotherhood who had
178f l a t l y  re jected any concessions to the B r i t is h ,  and who were considered
more dangerous opponents o f Nasser and his colleagues than the out-1 awed
179communists and the other dissolved t ra d i t io n a l  pa rt ies . Nasser
proceeded to create a more favourable climate fo r  the negotia tions. The
d isso lu t ion  o f the Muslim Brotherhood eliminated Naguib as the centre o f
r iv a l  power too. Consequently, the balance o f power between the two
leaders was qu ick ly  tipped in favour of Nasser. Events soon proved
tha t Nasser had become the real ru le r  o f Egypt in name as well as in fa c t .
As o f January 1954, Nasser's f  1 ex ib i 1 ityand his readiness to include
180Turkey in the reac tiva t ion  clause, encouraged Ambassador Caffery to
urge Fadil a l-Jam a li,  the Iraq i prime m in is te r ,  to persuade Nasser on the
v i a b i l i t y  o f B r i t is h  re -en try  in the case o f an attack on Turkey as 
181well as Iran. But Nasser would only agree to such an i n i t i a t i v e
176. The Times, 26 February 1954, "Removal of modern in f luence".
177. Interv iew with K. Roosevelt, Washington, D.C.
178. NA RG 84, Dept. No.345, from Cairo to Secretary of S tate, memo, of
conversation, 5 August 1953.
179. A1-Ahram, January 1954 ; La Couture, o p . c i t . , pp.249-52; NA RG 59
774".00/1 -26554, from Caffery to Dufies, 26 January 1954 ; NA RG 59
774.00/3-254, from Cairo to Secretary, 3 March 1954. Nasser 
reported to  Caffery tha t in his opinion "most of these leaders are 
o ppo rtu n is ts " .
180. Ahmed Hamroush, Qissat thawrat 23, p .345. Khalid Muhiyy a l-D in , a 
former member of the RCC, asserted tha t "the Americans supported 
Nasser against Naguib because o f his acceptance o f the inclusion
o f Turkey in the reac tiva t ion  clause".
181. NA RG 84, Box 255, Folder 320, Egypt-Iraq, 10 January 1954, from 
Cairo to Secretary.
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on condition tha t Iran was not to be included in the agreement w ith the
B r i t i s h .  The Caffery i n i t i a t i v e  came at a moment when the B r i t is h  were
in s is t in g  tha t they had the r ig h t  to re-occupy the base in the event of 
182"world war", despite Egyptian ob jections.
Taking in to  account Nasser's new status in Egypt, Ambassador Caffery
t r ie d  to convince him to accept Iran as well as Turkey in the event of
the reac t iva t ion  o f  the base. Nevertheless, Nasser was adamant on th is
p o in t ,  fo r  he believed tha t his newly-acquired pos it ion  w ith in  the
country would be undermined, espec ia lly  in the eyes o f his r iv a ls .  To
183accept the American formula uncond it iona lly  and wholeheartedly 
would have been detrimental to his prestige as a n a t io n a l is t  leader.
On 3 February Nasser t r ie d  to persuade his colleagues in the RCC 
to accept the inc lus ion  o f Turkey or Iran in any negotiated agreement 
over the Canal base. Although Nasser was not serious about the Iran 
part o f the formula, he included i t  in order to encourage his RCC 
colleagues to accept eventually  the inclusion o f Turkey, a member o f 
NATO, as the preferred choice. This ta c t ic  o f Nasser's appeared to be 
consistent with American s tra tegy , especia lly  in the eastern Mediterranean 
which would have welcomed a c loser l in k  between Egypt and NATO.
184-Ambassador Caffery welcomed Nasser's e f fo r ts  in th is  d ire c t io n .
With Naguib out of the p ic tu re ,  there was a fe e l in g  o f expectation
185in American c i rc le s  tha t Anglo-Egyptian re la t ions would improve.
182. NA RG 84, Box 256, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian nego tia t ions, from 
Secretary to Cairo 864, 29 January 1954.
183. NA RG 84, Box 256, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian negotiations (Turkey), 
to Secretary from Cairo, 28 January 1954.
184. NA RG 84, Box 256, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian nego tia t ions, from 
El t in g ,  his conversation with A1i Sabri to American ambassador 
(C affe ry ), 3 February 1954.
185. NA RG 84, Box 255, Egypt 350-1954, from Cairo to Secretary,
25 February 1954.
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Nasser's eagerness to achieve an agreement with B r i ta in  through his 
secret contacts with the Americans led him to keep a l l  o f h is aides
186and colleagues in the dark, includ ing his p o l i t i c a l  adv ise r, Dr. Fawzi,
187who, according to Raymond Hare, was a "good techn ic ian ", and in
188N utting 's  view, "a most g i f te d  career diplomat and nego t ia to r" .
The B r i t is h  were re lu c tan t to make any concessions in return fo r
Nasser's f l e x i b i l i t y .  Major Salah Salem, the RCC spokesman, declared
on 10 February, "We refuse to co-operate in any way w ith  anyone who
stands against our d ig n i ty  and our freedom". When reporters questioned
him about the nego tia t ions , he re p lie d , " I  have almost fo rgo tten  these
189words because the s i tu a t io n  has not changed since 21 October 1953".
The gap between the tone and the actual po licy  became evident when,
two weeks la te r ,  Nasser secre tly  contacted the American ambassador,
190o ffe r in g  the inc lus ion  o f Turkey i f  "B r i ta in  gives up the uniform" 
fo r  th e i r  techn ic ians.
While Nasser was maintaining his po licy  o f accommodation w ith  the 
United States, he was racing against time to secure his pos it ion  in 
Egypt and the re s t o f  the Arab world. By e lim ina t ing  Naguib's power base, 
Nasser had not yet neutra lised  a l l  o f his r iv a ls ,  both from w ith in  and
186. NA RG 59, Box 4020 774-11/3-1754 ,  from Cairo,  "Fawzi is n o t in  the 
picture or f u l l y  cognisant with the B r i t is h  negot ia t ions" ,  to 
Secretary of  S ta te ,  17 March 1954.
187. Interview with R. Hare, Washington, D.C.
188. Nutting, o p . c i t . ,  pp.70-1.
189. RG 59, Box 1978, 674-00/2-1259, from American Embassy, Cairo, to 
Department o f  S ta te, 12 February 1954, Salah Salem defines 
non-co-operation p o lic y .
190. NA RG 84, Box 256, Folder 320, Anglo-Egyptian nego tia t ions , from 
Cairo to  Secretary o f S tate, 10 March 1954.
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without the country. In the context o f the "Arab Cold War" where
Egypt and Iraq were competing fo r  the leadership o f the Arab world,
Iraq seemed i n i t i a l l y  to hold a number of advantages over Egypt. The
American-Iraqi m i l i ta r y  agreement in April 1954 increased Nasser's
suspicions tha t any fu r th e r  delay in the Anglo-Egyptian agreement might
induce Washington to support Nuri a l-S a id 's  leadership in the Arab world.
191Consequently Nasser wanted to reach a quick settlement w ith  the West.
At the end o f March he promised Caffery to ca ll  o f f  the g u e r r i l la
a c t i v i t ie s  tha t had plagued the B r i t is h  presence in the Canal Zone fo r
192the preceding four months. In so doing, he created a favourable
climate fo r  negotia tions. On 1 A p r il  1954 he to ld  the Americans tha t he
193"wanted to go ahead without delay with B r i t ish  agreement". A break­
through was achieved when Church ill and Eden apparently y ie lded to
American pressure. They accepted the idea o f granting Egypt economic
194aid because " i t  should have a favourable e f fe c t  on nego tia t ions".
However, the issues o f the a v a i la b i l i t y  and duration were the 
primary obstacles in breaking the impasse, and the United States became 
the p r inc ipa l intermediary a t the negotiating tab le . Behind the scenes, 
the United States renewed i t s  e f fo r ts  to break the deadlock. On
191. Interview with K. Roosevelt. See also NA RG 84, Box 255, Folder 350, 
Egypt, from Cairo to Secretary, 31 March 1954.
192. NA RG 84, Box 255, Folder 320, Anglo-Egyptian, accidents, to 
Secretary from Cairo, 23 March 1954.
193. RG 59 Box 1854, 611-7418-1154 LWC, from Caffery to Secretary,
1 April 1954.
194. NA RG 59 Box 5366 874-00/4-2054, 20 A p r i l ,  to Secretary from Byroade, 
economic aid to  Egypt; NA RG 59 Box 5366 874-00/4-2254, from Paris 
(Dulles) to Secretary o f  S tate, 22 April 1954; NA RG 84 Box 256, 
Folder 320-1, from Dulles (American Embassy, Paris) to Cairo No.39,
22 April 1954 (Eden and Dulles discussion on p o s s ib i l i t y  o f American 
aid to Egypt).
30 A p r i l , th e  State Department drafted a top secret memorandum of
understanding to cover the whole s i tu a t io n .  I t  suggested th a t "the
agreement should la s t  fo r  ten years from the date o f i t s  entry in to
force [furthermore] a l l  o f Her Majesty's force w i l l  be withdrawn
from Egyptian t e r r i t o r y  w ith in  a period o f twenty-four months from the
entry o f th is  agreement in to  fo rce " . The State Department suggested
in i t s  formula the American association with the f in a l  agreement, as i t
195"could become a party to a t r i p a r t i t e  agreement". The Foreign
O ffice  acknowledged the American "Draft Memorandum o f understanding", 
since from the B r i t is h  po in t o f view i t  was in l in e  with the th ink ing  
o f  the Foreign O ffice  as to the so rt o f agreement th a t would be o ffered 
to the Egyptians". Furthermore, the B r i t is h  welcomed the American 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the nego tia t ions , because they t r ie d  to avoid the r is k  
o f the Egyptians playing o f f  the Americans against them during the course 
o f the ta lks .
In May 1954 Nasser pointed out to Caffery tha t i t  was p o l i t i c a l l y  
impossible fo r  him to accept more than "seven years ' duration or more 
than f i f te e n  months fo r  w ithdrawal". Apart from these two points in 
Nass,er's way o f th ink ing  "there would not be any real obstacles" in 
achieving the agreement w ith the United Kingdom/196-.
The State Department's compromise formula to break the deadlock was 
e f fe c t iv e .  The two sides wanted a f in a l  arrangement, a lb e i t  fo r  
d i f fe re n t  reasons.
195. NA, top secret f i l e  from Acting Secretary Smith, to Cairo, London, 
NOCA 6247, 30 Apr il  1954.
196. NA, top secret f i l e  from London to Cairo Department CA 6247,
30 April and 4 June 1954, Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s ;  FO comments 
on Departmental Working Papers.
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Shortly  a f te r  becoming the undisputed master o f Egypt, Nasser 
and his colleagues dined secre tly  with the B r i t is h  ambassador and
his s ta f f  on 10 June 1954. Nasser pointed out to them Egypt's
197readiness to conclude an early settlement. He regarded th is  as a
198rad ica l attempt at remoulding the country. This led him to
consider the p o s s ib i l i t y  of Egyptian p a r t ic ip a t io n  in "a regional pact
199and even a Turkish-Pakistani pact". Nasser's compromise did not
improve the s i tu a t io n .  In the l ig h t  o f B r i t is h  intransigence and
Egyptian domestic fa c to rs ,  "Nasser's patience was running o u t" .  The
Egyptian government increased i t s  pressure on the United States to
bridge the gap, and on 22 June 1954, Dr. Fawzi indicated to Caffery
tha t the Egyptians hoped tha t they would "not be sold down the
r iv e r "  a t the Anglo-American summit m e e t in g . ^
Egyptian pressure made an impact on the American policy-makers.
Before the Anglo-American summit meeting o f June 1954, both Dulles and
Eisenhower decided not to "side w ith B r i ta in "  because "the Arabs would
want to throw both o f [them] out o f the o i l  lands". The American
assessment can be a t t r ib u te d  to Nasser's a ll ia nce  with Saudi Arabia,
which was c e r ta in ly  not in c o n f l ic t  w ith United States' in te res ts  in 
201the area, but could be used as a trump card at a c r i t i c a l  time against
197. NA RG 59 Box 4023 774-00 (W) 6-1059, from USRMA, Cairo, to 
Department, Washington, 11 June 1959.
198. In terv iew  with A1i Sabri, Cairo, February 1985.
199. NA RG 84 Box 256, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian nego tia t ions,
to Secretary from Cairo sent Department 1592, 29 June 1954.
200. NA RG 84 Box 258, Folder 320-1, Anglo-Egyptian re la t io n s ,  from
Cairo to  Secretary, 23 June 1954.
201. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , James Hagerty (Press secretary to the 
president) papers, 1953-1961, Diary Box 1, 28 June 1954.
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202the West. This pos it ion  provided Dulles and Eisenhower w ith  the 
confidence to confront Churchill and Eden openly during th e i r  
meetings and to press them fo r  quick and comprehensive agreement with 
Egypt.
The Agreement
Yielding to American pressure, on 27 June Eden f i n a l l y  agreed to
203the concessions which made a settlement with Egypt possible.
Nothing could i l l u s t r a te  the American influence be tte r  than C h u rch i l l 's
statement to the House of Commons when he said tha t " I  have fo r  some
time been o f the opinion tha t the United States has a s tra te g ic  in te re s t
in  Egypt as well as in te res ts  in the in te rna tiona l waterway o f the Canal,
and the re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  both o f these matters should no longer be
204allowed to res t exc lus ive ly  with Great B r i ta in " .
Needless to say, American inducement and the reduction o f the
s tra teg ic  importance o f Egypt due to modern developments in warfare, led
the B r i t is h  government to  modify i t s  stand v is -a -v is  Egypt. Shortly
a f te r  th a t ,  on 27 Ju ly , fo l low ing  the anniversary ce lebra tion  o f King
Farouk's abdication, and a f te r  several days o f short meetings the d ra f t
205agreement was concluded a t Mr. Caffery 's residence. The f in a l
202. RG 59 Box 2979 674-86A/6-1259, 12 June 1959, American Embassy, Cairo, 
to Department o f State (S. Salem announces resu lts  o f his ta lks  with 
King Saud) ; Box 2979, 677-86A/6-1354, 13 June 1959, from Jidda 
to Secretary o f State.
203. New York Times, 1 August 1954.
204. New York Times, 15 July 1954, p .2, excerpts from the speeches o f 
A tt lee  and Churchill in Commons; A li  Sabri in te rv iew , "The American 
embassy informed the Egyptian side o f B r i t is h  po in t o f view before 
the meetings".
205. Lacouture , Egypt in T rans it ion , p .214.
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agreement was signed on 19 October 1954, and embodied the fo llow ing  
p r in c ip le s :
1. Withdrawal o f B r i t is h  troops from the Canal base w ith in  
twenty months.
2. Termination o f the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty o f A l l iance .
3. B r i t is h  c iv i l i a n  technicians to maintain ce rta in
> -I-. , . 206m sta l la t io n s .
4. In the event o f an armed attack by an outside power "other 
than Is ra e l"  on any o f e igh t Arab states who were parties 
to the 1950 Treaty o f Jo in t Defence or Turkey, Egypt shall 
a ffo rd  the United Kingdom such f a c i l i t i e s  as may be 
necessary in order to place the base on a war foo ting  and to 
operate e f fe c t iv e ly . ^
5. Immediate consulta tion between B r i ta in  and Egypt in the event 
o f attack by outside power on the above-mentioned sta tes.
6. Immediate B r i t is h  withdrawal at the term ination o f such a war.
7. O v e r - f l ig h t ,  landing and serv ic ing r igh ts  fo r  announced
*
Royal A ir  Force f l i g h t s .
8. Recognition o f the in te rna tiona l importance o f the Suez Canal 
which is  an in tegra l part o f Egypt and mutual guarantees to
uphold the 1888 Constantinople Convention.
206. According to Dulles' statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on 27 July 1954, he mentioned the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f American 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  with B r i ta in  in handling technical operations o f the 
base: executive session o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Vol.V I-83, Congress sessions 1954, statement o f J.F. Dulles, 27 July 
1954, pp.686-7.
207. NA RG 84 Box No.1, Egypt 1953-1955, Department o f S tate, Washington, 
o f f i c i a l  in fo rm ation , 5 January 1955, "The Suez Agreement".
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2089. Agreement to remain in force fo r  seven years.
I t  seems tha t the agreement marked the end o f the era o f f r i c t i o n  
between Egypt and the Western powers in the area. To some extent the 
terms o f the agreement represented a new phase of Egyptian diplomacy 
from a covert an t i-S ov ie t a t t i tu d e  to tha t o f an overt one.
The accord shows tha t the American po licy  during the Anglo- 
Egyptian dispute o f 1952-1954, orchestrated by the State Department 
and Ambassador Caffery, which sometimes antagonised the two sides in 
the c o n f l ic t ,  was not challenged. Both sides were well aware tha t 
they could not s e t t le  th e i r  c o n f l ic t  w ithout American mediation. On 
the Egyptian s id e . i t  was hoped tha t the United States was going to present 
i t s  own plan as a basis fo r  the agreement, th is  being c loser to th e i r  own 
p os it ion  than B r i ta in 's .  However, most o f the time the United States 
preferred to keep i t s  engagement at the level o f the mediator, and to go 
no fu r th e r .
When the agreement was eventually signed i t  re in forced the B r i t is h  
pos it ion  in the region, ye t only s u p e r f ic ia l ly ,  f o r  in  a c tu a l i t y  i t  had 
confirmed th a t the balance o f  power between the United States and B r i ta in  
in the area had tipped in favour o f the former. A successful mediation 
by the US indicated th a t by f u l f i l l i n g  such a ro le ,  to some extent the 
US could secure i t s  ro le  as the guardian o f Western in te res ts  in the 
area, both present and fu tu re .
208. For more d e ta i ls  see New York Times, 28 July 1954, p p .1-2, 
" I n i t i a l  Suez Pact signed fo r  B r i t is h  e x i t " .  Great B r i ta in ,  
Foreign O ff ice , agreement between the Government o f the United 
Kingdom o f Great B r i ta in  and Northern Ire land and the Egyptian 
Government regarding the Suez Canal Base.
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This settlement was hailed by Egypt, B r i ta in  and the United States 
as the beginning o f a new chapter o f co llabora t ion  between them.
Shortly a f te r  concluding the agreement, Dr. Fawzi stated to Caffery 
th a t ,  "Egyptians w i l l  not endeavour to make trouble fo r  the United States 
in L ib ya .. .Egypt w i l l  not endeavour to make troub le  fo r  the B r i t is h  in
Iraq; on the contrary they w i l l  counsel 'sweet reasonableness' on
t 209I raq is  .
Egyptian optimism led Nasser to advise King Saud during th e i r
210meeting to avoid d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith the United States and the West.
On 3 August 1954, Nasser confirmed tha t "Egypt is confident tha t th is
agreement w i l l  s ta r t  a new era o f c loser co-operation w ith  the United
States as well as with a l l  other f r ie n d ly  countr ies". Fawzi re ite ra ted
211the same posit ion  in his personal message to Dulles. The agreement
enabled Nasser to declare tha t "We are f ig h t in g  an open b a t t le  in
Egypt with the communists, since we are convinced th a t they are working
212under Soviet d ire c t io n " .
Secretary Dulles welcomed the agreement because in his view i t
" w i l l  estab lish  the foundation fo r  even closer co llabo ra t ion  between our
countries on the problems a f fe c t in g  the Near Eastern area, and in the
long run the agreement w i l l  produce greater s t a b i l i t y  and defensive
213strength in the area". Eisenhower also hoped tha t the agreement
209. RG 59 Box 2978, 674.00/8-754, from Cairo to Secretary of State,
7 August 1954.
210. NA RG 59 774.00(W) 8-2054, from USARMA Cairo to G2 Department 
No.200849, August 1954, j o i n t  week, 20 August 1954.
211. Princeton U n ive rs ity , J.F. Dulles papers, Box No.85, Nasser 1954, 
Department o f State, exchange o f messages fo l low ing  statement o f 
Suez Canal Agreement.
212. NA RG 59 Box 2978, 674.00/8-454, from Cairo to Secretary o f State, 
4 August 1954, Nasser's in terv iew  with Reiman Morion of AP.
213. Department o f State B u l le t in , 16 August 1954, "Secretary Dulles to 
Nasser", p .234.
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would allow Egypt to go ahead with her friends in improving both her
214economic and security  position* In early  August, in fu l f i lm e n t  of
i t s  promises, the Eisenhower administration agreed to grant Egypt $20m
215fo r  economic development. The American scale o f economic aid
? 1disappointed the Egyptian leaders as they had expected a t leas t $100m.
Nevertheless, both the United States and Egypt were looking forward
to the achievement o f th e i r  respective goals. The American leaders
hoped tha t the Egyptian-Turkish b i la te ra l  ta lks  "would co n s ti tu te  best
217methods associating Egypt with Northern T ie r Grouping". Moreover,
there was expectation tha t the strengthening o f United States-Egyptian
re la t ion s  would present a new framework in which the United States could
take more e f fe c t iv e  measures in ensuring the peace and s t a b i l i t y  which
218Israel and the United States desired so much.
214. NA RG 84/361-1 Box No.2, Egypt 1953-1955, telegram No.149, 29 July 
1954, Eisenhower press conference, 28 Ju ly 1954.
215. Department of State B u l le t in , 16 August 1954, p .234, "Mr. Eden to
Mr. Dulles"; D.D. Eiesnhower L ib ra ry , papers o f Dulles, telephone
c a l l  se r ies , Box No.2, telephone memo., 1 Ju ly , telephone ca ll  from 
Governor Stassen, 27 July 1954. Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  offered 
Cairo $27m in m i l i ta r y  a id , but Nasse.r refused to accept the American 
terms, according to Section 503(B), Mutual Security Act. He 
explained tha t " i f  he accepted the American terms he would be 
accused o f  s e l l in g  his country to another big power before the 
B r i t is h  even got out o f the p lace", DonaldNeff, Warriors a t Suez,
p .60. NA RG 59 Box 4024, 18-3054, from Cairo to Secretary, :
30 August 1951 , 774-5MSP.
216. NA RG 59 Box 4024, 774-5-MSP/9-1454, memo, from Mr. Jernegan, 
sub ject, US aid to Egypt, 14 September 1954, from Mr. Roosevelt; 
"Nasser and RCC expected $100m economic aid since they are asking 
fo r  no m i l i ta r y  a id " .
217. NA RG 59, outgoing telegram to American Embassy, Ankara, from 
Dulles, 11 November 1954, secret.
218. NARG 59 674-84.A/-554 CS/W,memo.of conversation, Department of 
State, sub ject, Israel-Egypt re la t io n s , General Moshe Dayan, NEA, 
Jernegan, Bergus, 5 August 1954, D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry .
Egypt's readiness fo r  "close co-operation" w ith the United States 
and more f l e x i b i l i t y  was demonstrated when Dr. Fawzi expressed his 
government's hopes o f reso lv ing the Palestine question peacefu lly .
Also Nasser confirmed Egypt's w il l ineness  to end the s i tu a t io n  "now 
e x is t in g  between Israe l and the Arab countr ies". At the end o f h is 
in te rv iew  with the New York Times, Nasser offered an open in v i ta t io n  
to the United States to act as mediator between the Arab states and
Israel "since the United States was apparently able to s e t t le  the
. „ 219 dispute .
These hopes were dashed as other issues emerged to  cloud th is  
sunny in te r lude  in American-Egyptian re la t io n s . The most troublesome 
c o n f l ic t  was the A ra b -Is rae li  problem and the special re la t io n sh ip  
between Israel and the United States. Events soured these expectations 
as both sides t r ie d  to achieve a v a r ie ty  o f goals,.some o f whose aims 
were con trad ic to ry  in  nature.
219. NA RG 59 674-00/8-454, from Cairo to Secretary o f  S tate, 
4 August 1954.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PEACE COLLAPSES
In 1951 Ben Gurion, the Is ra e l i  Prime M in is te r ,  sa id , "Egypt is
the keystone fo r  peace in the Near East" and tha t "a peace agreement
w ith tha t country would go a long way to bring about a peace agreement
1
with the other neighbouring Arab countr ies". King Hussein noted
tha t o f the 670 miles o f h o s t i le  border between Israe l and i t s  Arab
neighbours, Egypt had to defend 180 m iles, Syria 45 m iles , Lebanon
over 50, and Jordan 400. The Is rae li-Jordan ian  border was in fa c t  the
s i te  of the most frequent h o s t i l i t i e s ,  while Egypt was fa r  less anxious
2about i t s  proxim ity to Is ra e l ,  u n t i l  the Is ra e l i  ra id  on Gaza in 1955.
In the "Philosophy o f the Revolution", Nasser mentions, " . . . i t  is  not 
true tha t the July 23 Revolution broke out as a re s u lt  o f  the Palestine 
offensive or because o f the defective arms which claimed so many v ic tim s. 
We were f ig h t in g  in Palestine but a l l  our thoughts were centred on 
Egypt". The Free O f f ic e rs ,  in  other words, were not preoccupied with 
the issue o f Palestine. In th e i r  published manifesto they did not 
mention Israel or Zionism.^ This encouraged the Is ra e l i  government to 
hope tha t peace was not a remote consequence. Prime M in is te r David
1. Harry S. Truman L ib ra ry ,  papers o f Dean Acheson, memo, o f 
conversation, 1951 Box 55, fo ld e r  May, memo, sub jec t, v i s i t  o f 
Prime M in is te r o f Is ra e l ,  8 May 1951.
2. King Hussein o f Jordan, Uneasy l ie s  the Head (New York 1963), p .86.
3. Gama! Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy o f the Revolution (n .d . ,  n .p .9 ,
pp .11-12.
4. Hamrush, Kharif Abdel N as ir , V o l.5, p .15.
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Ben Gurion made a c o n c i l ia to ry  speech, and p r iv a te ly  o ffe red  technical
5aid to the new regime. Five days a f te r  the m i l i t a r y  regime took over, 
the Is ra e l i  ambassador in Washington pointed out to the Americans tha t 
"they hoped the new regime in Egypt might open a way fo r  Egyptian- 
Is ra e l i  peace".^
The Americans were equally o p t im is t ic  about the prospects o f peace 
on the grounds tha t such a development would e lim inate the local cold- 
war ta c t ics  between the Arabs and the Jews as part o f a wider world 
c o n f l ic t .  Secretary o f  State, Dean Achseon, pointed out to Ambassador 
Caffery in Cairo th a t he "should remind the prime m in is te r  in fo rm a lly  
o f our continued hope th a t Egypt and Israel can reach understanding.
We consider such understanding in the in te re s t not only o f Egypt but 
the Near East as a whole".^
Events encouraged expectations o f peace, and the m i l i t a r y  regime 
was keen to maintain the calm th a t had prevailed along the Egyptian 
border with Israe l in  order to concentrate on consolidating the 
revo lu tion  and e lim ina t ing  B r i t is h  influence in Egypt. From th is  
perspective i t  paid Egypt to  suppress i t s  belligerance towards Israe l 
in return fo r  American support in resolving i t s  in te rna l problems. In 
the early  days o f the revo lu tion  the m i l i ta r y  leaders were pragmatic 
enough to understand tha t Egypt's f inanc ia l resources did not allow fo r
5. NA RG 59 674.84A/6-2353, o f f i c i a l  information, top_ secret, security
information from Caffery to Parker, T. Hart, Cairo, 23 June 1953;
NA RG 84-320, Is ra e l-E g yp t, to Secretary charged to  Embassy, Cairo,
22 August 1952, David Ben Gurion, My ta lks  w ith the Arab leaders, 
pp.269-70.     '
6. NA RG 59 Box 4015 774-00/7-3 152, memo, o f conversation, p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  
Abba Eban, M. Hart, sub jec t, Israe l view on Eaypt s i tu a t io n ,
31 July 1952.
7. NA RG 84 Box 219-320, Israe l and Egypt, from Secretary o f State,
Washington, to Cairo and Tel Aviv, 21 August 1952.
___________________________________________________________________________________
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economic development and m ob il isa t ion  towards a fu l l - s c a le  war with
g
Is ra e l.  Moreover, the old regime's po licy  o f keeping the door open
g
with i t s  frequent attempts at achieving a peace settlement with Israel ,
encouraged the m i l i ta r y  regime to fo l lo w  these c o n c i l ia to ry  steps as
they did not have any previous commitments fo r  a r e ta l ia to ry  war
against Is ra e l .  Furthermore, Nasser and his colleagues were not
ambivalent in the face o f Egyptian extrem ists , espec ia lly  the Muslim
Brotherhood. Some powerful members in the Muslim Brotherhood organisation
had shown a greater w ill ingness to compromise, demonstrating th e ir
10readiness to achieve peace with Is ra e l .
In a d d it io n , Nasser and his colleagues were professional m i l i ta r y  
men, and they understood p e rfe c t ly  well the r e a l i t ie s  o f Egypt's 
m i l i ta r y  po ten tia l v is -a -v is  Is ra e l .  Most of them had already faced
the Is ra e l is  on the b a t t le f ie ld  in  Palestine. During tha t time the 
junta needed to  consolidate i t s  power as rap id ly  as possible in  the 
face o f d i f f i c u l t  domestic problems. The lesson to be drawn from the
fa i lu re  of the ancien regime was tha t a m i l i t a r y  confronta tion  with
Israel would lead to th e i r  co llapse. Furthermore, a long time before
the re vo lu t io n , the junta had been influenced by l e f t i s t  p o l i t i c a l  
groups, who accepted in p r in c ip le  Is ra e l 's  existence. According to 
Jean and Simon Lacouture, in 1949 the Free O fficers  contacted l e f t i s t  
p o l i t i c a l  groups in Egypt tha t had previously supported the UN
8. In terv iew  w ith A l i  Sabri, Cairo, 6 February 1 9 8 5 ; ^ ^  Box 29978-674- 
84A/19-2352, from Cairo to Secretary o f State, 23 September 1952.
9. NA RG 59 Box 4037-780-5/7-352, memo, o f conversation, top secret, 3 July 
1952, The Wafd contacts the Is ra e l i  a u th o r i t ie s  in  Paris and they hold 
"ten meetings"; also NA RG 84 Box 219 320, Israel and Egypt, from 
Secretary, Washington, to American Embassy, Cairo, 14 July 1952, and
Tel Aviv.
10. RG 59 674-84A/3-553, from American Embassy to  the Department, despatch 
1763, 2 March 1953, Renewed Egyptian in te re s t  in peace with Is ra e l:  
M.Maklouf (son of General Mufti and nephew of the Supreme Guide of the 
Muslim Brotherhood) proposals to s e t t le  Egyp tian -Is rae li dispute.
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p a r t i t io n  plan fo r  Palestine, in order to discuss possible new d irec t ions
11fo r  Egyptian po licy  on Palestine. Then, Nasser, un like  some o f his
12Arab colleagues, had always been f le x ib le  on the subject o f Is ra e l.
I t  was w ith in  the wider context o f Egypt's overwhelming immediate problems 
tha t Nasser viewed the simmering dispute with Israel as a top p r io r i t y  
in policy-making.
A l l  tha t can be said w ith confidence is  tha t Egypt under the new 
regime was aware th a t c o n c i l ia to ry  statements about the A rab -Is rae li  
c o n f l ic t  would have a favourable e f fe c t  on i t s  re la t io n s  w ith Washington. 
These were o f great importance because Egypt was in need o f economic and 
m i l i ta r y  a id , while American dip lomatic support in i t s  negotiations with 
B r i ta in  would f a c i l i t a t e  a speedy and favourable re so lu t io n .
The Eisenhower Administration and the A rab -Is rae li Problem
Egypt's new po licy  encouraged Washington to assume a more d ire c t  
ro le  v is -a -v is  the Egyp tian -Is rae li c o n f l ic t ,  while also reassessing 
American po licy  towards the A rab -Is rae li  c o n f l ic t .
When the Republicans assumed o f f i c e ,  the s i tu a t io n  had been d i f fe re n t  
from tha t o f th e i r  predecessors. The Palestine war had been over fo r  
four years, and a l l  the actors concerned had had to ad just themselves to 
the new circumstances, while some had even disappeared from the p o l i t i c a l  
scene.
The new American pres ident, un like  Truman, did not have close 
Jewish fr iends or p ro - Is ra e l i  f r ie n d s ,  such as Clark C l i f f o r d ,  who
11. Lacouture, Egypt in T ra n s it io n , pp.232-3.
12. Interview with Mahmoud Riad, Cairo, 1985.
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could influence him at c r i t i c a l  moments with respect to Israel 's status
13quo in the Middle East. He was also not dependent on Jewish e lec to ra l 
14support, since most o f them had backed his Democratic opponent, Adlai
Stevenson. Eisenhower's popu la r ity  as a m i l i ta r y  hero freed him from
the immediate e lec t ion  concerns s t i r re d  by the changed issue o f support
fo r  Is ra e l .  As a m i l i t a r y  man, he saw the Arab world in p a r t ic u la r  as
a s ig n i f ic a n t  arena fo r  containing the Soviet Union, especia lly  a f te r  
15the Korean War. According to the Jackson Committee Report which had
been submitted to him sh o rt ly  a f te r  h is inauguration, "The US fa i lu re
to act j u s t l y  between the Arabs and the Jews w i l l  give a great chance
to the Soviet Union to play an active  ro le  in the area...and gives her
16a chance to bu ild  up her own 'NATO' in Western Asia". Dulles
re ite ra te d  the same p o s it io n , declaring tha t i t  was "high time th a t the
United States government paid more a tten tion  to the Near East and South 
17Asia". At the outset the Republican adm in istra tion rea lised tha t 
Truman's uneven po licy  towards the A rab-Is rae li c o n f l ic t  would lead to
18"s ilence and weaken modest Arab opinion holding pro-Western sentiments". 
There were some noticeable changes in the early Eisenhower years as the 
focal point o f the Dulles stewardship of fore ign po licy  was d irected 
on Soviet penetration and in te rna t iona l communism, and the desire to
13. Truman L ib ra ry , C l i f fo rd  papers.
14. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , papers o f J.F. Dulles, White House, memo.
White House correspondence 1953(1), 28 October 1953, from Eisenhower
to Dulles; Steven L. Spiegel, The Other A rab -Is rae li  C o n f l ic t ,  pp.52-3.
15. Ib id . , pp.52-3.
16. D.t). Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  records o f President Committee o f In t .  
Information A c t iv i t ie s ,  Jackson Committee, Box No.4, fo ld e r  
correspondence E(1), March 1953.
17. Department o f State B u l le t in ,  15 June 1953, p .831.
18. h'A RG 59 Box 2846 61 1 -8012-1953, to Under-Secretary from NEA
Mr.H.Byroade, 17 February 1953.
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19contain them. As fo r  the A rab-Israe li c o n f l ic t ,  the stress was put
20on the concept o f " im part ia l f r ien dsh ip ".  Is ra e l 's  importance
diminished as increased weight was given to other forces in formulating
United States po licy  in the area. Arab o i l  and the s tra teg ic
importance o f the Arab states became key considerations in the struggle
against Soviet penetration in the Middle East, Nevertheless, the
A rab-Israe li c o n f l ic t  remained the main obstacle in strengthening the
21region against possible Soviet encroachment.
United States E ffo rts  fo r  res to r ing  Peace in the Area and I ts  Impact 
on United States-Egyptian Relations
At ce rta in  times the United States had adopted a covert and overt
diplomacy in which i t s  primary goal was to prevent any fu r th e r
de te r io ra tion  in the re la t ions  between the two sides, thus l im i t in g
fu r th e r  Soviet penetration in the area at the expense o f American s tra tegy.
Washington t r ie d  to achieve a va r ie ty  o f goals, some o f them con trad ic to ry .
On the one hand, i t  wanted to show a w ill ingness to support and re in force
the new Arab nationalims while a t the same time keep up i t s  special
re la t io n sh ip  w ith  Is ra e l .  The United States therefore faced a big
dilemma in handling the Egyptian-Israel d ispute, although the two parties
showed a great w il l ingness to achieve peace fo r  th e i r  own sakes. The
main problem facing the two be ll ige ren ts  was tha t they did not t ru s t
each other even in a l im ite d  way, and th is  was the main obstacle in
22achieving even a l im ite d  reso lu tion  of the c o n f l ic t .  This handicapped
19. Truman L ib ra ry , Lucius B a tt le ,  Oral H is tory , No.305, Copy 2, pp .17-21.
20. NA(NSC)-155/1, July 1953, United States' objectives and po lic ies  
with respect to  the Near East.
21 • I b i d .
22. Bernard Reich, The United States and Is ra e l , p .5. Also see,
Princeton U n ive rs ity , J.F. Dulles papers, Box 62, Middle East 1952, 
memo, o f meeting with Za fru l la  Khan, 18 November 1952.
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American policy-makers in the Middle East, and they t r ie d  to avoid i t .
For the Egyptians i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to bring about a d ra s t ic  change in
Arab public  op in ion, and espec ia lly  in Egyptian public op in ion, from
th a t of h o s t i l i t y  towards and suspicion of Israel and dews in general,
to ensure understanding and co-operation in a short t ime, unless Israel
showed a great w il l ingness fo r  compromise. The most important ob jec tive
which the United States could t r y  to achieve was the bu ild ing  of t ru s t
in the re la t io n s  between the two sides rather than the imposition o f a
forced reso lu tion  on them.
Nevertheless, we are going to examine the American management of
the Egyp tian -Is rae li  dispute from the end o f 1952 to 1956, and i t s
e ffec ts  upon American-Egyptian re la t ions  and how the Egyptian-Israeli
c o n f l ic t  had undermined the cord ia l re la t ions  e x is t ing  between the
m i l i t a r y  regime and the Republican adm in is tra tion .
In one sense the idea of a negotiated settlement w ith Egypt had
existed since the time the m i l i ta r y  regime took power. A l l  actors
had adjusted to the new circumstances. Shortly a f te r  the re vo lu t io n ,
on 18 August, Prime M in is te r David Ben Gurion stated in the Kenesset
23th a t "We have no enmity against Egypt". The State Department
appreciated the c o n c i l ia to ry  speech, and asked i t s  representative in
Tel Aviv to t e l l  the Is ra e l i  prime m in is te r tha t they "hope[d] Egypt and
24Israel can reach an understanding".
23. NA RG 84 Box 219-320, Israe l-Egypt 1952, from American Embassy,
Tel Aviv, sent Department 286, 19 August 1952.
24. NA RG 84, Box 219-320, from Secretary o f State to Tel Av iv , 185,
21 August 1952.
.
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The Informal Talks
The Egyptian leadership did not ignore the new Is ra e l i  trend.
Secretly the Egyptian prime m in is te ^ d id  not exclude the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f
25having peace ta lks  w ith Is ra e l.  In Paris and Ankara the two sides
26already had had some secret informal meetings. Dean Acheson welcomed
these development, t e l l i n g  the Is ra e l i  ambassador in Washington tha t
"he f e l t  tha t the atmosphere towards Israel was much b e tte r  than i t  has 
27been before". Encouraged by these moves and the Free O ff ice rs '
reform programmes, Acheson persuaded President Truman to make a favourable
statement about the Naguib regime. Such a dec la ra tion  h in t ing  at
fu tu re  American aid was made on 3 September 1952, and was favourably 
28received in Cairo.
Egypt toned down i t s  bell igerence towards Is ra e l ,  and on 6 August, 
a f te r  becoming Commander-in-Chief, General Naguib, a t a press conference, 
declared p u b l ic ly  th a t "Egypt's entry in to  the Palestine was resulted
29from a decision made by the king" and tha t "the army was against i t " .
A fte r  becoming prime m in is te r ,  Naguib and his colleagues had attended the
opening o f the Yom Kippur service at the p r inc ipa l synagogue in Cairo,
and the Egyptian morning press showed Naguib shaking hands w ith  the Grand 
30Rabbi, At a press conference, Salah Salem the spokesman fo r  the
* AH Maher
25. NA RG 59, Box 2978, 764-84A/8-2052, from Tel Aviv to  Secretary of 
State, 20 August 1952.
26. NA RG 84, Box 230, Folder 350, Israe l 1952, memo, o f  conversation 
between Abbas Bon, Mr. Jerengen, 20 October 1952. A lso, F0.371/96998, 
1952 F0 Minutes, S ir  James Bowker, 15 September 1952, The
Is ra e l ie s  and Suez Canal.
27. Truman L ib ra ry ,  Dean Acheson papers Box No.670, memo, o f  conversation, 
sub ject, v i s i t  by Ambassador Abba Eban, 29 September 1952, security  
in formation.
28. I b id . , memo, o f 8 September 1952.
29. F0.371/96880/339, 1952, B r i t is h  Embassy, Cairo, 23 August to A fr ica  
Department, Foreign O ff ice . A1so The Times, 3 September 1952.
30. NA RG 84 Box 219-320, Is rae l-E gyp t, 29 September 1952, from Cairo 
to Secretary.
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m i l i ta r y  regime, l e f t  the door a ja r  when he did not exclude the
31p o s s ib i l i t y  o f having a peace settlement with Is ra e l ,  and Nasser
la te r  on re ite ra te d  the same pos it io n  to Caffery and to  Kermit 
32Roosevelt. Nasser's moderation was re flec ted  in h is speech on the
, . . 3 3sub ject.
Secret contacts were maintained through back channels. The
Egyptian ambassador, Ahmad Husayn, in the USA, w ith the acquiescence of
the m i l i t a r y ,  pointed out to Caffery tha t "a f te r  Sudan and MEDO are out
34o f the way Egypt should make peace with Is ra e l", At the Arab League 
meetings the Egyptian representative led the opposition to Ira q 's
proposals, th a t "Jews in the Arab countries to be treated l ik e  Arabs in
T T II 35 Israe l .
This show o f moderation in the early  days o f the revo lu tion  can be 
a t t r ib u te d  to the ju n ta 's  w il l ingness  to concentrate on Egypt's domestic 
problems pu tt ing  aside the other problems o f the area since the la t t e r  
were simply not top p r io r i t y .  The m i l i ta r y  leaders t r ie d  very hard to 
avoid any d iv is ions  in t h e i r  ranks which might lead to t h e i r  co llapse. 
American support was v i ta l  to  the m i l i t a r y  regime because o f the lack 
o f popular support and when old p o l i t i c a l  forces were s t i l l  w a it ing  to 
resto re  th e i r  e rs tw h ile  p o s it io n . The Egyptian a t t i tu d e  aroused great 
expectations in Washington. Ambassador Caffery, however, warned the
31. FO.371/95986, 1952, B r i t is h  Embassy, Cairo, to Foreign O ff ice ,
20 September 1952.
32. Mohamed H eika l, Qissat a l-Suwais, pp.69-70
33. Khutab wa ta s ira h a t a l - r a i s  Jamal, 1952-1959, 1 ' ( C a iro  1959) p 122.,
34. NA RG 59 Box 5378-874, 2321/11-1952, from Cairo to Secretary,
19 November 1952.
35. NA RG 59 Box 2978-674-84A/9002352, from Cairo to Secretary o f 
State, 23 September 1952.
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State Department against using American aid as a leverage to gain a
36quick Egyptian-Is rae li settlement.
Caffery 's  recommendation did not go unheeded. Ass is tant Secretary
Byroade pointed out to the Is ra e l i  ambassador in Washington tha t "We
have not pressed Egypt in th is  regard because the Egyptians have a lo t
37of house-cleaning to do before taking any step". Nevertheless
Byroade did not exclude the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f American pressure on Egypt
38"when the time was opportune".
The stalemate, however, continued despite a l l  these a c t i v i t ie s  and
in i t i a t i v e s .  The reason fo r  th is  was tha t any pressure upon Egypt in
these early  days o f the revo lu tion  might have been counter-productive.
This idea had been planted in the minds of the makers o f American po licy
by a number o f Caffery 's  reports as well as by Naguib's and his
colleagues' frequent promises th a t ,  a f te r  the B r i t is h  evacuation they could
39"reach an agreement with Is ra e l" .  The Americans were convinced th a t 
i t  was hard fo r  Egypt to break the united Arab f ro n t  against Israel ,
36. RG 59 Box 2978 and 674 and 84A/9852, from Caffery to Department
o f State, 8 September 1952, sub ject, Is ra e l i  e f fo r ts  to  estab lish
peace conversation with Egypt.
37. NA RG 84 Box 219-320, Is rae l-E gyp t, memo, o f conversation, 
p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  Mr. Byroade NEA and Ambassador Eban, 22 September 
1959. For more de ta ils  about the American stance, see
FO.371/96998 JE 1261/37, 21 September 1952, United States' rep ly  
to Israel note on Suez.
38. NA RG 84 Box 219-320, Is rae l-E gyp t, o p . c i t .
39. NA RG 59 Box 2847 61 1-80/1 1-2552, top secret to Secretary from
Cairo (Caffery) fo r  Byroade, 25 Novemver 1952, 1952 incoming 
telegram, top secret.
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because o f i t s  heavy re liance on the Arab League's support fo r  i t s
40stand against the B r i t is h  on the Canal Zone issue.
Secretly the Egyptian m i l i ta r y  leaders pointed out to Amabassador
Caffery tha t th is  show o f moderation did not s ig n i fy  any lessening of
Egypt's moral support fo r  the Arab cause against Is ra e l .  So long as
such problems as payment o f compensation to refugees, l im i ta t io n  o f
Is ra e l 's  m i l i ta r y  force and guarantees tha t present Is ra e l i  boundaires 
41would be f ix e d ,  remained unsolved, Egypt would refuse to consider any 
f in a l  peace settlement with Is ra e l.
At the beginning American optimism was strong. I t  was widely ■ 
believed tha t the Anglo-Egytian ta lks  would lead to an Egyp tian -Is rae li  
peace settlement, but the Egyptians gave much weight to the lame-duck 
Truman adm in is tra t ion , and tha t delayed fu r th e r  in i t i a t i v e s  to resolve 
the s i tu a t io n .
American negative reaction to Egyptian proposals alarmed Naguib.
He restra ined himself from c r i t i c i s i n g  America by name, but v igorously
denounced American po licy  on the sub ject, declaring th a t  " In  order to
create a nation o f one m i l l io n  you, the West, have spoiled the re la t io ns
with f i f t y  m i l l io n  Arabs who own among other th ings , great quan t it ies  
42o f o i l " .
40. NA RG 59 574-84A/6-2353, o f f i c i a l  in formation, top secre t, secu r ity  
in formation, from Caffery to Parker Hart, Cairo, 32 June 1953.
41. NA RG 59 Box 2847 511-80/11-2552, from Cairo ,' Caffery to 
Secretary o f S tate, 25 November 1952, top secre t, incoming 
telegram.
42. New York Times, 11 December 1952.
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So in order to ease the tension and to gain Arab confidence,
espec ia lly  tha t of Egypt, Assistant Secretary Byroade gave a speech
in December 1952 before the inauguration of President Eisenhower,
declaring tha t " . . . t h e  b ir th  o f the trag ic  Arab refugee problem out
o f the Palestine c o n f l ic t  has added to the real and deep-seated
b itte rness towards Americans throughout the Arab w o r ld . . . th e  emotions
which surrounded th is  problem in the Middle East are so intense tha t
any immediate or dramatic so lu t ion  o f the problem is impossible.
Even progress towards a so lu t ion  o f any segment o f the problem is  at
43best exceedingly d i f f i c u l t " .
Under the global cold-war circumstances the Republican adm in is tra tion  
decided to re-examine and possibly to reshape e x is t ing  American po licy  in 
the Middle East. The lesson i t  drew from the fa i lu re  o f the previous 
adm in is tra tion  was tha t a so lu t ion  o f the A rab-Is rae li c o n f l ic t  tha t 
might s a t is fy  both sides was a prerequ is ite  to the kind o f  defence 
arrangement tha t would s a t is fy  the United States' m i l i t a r y  demands.^
From the very beginning the Republican adm in istra tion rea lised  th a t an 
even-handed po licy  towards the A rab-Is rae li c o n f l ic t  would serve to 
bu ild  up a new American posit ion in the area.
GROWING U.S. INVOLVEMENT
American concern led Secretary o f S tate, John Foster Dulles, to 
v i s i t  the Middle East in May 1953. This f i r s t  v i s i t  o f any Secretary
43. H. Byroade, "US fore ign po licy  in the Middle East", US'Department o f 
State B u l le t in , 15 December 1952, p .932.
44. US Department of State B u l le t in , Dulles statement, 19 February 1953.
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o f State to the area was prompted, Dulles to ld  the nation over radio
and te le v is io n ,  by the danger tha t Middle East might f a l l  under
45communist domination, as had happened in China. The announcement of
Dulles ' t r i p  to the area was seen by Egypt as a concrete demonstration
o f America's new in te re s t in the Arab world and i t s  problems, and the
hope tha t Truman's Is ra e l i  stand would now be replaced by greater
46im p a r t ia l i t y  was p u b l ic ly  expressed by Mohamed Naguib. At th e i r
meeting Naguib informed Dulles that once the Suez Canal issue was
resolved, he could reach "an agreement with Is ra e l"  as long as Egypt
47gained a "land communication with the other Arab s ta tes " .
Simultaneously, be tte r covert contacts with Israel were maintained
through back channels. In th is  stage o f early  overtures, the Egyptians
showed greater f l e x i b i l i t y  by accepting "the p r in c ip les  o f settlement of
48refugees in Arab s ta tes".
In th is  new phase o f qu ie t diplomacy, fo l low ing  Dulles ' v i s i t ,
Egypt and Israel renewed th e i r  e f fo r ts  to resume th e i r  covert contacts.
49In th e i r  meetings the Egyptian side suggested the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f
reaching "some understanding on the t r a n s i t  through the Suez Canal o f
50n on-m il ita ry  goods destined fo r  Is ra e l" .  There were also other
45. Princeton U n ive rs ity , J.F. Dulles p r iva te  papers, Box 73, Near East, 
Important point of t r i p  1953, by Dulles, secret, p r iva te .
46- A1-Ahram, 11 May 1953.
47. NA RG 59 Box 4037 78-0015-2953, Dulles t r i p  to Near East, top 
secret, memo, o f convertation between Naguib and Dulles, 5.00pm,
11 May 1953, p .5. See also Dulles papers, pp .1-2.
48. RG 59 BOX 1979-674-84A/2-1753, JAS, top secret secu r ity  information
from Paris , to Secretary, No.46251, 17 February 1953.
49. According to the Is ra e l i  charge d 'a f fa i re s  in Paris , the Egyptian
side included "a c i v i l i a n  who has d ire c t  and very close re la t ions
with the RCC". See also RG 59 Box 2979 674-84A/7-653 , American 
Embassy, Paris, to Secretary, 6 July 1953, top secret,
50. Ib id .
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encouraging in d ire c t  contacts between the two sides. Dr, Fawzi, the
Egyptian fore ign m in is te r ,  to ld  Dr. Ralph Bunche o f the UN th a t ,
"Egypt was in terested in the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f ta lks  w ith Is ra e l " ,  and
suggested th a t "Egypt can accept one p a r t i t io n  but not two", expla in ing
51to him why Cairo wanted a Negev co r r id o r  to l in k in g  i t  w ith  Jordan.
These fe e le rs ,  however, were abandoned when the New York Times published 
52the s to ry . Nevertheless, Dr. Bunche and the American policy-makers
agreed tha t an Egyp tian -Is rae li peace settlement might be w ith in
. 53 reach.
P ub lic ly  the Egyptian leaders, fo r  instance, stated th a t "They
54should fo rge t the past". At one o f his press conferences, Salah
Salem declared tha t Egypt had no aggressive in ten t ions  against Is ra e l ,
55and to ld  the jo u rn a l is ts  " tha t Egypt is  a peace-loving na t ion " .
Moreover, Egypt showed a greater w il l ingness  to compromise on the major
outstanding issue, the settlement o f refugees. On 1 Ju ly the Egyptian
government signed an economic agreement w ith  the United Nations R e lie f
and Works Agency (UNRWA) th a t would provide work fo r  Pa lestin ian
56refugees in the Gaza S tr ip  and S ina i. A measure o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  and
pragmatism was evident in Egyptian po licy .
51. NA RG 59 Box 2979 674 -8 4A /9 -1C53, 10 September 1953, memo, of 
conversation, Ralph Bunche, NE, Mr. Hart.
52. I b id . ,  also New York Times, 30 March 1953/
53. NA RG 84 Box 247, Folder 320, Egypt and Is ra e l ,  memo, o f conversation, 
sub ject, peace fee le rs  between Egypt and Is ra e l ;  NA RG Box 4038, 
memo, o f conversation, p a r t ic ip a n ts , Byroade, Mr. Harry Flammery,
21 August 1953.
54. RG 59 2979, o p . c i t . , 28 August 1953, from Cairo to Department o f 
State, re s tr ic ted ,"E gyp tian  po licy  on Palestine"
55. RG 59 Box 2979 674.84A/7-2853 LWC, 28 July 1953, from American
Embassy, Tel Aviv, to Department o f State.
56. The Times, 1 July 1953, Economic surveys fo r  Gaza and S ina i.
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I t  is  c lea r th a t the Egyptian leadership began to move in three 
p o l i t i c a l  d ire c t io n s  at once. They t r ie d  to use the A ra b -Is ra e li  
settlement as leverage to gain American support on the Suez Canal issue. 
Then the settlement o f the Palestin ian refugees in Gaza and Sinai might 
e lim ina te  some sp e c if ic  obstacles hindering American po licy  in the area. 
The Egyptians t r ie d  to prove tha t Egypt was the key country fo r  any 
peace in the Near East, and th a t w ithout Egypt, no other Arab country 
would dare take a step towards a peace settlement w ith Is ra e l .  They 
wished to impress upon the United States tha t Egyptian po licy  towards 
Israe l would become the model to be emulated by a l l  o ther Arab s ta tes . 
Thus Cairo would often remind Washington tha t the centra l pro tagon is t 
in the Arab world was Egypt, and tha t w ithout Egypt nothing could be 
reso lved.
57Egyptian f l e x i b i l i t y ,  harsh Is ra e l i  ta c t ic s  and tough a t t i tu d e
towards i t s  n e i g h b o u r s l e d  the United States to take i t s  f irm es t
stand in support o f a United Nations order to Israe l to des is t.
President Eisenhower ins truc ted  the Treasury Department to  d ra f t  an
order removing the tax-deduct ib le  status o f con tr ibu tions  made by
American c i t izen s  to the United Jewish Appeal and other Z io n is t
59organisations in America, ra is in g  p r iva te  funds fo r  Is ra e l .  On
57. NA RG 84 Box 247-320, Egypt-Israel 1953, from Cairo to Department,
although Is ra e l i  troops attacked Gaza "the Egyptian a u th o r i t ie s  
have demonstrated unusual re s t ra in t  in connection w ith p u b l ic i t y  
about th is  inc iden t. The Is ra e l i  troops k i l le d  twenty-two persons", 
Stephen Green, Taking S ides ,(New York: W illiam Morrow 1984), p .60.
58. As well as a ttack ing Gaza and e l-A u ja , Is ra e l i  forces attacked 
Kibya on the West Bank in October 1953 and i t s  d ivers ion o f the 
Jordan r i v e r ,  i b id . ,  pp.76-80.
59. Ib id . , p .80.
18 September 1953 Dulles informed the Is ra e l i  ambassador in Washington 
tha t United States economic aid to Israe l was suspended. In th e i r  
conversation Secretary Dulles made c lear to the ambassador his 
"conviction tha t the way to win peace was not by s u p p o r t s  rael whether 
r ig h t  or wrong". At the conclusion o f his meeting w ith the Is ra e l i
ambassador, Dulles emphasised "h is desire fo r  early  progress towards
„ 60 area peace .
Johnston's Plan
The Americans faced a dilemma at the end of 1953. An Anglo-Egyptian
61agreement was about to  be reached. and Is ra e l is  feared th a t the
settlement would lead Egypt and other Arab countries to jo in  a Western
defence pact. The departure o f B r i t is h  troops from the Suez base would
62leave Israel exposed to attack from Egypt.
Is ra e l i  po licy  and eagerness to ease the tension and to re in fo rce  
i t s  cold war in American s tra tegy resulted in a new pattern in American 
policy-making, tha t o f promoting an A rab -Is rae li  settlement. Dulles, 
the a rch ite c t o f American fo re ign  p o l ic y ,  believed in a g ra du a lis t 
process to resolve the outstanding c o n f l ic t s .  The United States thus 
adopted a new po licy  to s e t t le  the matter o f the refugees and, on 
14 October 1953, President Eisenhower announced the appointment o f Eric
60. NA RG 59 Box 2979 611-84A/10-953 CS/CB, 9 October 1953, Department 
o f State to American Embassy, Tel Aviv.
61. New York Times, 11 October 1953.
62. NA RG 84 Box 246, Folder 320, p o l i t i c a l  re la t io n s ,  from Secretary,
Washington, sent to Tel Aviv 276, 9 October 1953: Ambassador Eban
ca lled  on Secretary 8 October 1953.
63. Saadia Touval 5 The Peace Brokers (Princeton: Princeton U n ive rs ity
Press 1982), pp.' 109-10.
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Johnston as Special Ambassador to the Near East. Johnston was to
undertake a plan with ce rta in  o f the Arab states and Israe l fo r  the
purpose o f the mutual development o f the water resources o f the Jordan
r iv e r  va lle y  on a regional b a s is . ^
Some scholars considered Johnston's mission to be one o f two major
65American i n i t i a t i v e s  in the 1950s to solve the A ra b -Is ra e l i  d ispu te . The
mission was p r im a r i ly  motivated by the desire to resolve the Palestin ian
refugee problem which was a root cause of regional d iscontent. Johnston's
main task was to create employment opportun it ies fo r  the 800,000
Pa lestin ian refugees in the Arab countries in the hope th a t they would
be absorbed there. Yet i t  was e x p l i c i t l y  recognised by Under-Secretary
General Bedel Smith tha t i t  was "unreasonable to expect Arab countries
to accept refugees as workers unless means are found to improve
67conditions o f t h e i r  own c i t iz e n s " .
Arab reactions to th is  American i n i t i a t i v e  were mixed. The Egyptian 
press appreciated Eisenhower's po licy  " fo r  his carefu l a tten t io n  towards 
the Middle East problem", but th is  welcome by the Egyptian press did 
not lessen i t s  a t t i tu d e  because "Mr. Eric Johnston's success does not 
seem very probable so long as the Palestine problem remains unsettled
C O
and as long as the United Nations' reso lu tions remain ink on paper".
The Egyptian government, however, i n i t i a l l y  len t support to the mission
69despite the ob jections o f other Arab states. According to S ir  Humphrey
64. US Department o f State B u l le t in , 26 October 1953, p .533.
65. Touval, o p . c i t . , pp .106-7.
66. Green, o p . c i t . , p .77.
67. US Department o f  State B u l le t in , 8 June 1953, p .824.
68. A1 -A'k h'ba r , 28 October 1953.
69. Middle Eastern A f fa i r s ,  "Chronology", 16 October-15 November 1953, 
pp.430-1.
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Trevelyan, one-time B r i t is h  ambassador to Cairo, "The Egyptians had
given Mr. Johnston considerable technical help inc lud ing  the loan o f
Egyptian e n g in e e rs " .^  Egypt may also have persuaded Syria and Jordan
71to reconsider th e i r  a t t i tu d e s  towards the Johnston plan. However,
the Egyptians could not make public  declarations o f  support so long
72as there was substantia l Arab resistance.
Whether or not the Egyptian government used th is  accommodating
po licy  as leverage to gain American support on the Suez Canal issue is
debatable. In any case, Johnston's mission lasted fo r  two years in the
hope tha t the p ro jec t would pave the way fo r  the peace settlement. At
the same time American hopes fo r  an Egyptian co n tr ibu t io n  towards the
success o f the peace process were re f lec ted  in the fa c t  tha t the US did
not take any f i rm  stand against Egypt in the United Nations over the
73blockade o f Is ra e l i  shipping through the Suez Canal.
So long as there was no t r u s t  between the Arab states and Is ra e l ,  
the peace process could not succeed. Both sides were considerably 
preoccupied by the p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t the other may a t any time and fo r  
any reason, t r y  to harm the other se r ious ly . I t  was there fo re  essentia l
to reduce the level o f  anx ie ty  on a l l  sides. Furthermore, the evenhanded
approach with which the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  began to explore the
70. Humphrey Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution, p .40. See also 
NA RG 59 322-2, Jordan Valley, Box No.1, Egypt 1953-1955, telegram 
sent to Secretary, 17 June 1954. At the close o f  the meeting
Mr. Johnston expressed his appreciation o f the atmosphere o f c o rd ia l i t y  
in which the conversation took place, and fo r  the famous h o s p i ta l i t y  
extended to him and his s t a f f  in Cairo by the Egyptian government.
71. Love, Suez: The Twice-fought War, p .277.
72. Trevelyan, o p . c i t . ,  p.40l
73. NA RG 84 Box No2, F i le  350-25/2-1954, "America does not approve 
o f taking a decision against Egypt".
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A rab -Is rae li  issue - with i t s  declared aim o f improving re la t ion s  with 
the Arab world - was viewed with alarm by Israel as i t  could lead to i t s  
is o la t io n .  Is ra e l i  fears and American eagerness to bu ild  a regional 
defence system shaped h is to r ic a l  events in the Middle East area fo r  the 
fo l low ing  years.
By the same token, the settlement o f the Anglo-Egyptian dispute 
was viewed in Israe l w ith misgivings since i t  increased the l ike l ih o o d  
th a t Egypt, with other Arab countr ies, "w i l l  ra ise the pr ice  fo r  
co-operation with the West" 7 ^  Moreover, the removal o f B r i t is h  troops 
"might re s u lt  in Egypt taking action w ith respect to Israe l which would
75be unhelpful and could even lead to incidents with serious consequences".
Is ra e l i  suspicions led Ambassador Eban to point out to  Henry Byroade
th a t from the Is ra e l i  poin t o f view " . . . t h e  Suez Base Agreement removes
b u ffe r  between Israel and Egypt and strengthens Egypt through the stores
76and f a c i l i t i e s  which in e v i ta b ly  w i l l  be l e f t " .  When the Americans 
f u l l y  rea lised Is ra e l i  anx ie t ie s , Assistant Secretary Byroade pointed out 
to Eban th a t "the United States considers i t s e l f  committed to Israel to
77endeavour to  induce Egypt to move forward on the A ra b -Is ra e li  problem".
74. NA RG 84 Box 249, Folder 320, Is rae l-R uss ia , from American Embassy,
Tel Aviv, to Department o f State, 16 February 1953; Mapcun d a ily  
al-Hamishmar ,15 February 1953 (Anglo-Egyptian accord on Sudan), 
c ited  in t ra n s la t io n  in State Department f i l e .
75. NA RG 59 Box 4038 780.00/7-754, 7 July 1954, memo, o f conversation, 
p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  Mr. Shiloah (the Is ra e l i  m in is te r ) ,  Mr. MacArthur (NEA).
76. RG 59 2979 674-84A/7-3054, 30 July 1954, Department o f State, 
memo, o f  conversation, p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  Ambassador Eban, and 
NEA Byroade.
77. Ib id .
.
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78Frequent American assurances did not dampen Is ra e l i  fea rs , which
had been raised to a high level as now the United States had to arm
Egypt, a necessary consequence o f the new development. On 29 July
1954, Moshe Sharett, the Is ra e l i  prime m in is te r ,  declared tha t "The
grant o f arms to Egypt a f te r  the decision to arm Iraq w i l l  p i le  blunder 
79upon blunder". At the same time, the p ro - Is ra e l i  lobby in America
concentrated much o f i t s  e f fo r ts  on preventing the United States from
arming the Arab s ta tes , espec ia lly  Egypt, as long as they refused to
80make peace with Is ra e l.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian government showed greater w il l ingness
to compromise, and Nasser pointed out to James Johnson, a B r i t is h  Member
o f Parliament, tha t "Egypt had no in ten t ion  whatsoever in s ta r t in g  a
81second round with Is ra e l" .  Dr, Mahmoud Fawzi re ite ra te d  the same
82p o s it io n , confirming tha t "Egypt wants to get along with Is ra e l" .
Moreover, in the Arab League Egypt le n t i t s  support to a proposal to
send the Palestin ian refugees to Libya, despite the objections o f  other 
83League members.
78. NA RG 59 Box 2848 611-80-1954, outgoing telegram sent to c i r c u la r  125-1959,
I September, according to Istanbul Conference, "US would take 
appropriate action to p ro tec t Is ra e l 's  se cu r ity " .
79. NA RG 59 Box 2979 674-84A/7-2954, from Tel Aviv to Secretary o f State,
No.106, 29 July 1954, 4.00 pm.
80. New York Times, 26 October 1954, "Jewish groups pro test to  D ulles", 
pp .14-16.
81. RG 59 Box 2979 674-84A/2-654, from American Embassy, Cairo, to 
the Department o f  State, Washington, 6 February 1954.
82. NA RG 59 774.00(W)/8-554, from USARM Cairo, to Washington, fo r  G2,
7 August 1954.
83. RG 59 Box 2979 764-87/9-1054, from Cairo to Secretary o f State,
I I  September 1954.
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The new Egyptian trend to ease the tension w ith Israe l a t any 
84cost, must be viewed in conjunction w ith the regime's po licy  to improve
re la t ion s  with the United States, and i t s  eagerness to consolidate i t s
power as ra p id ly  as possible in the face o f strong domestic opposition.
But, by now, American policy-makers understood th a t hopes fo r  peace were
a l l  too f r a g i le  to be fu r th e r  endangered by d isregarding the r ig h ts  o f
one o f the pa rt ies  to the c o n f l i c t .
For the State Department i t  was no secret th a t the Is ra e l is  were
seeking to propagate the untenable thes is  tha t only Is ra e l i  r igh ts  should
be respected; th a t  Arab r ig h ts  should be denied. The State Department
watched these events w ith growing f r u s t ra t io n .  On 30 August 1954 the
Assistant Secretary fo r  Near Eastern A f fa irs  informed Dulles in a secret
memorandum e n t i t le d ,  “A possible assurance to I s ra e l " ,  th a t " I s r a e l ’ s
concept o f her ro le  in the Near East is tha t o f a dominant power with
c lea r  m i l i t a r y  s u p e r io r i ty  over a l l  her neighbours combined.. . .When
Israel speaks o f peace and co-operation in the Near East she means on
85her terms and with Arab acceptance o f  her p o l ic ie s " .  The American 
National Security  Council re ite ra te d  the same po s it ion  to  Eisenhower, 
emphasising th a t  " . . . t h e re  has been no change in Is ra e l 's  apparent po licy  
o f using force to  accomplish p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t ives " . For the Eisenhower
84. Since March 1954 Egypt had re fra ined from in te r fe r in g  w ith shipping 
passing through the Canal e ith e r  to or from Is ra e l .  NA RG 84
Box 356, Folder 320, US to other countr ies , from Secretary to 
Cairo, 7 November 1954.
85. NA RG 59 Box 2841 611-84A/8-3054, to Secretary from Assistant
Secretary NEA Jernegan, sub jec t, Possible assurance to  Is ra e l ,
30 August 1954.
86. NSC, Progress Report on US ob jectives and p o lic ie s  w ith respect
to Near East, No.155/1, 30 July 1954.
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adm in is tra t ion  there were a number o f basic undeniable fa c ts .  One was 
th a t  the tough Is ra e l i  a t t i tu d e  towards i t s  neighbours would increase 
the "communist penetration in the area - although i t  was important fo r
87American s tra tegy th a t the area be kept from the hands of the Soviets".
Soviet sympathy fo r  the Arabs and the Egyptian case in the United
Nations made i t  apparent th a t the A rab -Is rae li  d ispute had become an
in te rna t io na l question. Israel appeared to be supported by the Anglo-
American b loc, and the Arab states by the Russian bloc.
The Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  t r ie d  to demonstrate to  the Arab world
th a t the American a t t i tu d e  towards the A rab -Is rae li c o n f l ic t  had evolved
with the new American leadership, but the facts  o f the s i tu a t io n  did not
substantia te  th is  change. The Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  was facing
strong pressure groups th a t t r a d i t io n a l ly  supported Israe l in periods o f
s tress . The true strength o f th is  lobby may have been exaggerated, but
i t  was perceived by the American leadership as being o f great po ten tia l 
88in f luence . Thus any attempt to give aid to the Arabs was always met
w ith  opposition behind the scenes in Washington, where the members o f
Congress were acute ly aware o f  the strong popular sentiment in  the
89country fo r  Is ra e l .  Consideration fo r  the great body o f  public
87. NA RG 59 Box 2848 511-80/9-154, Department o f State to c i r c u la r  top
secre t, September 1954; RG Box 2848 611-80/91/654, memo, o f
conversation, 1 $ -September 1954.
88. NA RG 59 Box 2848 611-80/1-1854, 18 February 1954, from Byroade to 
Robert Coulter, Special Assistant to President, " . . . [ t h e  Jewish 
lobby informed the State Department] arming Iraq or Saudi Arabia 
or any other Arab countries would be contrary to the in te re s t  o f 
US and would se r ious ly  threaten the secu r ity  o f Is ra e l" .
89. NA RG 59 Box 2848 611-80/2-554, from members o f Congress o f the
US House o f Representatives to  Secretary Dulles, 5 February 1954; 
D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry  se r ies , Box No.4, s ta f f  notes, January- 
December 1954, B ipartisan Leg is la t ive  meeting, 5 January 1954,
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opinion in the United States favouring Israel played a large ro le  in
90every government decision on Middle East issues.
To some extent i t  is  true  to say tha t pressure groups were most
e f fe c t iv e  w ith in  Congress, although most analysts consider fore ign
91po licy  to be the domain of the executive branch. Theore t ica l ly
th is  l a t t e r  statement is t ru e , but apparently i t  was d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the
Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  to re s is t  congressional pressures fo r  ever.
This can be a t t r ib u te d  to i t s  lack o f a m a jority  in the House of
92Representatives and the Senate. Therefore to some extent members o f 
Congress and the pressure groups were able to exert a re s tra in ing
no
influence on the new American approach towards the A ra b -Is ra e li  d ispute.
Yet Dulles and Eisenhower did not y ie ld  completely to these pressure
groups. Soviet containment was a top p r io r i t y  fo r  the United States.
Therefore i t  began to arm Iraq in Apr i l  1954. I s ra e l i  supporters
considered th a t arms to a p a r t ic u la r  Arab state would eventually mean
94arms fo r  a l l  Arab sta tes. Is ra e l i  objections stemmed from the
p r in c ip le  th a t "The Arabs could k i l l  Is ra e l is  w ithout any subsequent
95Is ra e l i  reactions" was close to  becoming an in te rna tio na l .doctrine.
This theory led them to  believe th a t American m i l i t a r y  aid to Arab 
countries and i t s  support of the Baghdad Pact "would s t i f f e n  Arab
90. Sherman Adams, FIrst-hand Report, pp.247-8.
91. Marvin Feuerwergar, Congress and Israel 1969-1975, pp.3-4: "The 
c o n s t i tu t io n  grants the President considerable a u th o r i ty  to  act 
w ithout congressional d ire c t io n  in his ro les as Commander-in-Chief and 
the sole US representative in re la t ions  w ith fo re ign  governments".
92. Interview with H. Byroade, Washington, D.C.
93. Abba Eban, An Autobiography, pp .178-9. See also William B. Quandat,
Camp David, p . 13.
94. I.E . Kenen, Is ra e l 's  Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in
Washington (Prometheus Books: New York 1981), pp. 122-3.
95. Eban, o p . c i t . ,  pp .172-3.
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96resistance to the idea o f coming to terms with I s ra e l " ,  and th is  was 
incons is ten t w ith Is ra e l i  stra tegy to  secure peace on the basis o f the 
status quo.
The Gaza Raid
The Is ra e l i  government in te n s i f ie d  i t s  propaganda campaign, thus
helping i t  to le g i t im is e  the po licy  o f rep risa ls  based on the theory
th a t matters w i l l  have to be made worse before they become be tte r.  This
po licy  led to the Is ra e l i  attack on the Gaza S tr ip  on 28 February 1955,
two days a f te r  the signing o f the Baghdad Pact, and ten days a f te r  Ben
97Gurion returned to the Is ra e l i  cabinet as defence m in is te r .  The
Is ra e l i  ra id  marked the end o f the calm which had prevailed along the
98Egyp tian -Is rae li  border. This ra id  was the f i r s t  d ire c t  clash between
Egypt and Israel since 1948. On the Egyptian side t h i r t y - s i x  so ld ie rs
and two c iv i l ia n s  were k i l l e d ,  and twenty-nine so ld ie rs  and two c iv i l ia n s  
99were wounded. A chain reaction o f increas ing ly  v io le n t  confrontations 
was in i t ia te d  between the two countr ies , coming to a climax in the Suez 
war twenty-one months la te r .  As one historianKas observed, "With the 
Gaza ra id  the count-down to war b e g a n " . ^
96. NA RG 59 Box 4083-780.00/2-2154, 21 December, memo, o f conversation,
M. Francois de Labdegya, Counsellor, French Embassy, Mr. Jernegan, NEA.
97. Michel Bar Zohar, Ben Gurion, pp.216-7. To understand Ben Gurion's 
a t t i tu d e  towards the Arabs, see Francis Russell, Oral H is to ry , Dulles 
Oral H is tory  C o l le c t ion , p .5, where Goldman says, "Ben Gurion f e l t  
th a t the only language tha t the Arabs understood was the language o f 
toughness and tha t Israe l fo r  i t s  fu tu re  secu r ity  would have to 
pursue a tough p o l ic y " .
98. Shortly  before the ra id  Nasser v is i te d  Gaza and to ld  the troops th a t 
there was no danger o f war, th a t the Gaza arm is t ice  demarcation l in e  
was not going to be a b a t t le - f r o n t .  Hamrush, V o l.5, p .22; see also 
NA RG 59 Box 2979, 647474.84A/10-75.4, Cairo to Department of State.
99. Burns, Between Arab and I s r a e l i .
100. DonaldNeff, Warriors a t Suez, p .33.
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Regardless o f the reasons behind the Is ra e l i  adoption o f a ha rd - l ine
po licy  towards Egypt, the consequences o f the ra id  were dangerous not
only fo r  Egyp tian -Is rae li re la t io n s ,  but also fo r  the s t a b i l i t y  o f the
Middle East. The s i tu a t io n  had been g rea t ly  complicated. Nasser, fo r
one, must always have had in the back o f his mind the p o s s ib i l i t y  of
being overthrown by the same sort o f cabal o f m i l i ta r y  o f f ic e rs  who had
previously overthrown Farouk. The hum ilia t ion  o f the Gaza ra id  made i t
d i f f i c u l t  fo r  him as a m i l i ta r y  man to pursue or enforce p o lic ie s  which
101were unpopular with the army. The murder o f Abdullah, fo r  example,
was s t i l l  fresh in his mind. More s ig n i f ic a n t ly ,  the ra id  had
elim inated any p o s s ib i l i t y  o f having the two sides together a t the
bargaining tab le  fo r  any so rt o f settlement.
Baghdad Pact and the Raid
Nasser's hum ilia t ion  in Gaza and the announcement o f  the Baghdad 
Pact led him to  assume tha t there was pressure to force Egypt to 
p a r t ic ip a te  in  the Baghdad Pact under Western auspices. Egypt's 
r i v a l r y  w ith Iraq fo r  leadership o f  the Arab world led Nasser to th ink  
tha t he must not appear weak, nor submit to any Is ra e l i  th re a t .  Thus 
the tim ing o f the Gaza ra id ,  and not necessarily the Egyptian m i l i t a r y  
defeat was the main fa c to r  behind Egypt's po licy  towards the Baghdad
101. Interview with Ambassador H. Byroade, Washington, D.C., 1983;
D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  papers o f  J.F. Du lles, telephone c a ll  
se r ies , Box No.4, September 1955, memo, o f telephone conversation 
with Mr. Hoover, 22 September 1955. Hoover to ld  Dulles th a t 
Nasser was under extreme pressure w ith in  his own group, 
"espec ia lly  a f te r  the Gaza ra id " .
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Pact and Israel afterwards. Nasser f e l t  tha t his emergence as one 
o f the leading f igures in the Arab world v is -a -v is  Nuri e l-Said would 
be se rious ly  undermined i f  he showed a greater w il l ingness to compromise 
a f te r  th is  destructive  ra id .  This marked the inauguration o f  an Arab 
"Cold War" between Cairo and Baghdad which helped shape the h is to ry  o f 
the peace process between Egypt and Is ra e l.  The chain o f  events did 
not help Egypt to become a bridge fo r  peace, as America had hoped, but 
ra ther a b a r r ie r  against i t  fo r  a long time. Nasser was now bent on 
using Arab u n ity  under his leadership as leverage to gain more 
concessions from the West and Is ra e l .  As fo r  the Americans, they 
believed tha t "the ra id  put an end to any hope fo r  the steps towards 
peace". ^
With the Gaza ra id  Ben Gurion hoped tha t " I f  Israe l were to s t r ik e
back hard against Egyptian provacations, Egypt would be fr igh tened o f f
103and curb i t s  behaviour". But the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  did not
believe tha t Ben Gurion's re p risa l po licy  was e ith e r  r ig h t  or e f f icac iou s .
Therefore i t  did not remain passive against th is  m i l i ta r y  a ttack . The
American delegation to the UN did not hes ita te  to condemn i t  in the
Security C o u n c i l ^  as "A v io la t io n  o f the cease-f ire  provis ion o f the
Security  Council Resolution o f duly 15, 1948, and incons is ten t with
ob liga t ions  o f the parties under the General Arm istice Agreement between
105Egypt and Israel and under the Charter". Condemnation in the United
102. Princeton U n ive rs ity , J. Dulles, Oral H istory P ro jec t, Francis 
Russel 1 , pp.6-7.
103. B arzoha r’ , o p . c i t . , p .219.
104. N e ff,  o p . c i t . , pp.46-7.
105. Burns, o p . c i t . ,  p .21.'
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Nations, however, did not reduce the explosive tension th a t was bu ild ing
up in the area. Secretary Dulles suggested to President Eisenhower
tha t " I f  there were aggression in the area, we should take action
106both w ith in  and w ithout the UN to stop the aggression".
The f i rm  American stand against th is  kind o f rep r isa l po licy  was
insp ired by a number o f fa c to rs ,  inc lud ing Nasser's a l l ia n c e  with Saudi
107Arabia whose o i l  was so important to American m i l i t a r y  needs.
No doubt too th is  kind o f Is ra e l i  rep r isa l would have lessened to some
extent the Arabs' in te re s ts  in Western defence schemes, thus
undermining American cold-war s tra tegy. In general, the Gaza ra id
and Is ra e l i  m i l i t a r y  po licy  diminished Arab re c e p t iv i ty  to the idea o f
co-operating in a Western defence system directed against the Soviet 
108Union. The ra id  ended Western hopes generally fo r  b e tte r  re la t io n s  
between Egypt and Is ra e l.  More p a r t ic u la r ly ,  i t  ended American hopes 
tha t Egypt would become the f i r s t  Arab state to make peace with Is ra e l .
In re trospect the sequence o f events touched o f f  by the Gaza ra id  
does in fa c t  seem to have driven a wedge between Egypt and the United
109States. I t  marked the end o f the honeymoon between the two countr ies. 
This can be understood in Ambassador Badeau's comment when he wrote in
106. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower Diary se r ie s , Box No.9, 
telephone ca lls  January-July 1955(2), Wednesday, 6 March 1955.
107. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , series Box No.4, s ta f f  notes, b i-p a r t is a n ,  
le g is la t iv e  meeting, 5 January 1955; Rubin, Paved w ith Good 
In ten tion  p .75.
108. W. Perkins L ib ra ry , Allen D iv is ion , Durham, NC Box 1, p . 15,
from Dulles to George A l len , 26 July 1955; Meyer, o p . c i t . , p .77.
109. NA RG 84 Box 2-350, from American Embassy, Cairo, to Department o f 
S tate, 23 September 1955. In Nasser in te rv iew  w ith Cedric Foster, 
he sa id , "The behaviour of Israe l was standing obstruc tion  between 
United States and the Arab world".
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1965 tha t "The day o f  honey in Arab-American re la t io ns  so eas ily  changed
110in to  a day of on ion", whether or not th is  was Is ra e l 's  real 
111in te n t io n .
La te r, tension s t i l l  prevailed on the E gyp tian -Is rae li borders.
Is ra e l i  threats strengthened the Egyptian leaders' determination to
112get arms to "defend Egypt f r o n t ie r " ,  especia lly  when i t  became known
tha t Israel had been securing arms from France, B r i ta in  and even the 
113United States despite those three countr ies ' commitments to the 1950
T r ip a r t i t e  Declaration. Soon the Egyptian leadership also in te n s i f ie d
i t s  campaign to  get arms from the United States. Byroade, the new
American ambassador, was bombarded with such demands. Nasser said tha t
only new arms supplies fo r  Egypt could fo re s ta l l  army and popular support
fo r  r e ta l ia t io n .  Nasser's CIA contacts took up his cause, but despite
114the sympathy o f  A llen Dulles, the CIA c h ie f ,  no help was obtained.
On the spot, Byroade, a former m i l i ta r y  man, saw the dangers to
the ex is t ing  cond it ions. In A p r i l  the Soviet Union was o ffe r in g  "to
115help any Middle East country not already aligned with the West".
110, John Badeau, Foreign A f f a i r s , 43, January 1965, "USA and UAR, 
c r is is  in confidence", p .283 - an Egyptian saying.
111. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , papers o f J.F. Dulles, White House, memo, 
chronological sub-series, meeting with the President, memo, of 
conversation, 5 June 1955: Dulles, "I to ld  the President tha t there
was some evidence th a t the Is ra e l is  might move to take over the whole 
of th is  s t r ip  [Gaza] d r iv ing  out the Egyptians". On 1 September 
1955, Dulles to ld  Eisenhower th a t "Today's troub le  spot is  Gaza 
S tr ip .  I hope, however, th a t i t  w i l l  not lead to fu l l - s c a le  war".
^ 2 .  The Times, 3 March 1955, Nasser's speech.
113. "Jamal Abd a l-N a s ir " ,  Khutab wa ta s r ih a t  a l- ra  is  Jamal 1952-1959,
V o l.5, 2 October 1955, pp. 1OOQ4-10UT; also Hamrush, Vol.’S", pp.23-4.
114. Eveland, Ropes o f Sand, pp. 136-8; also Mohamed Heika l, Nasser the Cairo
Documents, p .56; D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower papers (Ann 
Whitman f i l e ) ,  le g is la t iv e  leaders meetings 1956(4), 9 November 1956, 
Allen Dulles (see also D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Dulles papers, 
telephone c a l l  se r ies , Box No.3, 27 October 1954, telephone c a l l  to
Mr. A.W. D ulles).
115. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , le g is la t iv e  meeting, 9 November 1956.
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Nasser's f r u s t ra t io n  a t not ge tt ing  arms from the West led him to
t e l l  Byroade and his B r i t is h  counterpart tha t " i f  they refused to supply
116him w ith  arms he would t r y  to get them from the Russians". Byroade
was convinced tha t Nasser was not b lu f f in g ,  so he to ld  Dulles "Nothing
would do us more good than to turn a squadron o f B-26s over to the
117Egyptian a i r  fo rce " .  Alle.n Dulles ' and Byroade's recommendation
118went unheeded because o f Is ra e l i  pressure.
In the spring o f 1955 the Syrians accused Turkey, a member o f NATO
119and the Baghdad Pact, o f threatening th e i r  se cu r ity .  By then too
B r i ta in  and the United States were re luc tan t to supply arms to Egypt
outside the framework o f Western defence pacts. Nasser and his
colleagues assumed th a t the West was using Israe l as a constant challenge
to  th e i r  leadership. The Western powers knew th a t  i f  the Egyptians,
faced w ith  the choice o f  defeat by Israel or y ie ld in g  to the West,
120would have to choose the la t t e r .  Yet the Egyptian leadership did
not exclude the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  keeping i t s  re la t io n sh ip  w ith the United
States on good terms, and eventually  ge tt ing  arms from her. Before
going to  Bandung, Nasser did his utmost to see Dulles to  discuss a
121matter o f  mutual in te re s t ,  o f fe r in g  his readiness to use an American
116. In terv iew  w ith Ambassador Byroade, Washington, D.C., 1983;
Heika l, Qissat a l-S uwais, p .74.
117. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , J.F. Dulles papers, telephone ca ll  se r ies , 
Box No.31, fo ld e r ,  telephone conversations, general, telephone c a l l  
to Ta lbo t, 27 Apr il  1955.
118. Ib id .
119. At th is  time there was a m i l i ta r y  a l l iance  between Syria and Egypt, 
see Pa tr ick  Seale, The Struggle fo r  S y r ia , pp .233-4.
120. Sal ah Salem, to  Seale, i b i d . ,' pp. 234-5. A l i  Sabri repeated the 
same words to the author in Cairo, 29 January 1985.
121. Princeton U n ive rs ity , J.F. Dulles papers, Box No.96, Nasser Gamal 
1955, Dear Mr. Kermit, 28 February 1955.
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plane to  avoid v i s i t in g  India on his way to Bandung, since Nehru was
making tremendous e f fo r t s  to l in e  up the Middle East w ith  his
n e u t ra l is t  b loc . " In  Nasser's view th is  would cancel h is t r i p  w ith
122Nehru and underline h is real fee l in g  o f k inship w ith  the West";
but i t  was a l l  in va-in since no Egyptian inducement could change
American s tra tegy  based on the assumption tha t a l l  Arab countr ies ,
e sp ec ia lly  Egypt should be maintained only as defensive powers and
123not as o ffens ive  ones, 
ever since the establishment o f  Is ra e l .
This American pos it ion  had been formulated 
24
122. Princeton U n ive rs ity ,  J.F . Dulles papers, Box 96, Nasser to 
Dulles, 28 March 1955.
123. NA RG 59 Box 4042 780.5HMSP/9-453, to  Secretary, memo, o f 
conversation, sub jec t, fo re ign  a id . Regarding the Arab 
s ta tes , Dulles said "He f e l t  the primary purpose o f our 
m i l i t a r y  assistance to the area was to maintain in te rn a l  s t a b i l i t y  
And a f te r  the 1954 Agreement, A llen  Dulles in  a conversation 
w ith  h is  b ro the r, John, about arms aid to Egypt, sa id , "We
might t r y  to  keep i t  on a very defensive ba s is " ,  Dulles telephone 
c a l l  se r ie s ,  27 October 1954, conversation w ith  A llen  Dulles.
124. The executive session o f the Foreign Relations Committee,
V o l .V I I I  84, Congress, second session 1956: s i tu a t io n  the
Middle East, statement o f Hoover, 27 February 1956.
US arms exports , 1950-1955 (these are f igu res  from 25 May 1950 
to  December 1955), pp.84-6.
Country
Egypt
Arms
$1 ,263,100
A i r c r a f t
Commercial, 
spare parts
Total
$6,501,000
Israe l $7,800,100 A i r c r a f t  only 
$21 mil 1 ion
$28mi11i on (p .86)
Arab s ta tes  $3million $ 12mi11ion $ 15mi11ion ( p .91)
bordering on 
ls rae i
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The Arms Deal
125At Bandung Abdel Nasser met Zhou En la i, where he had reported ly
put forward the idea to him o f  securing Chinese arms fo r  Egypt. Because
o f China's own dependence on Soviet sources, Zhou agreed to re la y  the
Egyptian request to  the Soviet a u th o r i t ie s .  According to  Salah Salem,
the Soviet ambassador in  Cairo conveyed a p os it ive  response to them on 
1266 May 1955. Nasser nevertheless continued to press fo r  American
arms. This can be a t t r ib u te d  to  his eagerness to  avoid a fu r th e r  r i f t
in  re la t io n s  w ith the United States, while also tak ing in to  consideration
th a t the Egyptian army was accustomed to  Western arms. A ce rta in
wariness by Nasser on the p o l i t i c a l  im plications o f  arms purchases from
the Eastern bloc was no doubt another consideration.
Events now moved qu ick ly  towards th e i r  climax. Nasser decided to
make a la s t  attempt to secure American arms. Ambassador Byroade
recounts the sequence o f events as fo l low s :
I met Nasser a t the beginning o f June and he to ld  
me f ra n k ly  th a t i f  Dulles continued to refuse to  
supply them w ith  weapons, they Would get arms from 
the Soviet Union. I cabled the State Department 
on the same n igh t to  come to terms w ith  Egypt to 
fo re s ta l l  such possible agreement.'2'
Dulles, however, did not take the matter se r iou s ly , convinced th a t Nasser
128was b lu f f in g  and t ry in g  to  blackmail them. Soon events were to prove 
him wrong.
125. NA RG 59 Box 2851 670-901/12-2354, from Djakarta to  Secretary o f 
S tate, 28 December 1954, secre t; before Gaza ra id  Egypt opposed 
s trong ly  the Chinese p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the conference and sided 
w ith Iraq and Pakistan on th is  issue.
126. Seale, o p . c i t . , pp.236-7; al-Baghdadai, Mudhakkirat, V o l . I I ,  p .202.
127. In terv iew  w ith  Ambassador Byroade, Washington, D.C., 1984.
128. Ib id . ;  also in te rv iew  w ith  Kermit Roosevelt, Washington, 15 May 1984.
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1 P QAt the end o f  July Nasser gave a p o s it ive  rep ly  to the Soviets.
Simultaneously he did not "show or repeat to the United States o f f i c i a l s
any o f f i c i a l  proposals from the Soviet representative fo r  such free
a id " . 13^ Dulles claimed tha t he got wind o f  the deal in  June 1955.131
On 15 August, the CIA ch ie f  and h is  representative in Cairo received
information from a re l ia b le  Egyptian source th a t the arms deal was 
132f in a l is e d .  Whether or not the Egyptian a u th o r i t ie s  leaked th is  top
secret in formation in  June or August to the Americans in  order to
a t t r a c t  American m i l i t a r y  aid in  terms which they f e l t  compatible w ith
th e i r  own in te re s ts ,  is  not c le a r .  Byroade, in  any case, who was well
aware o f  the dangers o f such a deal, suggested on 15 August th a t the
United States should show sympathetic in te re s t  in  the High Dam p ro je c t ,
and make "arrangements to  s e l l  m i l i t a r y  equipment on generous terms
133d i r e c t ly  to  Egypt fo r  local currency".
A l l  ind ica tions  showed th a t Soviet prestige in Egypt was on the
134r is e ,  while  American influence had s ta rted  to wane. A ll  o f these
new circumstances went unheeded. D u lles ' only response was to  attempt
135to  infuse new l i f e  in to  an A ra b - Is ra e l i  peace p ro je c t .  Dulles ' 
peace plan a t th is  c r i t i c a l  time demonstrated a naivete by the Eisenhower
129. CIA papers, NA 774-56/52555, from O.R. P h i l ip  to F. Shethoux,
6 September 1955.
130. I b id . ,  pp.4-5.
131. John Foster Dulles before the Congress, US Congress Hearings, p . 16.
132. CIA papers, NA 774-56/52555: on 15 August Ahmed Husayn, , the Egyptian 
ambassador in Washington, reported to Byroade his conversation w ith  
Nasser about the arms deal w ith  the Soviet Union.
133. NA RG 218 09/CJCS, Chairman, S ta f f  Group, the Jo in t Chief o f S ta f f ,  
memo, fo r  Admiral Radford, sub jec t, Egyptian s i tu a t io n ,  8 August 1955.
134. I b id .
135. Department o f  State B u l le t in , No.845, 5 September 1955, Dulles 
advocating an A ra b - Is ra e l i  settlement in speech before the Committee 
fo r  Foreign Relations, 26 August 1955, in  New York.
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adm in is tra tion  in discounting the p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t any regional leader,
espec ia lly  Nasser, would dare confront the West w ith  an agreement such
as th a t which Egypt concluded over arms w ith the Soviet Union. Dulles '
m isca lcu la t ion  on regional developments in the Middle East stemmed
mainly from his disagreement^with the American r e p r e s e n ta t i v e ^  Cairo
on the issue o f  American po licy  towards Egypt. For Dulles, Henry
1Byroade's reports re f le c te d  Nasser's view, not the American one.
Consequently, the American Jo in t Chiefs o f  S ta f f  blamed the State
137Department and Dulles fo r  the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal. Although
Dulles did his utmost to prevent the deal going through, e i th e r  by
138threatening Nasser or through persuation, on 27 September 1955
Nasser made the fac ts  p u b l ic ,  thus pu tt ing  an accomplished fa c t  before
the American adm in is tra t ion .
D ulles, in  his telephone conversation w ith  the American Vice-
President Richard Nixon, considered i t  "as dangerous as the loss o f 
139China". Dulles ' f ru s t ra t io n  led him to become vengeful and, on 
27 September he proposed some h igh ly  unorthodox action  against Egypt.
"We have a l o t  o f  cards to play with Nasser", he declared, "although 
they are mostly negative. The waters o f  the upper N ile :  we can
136. H eika l, Nahnu wa Amrika, p .87; interv iews w ith  Ambassador Byroade, 
and Mr. k. Roosevelt.
137. RG 218-091, Egypt, Chairman's S ta f f  Group, the J o in t  Chief o f S ta f f ,  
memo, fo r  Admiral Radford, sub ject, Egyptian s i tu a t io n ,  26 September 1955.
138. A1^Baghdadi, o p . c i t . , Vo l.1 , pp.205-6; in te rv iew  w ith  Mr. K.
Roosevelt; aTsoHReikal, Cairo Documents, o p . c i t . , pp.60-1.
139. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , papers o f J .F . D u lles , telephone c a l ls  
se r ies , Box No.4, telephone conversation genera l, memo, o f 
telephone conversation w ith the V ice-President, 17 October 1955.
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strang le  him i f  we want to ,  we can develop the Baghdad group, and we
can ru in  the- cotton market; we can switch th is  year 's  economic aid
140from Egypt to Iraq " .
I t  was now c lea r to  the Americans tha t the centra l issue was th a t
_gf the great gains the Soviet Union had made in the area, not one o f
141how to subvert Nasser's in f luence . As a re s u l t ,  Dulles suggested
th a t the United States, B r i ta in  and France should p ro tes t to  the Soviet
142Union. In his meeting w ith  the Soviet fo re ign  m in is te r  Dulles t r ie d
very hard to j u s t i f y  the American move. He pointed out to Molotov
th a t  because o f the arms d e a l, "the r is k  o f war between Is rae l and the
143Arabs has increased". President Eisenhower re i te ra te d  the same
pos it ion  in h is message to the Soviet leader Bulganin. Furthermore,
he warned the Soviet Union th a t the arms deal " . . . w i l l  not promote the
goals which I hope we have in common...a re laxa tion  o f  tension between 
144us". In th is  context the arms deal transformed the Middle East
from an area o f parochial c o n f l i c t  between the Arabs and Is ra e l ,  in to  
an arena o f super-power competit ion.
140. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  o p . c i t . , telephone c a l l  to  Mr. Hoover 
in  Washington, 27 September 1955. Also see H eika l, Cairo 
Documents, pp.60-1.
141. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  J .F . Dulles papers, ib id .  The American 
policy-makers understood Very well the main reason which led Nasser 
to  deal w ith  the Soviets , and th a t in  H. Hoover's po in t o f  view, 
"Nasser was under extreme pressure w ith in  his own group and was 
doing a lo t  o f th ings to stay o f f  being thrown o u t" ,  telephone c a l l  
se r ies , memo, o f telephone conversation w ith Mr. Hoover,
22 September 1955.
142. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  J .F . Dulles papers, general correspondence 
and memo. Box No.1, memo, o f  conversation w ith S ir  Piers Dixon,
New York, September 1955.
143. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, Dulles series Box No.4, 
memo, o f conversation, top secre t, 31 October 1955.
144. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  White House, O ffice  o f  S ta f f  Secretary,
\  Box No.1 , 'Folder No.1, State Department, 11 October 1955, secret.
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The arms deal proved th a t the American concept o f "deterrence"
was sho rt-s igh ted . The p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  a loca l power would in v i te
the Soviet Union to intervene was not taken in to  consideration by
American s t ra te g is ts .  Moreover, the deal enabled the Soviet Union to
—"leap over the northern t i e r  o f  defence which would lead to  an increase
o f Soviet in f luence in  Egypt and perhaps a fu r th e r  expansion
145throughout the area". I t  represented a major challenge to Western ' 
policy-makers, espec ia lly  American ones. Now the Soviets fo r  the
1 ZLfIf i r s t  time since 1946, were p a r t ic ip a n ts  in Middle Eastern p o l i t i c s ,
proving th e i r  a b i l i t y  to  e x p lo i t  any favourable circumstance, and, as i t
were, " f is h  in muddy waters". The Soviet Union was lending i t s  weight
to some Arab regimes which became known as "p rog ress ive ", thus countering
the " reac tionary" Arab regimes supported by B r i ta in  and America.
As fo r  Egypt, the arms deal enabled her to strengthen her pos it ion
in the Arab world while at the same time Nasser's po pu la r ity  and prestige
in Arab p o l i t i c a l  c i rc le s  allowed him to assume the ro le  o f  the de fian t
hero, in  contrast to the Iraq i leadership which had bowed to Western 
147demands. Nasser's p o lic ie s  were now hailed throughout the Arab 
world. The Council o f the Arab League supported Nasser's f i rm  stand 
in buying arms from communist coun tr ies . The Saudi Arabian ambassador 
in the Arab League to ld  reporters th a t he saw "no reason why a l l  other
145. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower papers, In te rna tiona l se r ies ,
Box 41, Folder 2, Saudi A rab is , p r iva te  conversation between King
Saud and Eisenhower in  January 1957. In 1955 the Soviets 
o ffe red  to supply Saudi Arabia w ith  arms and also a t ra in in g  team 
"to  bring [the  Saudi fo rce ]  to  a good state o f readiness". They 
d id  the same th ing w ith  Is ra e l .  See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p .25. 
See also Eisenhower papers, Ann Whitman f i l e ,  cabinet series Box No.5, 
fo ld e r  30 September 1956. Dulles reported th a t Russia might also 
supply some African countries w ith weapons.
146. B. Lewis, "The Middle Eastern reaction to Soviet pressure", The Middle 
East Journal, V o l .10, spring 1956, No.2, p . 136.
147. In terv iew  w ith  Mr. Pa tr ick  Seale, London.
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148Arab states should not fo l lo w  Egypt's example". The Syrian, Lebanese
and Jordanian Chambers o f Deputies voted a reso lu t io n  o f congratu lations
to  Nasser. Even Nuri e l-Said f e l t  constrained to  send a message o f
149congratu la tions and approval to h is r i v a l .  This wide support by 
the^Arab community fo r  the arms deal-demonstrated the new p o l i t i c a l  
r e a l i t y  th a t Egypt, under Nasser and his young enroutage, would become 
the new protagonists o f  the Arab world , not Iraq under Nuri e l-Said and 
the old p o l i t i c ia n s .  Nasser's acceptance o f the Russian o f fe r  carried 
no r is k  to  his personal safety nor to his p o l i t i c a l  p o p u la r ity .  On 
the con tra ry , i t  strengthened his ro le-as the le g it im a te  leader o f the 
Arab world.
Dulles had re lu c ta n t ly  accepted the arms deal and i t s  consequences,
thus inducing him to moderate his tone o f animosity towards Nasser.
On 4 October 1955, he coo lly  said a t a press conference th a t  Egypt could
hardly be blamed fo r  buying weapons: " I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  be c r i t i c a l
o f countries which, fee l in g  themselves endangered, seek the arms which
150they s ince re ly  believe they need fo r  defence". The American p o l ic y ­
makers began to  re a lise  tha t i t  would be b e tte r  fo r  them to  draw Egypt
151closer to them ra ther than a liena te  her. Any fu r th e r  pressure might
152force Egypt to oppose any American peace p la n . in  the Middle East.
Also fu r th e r  American opposition could be s t ra te g ic a l ly  counter-productive , 
because Egypt had informed the United States th a t  i t  had received a
148. New York Times, 2 October 1955, p .7, "Arab League takes stand".
149. B.: Lewis, The Middle East and the West, p. 132.
150. Department o f  State Bui 1 e t i n , 17 October 1955, t ra n s c r ip t  o f Dulles
press conference release on 4 October 1955.
151. Neff, o p . c i t . ,  p .104.
152. Alpha p lan, see ~Du7Tes speech on 26 August 1955, Department of
State B u l le t in ,  March 1956.
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153Soviet o f fe r  to  finance the Aswan Dam. American overestimation o f
Nasser's influence on some Arab countries on the other hand, led them
to suppose tha t other Arab states - e .g . ,  Saudi Arabia and Syria - would
fo l lo w  Egypt's lead in obta in ing arms from the Eastern b lo c , thus
154undermining Western Middle East defence. American policy-makers- were 
convinced tha t Egypt could become the p o l i t i c a l  prototype emulated by 
other Arab countr ies. Since America chose to support Nasser's regime, 
i t s  strategy rested on the assumption tha t Soviet penetration could be 
contained and the A rab -Is rae l i  dispute resolved.
155Despite the establishment o f  Soviet-Egyptian re la t io n s ,  Egypt
continued to demonstrate i t s  w il l ingness  to improve i t s  b i la te ra l
re la t ion s  with America. Egypt's diplomacy was aimed a t m it iga t in g
American disappointment a t Egypt's arms deal w ith the Eastern b loc.
The Egyptians were keen to  deny th a t because o f the arms d e a l, Egypt
" is  going to open the door to  Soviet penetration in  the Middle East".
A h ighly-placed Egyptian source confirmed to  reporters th a t  "No nation
156has been more anti-communist than Egypt under th is  regime".
The Egyptian a t t i tu d e  was motivated by a desire to avoid Mossedegh's 
mistake in Iran , o f t ry in g  to  improve his re la t ions  w ith  the Soviet 
Union in order to  force the United States to adopt a f r i e n d l i e r  l in e  o f
157p o licy . On the con tra ry , such ta c t ic s  could only antagonise Washington.
153. New York Times, 14 and 18 October 1955; also N eff, o p . c i t . ,  p .125.
154. NA R6 218-091 Egypt 1959, August 1956, the JCS, 20 October 1956, memo, 
fo r  Chairman o f JCS, sub jec t, In te l l igence  b r ie f  regarding Egypt- 
Israe l s i tu a t io n .
155. D.D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Draper Committee Box No.20, S ino-Soviet bloc 
and free world, the development o f Sino-Soviet a c t i v i t ie s  in Egypt 
from 1954 to  1955. At the conclusion o f i t s  report the Committee 
mentioned tha t the b lo c 's  a c t i v i t ie s  were concentrated in a few 
countries such as S yr ia , Egypt and Afghanistan.
156. New York Times. 30 September 1955, "Cairo s ta te m e n t"a n d  4 October 1955.
157. For American-Iranian re la t io n s ,  see B. Rubin, Paved w ith  Good 
In te n t io n s , p .83.
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Egypt, that is, tried to avoid the point of no return in its relations 
with the United States. American friendship was important, especially 
during the Nasser-Nuri rivalry for Arab leadership. Trying to obtain 
American neutrality in regional conflicts was vital since that might 
heTp Egypt maintain its leadership over the other Arab countries.
Nasser was also trying to consolidate American economic assistance to 
build the Aswan Dam, which had become the cornerstone of Egypt's ten-year 
economic plan. Egyptian policy-makers thus tried very hard to avoid 
total dependence upon the support of one bloc, as this would put an end 
to their ability to manoeuvre between the two blocs, and thus achieving 
their ends more easily.
Dulles' Peace Initiative
A few days before the Gaza raid, the United States behind the 
scenes began to change its piecemeal methods of promoting an Arab-Israeli 
settlement into a more comprehensive and dynamic approach to the problem. 
According to the recently declassified American documents, Francis 
Russell, who was working at the American embassy in Tel Aviv, was 
appointed special assistant to Secretary Dulles to work on plans to 
improve Arab-Israeli relations. Russell, moreover, collaborated with
British officials in preparing comprehensive proposals to overcome the
4- ‘ 158 dispute.
158. D.D. Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers,. Alpha-to Secretary from 
F. Russell, 14 February 1953, and also see Francis Russell to 
Hoover, subject, Present status of efforts to secure Israel-Arab 
settlement, top secret.
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The sequence o f events touched o f f  by the Gaza ra id  encouraged
American policy-makers to move in reducing a c t iv e ly  the explosive
tensions that were building up in the area. In May 1955, a few weeks
after the Bandung conference, Henry Byroade, the American ambassador in
Cairo, approached Nasser in order to convince him to accept a new American
159comprehensive peace initiative. Nasser voiced a willingness to
compromise, and Secretary Dulles informed Eisenhower that "Nasser seems
1 finmore friendly and more sympathetic to such a project". Nasser was
still hoping to get American military aid while the State Department
thought that a comprehensive peace plan would weaken Egyptian demands
at such a critical phase in Middle Eastern politics. But the American
initiative was launched in May 1955 at a time when Israel's bargaining
position was strong and improving, while the Egyptians were temporarily weak
especially after the Gaza raid and before the arms deal. Egyptian-
Is rae li  re la t io n s  by th is  time had de te r io ra ted , and tension prevailed
along the Egyptian-Israeli border. Rumours had spread that the Russians
were offering armaments to Egypt. Dulles thought that if the Russians
began to get into the scene, particularly in Egypt, the USA should do 
161something.
The American leadership did not remain passive in the face of this 
development. Consequently Dulles revealed the American peace initiative
159. D.D. Eisenhower Library, J.F. Dulles papers, memo, series, 
chronological sub-series, Box 3: meeting with President 1955,
special assistant to Secretary, 6 May, memo, for the Secretary, 
re. Alpha Plan, top secret.
160. D.D. Eisenhower Library, J.F. Dulles papers, White House, memo, series, 
Box No.3, White House, Correspondence G 1955(1), memo, from Dulles to 
President, top secret (Alpha).
161. D.D. Eisenhower Library, J.F. Dulles papers, telephone call series, 
general, 2 May 1955-31 August 1955(2), telephone call to Eric 
Johnston, 18 August 1955.
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which was considered one o f the most comprehensive peace plans o f  the
1621950s. In a speech on 26 August 1955 to the Council on Foreign 
Relations in New YOrk, Dulles noted the need to deal w ith  three problems: 
the refugee issue, "the pa ll o f fe a r " ,  and the lack o f " f ixed  permanent 
boundaries", and suggested th a t they seemed capable o f  a so lu t io n . He 
proposed a m u lt i- face ted  approach to resettlement and re -p a r t i t io n  
invo lv ing  the crea tion  o f  add it iona l land. To f a c i l i t a t e  the e f fo r ts  
and pro jects fo r  the development o f water resources, United States funds 
would be set aside and an in te rna t iona l loan would be provided enabling 
Israe l to pay compensation to the refugees. To promote secu r ity  and 
to a l le v ia te  the fea r prevalent in the region, the United States would 
jo in  in  formal t re a ty  arrangements to help guarantee and preserve the
permanent borders between Israe l and i t s  neighbours, replacing the 1949
. . .  •, . 163arm istice  l in e s .
A1-Gomhouria, the s e m i-o f f ic ia l  Egyptian newspaper, saw Mr. Dulles '
proposals as a pressing desire fo r  completing the Middle East defence
organisation since these proposals denied Pa lestin ian refugees the r ig h t
to return to th e i r  homes. I t  wondered "Who has the r ig h t  to decide to
simply on the refugees' r ig h ts  and the fa te  o f a m i l l io n  homeless Arabs,
on the question o f border adjustments, and the fu tu re  status o f
Jerusalem". The newspaper emphasised the fa c t  th a t e x is t in g  reso lu tions
by the United Nations on the issue, though f i rm  and obvious, had not been
164respected by Is ra e l .  Mohamed Haikal reported th a t Nasser found the
162. Touval, o p . c i t . , pp .115-9; Meyer, o p . c i t . , p .79.
163. Department o f  State B u l le t in , 30 October 1955. See a lso , Dulles Oral 
H istory C o l le c t ion , F. Russell, pp.6-7.
164. A1-Gomhouria, 27 August 1955.
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Americans "too concerned w ith su p e r f ic ia l  and a r t i f i c i a l  ways o f
s e t t l in g  problems", and th a t he could not take these "gimmicks"
165ser ious ly . Ben Gurion, fo r  his p a r t ,  f l a t l y  opposed D u lles 's
proposals fo r  drawing permanent boundaries to replace the a rm istice  
, .  166l in e s . ^
As usual, i t  is  a combination o f causes ra ther than a s ing le  cause
tha t can explain the fa i lu r e  o f the American i n i t i a t i v e .  Dulles '
speech was made on 26 August 1955 when Egypt was about to  f in a l i s e
i t s  arms deal w ith  the Soviet Union, and i t  believed th a t  i t s  bargaining
pos it ion  had been strengthened. Thus- the timing was a c ru c ia l fa c to r
behind Egypt's reluctance to  accept the American proposals. Nasser
believed his bargining pos it ion  v is -a -v is  Israel was improving because
o f  the promised Soviet arms deal. I t  was d i f f i c u l t  f o r  Nasser to
s a c r i f ic e  his pos it ion  in the Arab world v is -a -v is  Nuri e l-Sa id  in the
throes o f an Arab cold war. The Arabs had come to look upon Nasser as
a symbol o f  u n ity  and independence. He could not y ie ld  to  American
pressure, and openly accept a reso lu tion  o f fe r in g  less than th a t o f
1 fi7the November 1947 United Nations P a r t i t io n  Resolution. He would
have undermined his image in the Arab world. His pos it ion  had been
strengthened, espec ia lly  a f te r  the Gaza ra id  and the Bandung conference
16ftand Egypt's Arab campaign against the Baghdad Pact and Nuri e l-S a id .
165. Heikal, Cairo Documents, p .66.
166. New York Times, 29 August 1955, "Ben Gurion f i rm  on f r o n t ie r " .
167. The Times, 29 December 1954 ("No peace w ith  Is ra e l " ) .  Salah Salem 
declared "Egypt would not make peace w ith  Israe l even i f  Is rae l 
agreed to  execute the United Nations reso lu tion  on p a r t i t io n  and 
refugees". Nuri e l-Said admitted to Ambassador Gallman th a t over 
95 per cent o f the Iraq i population saw Israe l as the enemy ra ther 
than the USSR. Quoted in Gallmann, Iraq under General N u r i , p .27.
168. NA In te l l ig e nce  Report No.7042, 12 September 1955, Mainspring of 
Egyptian fore ign p o licy .
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Moreover, Nasser's understanding o f  the m enta lity  o f the ord inary Arab 
prevented him from sid ing w ith the United States. He was conscious 
o f  the a t t i tu d e s  o f Arabs towards the American peace i n i t i a t i v e ,  and 
he did not want to undermine his own popu la r ity  and his a b i l i t y  to  whip 
up th e i r  support fo r  h is plans regardiftg Egypt's leadership o f the Arab 
world. The Palestine cause was a taboo subject fo r  most o f the Arab 
leaders who did not dare to handle i t  probably because o f th e i r  fears 
o f adverse reactions from th e i r  people. Most o f them preferred to 
be mere passive spectators, ra the r than experience any setback in th e i r
v
p opu la r ity  and prestige .
The fa i lu r e  o f  the American peace o f fe r  can also be a t t r ib u te d  to
the decline o f American m otiva tion . The American i n i t i a t i v e  was part
o f a comprehensive e f f o r t  to  l im i t  Soviet influence and te s t  Nasser's
claim th a t he wanted to preserve American fr ie n dsh ip . Peace however
desirable was not a goal fo r  i t s  own sake. F in a l ly ,  the unaccep tab il i ty
o f  the i n i t i a t i v e  to both Arabs and Is ra e l is  was a decis ive fa c to r  behind
the fa i lu re  o f  the American o f fe r . .  The United States did not have the
power to  fo rce a so lu t ion  on e i th e r  side and, as Campbell sa id , "Any
169hope o f an agreement between the two seemed qu ite  va in " .
The apparent fa i lu re  did not stop American attempts to reduce the
tension between the two sides. American policy-makers rea lised  th a t
the question o f boundaries was one o f the most de lica te  aspects o f the 
170whole issue, and they began to co-ordinate th e i r  p o lic ie s  w ith the
169. Campbell, Defense o f the Middle East, pp.88-9.
170. In terv iew  w ith  Ambassador H. Byroade,
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171B r i t is h  on th is  issue. A f te r  the Is ra e l i  occupation o f the
d e m il i ta r ise d  zone a t e l-Au ja  in November 1955, Anthony Eden, the
B r i t is h  prime m in is te r ,  suggested tha t the A ra b -Is ra e l i  side must
■ compromise between the borders established by the 1947 P a r t i t io n  plan
and the la rg e r  boundary claimed by the r ig h t  o f conquest by Israel in
172the 1949 a rm is t ice  l in e s .  But these comprehensive proposals could
only succeed i f  the b e ll ig e re n ts  themselves reached an agreement on the 
173whole issue. Nasser reacted p o s i t iv e ly ,  describ ing Eden's proposal
174as a "cons truc t ive  a t t i t u d e " ,  while Israel held the opposite 
175view. In general, though, Eden's speech met w ith  the same reaction 
as Dulles ' speech concerning his peace plan, and fo r  almost the same 
reasons.
Is ra e l 's  negative response to  Eden's proposals led the American
policy-makers to move from the level o f overt diplomacy to  a covert
one on the grounds th a t the CIA could probably help to win greater
co-operation and confidence. I t  seemed a t tha t time th a t Egypt and
espec ia lly  Is rae l f e l t  th a t the CIA met t h e i r  in te re s ts  w ith a
176greater understanding than the State Department. Using the CIA, 
Dulles t r ie d  u n o f f i c ia l l y ,  though in  va in , to  persuade Ben-Gurion
171. NSC Report No.5428, 2 November 1955, p.1.
172. The B r i t is h  may have been motivated by t h e i r  eagerness fo r  American 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  the Baghdad Pact, since the Americans pointed th a t 
t h e i r  "adherence depended upon a re laxa tion  in  the A ra b -Is rae li  
tens ion". See NSC Progress Report on the Near East (5428),
2 November 1955, top secre t, p .2.
173. Meyer, o p , c i t . , p .80.
174. Donald N e ff,  o p . c i t . , pp .115-6.
175. Touval, o p . c i t . , p . 122.
176. A llen Dulles pointed o u t t o  his b ro ther, John Foster Dulles, tha t his 
man "has more in f luence w ith  Ben-Gurion than almost anyone around". 
See Dulles papers, telephone c a l l  se r ie s , Box No.4, 1 September 1955 
t n ?n December 1955, 23 December, telephone c a l l  from A.W. Dulles; 
Copeland'yThe Game o f Nations, o p . c i t . ; in te rv iew  w ith  Ambassador 
Anmaa nusayn, Cairo; in te rv iew  with Kermit Roosevelt; see also 
Touval, o p . c i t . , pp .130-1.
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th a t the only possible settlement is  one along the l in e s  o f the B r i t is h  
177proposal. In other words, the Anglo-American proposals did not 
improve the s i tu a t io n .
Anderson's Mission
Fa ilu re  soon prompted the Americans to  change t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  ta c t ic s
in handling the issue. They moved in two d ire c t io n s .  They decided to
use Egypt's eagerness and Nasser's personal w il l ingness  to  maintain
hegemony over the Arab countries by supporting Egyptian demands in
178l im i t in g  the Baghdad Pact to i t s  present Arab membership. Th is, they
thought, would be a concession to  avoid any Egyptian disagreement w ith  the
American peace e f fo r t s  in  the region. Suddenly, the Americans changed
th e i r  view. They now believed th a t the Egyptian brand o f neutra lism ,
coupled w ith  Egypt's a b i l i t y  to un ite  the forces o f Arab nationalism
against Western influence in the reg ion, did not pose a th rea t to
179American o r ,  fo r  th a t m atter, Western in te re s ts  in  the area.
Furthermore, the Americans began to th in k  th a t e f fo r ts  should be made to
draw Egypt and Iraq together, and attempts should be made to "associate
180the Arab states under Egyptian leadersh ip". By November 1955, the
181Americans renewed th e i r  in te re s t  in  the High Dam p ro je c t .  I t  was
argued in  the United S ta tes .tha t i f  Egypt committed i t s  economic resources
177. DwightD. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  papers o f  John Foster Dulles, telephone 
c a l l  se r ie s ,  Box 4, telephone from Allen Dulles to  John Foster Du lles,
23 December 1955.
178. DwightD. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  papers o f John Foster Dulles, White House 
memo se r ie s , Box 4, fo ld e r ,  meetings w ith the President, 12 January 1956.
179. Meyer, o p . c i t . , p .125.
180. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  in te rn a t io n a l series Box 20, Eden v i s i t ,  
recommended United States' ta lk in g  po in ts , 1 February 1956.
181. Dulles oral h is to ry  c o l le c t io n ,  Eugene Black, p .3.
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to  th is  p ro je c t ,  fo r  example, i t  would be less able to buy additional
arms from the Eastern b loc. “ Egypt's resources are in s u f f ic ie n t  fo r
182both &uns and b u t te r . "  Du lles, a t the ins is tence o f his deputy
Hoover, decided to  jo in  the B r i t is h  and the World Bank in financing the
Dam and l in k  the o f fe r  to the covert attempt at f in d in g  a f in a l  so lu t ion
183to  the A ra b - Is ra e l i “ c o n f l ic t .  Hoover and D ulles, tha t i s ,  t r ie d
184to  buy peace w ith  the Dam, th ink ing  th a t  the l a t t e r  could be used as
an inducement to gain the co-operation o f  Nasser. Their assumption
was th a t by strengthening Nasser's prestige in  the Arab world and helping
him to  consolidate his p o l i t i c a l  power in  Egypt v is -a -v is  his opponents,
they would induce him to  co-operate or at leas t not to  in te r fe re  w ith
United States p o l ic y  in  the area. Dulles, at le a s t ,  ins is ted  on g iv ing
185Nasser a so r t  o f probation period.
Subsequently American hopes were placed on the mission o f Robert
Anderson, a former Secretary o f the Navy and a personal f r ie n d  o f
186President Eisenhower. I t  was the la s t  American opportun ity  to  bring
132. Executive session o f the Senate P.. Committee,..Vol .V I I I  84, Congress 
12 November 195*6, p .618, A llen Dulles.
183.' D.wight D. Eisenhower, papers o f John-Foster.Dulles, telephone c a ll  
series Box No.11, telephone c a l l ,  memo. Secretary - Hoover to 
President, " I  said th a t I was going to  recommend th a t Bob Anderson 
should go to Cairo w ith in  about the next week a f te r  we had cleared 
our own p o s it io n  on the Aswan Dam in order to t r y  our best to a r r iv e  
a t understanding with Nasser"; see also White House o f S ta f f  
Secretary, sub ject, series a lphabetica l CIA volume, February 1955, 
memo, o f  record, 28 November 1955* " _........................
184. In terv iew  w ith  H. Byroade w ith K. Roosevelt, Executive session o f the 
Foreign Committee, Vol VII 84 Congress, Report on the Aswan Dam by 
Hoover, 17 January 1956, p .56.
185. In te rv iew  w ith  H. Byroade, see also HerzogVaacov, John Foster Dulles, 
Oral H is to ry  P ro jec t, p p .15-6.
186. The American leadership gave too much a tte n t io n  to th is  kind of 
peace m ission, and Eisenhower suggested sending his brother M ilton 
instead o f  Bob Anderson. See Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  papers 
o f  John Foster Dulles, telephone c a ll  se r ies , Box No.11, memo, to 
Secretary from Hoover, 28 November 1955.
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about an E gyp tian -Is rae li  agreement before a greater c o n f l i c t  could
erupt over the Suez c r i s is .  In January 1956, eighteen years before
187K iss inger, Anderson shuttled  between Cairo and Tel Aviv. Despite
188the optimism o f Anderson and D ulles, his mission was a f a i lu r e .
Ben-Gurion,the Is ra e l i  prime m in is te r ,  ins is ted  on a face -to -face
meeting w ith Nasser, while the l a t t e r  feared any d ire c t  ta lk s  because
189th is  might lead to his overthrow or assassination. Nasser valued
his l i f e  on the basis o f the experience o f King Abdullah o f Jordan.
Ben-Gurion's determination to have d ire c t  ta lks  w ith Nasser was
190motivated by "his lack o f confidence in Nasser's in te n t io n s " .  And
despite Dulles ' personal assurance to  him in January 1956 th a t "the
maintenance o f  the State o f Israe l in  a l l  essentia ls  is  a d e f in i te  part
191o f our p o l ic y ;  th a t our present ob jec tive  is  to deter Egyptians". 
Ben-Gurion was in tra ns ige n t and American peace e f fo r t s  collapsed.
Whatever the reasons behind the fa i lu r e  o f Anderson's mission and 
the proper assignment o f re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  i t s  f a i l u r e ,  what concerns 
us here is  i t s  impact upon American-Egyptian re la t io n s  from March 1956 
onward. The tu rn in g -p o in t  came in  mid-March when Anderson returned from 
his mission in the Middle East, report ing  d ire c t ly  to  Eisenhower, Hoover
187. Eisenhower Diary Series, Box No,9, Folder 2, D ia ry , 11 January 1956.
188. Barry Rubin, The Arab States and the Palestine C o n f l i c t , p .229.
See also Eisenhower papers in te rna t io na l series", Box No.8, Folder 1, 
Egypt, 27 February 1956, from Eisenhower to  Colonel G. Abdel Nasser, 
27 February 1956.
189. Ben-Gurion, My Talks w ith  Arab Leaders, pp.294-325; Russell Francis, 
Oral H is to ry , p . 16; in te rv iew  w ith Henry Byroade.
190. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower papers, in te rna t io n a l se r ies ,
Box 29, I s ra e l ,  20 February 1956, from acting Secretary o f State,
fo r  the President, 20 February 1956.
191. Dwight D. Eisenhower, papers o f  John Foster Dull ess, telephone 
ca ll  se r ies , Box No.11, memo, o f telephone conversation w ith
White House, 25 January 1956.
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and Allen Dulles. He proposed some highly irregular responses to
Nasser's intransigence considering him "a man who does not react in
the normal sense to pressures by one government against another".
"Nasser's great concern", he added, "is to win popularity with the
Egyptians", and he recommended that the United States "undertake an
economic survey in the- area completely devoid of Israeli or Jordanian
water question, but make it clear we are not depending on his 
192leadership". He also suggested to Eisenhower that the United
States should "give attention to methods of splitting the Saudis away
193from the Egyptians and obtaining closer relations with Libya".
Anderson's recommendations did not go unheeded, and Eisenhower's
administration had to find a new strategy since it was painfully clear
that Arab-Israeli conciliations would not unite the area against the 
194Russians, while Nasser's leadership would not serve American interests
in the area, on the contray it would undermine it. As the administration's
frustration increased personal resentment against Nasser also increased.
Eisenhower thought that "...if we could get Libya and Saudi Arabia
Firmly in our camp...and at the same time we give Israel the necessary
assurances, the possibility of trouble in the region would be greatly
195minimized if not practically eliminated".
192. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, papers of John Foster Dulles, 
telephone call series, Box No.5, telephone call from Allen Dulles,
4 April 1956.
193. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, papers of John Foster Dulles, White 
House, memo, series, Box No.4, meeting with the President, January 
1956 through July 1956; memo, for the Secretary from Hoover, 16 March 
1956, secret; memo, for the Secretary from Hoover, 12 March 1956, 
secret.
194. Steven L. Spiegel, op.cit., pp.68-9.
195. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers as President, Dulles 
series, Box No.5, March 1956, from Eisenhower to Dulles, outgoing 
telegram, 10 March 1956.
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The American leadership began to move towards three political
strategies or aims. It tried very hard to form a competing anti-Nasser/
196Soviet camp under the banner of Saudi Arabia. In seeking to limit
Nasser's influence in the Arab world and to counter his activities in
the area, Secretary Dulles suggested to Eisenhower that the United
States should "encourage the United Kingdom to maintain its present
treaty relationship with Jordan and help to prevent a situation in which
197a pro-Egyptian coup d'etat would succeed". Furthermore, Dulles
Linked that with an increasing American support for the Baghdad Pact,
"without actually adhering to the Pact or announcing our intention of 
198doing so". It was clear that the Eisenhower administration's real
concern was to find a new strategy in the area, aiming to isolate
Egypt "from the rest of the Arab world and with no ally except the
Soviet Union". In Eisenhower's view that might lead her "to join us
199in a search for a decent peace".
196. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Diary series, Box No.9, Folder 1 1955,
28 March 1956, memo, for the Secretary of State, "Near Eastern 
policies", Eisenhower says, "We should begin to build up some other 
individual as a prospective leader of the Arab world. My own choice
for such a role is King Saud". See also NA RG 59, CIA papers, 
personal and private, copy 1 by Allen Dulles, Allen Dulles' 
recommendations.
197. Eisenhower papers, Dulles, Herter series Box No.5, Dulles, March 1956, 
top secret, memo, from Dulles to Eisenhower. See also ibid. , memo, 
top secret, from the Secretary to the President, 28 March” 1956, 
subject, Near Eastern policies.
198. Ibid, memo, top secret, from the Secretary to the President, 28 March 
1956. Ben-Gurion opposed strongly the American participation in the 
Baghdad Pact, see Dulles telephone conversation, telephone call to the 
President, 11 April 1956.
199. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Diary, Box No.9, Folder 
No.1, Diary, 8 March 1956.
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Theoretically, the Eisenhower administration was aiming, according
to Dulles, "to avoid any open break which would throw Nasser irrevocably
into a Soviet satellite status and we would want to leave Nasser a
bridge back to good relation to side with the West if he so d e s i r e d " . ^
But practically Dulles' tought policy could hardly accomplish anything
other than Nasser's alienation. Dulles was determined to show Nasser
how tough he could be for, according to Dulles, Nasser should realise
that "he cannot co-operate as he is doing with the Soviet Union and at
the same time enjoy most-favoured nation treatment from the United 
201States". Dulles decided to co-ordinate his strategy with the United 
Kingdom in order to make a greater impression on Nasser. The item 
high on the list of actions to be taken against Nasser was a co-ordinated 
tactic by Washington and London to "continue to delay the conclusion of 
current negotiations on the High Aswan Dam". Other actions included 
"continued refusal to seel arms to Egypt, delays in granting grains 
and oil to Egypt, and elimination of the financial aid which amounted 
to $40 mi 11 i o n " . ^
Dulles' frustration and Nasser's stubbornness led the former to 
take unusual military and economic measures against Egypt. On the one 
hand from April 1956 onwards, Dulles was most actively and positively 
using his influence to see that Israel solved "its major defense
200. Eisenhower papers as President, Dulles Herter series, Box No.5, 
Folder Dulles March 1956, to the President from the Secretary of 
State, 28 March 1956, subject, Near Eastern policies.
201. Ibid. , Box No.5, Folder Dulles, March 1956, from the Secretary of 
"State to the President, 28 March 1956, subject, Near Eastern
policies.
202. Ibid.
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problems" by putting pressure on Ottawa and Paris to provide Israel 
203with more arms. On the other hand, Dulles, as an international 
lawyer, began to study the legal aspects of imposing an arms embargo
C 4 . 2 0 4on Egypt.
One, however, must look to a combination of causes rather than a
single cause to explain these developments. 0ne~of these was the
fact that the United States sought actively to maintain the military
205balance in Israel's favour, in order to deter Nasser from launching
a war against Israel, especially after his arms deal with the Eastern 
206bloc. In retrospect thought, by maintaining Israeli military 
superiority over the Arab states as a whole, America tried perhaps to 
alter the climate of fear and insecurity in Israel, which the latter had 
always used to justify its preventive attacks against Egypt and other 
Arab countries. The Americans chose therefore to maintain the status 
quo by ensuring the superiority of the Israeli side.
203. Princeton University, J.F. Dulles, Oral History Project, Eban, pp.26-8. 
See Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, telephone call series, 
Box No.4, memo, of telephone call from Mr. Russell, Mr, Cassell. 
Secretary Dulles told Lester Pearson, the Canadian Prime Minister, that 
"we would be glad to see them sell some of the F86s to Israel".
Also see Dulles Oral History, Herzoj Yaocov, p p . 17-8. For US
pressure on France, see Eisenhower papers, international series, Box 8, 
Folder Egypt, White House communication from Goodpaster to Mrs.
Whitman, 11 April 1956. Eisenhower in his diaries, said whether 
French should send to Israel "our position no objection", see 
5 March 1956.
204. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, telephone call series,
Box No.4, folder 3 January to April 1956, Monday, 9 April 1956,
telephone call to Wilkins. *
205. See Executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee, Vol.VIII, 
p.84. Congress second session statement by Admiral Radford,
Chairman of JCS, 27 February 1956. Radford confirmed that "Israel 
equipment is the best in the area".
206. Eisenhower papers, Ann Whitman File NSC, Box No.7/276, the meeting of 
NSC, 10 February 1956, see p.3, Dulles' point of view. See also 
Cabinet series, Box No.6, 2 March 1956, Secretary Dulles, "the 
situation was complicated by the introduction of Soviet armaments 
which in few more months will make Egypt a threat to Israel".
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Even before the failure of Anderson's mission, the United States 
had also tried to undermine the growth of the Egyptian economy, by
207selling its long-staple cotton at competitive prices in foreign markets,
when cotton was Egypt's main export commodity. As a result of this
policy, according to Dr. F awzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, "the loss
in cotton export which Egypt has already suffered due to United States
cotton export subsidy was greater than the $40 million of United States
208
economic aid for Egypt". The Americans calculated that cotton
209exports represented 85 per cent of Egypt's total export earnings.
American cotton policy therefore could have adverse political effects
on United States relations with Egypt. Nevertheless, from February to 
210May 1956, the United States announced its intention "to bring economic
211pressures on Egypt" by flooding the world market with the American 
long-staple cotton regardless of its harmful effect upon Egypt's economy.
The High Dam
The failure of the Anderson mission also had serious implications 
for America's offer to help finance the construction of the Aswan Dam.
In the autumn of 1955, Under-Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., 
had linked the success of Anderson's mission to the Aswan Dam offer, and
207. Dwight D. Eisenhower, US Council on foreign economic policy records, 
1954-1961, policy papers series, Box No.5, folder CFEP 529, US 
policy with respect to disposal of CCC-owned cotton (2), from Hoover 
to Secretary of Agriculture, 19 February 1956.
208. Ibid., State Department position on cotton problem, to the President,
11 August 1955.
209. Ibid.
210. Ibid., from Hoover to Secretary of Agriculture, 1 February 1956, Dulles 
papers, telephone call series, Box No.4, telephone call from Mr.
Anderson, 28 February 1956; Eisenhower papers, confidential file 1953- 
1961 series, Box No.94, trade agriculture cotton, Department of 
Agriculture, office of the Secretary, Washington 14 March 1956, to the 
President; Dulles papers, telephone call series, telephone call from 
Francis Bolton, 10 May 1956.
211. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, papers of John Foster Dull e s , telephone 
call series, Box No.5, folder memo, of telephone conversation, telephone^ 
call.to Ambassador Lodge, 9 May 1956.
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had consequently won the administration's approval for both projects 
2 12on this basis. Although there was no particular link between the
two projects, it was assumed that Nasser would understand that aid for
the High Dam would strengthen his position at home and enable him to
213reach an agreement with Israel,. The Aswan Dam offer was thus
proposed in mid-December^ after obtaining British backing- and World 
214Bank support. Eugene Black, the President of the World Bank,
after two years of study,decided that "this was a good project to carry 
215through". All of this was neat and plausible, but trouble was
p I r
bound to follow if Nasser did not play by the rules.
As soon as the offer was announced in late December 1955, Nasser ,
2 17
objected to the terms despite the agreement of his negotiating team.
The Egyptian side wanted firm assurances of aid for the whole project
and the abandonment of the separate first phase which had been suggested
by the State Department when Congress objected to any long-term 
218commitment. The administration was at that time under a great deal 
of domestic pressure, and Nasser did not make its task any easier. By
February 1956 it began to lose its enthusiasm for the Aswan
212. Interviewswith H. Byroade and K. Roosevelt; see also Spiegel, op.cit., 
pp.67-8; Dulles papers, White House memos, series, Box No.3, Folder 
meeting with President, Department of State, Sec. memo, of conversation 
participants: President, Secretary Humphrey, Dr'.Snyder, Secretary Wilson, 
Secretary Dulles, 8 December 1955; Eisenhower papers, international 
file series, Box No.8, Folder 1, Egypt, memo, for the President, subject, 
status of the United States on the High Aswan Dam by Hoover (no date).
213. Love, o p . c i t . , pp.304-8.
214. Bryson Thomas, American Diplomatic Relations, p . 190.
215. Princeton University, Dulles Oral History Collection, Eugene Black, p.3.
216. Spiegel, o p . c i t ., p.68; Neff, op. c i t . , pp.130-3; Eugene Black, 
jp.cit., p . 12.
217. Department of State Bui 1e tin, 23 January 1956, transcript of 
Secretary Dulles, 11 January, Dulles new conference.
218. Executive session of Foreign Relations Committee, Vol.VIII 1956, report 
on the Aswan Dam, 17 January 1956, pp.48-9; Mr. Hoover to members of 
the Committee, "I do not believe we are - we think it would be good 
business to go ahead with the second phase but we are not committed.
We have no committment of any sort toward phase 2 other than to look at 
it"; see also Dulles Oral History Collection, Henderson, Oral History, 
p.41, "Interview with Ambassador Ahmed Husayn.
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219Project. put the turning-point came in mid-March, when Anderson
returned from his mission to the Middle East empty-handed. The
situation moreover brought complications for the Eisenhower
administration in an election year. Its efforts to achieve peace or a
modus vivendi between Egypt and Israel did not bear fruit. Its attempt
to align the Arab countries against Russia did not succeed either, largely
because of Nasser's resentment and opposition. To some extent, the
administration began to yield to the pro-Baghdad Pact group that argued
that Nasser was being rewarded for his recalcitrance on the Pact and his
220flirtation with Russia. There was also opposition from the group of
"cotton senators" from the South who opposed the Dam because it would
221intensify competition with Egyptian cotton. Finally, there was
pressure from influential pro-Israeli groups who believed that the United
States should withhold aid from Egypt as long as Egypt refused to make 
222peace with Israel. As a result the administration faced mounting
223congressional opposition to the project, while Dulles had only limited 
political influence on Capitol Hill, the Eisenhower was still
219. Thomas, op.cit., p . 190.
220. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, papers of John Foster Dulles, telephone 
call series, Box 12, telephone call to Mr, Phleguin, San Francisco,
15 May 1957, Dulles, our northern allies like Pakistan, etc., complain 
that "we are doing to much for a neutral".
221. Executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee, Vol.VIII, 84 
Congress, "Report on the Aswan Dam", 17 January 1956, p.46. Before 
the failure of Anderson's'mission, Hoover did all he could to 
convince the "cotton senators" that the Egyptians "feel that they 
can get income per acre of about four times in fresh vegetables for 
European markets over what they can get in cotton".
222. Princeton University, Dulles Oral History Project, Abba Eban, 
pp.30-1.
223. Dulles-Herter series, Box No.6, Dulles, 2 September 1956, the Secretary 
to the President, "When I did it, the Congress would certainly have
imposed it on us". Also see Box No.5, Dulles, July 1956, memo, of
state to the President, subject: Limitation on use of mutual
security funds, 16 July 1956.
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recovering from his heart attack and preparing for his second
224presidential campaign.
Historians debated whet her P a s s e r 1 s recognition of the People's
Republic of China in mid-May 1956 cooled Dulles' approach to Egypt, and
further added to Washington's disullusionment with the Egyptian 
225regime. Egypt was the first nation to recognise China since the
226Korean war. The Egyptian leadership offered as an explanation the
possibility of an arms embargo by Britain and the United States, and the
Soviet Union's advice that, in recognising communist China, an alternative
227source for arms could be realised. Privately though, Dulles was not
228shocked because Israel and others had also recognised communist China.
At one of his press conferences, Eisenhower pointed out that "a single
action on the part of another nation does not of itself destroy a
229friendship for that nation".
The Egyptian decision to recognise China, however, was in several 
ways significant for the Eisenhower administration. First, Nasser 
was challenging American efforts to put an end to the arms race in the 
area and to freeze the arms imbalance.. Privately, Dulles suspected
224. Princeton University, J.F. Dulles, Oral History, Black, p . 12.
225. Thomas, op.cit., p. 191; Spiegel, op.cit. , p.69; interview with 
Raymond Hare; also see Nutting, op.cit., p . 140.
226. Princeton University, Dulles papers, Box 113, news conference of 
2 April 1957, No.184.
227. Mohamed Heikal, Nasser the Cairo Documents, p.66; also see Baghdadi, 
Vol.I, p.316. Baghdadi exp1 ain ed the ma in reasons behind Egypt's 
recognition of communist China after the Anglo-Soviet summit 
meeting in London on 26 April. They declared that "the governments 
of the two countries consider that effective measures should be 
undertaken for the prevention of an increase of tension in the 
Middle East area".
228. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles papers, telephone 
call series, Box No.11, 23 May 1956, memo, of telephone conversation 
with Snyder.
229. Eisenhower papers, Ann Whitman file, press conference series,
Box No.4, press conference, 23 May 1956.
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Nasser did that because "the Egyptians do not feel confident that they
230can get arms indefinitely from the Russians". Nasser's recognition
of China, however, undermined American attempts to curb communist bloc
influence in the area which was an essential factor of America's global
cold-war strategy, thus enabling the Soviet Union and China to bypass
American military measures in the Near East. Egypt's recognition of
Peking finally had created an impossible situation for the Eisenhower
administration in Congress, especially vis-a-vis the conservative
231elements, headed by Senator Knowland. Dulles therefore could not
tolerate Nasser's recognition of China and his strategy of interference
in power politics. For him it had been the last straw, and he finally
decided to withdraw the offer of financial assistance for the Aswan Dam.
Before declaring his final decision, Dulles tried very hard to
provoke Egyptian anger when, on 26 June before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Dulles declared, "I do not think that it is possible to build
this Dam without a considerable sacrifice on the part of the Egyptian
people whatever the Soviet offer may be. You will have to displace
lots of people...I do not believe that a project of this magnitude can be
undertaken without its imposing a considerable strain upon the economy
232of the country where it is done". Dulles' statement was an indication
that it was a matter of days before taking a firm stand over the project.
230. Dulles' telephone conversation with Mr. Jackson, 23 May 1956.
231. Interview with Ambassador Ahmad Husayn, Cairo, August 1983.
232. Executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Vol.VIII, 84 Congress, second session 1956, "Statement of 
Secretary Dulles", 26 June 1956.
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One day before that, Secretary Dulles in a press conference gave an 
indication that the situation had been altered completely since the 
offer was made, declaring that "Those would have to be taken into 
account and will be taken into account in my talk with the Egyptian 
ambassador"
Although Nasser accepted without haggling the American conditions
to finance the project and it became clear that there was no longer
any Egyptian obstacle to an agreement, on 19 duly 1956 the Aswan Dam
offer was reversed. Dulles tried very hard to justify the American 
234decision. The State Department statement angered Nasser, and
especially its accompanying slur on Egypt's economy, and hence on her 
235creditworthiness. The emphasis in the administration's statement
on friendship towards the people of Egypt, and the assertion that "The
United States remains deeply interested in the welfare of the Egyptian
people", sounded to Nasser suspiciously like a direct appeal to the
Egyptians to get a new leader who might be better able to deal with the
United S t a t e s . ^
All of this suggests that it was Dulles' personal decision to
237withdraw the Aswan Dam Fund, and that President Eisenhower had been
233. Department of State Bul l e t i n , 30 July 1956, "Transcript of Secretary 
Dulles' news conference", 18 July 1956, p . 185.
234. Department of State Bulletin, July 1956, p . 188, "Aswan High Dam" 
release, 19 July 1956.
235. Nutting, op.cit., p.141.
236. Neff, op.cit.; interview wi th, A1 i-Sabri, Cairo.
237. Adams, Dulles Oral History, pp.23-5; Raymond Hare, Oral History 
Research Office, Columbia University, pp.27-8; interviews with 
R. Hare, H. Byroade and K. Roosevelt; Eugene Black, Dulles 
Oral History Project, p.26.
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238guided by him. Neither the British nor the World Bank, as equal
239partners, had been consulted about this change of American plans.
Eugene Black, the President of the World Bank, was shocked, giving as
his opinion that Dulles "made a mistake in turning down this p r o j e c t " . ^
The abrupt manner with which Dulles revoked the American offer,
however, reflected a new American approach towards Egypt. It marked
the use of the big-stick tactic, designed to punish Nasser for his
refusal to co-operate with the West. In the words of Eugene Black,
"Mr. Dulles felt if he turned down the Aswan Dam project the USSR would
not carry it through and if the Russians did not carry it through that
Nasser would be in a tough spot. Because Aswan Dam was his magnum
o p u s . This was the thing he had promised his people, so if he did not
241achieve it that meant the end of Nasser".
;"The manner of the American withdrawal of aid may be viewed as an
act of political brinkmanship. Frequent reports, especially after
Shepilov's visit to Egypt, convinced Dulles that "Shepilov did not have
242in his pocket any such offer Nasser was expecting". This was
238. Anderson Dillon, Assistant to the President for the NSC, Dulles Oral 
History Project, p.38: "Mr. Dulles* strong voice in the NSC for it and 
the President agreed with him when he recommended it. Also see Adams, 
op.cit. , p.25, "The President said, 'OK if that is your judgment, I 
think we'll have to tell them we're d o n e " 1.
239. AldTich, American Ambassador in London, said "He did not notify anybody 
in advance, in fact it,came as a great shock to the British", see Dulles 
Oral History Project, p . 12; Aldrich, "The Suez Crisis is a Footnote
to History", Foreign A f f a i r s , April 1967, p.541; see also Black, Oral 
History, p.231 Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dulles telephone call 
series, Box 5, folder memo, of telephone conversations, telephone call 
to Allen Dulles, 19 July 1956; Selwyn Lloyd, Suez: a Personal
A c c o u n t , pp.70-1, "Eden said that we had been "informed,' but not 
consulted".
240. Black, o p . c i t ., pp.16 and 21.
241. Ibid., pp.16 and 28.
242. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, papers of John Foster Dulles, Box No.5, 
folder, memo, of telephone call to Allen Dulles, 27 June 1956.
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confirmed by Shepilov's statement, the head of Pravda and subsequently
foreign minister, that the USSR was not considering aid to Egypt for
243construction of the Dam. Dulles therefore believed in Egypt's
readiness to accept the American proposals on the original terms and
244withdraw its own counter-proposals.
“ Dulles was aware of the large Soviet expenditures to quell growing
unrest in Eastern Europe. He also knew the probable cost of the Aswan
Dam project, and apparently was sceptical of the Soviet Union's financial
245capacity during that time to grant a loan of that magnitude. Apart
from the damage it would inflict on Nasser, Dulles' withdrawal of the
American offer would thus had the added effect of placing the Soviet
Union in a high embarrassing position. Dulles assumed that "If the
Russians say no this will undermine their prestige - all over the world,
246particularly in the Arab world". A positive Russian reply to 
Nasser's request on the other hand, Dulles thought would provoke the 
anger of the Soviet satellite countries which could be intensified 
through American propaganda within the satellite bloc with the theme
247that "You don't get bread because you are being squeezed to build a dam".
243. Congressional Record, Senate, 21 August 1957, p.14072, Mr. Knowland's 
statement; see also Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p.64.
244. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, John T o s t e r  Du11es papers, White House,
memos. Box No.4, meeting with the President, 13 July 1956, p.3.
245. Moyer, op.cit. , p . 143; interview with Ahmad Hamrush, Cairo.
246. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Jackson papers (Assistant to the
President), Box 56, folder, time inc. file log 1956, 20 July 1956, 
lunch in Washington with Dulles.
247. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles papers, telephone 
call series, Box No.5, 19 July 1956, telephone call to Allen Dulles. 
Dulles tried to exploit the atmosphere that followed Khruschev's 
February anti-Stalinist speech; certain "revisionist" tendencies 
began to appear in Eastern Europe, and led the Soviets to crush 
them later in October-November 1956.
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Dulles' miscalculation was thus responsible for his decision to withdraw
the American offer. On 26 July 1956, seven days after Dulles' decision,
248Nasser reacted to "the slap in the face received from the West", by
nationalising the Suez Canal Company, the revenue from which would
henceforth be used to construct the High Dam.
The prospects of peace were now remote and sTTm. One hundred days
after Dulles' decision to withdraw the funds, and eight days before the
presidential election in America - 29 October - the Israelis attacked
Egypt, and that put an end to Dulles' attempt to achieve peace, or at
least a modus vivendi between the two sides. American hopes for Egypt
to become the first Arab state to make peace with Israel had been dashed.
The American failure to achieve peace dmonstrated new realities,
namely, that the success or failure of a global power's policy sometimes
would hinge on the attitudes and decisions of regional powers or even
regional leaders. The lesson to be drawn from this whole affair was
that Nasser's images and his ambitions as a regional leader conflicted
with the United States' responsibility as a global power to maintain and
secure its own interests. The Eisenhower administration had intended
to contain Nasser's influence and not to bolster him into a major Third
World leader. In the end peace, however desirable, was not a goal on
its own merits. According to Dulles, at least, United States' objectives
in the area were to accomplish the dual purpose of "preserving the State
of Israel" and at the same time keeping good relations with the Arab oil- 
249
bearing countries , a near impossible task.
248. Interview with Ali Sa b r i , Cairo.
249. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles papers, Box No.4, 
folder, meeting with the President, memo, of conversation with the 
President, 2 March 1956.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUEZ CRISIS
Nasser increased his popularity with and cemented his leadership
of the Egyptian people when he made a speech on 26 July 1956 announcing
the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Anthony Eden heard of
Nasser's move in the middle of a dinner at Downing Street given in
honour of King Faisal of Iraq and his prime minister, Nuri Es-Said.
Eden immediately summoned his senior ministers, the chiefs of staff of'
the armed forces, and the Ambassadors of France and the United States.
The American ambassador, Winthrop Aldrich, was on holiday, and his
place was taken by his charge d'affaires, Andrew Foster. The
emergency meeting lasted for two hours, and at five o'clock that Friday
morning Foster sent his report to Washington: "Cabinet takes an
extremely grave view of situation and very strong feelings were
expressed, especially by Eden, that Nasser must not be allowed to get
away with it...The question confronting cabinet tonight was of course
extent to which US would go in supporting and participating in firm
position vis-a-vis Nasser in terms of economic sanctions and beyond
2
that if necessary military action".
The Americans' key NATO allies, Britain and France, considered the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company unacceptable. At that time 
nearly 25 per cent of Britain's imports passed through the Canal; one-
1. Mohamed Heikal, Cairo Documents, op.cit., p.97; Eden, Full Circle, 
op.cit., pp.423-3~
2. Foster, cable to the State Department. Foster's cable is among 
President Eisenhower's papers at Gettysburg, quoted in Kennet Love, 
Suez: The Twice-fought W a r , op.cit., pp.354-5.
254
th i r d  o f the to ta l  t r a f f i c  through the Canal was B r i t is h - re g is te re d ,
and by fa r  the most important consideration was th a t a large percentage
o f the country 's  o i l  requirements depended on the Canal. Without
the presence o f B r i t is h  troops in  the Canal Zone, n a t io n a l isa t io n
4
seemed to  put B r i t is h  in te res ts  a t the mercy o f Egypt. So sh o r t ly  
a fte rw ards, Anthony Eden to ld  Parliament, "No arrangement fo r  the 
fu tu re  use o f th is  great in te rn a t io n a l waterway can be acceptable to  the 
B r i t is h  Government which would leave i t  in the unfettered contro l o f  
a s ing le  power which could e x p lo i t  i t  purely f o r  purposes o f national 
p o l icy "
The Canal was also a v i ta l  economic fa c to r  f o r  the French, 
e sp ec ia lly  since there were some 70,000 French share-holders in  the 
Canal Company. But even more important than the economic im p lica t ions  
created by th is  move, French leaders, p a r t ic u la r ly  the m i l i t a r y ,  f e l t  
great enmity towards Nasser because o f his support fo r  the Algerian 
rebels. Nasser's un fr iend ly  actions were making i t  much more d i f f i c u l t  
f o r  the French to suppress the A lgerian re v o lt  tha t was s te a d ily  d ra in ing  
away t h e i r  resources. Indeed, France was even more ardently  committed 
than B r i ta in  to  a showdown w ith  Nasser, and from the outset o f the 
c r is is  the French leadership considered a l l  the possible means to achieve 
t h e i r  aims.^
3. Eden, Full C irc le ,  o p . c i t . ,  pp.426 and 429; Meyer, o p . c i t . ,  p . 153. 
Thomas, The Suez A f f a i r ,  o p . c i t . ;  A rthur K. Marmor, A ir  Operations in 
Suez Inc ident 1956, pp.3-4. See also RG 218 CCS-092 Egypt, note by 
the Secretary o f Defence to dCS, 31 duly 1956.
4. Eden, Full C i r c le , o p . c i t . , pp.465-6.
5. RG 218, “A po’s t-ana lys is  o f  the c r is is  in  the Suez Canal Zone", USAEF
AIR In te l l ig e n ce  Summary, May 1957, p .21 s.
6 . Marmor, o p . c i t . , p .4.
7. Ambassador D i l lo n 's  report to  Eisenhower; Eisenhower, Waging Peace,
p .36. See also Roy F u lH ck , Suez: the Double War, o p . c i t . ,  p.V4;
N e ff,  Warriors a t Suez, o p . c i t . ,  p .282.
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Both B r i ta in  and France were thus determined th a t Nasser's challenge 
could not go unanswered. As Eden pointed out to  Eisenhower on 31 July 
1956, "My colleagues and I are convinced tha t we must be ready in the 
la s t  reso rt to  use force to  bring Nasser to  his senses. For our p a r t ,  
we are prepared to  do so. I have th is  morning ins truc ted  our Chief o f
o
S ta f f  to  prepare a m i l i t a r y  plan accord ing ly".
The French Foreign M in is te r ,  C hris tian  Pineau, p u b l ic ly  stated
tha t France would not accept the u n i la te ra l  action o f Colonel Nasser.
Prime M in is te r Guy M o lle t went even fu r th e r ,  and ca lled  Nasser an
"apprentice d ic t a to r " ,  whose methods were s im ila r  to H i t l e r ' s :  "The
p o lic y  o f blackmail a l te rn a t in g  w ith  f la g ra n t  v io la t io n s  o f in te rna t ion a l
agreements". He announced th a t  France had decided upon "an energetic
g
and severe co u n te rs tr ike " .  The leaders o f B r i ta in  and France were
sp o il ing  fo r  a f i g h t .  So they made arrangements w ith  each other to
10co-ordinate plans fo r  a united m i l i t a r y  response.
Three important fac to rs  now stood between the determ ination o f the 
leaders o f B r i ta in  and France to  go to war and i t s  speedy re a l is a t io n .
11The f i r s t  was th a t a m i l i t a r y  in te rven tion  would take time to  prepare.
The second, according to Murphy, the American d ip lomat, was the impact 
th is  move would have on America. Eden hoped th a t i f  B r i ta in  and 
France resorted to  force to  s e t t le  th e i r  dispute w ith  Egypt, the US
8 . Eden, Full C i r c le , o p . c i t . , p .428. See also Dwight D. Eisenhower 
L ib ra ry ,"John Foster Dulles papers, subject se r ie s ,  a lphabetica l 
se r ia l Box No.11, UK to  the White House, 31 Ju ly  1956, Eden message 
to Eisenhower.
9. N eff, o p . c i t . , p .280.
10. Robertson, C r is is :  The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy, p .76.
11. N eff, o p . c i t . ,  pp .288-9; also Marmor, o p . c i t . ,  pp.7Fj Andre 
Beaufre, The Suez Expedition.
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would provide a nuclear umbrella to counter the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f a
12Soviet nuclear th re a t.  T h ird ly ,  t h e i r  dependence on Middle East
o i l  required them to ensure tha t the Americans would provide a lte rn a t iv e
. . .  o 13supplies in  case o f  an emergency.
I f  the ro le  o f the United States was o f p ivo ta l importance to
B r i ta in  and France, i t  was to prove no less c ru c ia l  to  the in te res ts  of
Egypt, t h e i r  common antagonist. In order to understand the American ro le
and i t s  impact upon American-Egyptian re la t io n s ,  i t  is  necessary to
id e n t i f y  some o f the p r inc ipa l fac to rs  th a t American policy-makers
took in to  consideration.
From the legal po in t o f view, President Eisenhower rea lised tha t
the n a t io n a l isa t io n  o f the Suez Canal Company was "w ith in  Egypt's
14r ig h t  u n t i l  i t s  operation of the Canal was proven incompetent",
because, in  h is  view, the Suez Canal Company was a commercial 
15corpora tion. He opposed the use o f fo rce from the beginning, and
15emphasised th is  stand to Eden. Four days a f te r  the n a t io n a l isa t io n
12. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p .465.
13. Eden, Full C i r c le , o p ^ c i t . ,  p~.427. In Eden's telegram to Eisenhower 
on 27 Ju ly  he sa id , " I f  the Canal were closed we should have to ask 
you to  help us by reducing the amount which you draw from the
p ip e ! in e . . .and possib ly by sending us supplementary supplies fo r  a 
time from your side o f the world".
14. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower D iary, Box No.16, conversation 
w ith  the President, 28 Ju ly 1956. Also see in te rv iew  with Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, Dulles Oral H is tory P ro je c t,  pp .30-1. See also Eisenhower 
papers, Ann Whiteman f i l e ,  personal, 2 November 1956, Eisenhower, "No 
one can question the legal r ig h t  o f Egypt to na tiona lize  the Canal 
Company".
15. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Oral H is to ry , in te rv iew  with General 
Goodpaster, V o l .2, p .82.
16. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  John Foster Dulles papers, subject 
se r ie s , a lphabetical Box No.11, Uk the White House, 31 July 1956, 
Eisenhower to Eden, "Early th is  morning I received the message 
t e l l i n g  me o f  your decision to employ force w ithout delay. I 
personally  fee l sure th a t the American reaction would be severe, and 
th a t  the great areas o f  the world would share th a t reac tion " .
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o f  the Canal Company, Dulles restated th is  pos it io n  in  a top secret
in s t ru c t io n  to  the American envoy in London, Robert Murphy, the Deputy
Under-Secretary o f S ta te, by saying, "We make no commitments fo r  the
use o f fo rce w ithout Congressional ac t ion , which is  extremely
17problematical under e x is t in g  cond it ions".
Events moved ra p id ly .  Alerted by news from London and Paris ,
President Eisenhower began to th ink  o f despatching his close personal
f r ie n d  Robert Anderson on another peace mission to  Cairo, to  f in d  a
formula whereby to avert any Anglo-French m i l i t a r y  action  against 
18Egypt. Whether he sent Anderson or not on th is  m ission, i t  seems 
c lear th a t the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  was keen to  prevent any 
outbreak o f h o s t i l i t i e s .  This can be a t t r ib u te d  to  a combination of 
causes.
Eisenhower did not wish his record o f peaceful fo re ign  po licy  to
be marred, espec ia l ly  before or during the re -e le c t io n  campaign in
which he was seeking to  gain Republican control o f  both Houses of 
19Congress. A lso, the Republican adm in is tra tion  was aware th a t i f  i t
ca lled a special session o f congress to debate the idea o f supporting
Anglo-French m i l i t a r y  against Egypt, i t  would be seen as an e f fo r t  to
back French co lon ia lism  in  North A fr ica  and elsewhere, and the Democrats
20would make p o l i t i c a l  cap ita l out of i t .  Furthermore, Eisenhower was
17. Eisenhower papers, Dulles-Herter se r ies , Box No.5, fo ld e r  July 1956, 
Department o f State to American embassy, London, eyes only Murphy, 
from Secretary, 30 July 1956, top secret.
18. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower Diary Box No.16, July 1956, 
telephone c a l l s ,  28 Ju ly 1956.
19. In s tress ing Eisenhower's dedication to  peace, the Republican p latform 
exp lo ited  the fa c t  tha t the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  had been credited 
w ith ending the Korean war: see Meyer, o p . c i t . , p . 153; Spiegel, op.
c i t . ,  p .72; in te rv iew  with R. Hare, Washington, D.C.
20. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , John Foster Dulles papers, telephone 
c a l l  se r ie s ,  Box No.11, memo, o f telephone conversation with 
President, 30 Ju ly 1956.
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aware th a t American public  opin ion was not "prepared to  support such 
21a move".
A c lose ly - re la te d  fa c to r  was the American leadersh ip 's  desire to
keep the Anglo-French/Egyptian dispute over Suez sharply separated
from the A rab -Is rae li  c o n f l i c t .  Fears th a t B r i ta in  and France would
f in d  a w i l l in g  partner in Is rae l fo r  a m i l i t a r y  so lu t ion  to th e i r  problem
22increased the adm in is tra t ion 's  p re -e lec t ion  a nx ie t ies . Added to  
th a t was the a t t i tu d e  o f Dulles who was hoping to win over Nasser, 
who he saw as the only Arab leader capable to resolv ing the A rab -Is rae l i  
c o n f l i c t .
Apart from the above reasons, the American leadership understood
th a t the in te res ts  o f the US were not g re a t ly  a ffected by Egypt's
dec is ion , as long as the Suez Canal continued to fu n c t io n . United
States shipping comprised only 3.1 per cent o f the to ta l  shipping
through the Canal. Moreover, the United States government had no
f in a n c ia l  in te res ts  in  the Suez Canal Company, whereas i t  had considerable
23economic, p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  in te res ts  in  the Middle East".
Another fa c to r  in f luenc ing  the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  was th a t
most West European countries were dependent on Middle East o i l ,  while
the Arab countr ies , espec ia lly  Saudi Arabia and Ira q , depended on the
24goods and services tha t they received in exchange. While these
21. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Dulles-Herter se r ies , Box No.6 , Du lles,
September 1956, d ra f t  l e t t e r  to Eden, 8  September 1956: Eisenhower
to Eden, " I  must say f ra n k ly  there is  as yet no pub lic  opinion in  
th is  country which is  prepared to support such a move".
22. N eff, o p . c i t . ,  p .288. Also Meyer, o p . c i t . ,  p .159; Dulles Oral 
H istory C o l le c t io n , Phleger Herman "Oral H is to ry , p .48.
23. NA RG 218 CCS-092 Egypt, note by Secretary to JCS, 31 Ju ly 1956, 
pp.306-20, inc lud ing JC-2105/38.
24. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  WHO o f f ic e  o f the Special Ass is tan t fo r  
NSC a f fa i r s  (OSANSC), records No.52-61, NSC b r ie f in g  notes, sub series 
Box No.14, fo ld e r  Near and Middle East O i l ,  56-60, p re lim ina ry  papers, 
Middle East o i l  s i tu a t io n ,  Economic Ingelligence 19-20, Committee's
ad hoc working group on Middle East o i l ,  3 May 1956.
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re la t io n s  were b i la te r a l ,  they were none the less asymmetrical. The
European coun tr ies , espec ia lly  the United Kingdom and France, were
g re a t ly  in  need o f o i l  from the Arab coun tr ies , whereas these countries
were less dependent on the goods from them.
Events before the Suez c r is is  had confirmed th is  as an e x is t in g
25r e a l i t y  tha t the American leadership re a d i ly  understood. The new
s itu a t io n  facing Eisenhower's adm in is tra tion  was indeed a cause fo r  worry.
The l ik e l ih o o d  o f an Arab o i l  embargo was hard to assess, but fo r  a
v a r ie ty  o f  reasons the impact o f such an action would have been
detr im enta l; Eisenhower was well aware o f the heavy dependence o f his
a l l ie s  on the Canal, espec ia lly  o f t h e i r  need to  receive t h e i r  o i l
through i t .  "The economy o f the European countries would collapse i f
26those o i l  supplies were cut o f f . "  In a meeting w ith  h is  top advisers,
Eisenhower re ite ra te d  the same a t t i tu d e  because in  his view, " I f  the
movement o f o i l  were in te r fe re d  w ith or the p ipe lines were cut we would be
27faced with a c r i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n " .
25. Crude Oil Supply o f Western Europe by Source and Country 1954
(thousands o f b a rre ls  per day)
Country Local Imports from Others Total
Production Middle East Supply
Belgium - 75 4 79
France 10 449 29 488
UK 1 490 48 539
W. Germany 52 105 15 172
I ta ly  2 305 13 320
Netherlands 18 161 32 211
Ib id . , OASNSC, p .3, Table 5.
26. Eisenhower D iary, quoted in  Neff, o p . c i t . , p .282. See also Eisenhower 
papers, Du lles-H erte r se r ies , Box No.5, from Eisenhower to Eden,
31 August 1956.
27. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, Diary se r ies ,
Box No.16, fo ld e r  Ju ly  1956, Diary, State memo.27 Ju ly 1956, memo, 
o f conversation w ith  President.
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Another external fa c to r  which motivated the American leadership
was the fear o f  the adverse e f fe c t  an American m i l i t a r y  involvement
might have on world pub lic  op in ion , espec ia lly  w ith in  the Arab world
28and among Muslim nations. I t  could appear th a t the Western powers
were ganging up on a small nation l ik e  Egypt/ By the same token,
the American leadership queried whether such action would not in  fa c t
enhance Nasser's p res tige  as the martyr o f strong-arm 'C o lo n ia l is t
methods, ra ther than weaken his charismatic appeal, which B r i ta in  and
France were aiming to  do?**
Furthermore, i t  was c lea r to the Americans th a t only the Soviet
Union stood to  gain from the bad image o f the US th is  could fo s te r .
Subsequently the American j o i n t  chie fs o f s t a f f  in  t h e i r  assessment
thought th a t " I t  would be harmful to  US and Western in te re s ts  i f  the
Middle East became more c lose ly  a f f i l i a t e d  with the communist bloc or
30more f i rm ly  n e u t ra l is t " .  Apart from th a t ,  the CIA warned th a t a
reso rt to force by B r i ta in  and France in "the Suez c r i s is  would re s u lt
31in increased Soviet pressure on I ra n " ,  which no doubt would adversely 
a f fe c t  the American s tra tegy o f containing Soviet penetra tion  in  the 
Middle East.
Nasser's a l l ia n ce  w ith Saudi Arabia (against the Iraq-Jordan 
Hashemite bloc) was one o f the most important elements which motivated
28. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, Diary se r ies ,
Box No. 16, s t a f f  memb_, fo ld e r  memo, o f conversation*w ith President,
3T July 1956.'
29. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, Dulles-Herter se r ies , 
Box No.6, Dulles September 1956, d ra f t  l e t t e r  to  Anthony Eden: 
Eisenhower, "The use o f m i l i t a r y  force against Egypt under present 
circumstances might have consequences even more serious than causing 
the Arabs to  support Nasser".
30. NA RG 218 CCS-092 Egypt JSC 2105/38, 31 Ju ly 1956, pp.306-20, 
inc lud ing No.D.
31. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower papers, Ann Whitman f i l e ,  Box No.8, 
NSC 297, meeting o f the NSC, 7 Septebmer 1956, CIA Report.
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American p o l ic y  during the c r i s i s .  Admiral Radford, Chairman o f the
Jo in t  Chiefs o f S ta f f ,  to ld  the National Secunity Council th a t they
were "very g re a t ly  concerned to be assured o f  continued access to Saudi 
32Arabian o i l " .  The policy-makers rea lised  th a t  any American i n i t i a t i v e  
during the c r i s is  not acceptable to the Egyptian government would not 
/ f in d  i t  any more to  th e ~ lik in g  of the Saudis, because o f th e i r  commitment 
to  a p a t r io t ic  pan-Arab philsophy. A lso, there was the consideration 
o f S au d i-B r i t ish  animosity over the Buraimi and Baghdad Pact .
The B r i t is h  and French had no i l lu s io n s  concerning the personal 
misgivings o f  Dulles about Nasser. In the recen t ly  d ec la ss if ied  minutes 
o f a meeting held w ith  Congressional leaders in  mid-August, Dulles 
compared Nasser to  H i t le r ,  saying th a t "A f te r  a l l  our e f fo r ts  to work 
w ith  him, f i n a l l y  we have become convinced he is  an extremely dangerous 
fa n a t ic "
Although by now Dulles a ffected an anti-Nasser a t t i tu d e ,  Eden and 
M olle t could not understand th a t there was s t i l l  a s l ig h t  d if fe rence 
between his p o lic y  and th e i r s .  In sp ite  o f being scandalised by what 
he saw as Egypt's in ten t io ns  regarding the r ig h ts  o f property and the 
func tion  o f  in te rn a t io n a l legal arrangements, Dulles believed th a t  "Nasser
34must be made to disgorge th is  th e f t  by in te rna t io n a l means...not by fo rc e " .  
Eden and M o lle t 's  eagerness fo r  war blinded them to the fa c t  tha t the 
d if fe rence  between th e i r  po licy  and th a t o f Dulles lay  in  methods, not
32. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  o p . c i t . , NSC fo ld e r  295, the meeting of 
NSC, 30 August 1956, the Suez Canal s i tu a t io n ,  p .7 (JCS). ARAMCO 
(the Arabian American Oil Company) in  Saudi Arabia was t o ta l l y  
American-owned. See also RG 218, CSS-092, Egypt, 31 July 1956,
note by the Secretary to  JCS.
33. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  White House o f f ic e  o f  the S ta f f  Sec, 
records 1952-1961 , le g is la t iv e  meetings se r ie s , Box No.3, L.31a(2),
12 August 1956, p .34, b ipa rt isan  meeting (Minich se r ie s ) .
34. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Diary se r ie s ,  Box No.16, July 1956, 
Diary s t a f f  memos, fo ld e rs ,  memo, o f conversation w ith  President,
31 Ju ly 1956.
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35in  t h e i r  u lt im a te  goal. In view o f these circumstances and Dulles ' 
a t t i tu d e  towards Nasser, there is  l i t t l e  wonder th a t  Eden and Mol l e t  
were confused. The ir f r u s t r a t io n ,  together w ith  D u lles ' ta c t ic s  and 
controvers ia l statements, led them to assume th a t  the United States 
would to le ra te  m i l i t a r y  in te rven tio n  i f  diplomacy f a i le d .  The question 
i s ,  Why was tire American stance in the midst of- th is  d ispute so 
ambiguous? The ambiguity o f  the American p o s it io n  allowed those who 
had opted fo r  American support to -nu rtu re  fa lse  hopes. Herman Finer 
gives two reasons fo r  th is .  F i r s t l y ,  fo r  Du lles, the main issue was 
the a t t i tu d e  o f h is adversary, the Soviet Union, in global c o n f l i c t .  
Therefore he d id not t e l l  h is a l l ie s  tha t the USA would keep i t s  hands 
away from the Middle East while  they were preparing fo r  t h e i r  en te rp r ise . 
He feared the growth o f Soviet strength in th is  area o f the world as a 
consequence o f fo rce fu l action taken by the a l l i e s .  He would look at 
the problem merely as one o f B r i t is h  and French nationa l in te re s ts  in the 
Middle East. Secondly, in  i t s  fo re ign  po licy  the United States had 
always shown a marked reluctance to  take a dec is ive  stand, supported by 
fo rce , except in  extreme cases, such as Pearl Harbour. Usually in  times 
o f c o n f l i c t  she has tended to seek a middle course.
35. N u tt ing , Nasser, p . 147.
36. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Diary se r ie s ,  Box No.17, August 1956, 
Diary s ta f f  memos., White House memo, o f record, sub jec t: Suez Canal
s i tu a t io n ,  P res identia l meeting, 12 August 1956. In a P residentia l 
meeting before the f i r s t  London conference, Secretary D ulles, " fee ls  
th a t we must not lead the B r i t is h  and the French to believe th a t we 
are w i l l in g  to  support any kind o f p rec ip itous  action  they may take. 
As a re s u l t  he believes th a t we must ind ica te  t h a t . . . i f  the London 
conference does present a proposal to Nasser and he re je c ts  i t ,  and 
the B r i t is h  and the French fee l tha t i t  is  necessary to  act in  order 
to  p ro tec t th e i r  in te re s ts ,  i t  would seem to  be c le a r  tha t the US 
should give them moral and economic support" . See also Eden, FuTl
C i r c le , o p .c i t ., p .437.
37. F ine r, Dulles over Suez, p p .112-3.
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The American policy-makers did not consider the matter closed.
In order to  achieve t h e i r  goals, they embarked on a three-pronged
s tra tegy . They t r ie d  to use the Arab o i l  countries as a lever against
Nasser, on the ground th a t " . . . i f  Nasser goes too f a r ,  i t  w i l l  cut o f f
38th e i r  income and Nasser w i l l  begin to lose his p o s i t io n " .  At the
— 39same time they began to  reconsider t h e i r  economic a id to Egypt.
Simultaneously Dulles decided to  bring the issue before a spec ia l ly
created in te rn a t io n a l forum, where B r i ta in ,  France and Egypt could
perhaps be persuaded to  accept some form o f compromise. Nevertheless,
Dulles in s is te d  from the very beginning on -fiBiTipennng down any appeals
to the United Nations over the Suez c r i s is .  In h is meeting w ith  the
B r i t is h  and French fo re ign  m in is te rs ,  he did his best to convince them
to omit any re fe r ra l  to  the UN from th e i r  own d ra f ts  o f the t r i p a r t i t e
communique before the documents were f i n a l l y  accepted fo r  p ub l ica t io n .
He s trong ly  pressed the po int th a t  he would not to le ra te  any mention o f
the United Nations, because the in e v i ta b le  Soviet veto would, from the
40Western po in t o f view, make any des irab le  settlement impossible.
On 2 August, the French, B r i t is h  and American communique was issued, 
deploring the d is ru p t ive  nature o f Egypt's ac t io n , and drawing a t te n t io n  
to  the "freedom and secu r ity  o f the Canal1 according to  the 1888 
Convention. In s is t in g  th a t the "operating arrangements under the 
in te rn a t io n a l system" should be re -es tab lishe d , Dulles jo ined his a l l i e s  
in  convoking an in te rna t io na l conference o f the "nations only concerned
38. Dwight D. Eisenhower, White House o f f ic e  o f the S ta f f  Sec., research 
1952-61, le g is la t iv e  meetings se r ie s ,  Box No.3 L31a, August, b i ­
partisan  meeting, M in ich jp .3 . For more d e ta i ls ,  see Eve!and, Ropes 
o f  Sand, pp.202-9. '
39. M in iCh,Series. In b i-p a r t isa n  meeting, Secretary Dulles declared tha t 
"No heavy payment due"Egypt*unti1 next year".
40. Princeton U n ive rs ity ,  J.F . Dulles paper, Box 110, Suez Canal, pre­
conference, 31 Ju ly-9 August 1956, top secre t,  p .4. See also F iner, 
o p . c i t . , p p .136-7.
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41with use o f the Canal", to take the appropriate a c t io n . The po lic ies
orchestrated by Eisenhower and Dulles re f lec ted  the American dilemma
v is -a -v is  i t s  global re p o n s ib i l i t y .  Dulles was t ry in g  very hard to
achieve a va r ie ty  o f  goals, some o f them co n trad ic to ry . On the one
hand he attempted to  show his w il l ingness to a l l y  the USA w ith B r i ta in
and France, despite the real d if fe rence  between them. On the o th e r
hand, he t r ie d  to show a ce rta in  respect fo r  Nasser's sovereignty and,
while making some threatening gestures, did nothing openly th a t might
push Nasser and the Arab countries completely in to  the Eastern bloc.
Nasser understood th a t fo r  Dulles the p r inc ip a l legal question was
Egypt's a b i l i t y  and w il l ingness  to maintain free passage through the
42Canal, as guaranteed by the 1888 Convention. On 31 J u ly ,  Nasser
announced th a t normal trade would go on w ith B r i ta in  unless outside
in te rven tion  -occured. He fu r th e r  stated tha t the freedom o f navigation
in the Canal would not be a ffected by n a t io n a l is a t io n ,  confirming tha t
"Egypt had always p h ys ica l ly  protected the Canal and would continue to 
43do so". Three days la te r  A l i  S ab r i, Chief o f the Egyptian President's
o f f i c e ,  restated th is  p o s it io n ,  confirming th a t the n a t io n a l isa t io n
did not in any way or to  any extent a f fe c t  the in te rn a t io n a l commitments
o f Egypt. "We are as ever determined to honour a l l  our in te rn a t io n a l
44obi igations."
4 1 - ' Dept, of State‘publication .“The Suez Canal Problem", 26 Ju ly -
2 2 September 1956, pp .3 /-4^.
42. Princeton U n ive rs ity ,  John Foster Dulles paper, Box No.120, 
secret from Dulles to Nasser, p .2, 19 March 1957.
43. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, o p . c i t . , p .41.
44. RIIA Documents (1956), p . 156, quoted in F iner, o p . c i t . , p . 124.
See also the Times, 4 August 1956.
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Even before Dulles ' re tu rn  from London, Egypt had attempted to
block Western e f fo r ts  to  impose in te rna tio na l contro l upon the Suez
Canal Company. The Egyptian government undertook three p o l i t i c a l
i n i t i a t i v e s .  F i r s t l y ,  i t  t r ie d  to  e n l is t  Arab support in order to
consolidate i t s  p o s it io n . On 1 August 1956, Nasser declared tha t
Arab nationalism was s trong ly  entrenched from the Persian Gulf to  the
A t la n t ic .  He added th a t ,  "the Arabs represented a strong group which
45would march forward". Even Nuri es-Said, Nasser's adversary, f e l t
constrained to support Egypt, declaring tha t "N a tiona lisa t ion  has become
the undoubted r ig h t  o f any n a t io n " ,  and tha t " Iraq  stands on Egypt's
46side in the dispute over the Suez issue". Day a f te r  day the Arab
nations and the A fr ican and Asian countries proclaimed t h e i r  support
o f Nasser, and his image and po s it io n  in  the struggle against the Western
47powers was s u b s ta n t ia l ly  strengthened. In terms o f Cold War p o l i t i c s ,
Egyptian pressure on the United States was maintained by the many
48conferences between Nasser and the Soviet ambassador in Cairo. The 
Egyptian-Soviet contacts were espec ia lly  d is tu rb ing  to  Dulles, since
49they could have enhanced Soviet p res tige  in the Third World a t  th a t  time.
Nevertheless Nasser did not exclude the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  n e u tra l is in g  the
United States and separating i t  from i t s  Western a l l i e s ,  by pra is ing  the
50"moderation" o f the United States government. Nasser seemed qu ite
45. The Times, 1 August 1956, "Colonel Nasser's P iracy".
46. The Times', 6 August 1956, "Baghdad Support fo r  Egypt".
47. The Times, 1r7..August 1956. See also F iner, o p . c i t . , p. 124.
48. The. Times, 6 August 1956, "Consultation in Cairo: Nasser has
seen” the Soviet Ambassador.-Kisselve three times in three days".
49. F iner, o p . c i t . , p . 125. See also in te rv iew  w ith  H. Byroade.
50. F iner, o p . c i t . ,  p . 125.
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adept in  handling the s i tu a t io n .  On 6 August he stated th a t he
intended to  devote a large share o f the revenues from the Canal to
modernising and widening i t ,  to make possible the passage o f large 
51o i l  tankers, thus g iv ing the Western powers no excuse to use force 
against Egypt.
The F i r s t  London Conference: 16-23 August
The f i r s t  London conference was convened on 16 August w ith the
declared purpose o f fos te r ing  an agreement between the major users
o f the Suez Canal to a system o f in te rna t io n a l contro l th a t would
52withstand the p o l t ic a l  pressures o f  s ing le  nations. Twenty-two
nations were in attendance: the top sixteen users o f  the Suez Canal
and the o r ig in a l  s igna tories to the Convention o f  Constantinople which
53guaranteed free access fo r  a l l  shipping to the Canal.
For the United States, th is  conference appeared to o f fe r  a chance
o f in te rn a t io n a l is in g  the Suez Canal problem, as well as l im i t in g  the
scope fo r  independent action by i t s  a l l ie s  against Egypt. Besides
gaining time fo r  the American a d m in is tra t ion , i t  led to the formation
o f a group o f nations whose common in te res ts  strengthened the pressure
54brought to bear on Nasser.
51. The Times, 7 August 1956.
52. Department o f  S tate, documentation
26 July-22 September 1956, p .53.
53. S ignatories to the Convention 
United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Spain 
France 
I t a ly  
USSR 
*Egypt 
Turkey
^refused to attend
54. Department o f  State B u l le t in ,  13 August 1956, p .263.
p u b l ica t io n , The Suez Canal Problem, 
Main Users o f the Canal
A u s tra l ia
United Kingdom
Ceylon
Denmark
Ethiopia
India
France
Indonesia
Japan
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Persia
Sweden
USA
*Greece
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The s to ry  o f  the f i r s t  London conference has been to ld  many times.
What concerns us here is  the ro le  o f  the American Secretary o f State
a t the conference, and i t s  e f fe c t  upon American-Egyptian re la t io n s
during the c r i s is .  Although in v i te d  to a ttend, Egypt preferred to stay
away. The three Western powers immediately froze Egyptian assets and funds
in th e i r  banks, and B r i ta in  and France mobilised th e i r  reserves. On 12
August Nasser gave his reasons fo r  not attending the conference. He
accused the three Western powers o f conspiring to starve and te r ro r is e
the Egyptian people. Nothing could i l l u s t r a t e  Egypt's reaction b e tte r
than Nasser's statement on 12 August 1956, when he declared th a t ,  "Egypt
s trong ly  deplores these measures and regards them as a th re a t to the
Egyptian people, to make them surrender part o f th e i r  t e r r i t o r y  and
sovereignty to an in te rna t iona l body, which in fa c t  is  in te rna t ion a l 
55co lon ia l ism ".
The ro le  o f  Secretary Dulles was paramount at the conference. In
order to avoid any f ru s t ra t io n  o f his p o l i t i c a l  aims, Dulles worked out
w ith  the B r i t is h  and French a d ra f t  cons is t ing  o f  concrete proposals.
' I t  ca lled  fo r  the creation o f an in te rna t io n a l board th a t would operate
the Canal and guarantee respect fo r  Egyptian sovereignty a t the same
time. Dulles informed Eisenhower th a t " I t  w i l l  go in as a United
States paper, not as a t r i p a r t i t e  paper.. . .Also I believe i t  w i l l  be
56more acceptable as such".
To gain s u f f i c ie n t  support fo r  his p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvre, Dulles 
t r ie d  to form an a n t i -n a t io n a l is a t io n  grouping under the banner o f
55. Department o f S tate, documents p u b l ica t io n , The Suez Canal, o p . c i t . , 
pp.50-1.
56. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, Dulles-Herter 
se r ies , Box No.5, Dulles -256, from London to the President,
18 August 1956.
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in te rna t iona lism . He used his personal influence to induce the
Afro-Asian delegates to commit themselves to the American proposal,
thereby showing th a t i t  was not ju s t  a Western view, but to some extent
57an in te rna t io na l one.
In actual fa c t ,  the Americans understood th a t th e i r  ta c t ic s  were
not fea s ib le . Dulles was motivated more" by the aim o f  keeping his
a l l ie s  under American contro l than by any conviction th a t an in te rn a t io n a l
contro l board was workable. During th is  period Dulles and Nasser were
o f one mind, seeing the conference as another way o f gaining the time
both o f  them needed to complete th e i r  task.
Once B r i ta in  and France were persuaded to negotia te , Dulles had in
fa c t  begun to weaken the force o f the conference. He declared th a t ,
"This is  not a conference through which to de live r  any kind o f ultimatum
58to Egypt. None o f us would fo r  a moment en te rta in  th a t purpose".
In order to prove his goodwill and put an end to the Soviet attempt
59to f is h  in muddy waters, Dulles secre t ly  contacted Nasser through his
ambassador in Cairo, asking him not to give Eden the chance he was 
60w aiting  fo r .  Dulles ' advice did not go unheeded; Nasser exp lo ited
57. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, NSC, Box No.8,
298, meeting o f NSC, 30 August 1956. Dulles induced Turkey, Iran , 
Pakistan and Ethiopia to support the American proposals. Also see 
Princeton U n ive rs ity , Dulles p r iva te  papers, Box No.110, from Dulles 
to Foreign M in is te r o f  Iran , 8 August 1956. Also see o p . c i t . , Box 
No.106, from Dulles to Adanan Menderes o f Turkey, 29 August 1956. 
Dulles also pressed Spain to support the American proposal. He 
informed the Spanish fo re ign  m in is te r  th a t ,  " I t  would be a great shock 
to American pub lic  opinion th a t. . .S p a in  was aligned w ith  the USSR, 
I n d ia , . . . " .  See Eisenhower papers, Dulles-Herter se r ies , Box No.5, 
from London to the President, 22 August 1956.
58. Department o f  State B u l le t in , No.897, 29 September 1956, "Conclusion 
o f London Conference", statement o f  20 August by Dulles, p .371.
59. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Duppes papers, general correspondence 
and memos, se r ies , Box N o . l,  21 August 1956, Dulles, " I  spoke o f the 
fa c t  th a t the Soviet Union was a c t iv e ly  wooing the Arab s ta te s " .
60. Mohamed Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents, o p . c i t . , p . 100.
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the American moves towards peace. His personal envoy, A l i  S ab r i ,
p r iv a te ly  approached the American delegation to the conference, informing
them th a t ,  "Force was only a p r im i t iv e  way and there was no sense in i t ,
because Egypt stood ready to work out a reasonable and ju s t  so lu t ion  to
the Canal problem. We are not going to accept the in te rn a t io n a l is a t io n
the Canal . . .there isa p e a ce fu l way o f  s e t t l in g  th is  matter, and i f ^ t i c h
a method is  applied , i t  w i l l  be found tha t we are ready to give our
fi 1wholehearted co-opera tion".
The Egyptian o f fe r  and Dulles ' w il l ingness not to  give the impression
tha t the Western powers had united together against Egypt led him to
refuse to p a r t ic ip a te  in the f ive -n a t io n s  delegation dispatched to
Cairo by the London conference. Although the B r i t is h  urged Dulles
most s trong ly  to take on the negotia tions w ith  Nasser, since "They did
63not have confidence th a t anybody else could pu ll i t  o f f " ,  Loy Henderson
was sent in his place, and the mission was headed by the A ustra lian  prime
m in is te r ,  S ir  Robert Menzies.
The American adm in is tra t ion  t r ie d  very hard to exhaust every
possible means o f achieving a peaceful settlement, and on 25 August 1956,
a few days before the Menzies mission set out, Eisenhower asked the
Indian prime m in is te r ,  Nehru, to use his personal in fluence on Nasser to
64reach a so lu t ion  to the c r is is .
61. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  John Foster Dulles papers, White
House memos. s e r ie s , Box No.31, fo ld e r ,  White House correspondence, 
general 56(2), re. Suez, forward to the Sec.23181 (95).
62. Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1957, p .108. Maybe Dulles '
reluctance can be a t t r ib u te d  to his awareness tha t Nasser would not 
accept the Western proposals, espec ia lly  a f te r  shepiiovs inflammatory 
speech against them: see Eisenhower Papers, Duiles-Hercer se r ies ,
Box No.5, Dulles fo ld e r  August 1956, from Dulles to Eisenhower, 
incoming telegram, 21 August 1956.
63. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , o p . c i t . , memo.of conversation w ith
Harold Macmillan, 21 August 1956.
64. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, Ann Whitman f i l e ,
in te rna t io n a l se r ies , Box No.26, fo ld e r  Ind ia , from Eisenhower to 
Nehru, 25 August 1956.
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On the eve o f  the mission's departure fo r  Cairo, Eisenhower and 
Dulles spoke about the Anglo-French attempt to use the London conference 
proposals as a f in a l  o f fe r  to Egypt. Eisenhower stated in a press 
conference on 31 August, "For ourselves we are determined to exhaust
every poss ib le , every feas ib le  method o f peaceful settlement, and we
—  55
believe i t  can be done. We are^committed to a peaceful se ttlem ent".
Dulles, a t a press conference on 28 August, saidi, "The Suez Canal is
66not a primary concern to the USA". P r iva te ly  w orried, Eisenhower 
wrote a long l e t t e r  to Eden on 31 August warning him, " I  re a l ly  do 
not see how a successful re s u l t  could be achieved by fo rc ib le  means.
The use o f  force would, i t  seems to me, va s t ly  increase the area o f  
jeopardy",
I t  was obvious th a t American diplomacy had rendered Menzies' 
mission powerless. The mission held a series o f meetings w ith  Nasser 
between 3 and 9 September, but i t  was doomed to fa i lu r e  fo r  a number o f  
reasons. The mission had ne ither inducements to o f fe r  Egypt nor a
50
mandate to negotiate on the terms o f the reso lu t ion  as they stood.
Also, the head o f  the mission, the A ustra lian  prime m in is te r ,  S ir  Robert
Menzies, was one o f the factors  behind i t s  f a i lu r e ,  because he was
69id e o lo g ic a l ly  and personally d i r e c t ly  opposed to Nasser.
65. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower, press conference,
31 August 1956, McCordle papers, Box No.5, Suez.
66. Mohamed Heika l, Cairo Documents, o p . c i t . , p .103.
67. Eisenhower papers, Dulles-Herter se r ies , Box No.5, August 1956,
from Eisenhower to Eden, 31 August 1956.
68. Meyer, o p . c i t . , p. 161; Princeton U n ive rs ity ,  John Foster Dulles, 
Oral H is to ry  P ro jec t, Loy Henderson, p .27.
69. See N eff, o p . c i t . , p .300.
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In Egypt Menzies and his mission had three meetings w ith  Nasser.
According to Mohamed Heika l, Nasser's f r ie n d  and con fidan t, the
discussions broke down when Menzies threatened Nasser by saying,
"Mr. President, your re fusal o f  an in te rna t io n a l adm in is tra t ion  w i l l
be the beginning o f t ro u b le " .^ 0 Nasser refused to negotiate fu r th e r ,
the discussions came to an end on 9 September, and the mission l e f t
Cairo empty-handed.
Loy Henderson re c a l ls  th a t Washington had not wanted the mission
to be used to threaten E g y p t .^  Winthrop A ld r ich ,  the American
ambassador to the United Kingdom, claims th a t “ Eisenhower sent a
72cable to Menzies saying he had never intended to use fo rce " .
Menzies blamed the fa i lu r e  o f  his mission on the pronouncements o f
Eisenhower and Dulles which were issued while he was in the middle o f 
73his negotia tions. Even Heikal agreed with Menzies th a t the mission
was doomed to f a i l  because o f Eisenhower's statements. ^  These
75statements by the American leadership puzzled Nasser h im se lf. 2
The fa i lu r e  o f the Menzies' mission put Eisenhower's adm in is tra tion  
in a d i f f i c u l t  s i tu a t io n .  The Americans were faced w ith  a dilemma, th a t 
was c lear from Eisenhower's telephone conversation w ith  Dulles: "We were
in an unfortunate p o s it io n ,  because we could not r e a l ly  take a stand; 
we did not want to a liena te  our fr iends  and we wanted to keep NATO strong,
I f ibut we cannot agree w ith  these people in th e i r  extreme a t t i tu d e " .
70. Mohamed Heika l, Qissat al Suwiss, p .168.
71. Dulles Oral H is to ry ,  Princeton U n ive rs ity ,  Loy Henderson, p .27; 
in te rv iew  w ith  Henderson.
72. Dulles Oral H is to ry , Princeton U n ive rs ity , Winthrop A ld r ic h ,  p .38.
73. Loy Henderson, o p . c i t . , p .27.
74. Heika l, Qissat a l-Suw iss, p .103.
75. Ib id . , p . 103. In his statement Eisenhower excluded the p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f using force against Egypt.
76. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  John Foster Dulles papers, telephone 
c a l ls  se r ies , Box No.11, fo ld e r ,  memos, o f telephone conversations,
7 September 1956, telephone c a l l  to the President.
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As usual, American diplomacy t r ie d  to achieve a v a r ie ty  o f goals, some 
o f them con trad ic to ry . Therefore another way to buy time had now to 
be discovered.
While the French and the B r i t is h  searched desperately fo r  an
in te rn a t io n a l ly  acceptable p re tex t to go to war against Egypt, Dulles
did his best to s idetrack them. The American adm in is tra tion  repeatedly
o ffe red  d ip lomatic a lte rn a t ive s  to the violence i t s  a l l ie s  were
proposing. Eisenhower began to th ink  o f keeping up economic pressure
on Egypt, which in his view " i f  continued w i l l  cause d is tress  in Egypt".
To l im i te  Nasser's influence Eisenhower to ld  Eden on 8 September th a t
"there are Arab r i v a l r ie s  to be exp lo ite d , and which can be exp lo ited
i f  we do not make Nasser an Arab hero". Furthermore, in his long le t t e r
to Eden mentioned above, Eisenhower pointed out th a t there were
a lte rn a t ive s  to the present dependence on the Canal which should be
developed, "perhaps by more tankers and a possible new p ipe line  to
77Turkey, and some possible re -rou t in g  o f o i l " .
The American I n i t i a t i v e
The Americans understood very well tha t th is  d ip lomatic breakdown 
would mark the end o f the ad m in is tra t io n 's  e f fo r ts  to bu ild  up i t s  
regional stra tegy in the Middle East. Eisenhower decided there fo re  to 
abandon the previous pattern o f  American diplomacy, whereby the United 
States used to exert i t s  in fluence behind the scenes by co-operating 
w ith  i t s  a l l ie s .  Now he chose to take a d ire c t  ro le  in  handling the 
s i tu a t io n  by sending one o f h is fr iends  (Robert Anderson or Eric
77. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower papers, Dulles-Herter 
se r ies , Box No.6, Dulles, September 1956, le t t e r  to Anthony Eden, 
8 September 1956.
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Johnston) to Nasser w ith  a concrete American proposal, g iv ing  Egypt a 
share in  the Suez Canal Company's revenue and seats on i t s  board o f 
d ire c to rs .  According to Eisenhower, "Egypt would get h a l f  i t s
revenue and have on the Board three out o f  f iv e  D irec to rs , and they
78would be in a b e tte r  pos it ion  than they are today".
Secretary Dulles did not welcome Eisenhower's peace i n i t i a t i v e ,  on
the grounds th a t  the B r i t is h  were ge tt in g  very se n s it iv e ,  because they
79f e l t  th a t  the Americans were not working w ith  them. Dulles '
ob jec tion  can be a t t r ib u te d  to his wish to  avoid an open r i f t  w ith  his 
a l l i e s .  Also he wanted to o f fe r  them evidence o f his apparent sympathy
w ith  t h e i r  demands, and hoped th a t they would l is te n  to him and not
80immediately use th e i r  armed forces against Egypt. Nevertheless, the
Americans d id th e i r  best to avoid crea ting  the impression tha t the
81T r ip a r t i t e  Powers were "ganging up" against Egypt. Therefore the
United States did not send i t s  fo re ign  secretary to a NATO meeting in
82Paris on 5 September, ca lled to discuss the Suez c r is is .
Events moved ra p id ly ,  and the French and B r i t is h  t r ie d  to f in d  an
excuse fo r  war. The B r i t is h  stopped exchanging items o f in te l l ig e n c e
83about developments in the Middle East w ith  the United States. Eden
informed the American leaders o f the Anglo-French in te n t io n  to bring
the Suez Canal problem before the United Nations. We have already seen
84th a t Dulles opposed th is ,  because o f the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f a Soviet veto.
78. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower Diary se r ies , Box 18,
September 1956, phone c a l ls ,  7 September 1956.
79. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , John Foster Dulles papers, telephone c a l l
se r ies , Box No.11, fo ld e r ,  memos, o f  telephone c a l ls ,  White House,
7 September 1956, telephone c a l l  to the President.
80. F iner, o p . c i t . ,  p .207.
81. I b id . ,  p .206.
82. Macmillan, o p . c i t . , p .113.
83. Princeton U n ive rs ity ,  Dulles Oral H is to ry  P ro jec t, Loy Henderson, p .30.
84. In te rv iew  w ith  Loy Henderson, Washington, D.C.: F iner, o p . c i t . , p .206.
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However, he understood tha t his a l l ie s  had to demonstrate tha t they 
had f u l f i l l e d  th e i r  ob liga t ions  under the UN Charter, so tha t they 
could then plead tha t a l l  peaceful means o f revo ls ing  the c r is is  had 
been exhausted.
The Suez Canal Users1 Association “
Dulles immediately o ffered a new formula to keep the negotiations
85going between the pa rt ies  in  the dispute. The new United States 
plan ca lled  fo r  the formation o f an in te rn a t io n a l association o f Canal 
users tha t would maintain and manage the Canal, h ire  the p i lo t s ,  and
o r
thus contro l i t s  operation. This group was to be known as the Suez
87 88Canal Users' Association (SCUA). Although i t  was Dulles ' b ra in c h i ld ,
he somehow convinced Eden to explore the idea and even to suggest i t  as
his own. Eden y ie lded to American pressure, th ink ing  tha t the SCUA
would be a useful face-saving formula fo r  him and the French. The
American ambassador in London gained the impression th a t the SCUA plan
had g rea t ly  lessened the tension "not only in the Opposition ranks, but
89even among many T o r ies ."
As soon as the Americans lea rn t o f th is ,  and heard tha t th e i r  a l l ie s
had accepted the Users' Club scheme, Secretary Dulles had another shock
90in store fo r  Eden. In a press conference on 13 September he declared 
th a t ,  "The United States does not intend to shoot i t s  way through the 
Suez Canal i f  Egypt t r ie s  to block the passage o f US ships t r a v e l l in g
85. Murphy, Diplomat among W arriors , p .467.
86. Macmillan, o p . c i t . , p .119; Love, o p . c i t . , pp.425-7.
87. F iner, o p . c i t . , p .207.
88. Department o f State B u l le t in , No.900, 24 September 1956, "Dulles press 
conference" on 13 September 1956, p .479.
89. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower Papers, in te rn a t io n a l se r ies , 
Suez summaries, Summary No.9, 14 September 1956.
90. One day a f te r  Eden had presented the SCUA plan to the House o f 
Commons.
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91under the auspices o f the proposed new Users' Association".
Furthermore he added ambiguously, "Each nation had decided fo r  i t s e l f
what action i t  would have to take to  defend and i f  possible re a lize  i t s
92r ig h t  which i t  believes i t  has as a matter o f t re a ty " .
Dulles ' statements fru s tra te d  Eden, who w r ite  in  his memoirs tha t
"The words were an advertisement to Nasser tha t he could re je c t  the
p ro je c t w ith  impunity". Eden's b it te rness  led him to re ca ll  tha t
"such cynicism towards a l l ie s  destroys true partnersh ip . I t  leaves
only the choice o f parting  a master and vassal re la t io n sh ip  in fo re ign  
93p o l ic y " .
In 1957 Dulles explained the main reasons behind his con trovers ia l
actions regarding the Users' Association. He pointed out to the
B r i t is h  defence m in is te r  th a t "The B r i t is h  and the French had never been
w i l l in g  fo r  t h e i r  ships to pay t o l l s  to the Users' Association ; they
wanted to go on paying in to  the old Suez Canal Company. This meant
th a t the United States alone among the major powers would be working
94through the Users' Assoc ia tion". I t  can therefore be assumed th a t 
the Americans rea lised  th a t t h e i r  a l l ie s  expected th e i r  m i l i t a r y  
s i tu a t io n  to improve even fu r th e r  w ith the passage o f time. Thus 
there was nothing in the s i tu a t io n  to induce them to be f le x ib le  or 
c o n c i l ia to ry  towards Nasser, but on the contra ry , they could sa fe ly  
achieve th e i r  ends w ithout any American ob jection .
91. Department o f  State B u l le t in ,  No.900, o p . c i t . ,  p .479.
92. I b id .
93.. Eden, o p .c i t ‘. s pp.483-4.
94. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry  Dulles papers, general correspondence
.and memo, s e r ie s  Box N o . l,  memo, o f conversation, 27 January 1957,
Dulles to B r i t is h  defence m in is te r ." -
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This assumption is  substantiated by the fo l lo w ing  fa c ts :  on
10 September the State Department asked the B r i t is h  and French
governments " to  exert such influence as they can to keep the p i lo ts
on the job u n t i l  agreement can be reached on the proposed Users'
95Assoc ia tion". The American advice went unheeded, and the B r i t is h
and French began to take measures to withdraw th e i r  p i lo t s .  From th is
po in t onwards i t  became obvious to the American a d m in is tra t ion ,
espec ia lly  to Dulles, tha t the real issue a t stake fo r  B r i ta in  and
96France was Nasser, not the Suez Canal.
On the same day, 15 September, the B r i t is h  and French withdrew
th e i r  p i l o t s ,  Nasser ru les out the Users' Association p ro je c t by
dec la r ing , "We s h a l l  not a llow the Western-proposed Canal Users'
Association to  func tion  through the Canal. We Egyptians shall run the
Canal smoothly and e f f i c i e n t l y ,  and i f  despite th is  the Canal Users'
Association forces i t s  way through the Canal i t  would be aggression,
97and would be trea ted  as such".
- The Second London Conference
The second plenary session o f the Suez Canal conference gathered in 
London to discuss the Suez Canal Users' Association proposals, w ith
95. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower papers, in te rna t io na l se r ies , 
Summary No.7, summary o f developments in the Suez s i tu a t io n ,  Canal 
p i lo t s ,  9 September 1956.
96. Although on 4 September the State Department informed Paris , London 
and Cairo th a t  "the US is-try ing to avoid any accusation th a t the US 
is  co n tr ib u t in g  to breakdown o f the Canal operation, and our 
preference is  th a t  any new p i lo ts  be h ired from the West ra ther than 
the Last, we do not plan to take any o f f i c i a l  action against 
ind iv id u a ls  who wish to accept a Suez jo b , i b i d . , Box 43, Suez summary 
4 September 1956.
97. Khotab wa Tassria t e l-Rais jam a l, Vol.7., pp. 1438-9.
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eighteen supporters o f  the e a r l ie r  reso lu tion  in attendance. The r i f t  
between America and i t s  a l l ie s  became even wider than before. While 
London and Paris looked upon the seizure o f the Canal Company as a 
breach o f in te rn a t io n a l ob liga t ions  and a d ire c t  th re a t to the secu r ity  
o f  the free world , "Washington seemed to them to be too ready to t re a t
98the matter as a c o n f l i c t  between co lon ia l and a n t i -c o lo n ia l  in te re s ts " .
The American perspective encouraged Nasser to approach them,
looking fo r  a new face-saving formula. He raised the obvious question
w ith  Dulles: whether US vessels would continue to pay the Egyptian
a u th o r i t ie s  fo r  t r a n s i t  as they had since the n a t io n a l isa t io n  o f the
Canal. I f  the answer was a f f i rm a t iv e ,  Nasser maintained th a t he would
"look w ith  greater sympathy towards the Users' Association which is
99considered as a possible nucleus fo r  a negotia tion  group". The 
American reluctance to oblige i t s  ships to pay t o l l s  to the SCUA can be 
a t t r ib u te d  to the above, since Dulles ' ch ie f ob jec tive  was to prolong 
the negotia tions and to achieve a peaceful so lu t ion  to the problem.
Under changing circumstances Nasser modified his po s it io n .
Again and again he showed his readiness to es tab lish  negotia ting  contacts 
d i r e c t ly  w ith  the United States through secret emissaries. Furthermore 
he ou t l ined  some points as a basis fo r  a settlement:
i )  Acceptance o f Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.
i i )  Recognition o f the le g a l i t y  o f the n a t io n a l isa t io n  o f 
the Suez Canal.'
98. NA RG 218 Record of US J o in t  Chiefs o f S ta f f ,  top secre t,
Jo in t  Chiefs o f S ta f f ,  V o l.V I,  Ch.X, the Suez Canal C r is is ,  p .331.
99. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, in te rn a t io n a l se r ies , 
Suez summaries, No.15, 24 September 1956.
100. N utting, o p . c i t . , p .159, "Pressure had been bu ild ing  up from ce rta in
Arab countries and from Ind ia , the Soviet Union and T ito  in favour
o f  an agreed settlem ent".
2 . 7 ^
i i i )  Recognition by Egypt o f the leg it im a te  in te res ts
im
o f the Users.
Egyptian f l e x i b i l i t y ,  and i t s  readiness to break out o f the
impasse which had troubled the in te rna t io na l s i tu a t io n  fo r  more than
two months, led Eisenhower to in s t ru c t  Dulles to maintain an independent
pos it ion  as regards the B r i t is h  and the French u n t i l  "we know d e f in i te ly
102what they are up to " .  Eisenhower's in s t ru c t io n s  did not go unheeded,
and the divergence between the American approach and th a t  o f i t s  a l l i e s ,
who were keen to impose the SCUA on Egypt, i f  necessary by fo rce , became
obvious. This was so when Dulles was asked at a press conference in
Washington on 2 October whether the new association would have " te e th " .
"There is  t a lk  about the ' te e th 1 being pu lled out o f  i t " ,  said Dulles,
103"but there is  no t ru th  in  i t  i f  th a t means the use o f fo rce ".
X I
Time and again Dulles restated the same p o s it io n ,  stressing tha t the
purpose o f the US in  re la t io n  to the Suez s i tu a t io n  was p rec ise ly  tha t
set out in  the F i r s t  A r t ic le  o f the United Nations Charter, namely to
seek a settlement "by peaceful means and in conform ity w ith the p r in c ip le s
104of ju s t ic e  and in te rn a t io n a l law".
Nevertheless, behind the scenes American diplomacy began to move 
in various d ire c t io n .  I t  began to th ink  in terms o f l im i t in g  .
Egypt's in f luence in the Arab world-by topp ling  the Syrian
101. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , John Foster Dulles papers, general 
correspondence and memo.series, Box No.3, memo, o f  conversation w ith  
Mr. Raimondo Manzini, 30 September 1956.
102. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , John Foster Dulles papers, White House 
memo, se r ies , Box No.4, fo ld e r ,  meeting w ith  the President, sec.memo, 
o f  conversation, sub ject, Suez Canal, 2 October 1956.
103. N eff, o p . c i t . , p .320. See also Eden, o p . c i t . , p .499.
104. Department o f  State B u l le t in , 8 October 1956, t ra n s c r ip t  o f  "Secretary 
Dulles ' newS- conference", p .543, 26 September 1956. O f f i c ia l l y  the 
Foreign O ff ice  blamed the Americans, because in th e i r  view "the US 
fa i lu r e  to act on the payment o f t o l l s  to SCUA is  d i r e c t ly  responsible 
fo r  Egypt's unwillingness to negotia te". See Eisenhower papers, 
in te rn a t io n a l se r ies , Suez summaries, Summary No.39, 29 October 1956.
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government"^ and bring ing  about a regime more f r ie n d ly  to the W e s t . "^
Nasser's a l l ia n ce  w ith  Saudi Arabia against the Hashemite bloc was
c e r ta in ly  one o f the most important elements which the American
policy-makers t r ie d  to e x p lo i t .  Eisenhower asked King Saud to use his
great influence to bring about a s h i f t  in Egypt's p o s it io n . He
concluded his le t t e r  by saying, " I t  seems to me th a t any c o n c i l ia to ry
107move by President Nasser has been conspicuously lack in g " .
Simultaneously, America kept in  secret contact w ith  the o il-p roduc ing
Arab states in order to get them to exert pressure on Nasser to modify 
108his p os it io n . Moreover, Eisenhower approached the Indian prime
m in is te r ,  Nehru, fo r  the same reason. At the same time some members
o f Eisenhower's adm in is tra t ion  began to study the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  topp ling
Nasser h im se lf, but Eisenhower did not endorse th is  plan because the
time was not r ipe  fo r  i t .  In h is  view, "An action o f th is  kind could
109not be taken when there is  as much active  h o s t i l i t y  as a t present".
The Americans were in a d i f f i c u l t  s i tu a t io n .  On the one hand
they were convinced th a t the B r i t is h  and the French were determined to 
use m i l i t a r y  force to ensure non-Egyptian control o f the C a n a l , a n d  
on the other they rea lised  th a t Nasser was probably w i l l i n g  to accept
105. The American policy-makers had the fe e l in g  th a t the Syrian government 
during tha t time was under Egyptian hegemony. See Eveland, Ropes o f 
Sand, pp.214-29. He re fe rs  in his book to American covert attempts 
to get r id  o f  the pro-Nasser government in Syria. See also Seale,
The Struggle fo r  S y r ia , p .212.
106. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  John Foster Dulles papers, White House 
memo, se r ies , Box No.4, fo ld e r ,  meeting with the President (5 ) ,
22 September 1956.
107. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, in te rn a t io n a l se r ies , 
from Eisenhower to King ' Saud, 18 September 1956, Box No.42,
Folder 3. See also in  i b i d . , proposed rep ly  to 25 September message 
from King Saud, 6 October '1956.
108. Eisenhower Diary se r ies , Box No.18, October 1956, miscellaneous,
8 October 1956, secret to Hoover.
109. I b id , September 1956, from Eisenhower to Eden, 22 September 1956.
110. Eisenhower D ia r ies , Box 19, s t a f f  memos., memo, o f  conference,
6 October 1956, Eisenhower, Secretary Hoover, Col.Goodpaster.
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some in te rn a t io n a l contro l o f the Canal, provided he could f in d  a face-
saving formula. American m i l i t a r y  analysts were convinced tha t
although the Soviet Union was not in favour o f Western m i l i t a r y  action
against Egypt, they would e x p lo i t  the s i tu a t io n  to a po in t short o f
fo rc ing  such ac t ion . A l l  these complex fac to rs  had a bearing on
American p o lic y  a t tha t stage. Their awareness tha t the B r i t is h  and
French were u n l ik e ly  to  accept any compromise which would leave Nasser 
111in power in Egypt put them in  a c r i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n .
on 21 September Dulles had a long conversation w ith  Eden. Eden
expressed disappointment tha t the Suez Canal Users' Association had not
turned out to  be the t r u l y  e f fe c t iv e  organisation he had expected.
Nevertheless Dulles s trong ly  urged him to keep the c r is is  out o f the
United Nations fo r  the time being, on the grounds th a t  taking i t  there
would not be a f r u i t f u l  move. Then he asked th a t should Eden decide to
112go to the S ecu r ity .C oun c il , he would consult Dulles f i r s t .  On
22 September, while Dulles was f ly in g  back to  Washington, the B r i t is h
and French, w ithout f i r s t  informing him, la id  the s i tu a t io n  before the 
113Security  Council. Now i t  was evident to the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion
th a t the A l l ie s  were t ry in g  to  bring the matter to  an end qu ick ly  w ith
114a "Soviet veto" which would give them freedom o f ac tion . Dulles
111. RG 218 CJCS 091 Egypt, Jo in t Chiefs o f  S ta f f ,  memo, fo r  the 
Chairman, Jo in t Chiefs o f S ta f f ,  7 August 1956; sub ject: 
N a t ion a lisa t io n  of the Suez Canal Company by the Egyptian government.
112. F ine r, o p . c i t . , p .261.
113. A ld r ic h ,  Dulles Oral H is tory  C o l le c t io n , p . 19, See a lso , Dulles 
papers, subject se r ies , a lphabetical sub. Box No.7, Suez problem: 
po in ts to be raised with Macmillan, 25 September 1956.
114. I b i d . , No.13.
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conjectured th a t he might serve his country 's  in te re s ts  by re s tra in in g
his a l l ie s ,  and by ac ting  as an honest broker between them.and Nasser,
while posing as th e i r  p a r t ic u la r  f r ie n d .
For the Egyptian leadership the ch ie f ob jec t ive  was to maintain
i t s  hold on the Suez Canal Company against the opposition o f B r i ta in
and France. Nasser th e re fo re " t r ie d  to e x p lo i t  the American's attempt
to  re s tra in  her a l l ie s  from using force against Egypt. Although the
American po s it ion  as a whole was fa r  from c lea r to  Egypt, Egyptian
diplomacy was d irected a twooingthe United States. Nasser gave the
Americans a personal assurance th a t  a "Soviet p i l o t  would not be assigned
115
to US vessels t ra n s i t in g  the Canal". At the same t im e, he t r ie d  to
e x p lo i t  American fears of communist penetration in  the area, espec ia lly
in Saudi Arabia, in  order to put pressure on the worried American
adm in is tra t ion . Through Nehru, Dulles and Eisenhower gained the
impression th a t the Saudi regime was in grave danger "o f  a communist coup
116i f  i t s  o i l  revenues should be denied or s u b s ta n t ia l ly  reduced".
Moreover, e f fo r ts  to  encourage a peaceful exchange between Egypt, B r i ta in
and France gave the American policy-makers an in d ic a t io n  th a t he was
117ready fo r  "negotia tions i f  the opportun ity  arose".
115. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower in te rn a t io n a l ser ies , Suez 
summary No.15, 24 September 1956.
116. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower in te rn a t io n a l ser ies , Suez 
summary No.13, 20 September 1956. Eisenhower's adm in is tra tion  was 
well aware th a t the Saudi government " is  fe e b le " ,  see Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles papers, telephone c a l l  se r ies , Box 
No.5, fo ld e r ,  memo, o f  telephone conversations, telephone c a ll  from 
Secretary to Humphrey, 9 August 1956.
117. Ib id . , summary No.20, 1 October 1956. The American embassy in 
Cairo informed the State Department th a t "the inc lus ion  o f A li  
Sabri and Dr. Badawi, the D irec to r o f the Canal A u th o r ity ,  ind icates 
th a t Nasser wishes the delegation to be prepared to set the basis 
fo r  negotia tions i f  opportun ity  a r ise s " .
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The United Nations
Since i t  was obvious th a t Anglo-French m i l i t a r y  preparations had 
reached th e i r  peak, i t  was in the in te res ts  o f the USA and Egypt to 
break the impasse and keep negotiations going. Anthony Nutting 
reports th a t Dulles advised Dr. Fawzi, the Egyptian fo re ign  m in is te r ,
 ^g____________ _
to  continue the ta lks  a t a l l  costs. Furthermore, he urged him to
119make concrete proposals. According to Heika l, the Americans warned
Egypt th a t Eden was in  a h igh ly  unpredictable mood, and th a t  made him
120ready to undertake the most dangerous o f gambles. In t h e i r  e f fo r ts
to  a le r t  Egypt to  the danger o f the s i tu a t io n ,  the Americans had leaked
to the Egyptian ambassador the news tha t General Ke igh tly  had been
121chosen to  command an invasion o f Egypt.
The American advice was considered by the Egyptians on 5 October.
The Egyptian fo re ign  m in is te r  proposed tha t d ire c t  negotia tions between
the parties could be held under the auspices o f the United Nations.
Moreover, on Nasser's in s t ru c t io n s ,  Fawzi accepted the p o s s ib i l i t y  tha t
an in te rna t ion a l advisory board could enable Canal users to p a r t ic ip a te
122in matters o f  common in te re s t .  Furthermore, Egypt had shown a great
w il l ingness  to  compromise. On 12 October, Fawzi accepted L loyd 's  s ix
123p r in c ip le s  fo r  the operation o f  the Canal "w ithout exception", and
the Security Council adopted them on 13 October. These were:
118. N utt ing , o p . c i t . , p J 5 6 .
119. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower in te rn a t io n a l se r ies , 
summary No.36, 23 October 1956.
120. Heika l, The Cairo Documents, o p . c i t . ,  p .29.
121. I b id . , p .105.
122. Love, o p . c i t . , p .444.
123. Executive Session o f the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
V o l .V I I I ,  84, Congress Second Session, Mr. Hoover, 12 November 1956, 
p .613.
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i) That there should be free and open transit through the 
Canal without discrimination, overt or covert.
ii) Egyptian sovereignty to be respected.
iii) The operation of the Canal should be insulated from the 
politics of any country.
i v ) The levels of dues should be fixed by agreement between 
users and owners.
v) A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to
development.
\ 124vi) Disputes to be settled by arbitration.
Egypt's moderate attitude led Eisenhower to believe that the danger of
war was over. Making this premature assessment, he declared at a press
125conference that "It looks like there is a very great crisis behind us".
The British and the French, however, were still seeking a new pretext
for attacking Nasser. They submitted a draft resolution to the Security
Council that included a rider insisting that Egypt "had not yet formulated
sufficiently precise proposals to meet the requirements of the six
principles set above". They demanded, among other things, that Egypt
should promptly submit proposals no less effective than those delivered
by Menzies, which Nasser had already rejected. Moreover, Britain and
France insisted that Egypt should co-operate with the SCUA to include
126the payment of tolls.
124. Lloyd, op.cit., p.159.
125. Eisenhower press conference, 13 October 1956, quoted in ibi d . , p . 160.
126. Love, op.cit., p.446.
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In the Security Council the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia voted
127against that part of the Anglo-French resolution. Still worried, .
Dulles reported to Eisenhower that Britain and France refused minor
modifications that would have made their rider palatable. They felt
128they needed the above-mentioned veto for their political aims. In
order to make his delaying-tactics successful, Dulles pressed Fawzi
to set out concrete proposals and suggestions within the context of
129the six principles. On the other hand, he pointed out to his allies
that the US had abandoned the principle of international control of the 
130Canal. It became clear that they were about to break the impasse. 
This appearance of success led Dag Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, to call the parties concerned to a meeting in 
Geneva on 29 October.
The War
Israel invaded the Sinai on the evening of 29 October 1956. The 
following day Britain and France, without informing the US, issued a 
joint ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to cease firing and to withdraw
127. Lloyd, op.cit. , p.169. The French and the British were insisting that 
"the Egyptian government make known promptly its proposals for a 
system meeting the requirements set out above and providing guarantees 
to users not less effective than those sought by the proposals of 
eighteen powers...", and considered that the "Canal Users'
Association and the competent Egyptian authorities should co-operate 
to ensure the satisfactory operation of the Canal and free-and-open 
transit through the Canal in accordance with the 1888 Convention".
For more details, see Heikal, Cairo Documents, p . 104.
128. Love, op.cit. , p.446.
129. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower international series, Suez 
summaries, summary No.36, 23 October 1956.
130. RG 218, Record of the US JCS, top secret, Chapter X, The Suez 
Crisis, p.332, Vol.VI, 1955-1956.
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131to positions ten miles from the Suez Canal within twelve hours.
Nasser rejected the ultimatum, and the French and British launched an 
attack against Egypt in collusion with Israel. They had found the
132excuse for which they had been desperately seeking to attack Nasser.
133Although the attack did not come as a surprise to American circles,
the American leadership was not prepared to accept that its allies could
present the United States with a fait accompli, demanding her unlimited
support. Eisenhower was shocked, and expressed concern over the
1 34possibility of Soviet intervention on the side of Egypt. He
considered that America's allies were giving the Soviet Union the chance
to leapfrog over the Western military build-up in the area, and so
threaten to undermine the American plan of containing Soviet penetration
around the Ca n a l .
Twelve hours after the Anglo-French ultimatum, Eisenhower declared
to Eden and Mol let, "It is my belief that peaceful processes can and
135should prevail to secure a solution". The American leadership's
resentment was deepened by the sense of shock suffered in Washington.
Secretary Dulles, in a telephone conversation with Vice-President Nixon,
said, "They cannot count upon us to engage in these policies". Furthermore,
he considered the American stance vis-a-vis its allies "a declaration of
136independence for the first time".
131. Love, op.cit. , pp.481-491.
132. Nutting, op.cit. , p . 165; Meyer, op.cit., p . 167.
133. Dulles Oral History Collection, Armstrong W. Park, p . 19.
134. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Diary, Box 19, staff memos., 
memo, of conversation, p.4 with the President, 30 October 1956; 
others present: Dulles, Hoover, etc., 30 October 1956. See also 
telephone call series, 30 October 1956, President and Dulles.
135. Eisenhower papers, international series, Box 19, Eden text,
President's letter to Eden and Mollet, 31 October 1956.
136. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles papers, telephone call 
series, Box No.5, telephone call from the Vice-President, 31 October 1956.
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Publicly, President Eisenhower, in a nationwide broadcast on
31 October, emphasised not only America's non-involvement in the attack,
but also its disapproval, "The United States was not consulted in any way
about any phase of these actions, nor were we informed of them in
advance...we believe these actions to have been taken in error, for we
do not accept the use-ef force as a wise and proper instrument for the
137settlement of international disputes".
From the very beginning, when the issue was introduced to the 
United Nations, the American delegation showed a great regard for the
1 oo
opinion of the Afro-Asian countries. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
worked closely with these countries during the Suez war. The Arab
delegations in the United Nations appreciated his stance in the midst
of the d i s p u t e . ^
The main aim was to terminate hostilities and bring about the
withdrawal of the attacking forces in the shortest possible time.
The United States committed itself to the 1950 Tripartite Declaration.
Under instructions from Dulles and Eisenhower, Ambassador Lodge took
the lead in the United Nations Security Council, submitting his first 
140proposal. On 30 October Israel was called upon "to withdraw its
137. US Department of State Bulletin, 12 November 1956.
138. Aldrich, Dulles oral history collection, pp.34-5.
139. Eisenhower papers, Dulles-Herter series, Box No.6, incoming 
telegrams, Department of State, from New York to Secretary,
31 October 1956. Azzam Pasha, former Secretary-General of the 
Arab League said, "You have won a place in the hearts of all Arabs 
which they will never forget".
140. See Eisenhower Diary, Box 18, October 1956, phone calls, 3 0  October 
1956, President and Secretary, File 3. The above-mentioned can
be attributed to the American fears of Soviet military intervention 
to support Egypt. So Eisenhower told Dulles, "We think we should 
push ahead on our resolution".
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armed forces behind the armistice lines", and all member states were
urged to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial aid
141to Israel as long as it had not complied with this resolution. The 
United Kingdom and France vetoed the American proposal, and it became 
clear that Israel was acting as an instrument of the two European 
powers, which confTicted with the American policy of achieving peace 
in the area.
To some extent the Americans sided with Egypt against the
aggressors. On 1 November in the General Assembly, where the final
decisions were not subject to the veto, Secretary Dulles submitted a
new proposal requesting an "immediate cease-fire" and prompt withdrawal
of all forces behind the armistice lines. Dulles' resolution recommended
that "all members refrain from introducing military goods in the area of
hostilities". Moreover, it urged that once the cease-fire took effect,
steps should be taken to reopen the Canal and restore secure navigation..
At the end it requested the Secretary-General to observe and promptly
report on the compliance, or lack of it, with this resolution to the
Security Council and the General Assembly.
The American resolution was adopted on 2 November by an overwhelming 
142majority of 64 to 5. American pressure in the United Nations made its 
impact on the Anglo-French-Israeli situation. The Israeli government
141. See UN Documents S/37/0. See also Department of State Bulletin,
5 November 1956, p.699. See also Eisenhower Diary S e r i e s , Box N o . 19, 
White House staff memo., 30 October 1956. In Washington they began 
to think of holding up the Israeli bank balances. Dayan reports that 
Eisenhower telegraphed Ben-Gurion, suggesting that Israel should 
withdraw its forces from Sinai. See Dayan, The Story of My Life, p.254.
142. UN Document S/3256, General Assembly Resolution on Middle East.
Also see Department of State Bulletin, 12 November 1956,
"Statement by Secretary in the General Assembly", 2 November 1956.
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considered that Dulles' second resolution was especially directed 
143against them. The Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal had a
significant impact on the legitimacy of the British and French invasion,
and marked a serious setback, particularly for the British government,
which was trying to convince its people that the purpose of the Anglo-
French military intervention was to keep the international waterway free
and open. Now there could be no justification for the invasion. The
American contribution in the UN, and Egyptian resistance, led to the
failure of the main purpose of the invasion.
In order to contain the situation and put an end to any Soviet
attempts to intervene, the United States government supported the
Canadian resolution calling upon the Secretary-General of the United
Nations to submit a plan for setting up an international United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure and supervise the cessation of 
144hostilities. This proposal was adopted on 4 November 1956, and the
UNEF was created on the following day. The Canadian proposal was a
face-saving formula to facilitate the Anglo-French withdrawal at minimum
cost to Western interests in the area.
Some historians considered that the United States was not primarily
engaged in solving the Middle Eastern problems in which it had become
involved. The American policy-makers convinced themselves that they
145were saving the United Nations and building "a world without war". 
Nevertheless, American tactics in the United Nations can be attributed to
143. Dayan, op.c i t . , p.266.
144. Department of State, US policy in the Middle East, September 1956- 
June 1957..documents, p . 160.
145.. Finer, o p . c i t ., p.440. Also see Dean Francis Wilcox, Assistant
Secretary, Oral History Interview, Columbia University, Oral History 
Project, p.38.
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t h e i r  desire to  put an end to  Soviet attempts to  assert th e i r
leadership in  the UN, e spec ia lly  upon the newly-independent countr ies .
Dulles rea lised  th a t  i f  the US did not take a f i rm  stand against i t s
a l l ie s  in the United Nations, America no doubt " w i l l  share the fa te  o f
146B r i ta in  and France". In order to  prevent th is  happening, the American
government began to  move in two p o l i t i c a l  d ire c t io n s :  i t  t r ie d  to
assert i t s  leadership in  the UN by submitting i t s  cease-f ire  proposal
147before the Soviet Union could seize the i n i t i a t i v e ;  also the United
States was well aware th a t i t s  hegemony in the Western European countries
was under a t ta ck , because o f i t s  opposition to t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  action
against Egypt. So Eisenhower ins truc ted  Dulles not to condemn the
aggressors but merely to  c a l l  f o r  a quick cease -f ire . This was to be
followed by de libe ra te  action on the part of the United Nations to reach
a so lu t ion  to  which a l l  pa rt ies  would adhere, by each making some 
148concessions.
In seeking to  l im i t  the h o s t i l i t i e s  in the area, Eisenhower asked 
Eden on 1 November 1956 to announce h is in te n t io n  to  resume negotia tions 
concerning the operation o f  the Canal on the basis o f  the s ix  p r in c ip le s  
which had been agreed by the United Nations, and l inked  the B r i t is h  
evacuation w ith I s r a e l ’ s re tu rn  to  i t s  t e r r i t o r y  and the Egyptian 
announcement o f  readiness to  "negotiate on the basis o f the s ix
146. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers (Ann Whitman f i l e ) ,  
NSC Box No.8, 302, meeting o f NSC, 1 November 1956, p .5, Dulles to 
the members o f  the NSC.
147. Eisenhower D ia r ie s ,  31 October 1956, memo, o f Conversation with 
President; other p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  Dulles, Col. Goodpaster, Eisenhower, 
"We plan to  get there [ the  Security Council] f i r s t  th ing  in ■‘■he 
morning when the doors open before the USSR gets th e re " .
148. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  John Foster Dulles papers, White House 
memo, se r ie s , chronological sub-section, White House correspondence, 
from Eisenhower to  D ulles, 2 November 1956, p .2.
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149p r in c ip le s  as w e l l " .  But the American advice went unheeded.
The American i n i t i a t i v e  was launched a t a moment when one side 
believed th a t  i t s  po s it io n  was strong and improving, and the other 
was weak. Eden probably expected tha t w ith the passage o f time his 
pos it ion  would improve and he could achieve his ends. Thus there 
was nothing in the s i tu a t io n  to induce him to be f l e x ib le  or c o n c i l ia to ry  
towards Egypt.
The appearance o f  f a i lu r e  and the Anglo-Frerch i n f l e x i b i l i t y  led
the American policy-makers to some extent to impose economic and o i l
150sanctions against t h e i r  a l l i e s .  This American pressure was not an
end in i t s e l f .  The United States was aiming to  end the h o s t i l i t i e s
w ithout fu r th e r  damaging Western in te res ts  in the area. On the other
hand, Eisenhower (a former general) decided not to  suspend any m i l i ta r y
assistance to  h is a l l ie s  during the c r is is .  His b it te rness  did not
lead him to  fo rg e t h is m i l i t a r y  commitments towards his NATO partners.
So on 1 November he informed the members o f the American National
Security Council th a t "We should continue to send m i l i t a r y  supplies to
151B r i ta in  in order th a t  she might meet her NATO requirements".
Eisenhower t r ie d  to  show his B r i t is h  a l l ie s  th a t the temporary American 
sanctions against them would not lead to the d is u n ity  o f  the m i l i ta r y  
powers o f the NATO countr ies . He f e l t  tha t the r i f t  between him and 
his a l l ie s  could be characterised as "a fam ily  f i g h t " .
149. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, in te rn a t io n a l 
se r ies , Eden, Box 19, Eisenhower to Eden, 11 November 1956.
150. Macmillan, o p . c i t . , pp .161-4. See also L loyd, o p . c i t . , p .211.
151. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , Eisenhower papers as President,
Ann Whitman f i l e ,  NSC Box No.8, 302, meeting o f  NSC, 1 November 1956,
p .10.
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Further developments in the Suez c r is is  showed th a t  the B r i t is h
and French depended on the United States fo r  m i l i t a r y  support, espec ia lly
152in facing up to the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a Soviet nuclear th re a t ,  even in
a l im ite d  war. The e q ua l ity  o f  NATO members proved to be fa ls e ,  since
the United States throughout the c r is is  t r ie d  hard to  show i t s  a l l i e s
th a t  they had become American s a te l l i t e s ,  and should work under American
153auspices and recognise th e i r  new ro le .
Although the f ig h t in g  a t Suez was over, the p o l i t i c a l  manoeuvring
was not. B r i ta in ,  France and Israe l s t i l l  refused to  accept a to ta l
w ithdrawal. In the meantime, Eisenhower won an overwhelming e lec t ion
v ic to ry  which gave him a strong mandate to  face up to  h is  a l l i e s 1
intransigence. On 6 November the American leadership supported
Hammarskjold's e f fo r ts  to get the Anglo-French forces completely out o f 
154Egypt. Furthermore, on the advice o f the State Department,
Eisenhower cancelled Eden's t r i p  to  Washington because, from his po in t
o f  view, " I t  would be very unfortunate to have a communique issues which
155ind icates we are in  disagreement". The United States was fac ing a 
de lica te  s i tu a t io n  in  handling the problem. The Is ra e l i  penetration 
in Sinai fu r th e r  complicated th is  s ta te  o f  a f fa i r s .
152. On 5 November the Soviet Union sent notes to B r i ta in ,  France and 
Israe l which implied the th re a t o f nuclear in te rve n t io n  against 
them. See Department o f State, US Policy in the Middle East, 
September 1956-June 1957. pp .183-8.
153. On 6 November, as a re s u lt  o f  the Soviet ultimatum, Eisenhower 
informed his top aides th a t " . . . i f  the Soviets a ttack the French 
and the B r i t is h  d i r e c t ly ,  we would be a t war". See Eisenhower 
Diary se r ie s , Box No.19, s ta f f  memos., memo, o f  conversation,
6 November 1956; others present: Goodpaster, A l le n ,  Dulles, Hoover.
154. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers as President, Box 24, 
H. Lodge, Folder No.1, 1956, from Lodge to  the President, 6 November
1956.
155. Also see in te rna tio na l se r ies , Box 19, Eden, 7 November 1956,
Anthony Eden.
292
From the very beginning and before winning the e le c t io n ,
Eisenhower adopted a tough a t t i tu d e  towards the Is ra e l i  invasion o f
Egyptian t e r r i t o r y .  Five days before the p res iden tia l e le c t io n ,
he pointed out to one o f his fr iends tha t " I  gave s t r i c t  orders to the
State Department th a t they should inform Israel th a t we would handle
our a f fa i r s  exactly  as though we did not have a Jew in America. The
welfare and best in te res ts  o f our own country were to be the sole
156c r i t e r ia  upon which we operated".
The American president t r ie d  very hard to d if fu se  Is ra e l 's  high
expectations regarding American support. While the Eisenhower
adm in istra tion  was attempting to terminate the h o s t i l i t i e s ,  Ben Gurion
was exu ltan t a t Is ra e l 's  v ic to ry .  On 7 November he shocked in te rna tiona l
opinion by declaring the annexation o f the Sinai desert to Is ra e l .  His
determination to hold fa s t  to Is ra e l 's  t e r r i t o r i a l  gain was endorsed
by an overwhelming m a jo r ity  of his people's representatives in the 
157Knesset. The Is ra e l i  government assumed tha t Ben Gurion's declaration
would be seen as a f a i t  accompli by world opinion which i t  would be 
foolhardy to repudiate.
But the Eisenhower adm in istra tion  began to move ra p id ly  to reverse 
th is .  Eisenhower immediately cabled Ben Gurion to s ta te  tha t the 
United States viewed his stand "with deep concern". He to ld  Ben
Gurion th a t Israel would "serious ly  undermine" United Nations peace
e f fo r ts  w ith such a p o l ic y ,  which, moreover, "could not but bring about
156. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, name series , 
H az le tt ,  personal, 2 November 194, quoted in Love, o p . c i t . , pp.460, 
639-40.
157. For more d e ta i ls  see Department o f 5 ta te : United States Policy in 
the Middle East September 1956-dune 1957, Documents, ppl99-204, 
Depeartment o f  State Publication No_6r509 August 1957.
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the condemnation o f Israel as a v io la to r  o f  the p r in c ip le s  as well as
158the d ire c t ive s  o f the United Nations".
Eisenhower's cable had been followed by Hoover's d ire  warning o f
possible consequences: UN condemnation, attack by Soviet "vo lun tee rs " ,
159and the term ination o f a l l  US governmental and p r iva te  a id .
Furthermore, Ben Gurion's request to meet Eisenhower had been sheTved
u n t i l  the Is ra e l is  "have withdrawn completely from Egyptian 
1 r  n
t e r r i t o r y " .  As a consequence o f America's harsh warnings, Ben
Gurion re lu c ta n t ly  informed Eisenhower tha t the Is ra e l is  would
withdraw, contingent upon a s a t is fa c to ry  arrangement w ith  U ^ fo rces  
161being estab lished.
The Last Phase
Evidence ex is ts  to  demonstrate th a t  B r i ta in ,  France and Israe l
repeatedly refused to  accept a to ta l  w ithdrawal. As a re s u l t ,  the
United States found i t s e l f  on the side o f the Afro-Asian and communist
nations in the United Nations General Assembly, and supported the
Indian reso lu tion  o f 24 November, which once more ca lled  upon the
162invaders to withdraw th e i r  fo rces.
The Eisenhower adm in is tra t ion  t r ie d  to ease i t s  way out o f the 
dilemma by coaxing i t s  a l l ie s  to  comply w ith the United Nations 
re so lu t io ns , thus easing the o i l  shortage which undoubtedly had caused
158. Love, o p . c i t . ,  p .641. Also see Eisenhower to Ben Gurion, 8 November
1956, Us Department o f S ta te , US Policy in the Middle East 1956-Uune
1957.
159. Michael Brecher, Decisions in  Is ra e l 's  Foreign P o l ic y , p .286.
160. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, In te rn a t io n a l se r ies , 
Box 29, fo ld e r ,  Is ra e l ,  Thursday, 8 November 1956.
161. Message to  Eisenhower from Ben Gurion, 8 November 1956, see
US Department o f S ta te . US Policy in the Middle East, September 1956- 
June 1957. p .213.
162. Brecher, o p . c i t . , p .292.
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"hardship through lack of adequate heating and unemployment at the 
163s ta r t  o f w in te r " .  On 3 December 1956, the B r i t is h  and French
governments agreed to  a to ta l  w ithdrawal. Is ra e l ,  however, was
f ig h t in g  fo r  d i f fe re n t  reasons from the French and B r i t i s h ,  so coaxing
1 fidher to abandon her t e r r i t o r i a l  gains proved a d i f f i c u l t  task.
In the meantime, Egypt had made thr& reopening o f  the Canal contingent
165on Is ra e l 's  to ta l  withdrawal from i t s  t e r r i t o r y .  The United States 
and i t s  a l l ie s  needed the Canal to be opened as soon as possible to  
avoid economic setbacks. Eisenhower threatened Nasser, " . . . I f  they
1 fifido not do b e t te r ,  the whole weight o f the US w i l l  be against him".
Nevertheless, the reopening o f the Suez Canal was not the most important
fa c to r  behind the United States' a t t i tu d e  towards I s ra e l 's  non-compliance
with the UN's withdrawal re so lu t ion . Rather, the American leadership
was keen to  avoid any p o s s ib i l i t y  o f Egypt's opposing America's new
167programme in  the Middle East. Under the banner o f Arab nationa lism ,
conditions were r ipe  fo r  someone l ik e  Nasser to  reassert h is  leadersh ip,
168espec ia lly  a f te r  such an unequal con fron ta tion .
Is ra e l i  intransigence would provide Egypt w ith  an ideal opportun ity
169to draw most o f the Arab countries in to  i t s  o r b i t .  While increasing
163. White House o f f ic e  o f the s ta f f  sec.records, fo ld e r ,  State Department 
(5 ) ,  d ra f t  rep ly  to  M o lle t,  27 November 1956.
164. The Is ra e l i  leaders accepted only a p a r t ia l  withdrawal from S ina i,  and 
refused to  re linqu ish  control over Gaza and Sharm e l-She ikh, see 
Brecher, o p . c i t . , pp.289-97,
165. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  John Foster Dulles papers, telephone c a l l  
se r ies . Box No.5, fo ld e r  October-December 1956, telephone c a ll  to  Lodge.
166. In terv iew  with Ahmad Husayn Pasha.
167. The American President contacted Nasser about the US Middle East 
programme (the Eisenhower doctr ine) in  December 1956. See Dulles papers, 
special ass. chronological se r ies , Box No.11, 19 December 1956,
NEA Mr. Rountree.
168. New York Times, 17 November 1956.
169. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry , central f i l e s ,  o f f i c i a l  f i l e s  611 LL Box 
594, 116 LL Middle East, Suez s i tu a t io n ,  31 October 1956, telegram 
message Saud to  Eisenhower. King Saud warned Eisenhower o f  the
consequences o f Is ra e l i  aggression.
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Nasser's p restige  and p opu la r ity  among the Arab populace, th is  plan
could also be considered by Nasser as the most promising way out o f
his d i f f i c u l t i e s .
Apart from Nasser's ro le  in Arab a f fa i r s ,  American policy-makers
viewed the Is ra e l i  delay as a s ig n i f ic a n t  fa c to r  in promoting tension
in the Near^East, which had "impaired e f fo r ts - to work towards the
achievement o f  a la s t in g  so lu t ion  to the problems which provoked the Near 
170East c r i s is " .  Confronted with the above, the American leadership
began to move to put an end to  Is ra e l 's  p o l i t i c a l  menoeuvring.
Eisenhower wrote to Ben Gurion on 3 February urging Is rae l to complete
i t s  w ithdrawal. He ended w ith a stern warning, "That such continued
ignoring o f the UN reso lu tion  would almost sure ly lead to  the invoking of
fu r th e r  UN procedures which could se r ious ly  d is tu rb  the re la t io n s  between
171Israel and other member nations inc lud ing the United S ta tes".
At the same time, Secretary Dulles had informed Tel Aviv in a
con fiden t ia l memorandum tha t the United States would support the p r in c ip le
o f free  navigation in the Gulf o f Aqaba and th a t the UNEF would be
172stationed in Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh. Israe l did not accept the
. .  . 173aide memoire.
Israe l intransigence led Eisenhower's adm in is tra t ion  to  t r y  to avoid 
appearing s o f t  towards any aggression. The adm in is tra t ion  was well aware 
th a t a successful Arab UN re so lu t ion  advocating economic sanctions against
170. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers, in te rna t iona l 
se r ies , Box 29, fo ld e r  3, outgoing telegram from Eisenhower to 
Ben Gurion, 3 February 1957.
171. I b id .
172. 'Rutting, o p . c i t . , pp .189-90.
173. Brecher, o p . c i t . , p .297.
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174Is rae l was imminent. The United States had to be f i rm  with Israe l
in  order to  maintain i t s  good re la t io n s  with the Arab world.
Eisenhower had also been successful in  weakening Is ra e l i  attempts to
manipulate the Jewish lobby by making a d ire c t  appeal to the American
people above the heads o f the pressure groups. On 20 February Eisenhower
went on national te le v is io n  and de livered a tougharnessage to  Is ra e l ,
dec laring th a t "the United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure
175upon Israe l to  comply with withdrawal re so lu t io n s " .  He re ite ra ted
the same p os it ion  in a p r iva te  message to  Ben G u r ion .1'76 In the end
Israe l y ie lded to  these pressures and inducements. By 7 March 1957
177Israe l troops moved out of the Sinai and Gaza s t r ip .  The most 
important outcome o f the c o n f l ic t  fo r  Israe l in te res ts  was the r ig h t  o f  
free  navigation through the Gulf o f Aqaba, which was v i ta l  to Is ra e l 's  
economy.
From the very beginning the Egyptian regime had accepted the harsh
r e a l i t y  th a t  i t s  fr iendsh ip  w ith  the Soviet Union would not deter the
invaders. They understood f i r s t l y  th a t the Soviet m i l i t a r y  presence in
the Middle East was non-ex is tent, and secondly th a t  the Soviet Union's
g e o -p o l i t ic a l  influence was minimal, due to the great distance separating 
178i t  from Egypt. A l l  of th is  had been confirmed from the moment of 
the t r i p a r t i t e  invasion, when the Soviet leaders made i t  c lea r to Nasser 
through President Quwatly o f S y r ia , who was in Moscow a t the t im e, th a t
174. Love, o p . c i t . , p .667.
175. Department o f S tate, The US Middle East P o licy , pp .301-7.
176. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower papers as President, 
in te rn a t io n a l se r ies , Box 29, Folder 2, Is ra e l ,  from Eisenhower 
to Ben Gurion, 20 February 1957.
177. Love, o p . c i t . , p .670.
178. Mohamed Heika l, The Sphinx and the Commissar, o p . c i t . , pp.70-1. 
See also Love, o p .c i t ' . ,  p.557.
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Egypt should not expect any Soviet in te rven tion  to  end the c r i s i s ,  and
th a t the c o n f l ic t  should be resolved through d ip lom atic  and p o l i t i c a l  
179channels. I t  was d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the Soviet s t ra te g is ts  to a l te r
th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  p r io r i t i e s  from the ex is t in g  problems in  Eastern Europe,
which was th e i r  own sphere o f in f luence , to  the Middle East c r i s is .
Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States had i t s  S ixth Fleet in  the 
180Mediterranean, and had the means to impose e f fe c t iv e  economic
pressures upon the invading powers.
Nasser perceived Egypt's precarious p o s it io n ,  knowing f u l l  well
tha t only the support o f a great power could assure i t s  surviva l under
his leadership. Consequently Nasser turned to Eisenhower on the f i r s t
day o f the t r i p a r t i t e  invasion, asking fo r  American m i l i t a r y  aid to
181stop the aggression. The Egyptian request did not surprise  American
p o l i t i c a l  c i r c le s ,  as they had previously received an in te l l ig e n ce  report
confirming th a t "ne ithe r Egypt nor the USSR is  ready to accept the
r isks  o f m i l i t a r y  a ll ia nce  a t th is  time. Our continued estimate is
th a t the USSR would make every e f fo r t  to avoid d i re c t  involvement in
182the event o f  Western m i l i t a r y  action against Nasser".
Nevertheless, the Egyptian request was u n re a l is t ic ,  because i t s  
leadership had overestimated i t s  in f luence. I t  d id not understand one 
important fa c to r ,  th a t any American in te rven tion  against i t s  a l l ie s
179. See Heika l, Nasser:the Cairo Documents, o p . c i t . , p . 142. Also 
in te rv iew  w ith  Fathi Radwan, Cairo, and Mustefa Amin, Cairo.
180. J.C. Wylie, "The Sixth F leet and American Diplomacy", in Hurewitz (e d . ) ,  
Soyiet-American R iva lry  in the Middle East, pp .55-6. See also
Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower record as President, White 
House centra l f i l e ,  incoming telegram to Secretary from Hare,
31 October.
181. In terv iew  w ith  R. Hare, Washington, D.C., 4 November 1983.
182. RG 218 h OCS 091 memo, fo r  Chairman JCS, sub jec t, Nasser's alleged 
attempt to  obtain Soviet mutual defence agreement, no date.
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would mean the end o f the NATO a l l ia n c e ,  leading to the destruc tion  o f 
Western u n ity  v is -a -v is  the Soviet Union. In terms o f cold-war p o l i t i c s ,  
Egypt m iscalculated the p re requ is ites  regarding the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  any 
American m i l i t a r y  in te rfe rence , but on the other hand Egypt's in v i ta t io n  
gave the United States a mandate to handle the s i tu a t io n  on behalf o f 
both sides. By th is  move the Eisenhower adm in is tra tion  scored a major 
psychological v ic to ry ,  thus compensating fo r  i t s  previous fa i lu r e  in 
handling Middle Eastern problems.
As expected, the American response indicated a w il l ingness  to help
183Egypt only w ith in  the framework o f  the United Nations. As has been 
seen, these American e f fo r ts  to h a l t  the war and force the invaders to 
withdraw went well beyond the l im i t s  o f  th a t promise. From the very 
beginning Nasser did his best to woo the United States. He sent Mustefa 
Amin, the well-known Egyptian jo u r n a l i s t ,  c landestine ly  w ith  a personal 
message to  Dulles. In th is  message Nasser assured the United States 
th a t he would oppose communism and would not take a h o s t i le  a t t i tu d e
towards American in te res ts  in  the area. Moreover, he demonstrated
184his readiness to reconsider his p o licy  towards Is ra e l .
Egyptian diplomacy now moved in three d ire c t io n s . I t  re in forced
i t s  l in k s  w ith  the United States. I t  t r ie d  hard to  create a s p l i t
185between the United States and i t s  a l l i e s .  F in a l ly  i t  did i t s  utmost
183. In terv iew  with R. Hare, Washington, D.C.
184. In terv iew  with Mustefa Amin, Cairo, 14 January 1985.
185. For example, in Nasser's message to Eisenhower on 3 November, Nasser
wrote th a t fo r  the f i r s t  time he rea lised  th a t  the USA was not simply
playing the B r i t is h  game in the area. See Eisenhower D ia r ies , Box 
No. 19, fo ld e r  November 1956, memo, o f conversation, w ith  President,
3 November 1956. Moreover, Nasser asked Serraj o f Syria not to 
blow up the p ipe line  because o f America's stance. See Heika l,
Nasser: The Cairo Documents, o p . c i t . , pp .111-2.
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to  a l la y  American fears th a t Egypt would a llow the Soviet Union to
increase i t s  in f luence  w ith in  the country. Nasser assured Ambassador
Hare th a t  "Egypt has had a long s trugg le  to  get r id  o f fo re ign
186domination, and did not intend to  repeat th a t experience". Moreover,
the Egyptian leadership informed the American government th a t i t  "did
— 187not want volunteers from the Soviet Union".
The po s it io n  adopted by the Egyptian leadership a t the very beginning
o f the c r i s is  showed th a t  there were wide divergencies between Egypt's
o f f i c i a l  p o l ic ie s  on the one hand and Egypt's real ob jectives on the
other. Egypt had in r e a l i t y  abandoned i t s  previous claim o f "non-
a lignm ent", and demonstrated i t s  readiness to  put i t s e l f  under the
p ro tec tion  o f  one o f  the two super-powers. The p o l i t i c a l  p r io r i t ie s
which promote the concept o f  "non-alignment" are thus seen not to be
v iab le  in  small countries during a time o f c r i s is .
The most important th ing  about the Suez c r is is  is  th a t i t s
consequences, both in regional and global terms, were vast and fa r- reach ing .
Egypt, the v ic t im  o f the aggression, w ith world pub lic  opinion on i t s
s ide , and w ith  Soviet-American moral support, had turned i t s  m i l i t a r y
defeat in to  a p o l i t i c a l  v ic to ry .  Nasser's p restige  had never been so
g rea t, and he had gained in fluence in the Arab world , contrary to  the
188in ten t io ns  o f  B r i ta in  and France. Throughout most o f  the c r is is ,A ra b  
o i l  became a major force to be reckoned w ith  in  Middle East p o l i t i c s .
186. Eisenhower papers, Dulles-Herter se r ie s , Box No.6, from Cairo (Hare) 
to  Secretary o f  State, Department o f  S tate, incoming telegram,
8 November 1956.
187. Eisenhower Diary se r ies , s t a f f  memos., s t a f f  note No.44, 23 November 
1956. Also Dulles papers, telephone c a l l  se r ie s ,  Box No.5, fo ld e r  
October-December 1956, telephone c a l l  to  Ambassador Lodge, 26 
December 1956.
188. See Eisenhower D ia r ies , Box 19, November 1959, memo, o f  Conversation 
w ith President, Secretary Hoover, Col.Goodpaster, November T91>6.
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The lesson to be drawn from the Suez c r is is  and the resu lt ing  
o i l  shortage was th a t global po licy  could hinge on a t t i tu d e s  and
189decisions by local powers, as long as the conditions were su ita b le ,
and tha t was obvious in the 1973 energy c r i s is .
For B r i ta in  i t  was hard to turn the clock back. The domineering
s ty le  o f n ineteenth-century diplomacy proved her downfa ll.  In the
course o f  the war, B r i ta in  had sh if ted  from im p a r t ia l i t y  to conspiring
with Is ra e l ,  which was a surprise even to Nasser. B r i ta in 's  posit ion
in the region was diminished ra ther than enhanced. She lo s t  her
tre a ty  r ig h ts  in  Egypt, and found tha t even her re la t io n s  with the
190Baghdad Pact countries had de teriroated. The B r i t is h  invasion o f
Egypt had f i n a l l y  undermined the pro-Western regimes in the area.
Soon afterwards, in 1958, the Iraq i regime f e l l ,  and subsequently followed 
Egypt's example by turn ing to the Soviet Union fo r  aid and arms.
The Suez c r is is  was a tu rn ing -po in t in the h is to ry  o f the Middle 
East. I t  provided the h is to r ic a l  circumstances fo r  the new national 
leaders to enhance th e i r  prestige and popu la r ity .  The very purpose 
of the Baghdad Pact, i . e . ,  to contain the Soviet Union, had become a 
questionable undertaking. I t  was not the Soviet Union th a t  had 
attacked Egypt; on the contrary , the Soviet Union had supported Egypt 
against one o f  the founding members o f the Baghdad Pact.
189. See Princeton U n ive rs ity ,  John Foster Dulles Oral H is tory  P ro ject, 
p .28, Mr. Humphrey, "We learned in the f i r s t  tw enty-four hours 
th a t they could not la s t . . . a  week or two, th e i r  o i l  would not 
la s t  them any longer".
190. See Eisenhower Diary se r ies , Box No.19, October 1956, s ta f f  memos. 
29 October. Also J. Hurewitz (e d .) ,  Soviet-American R iva lry  in 
the Middle East, "Orig in o f the R iv a lry " ,  pp .10-14.
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No longer, a f te r  Suez, could the West assert th a t i t  was the 
sole exponent and champion o f man's asp ira tions fo r  a ju s t  world.
Through i t s  commitments and actions during the c r i s i s ,  the United 
States t r ie d  hard to salvage Western prestige and in f luence which 
had been badly tarnished by the invasion. From th is  time on, 
the American government assumed the ro le  o f the sole leg it im a te  
guardian o f  Western in te res ts  in  the area, against Soviet attempts to 
penetrate the region.
Although during the c r is is  Eisenhower did his best to keep the
Conservatives in  power in  B r i ta in ,  he was nevertheless a pragmatist when
he forced Eden to accept his own h is to r ic a l  l im i ta t io n s ,  and not to t r y
"to  be bigger than he i s " .  In Eisenhower's view, Eden was s t i l l  acting
191in the manner o f  the "V ic to r ian  period".
For the West the Suez war marked the end o f c o l le c t iv e  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  
by the three Western powers fo r  Soviet containment in the Middle East.
I t  became apparent th a t B r i ta in  and France were no longer the dominant 
powers in the reg ion; th e i r  dependence on the United States was evident 
to a l l .  The Suez war confirmed th a t major changes had occurred. From 
1956 onwards the Soviet-Western r i v a l r y  in  the A rab -Is rae li  zone had 
thus been transformed in to  a Soviet-American r i v a l r y .  This consequence 
was more c le a r ly  shown in January 1957, when Eisenhower ou tl ined  the new 
American i n i t i a t i v e  to  f i l l  the vacuum created by the Anglo-French 
withdrawal from Egypt.
19.1. Eisenhower Diary se r ies , Box No.20, November 1956, from 
Eisenhower to General A lfred  Grunther* Supreme Ccxmmander, 
personal, Z November 1956.
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This s h i f t  in  the balance o f  power had i t s  impact upon the regional
s tru c tu re .  The decline o f B r i t is h  influence led the United States to
look fo r  an Arab leader w ith the q u a l i f ic a t io n s  to lead th is  area
under the banner o f pan- 1si amism, as a counterweight to  Nasser.
King Saud was a lo g ica l  choice in th is  regard, because he a t le a s t ,  in
Eisenhower's view, "professed anti-communism and enjoyed on religi-eus
192grounds a high standing among a l l  Arab na tions".
This pol icy  demonstrated the obvious fa c t  that, despite Nasser's p o pu la r ity ,
the American policy-makers since 1953 did not view Egypt as a protagonist
o f the Arab world or as the cornerstone in t h e i r  s tra tegy . Nasser, as
regional leader, believed th a t the Suez c r is is  had proved th a t Arab
nations under h is  leadership could defend themselves from any external
pressures. The United States, however, took the opposite view, which
was th a t no one Arab s tate o r leader was capable to tak ing upon i t s e l f
the leadership o f  the e n t ire  region. Apparently American-Egyptian
re la t io n s  during th is  period improved to  the po in t o f  c o r d ia l i t y ,  but
193th is  c o r d ia l i t y  did not la s t  fo r  long.
The centra l issue fo r  the United States as global power was the 
containment o f  communist penetration in the Middle East. For Nasser, 
asserting Egypt's p o l i t i c a l  hegemony over the e n t i re  Arab world was 
h is foremost aim, thereby d isp lac ing  Iraq under Nuri es-Said.
192. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, o p . c i t . , pp .114-6.
193. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Eisenhower records as President, 
centra l f i l e ,  Box No.72, State Department incoming telegrams, 
Department o f  State from Cairo to  Secretary o f  S ta te , 5 November 
1956. Ambassador Hare reported th a t ,  " I  am now convinced tha t 
as fa r  as Egypt and possible other Arab states are concerned, the 
US has suddenly emerged as a real Champion o f  R igh t".
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Yet Nasser deceived h im se lf,  not re a l is in g  th a t ne ithe r he nor 
Nuri was q u a l i f ie d  to be the Grand Master o f the Middle Eastern 
chessboard under the new American ru les . The American policy-makers 
never fo rgo t th a t Nasser's p o licy  gave the Soviet Union a golden chance 
to  move th e i r  chessmen over the Western defences in to  the heart o f the 
Arab world. _  —
CONCLUSION
United States-Egyptian re la t io n s  during the period from 1952 to 1956 
were marked by the fa i lu r e  o f both Nasser and John Foster Dulles to reach 
a proper understanding o f each o the r 's  goals, asp ira t ions  and p o l i t i c a l  
circumstances. _
One o f the major p r io r i t i e s  in the understanding o f  these p a r t ic u la r  
re la t io n s  has to be Egypt's emergence as a leader among developing countries 
in which - l ik e  most o ther Third World countries - the decision-making 
powers are usua lly  concentrated in the hands o f one in d iv id u a l .  This 
p a r t ic u la r  ind iv id u a l is ,  to a large ex ten t, the f in a l  a rb i te r  in  a l l  major 
policy-making; consequently, Egyptian fo re ign  p o lic y  too has re f le c ted  
the p o l i t i c a l  a t t i tu d e s  o f s o l i ta r y  ind iv idua ls  whoever they may be.
From 1952 up to  September 1970, Egypt was under the contro l o f Nasser's 
charismatic p e rson a l i ty .  He represented the spearhead to power o f  Egypt's 
urban lower middle class whose ascendancy was in i t ia te d  by the m i l i t a r y  
coup d 'e ta t  o f  1952. This p a r t ic u la r  class displaced the more t ra d i t io n a l  
landed a r is toc ra cy  and upper middle classes which had dominated Egyptian 
p o l i t i c s  since the 1919 revo lu t ion . Nasser's challenge to his p o l i t i c a l  
predecessors, and e sp ec ia lly  to the popular leader o f  the Wafd Party,
Moustafa el-Nahas, was based mainly on ideo log ica l grounds; ye t both 
espoused the idea th a t Egypt was not merely a sta te  on the banks o f  the N i le ,  
but a major part o f  the greater Arab nation. Egyptian pan-Arabism became 
Nasser's focal po in t in his p o l i t i c a l  ambitions. He also used i t  as a 
d ivers ionary  ta c t i c  to draw a tten t io n  away from Egypt's in te rn a l problems.
Like most o f  his predecessors, Nasser was a p risoner o f  Egypt's g e o -p o l i t ic a l  
r e a l i t i e s  in the Middle East, always having to take in to  account Egypt's
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p ivo ta l ro le  in the Arab world. Nasser accepted wholeheartedly Egypt's 
c e n t r a l i t y ,  be liev ing  th a t in th is  way he could ensure his leadership in 
Egypt and Egypt's pre-eminence w ith in  the Arab world.
Turning from Egypt's ro le  in the Arab world under Nasser to American 
a t t i tu d e s  towards these developments, we f in d  th a t ,  a t the very beginning the 
US did help Nasser to achieve his goals in various ways. Nevertheless, 
there was an area o f c o n f l i c t  between the US and Nasser a f te r  1953, when, on 
v is i t in g  the Middle East, John Foster Dulles formulated a po licy  which assumed 
th a t Egypt should abandon i t s  plans fo r  Arab leadership and instead work w ith in  
the Western framework o f  regional state a l l ia nce s . Dulles and the American 
government expected Egypt, as a major Arab country, to set an example and be 
the f i r s t  Arab s ta te  to  make peace w ith Is ra e l .  To America i t  was o f the 
utmost importance th a t a l l  Arab countries should evolve in to  active  
p a rt ic ip a n ts  o f  a Western defence strategy and l im i t  "the Red P e r i l " ,  Soviet 
expansionism, in the Middle East. To a large extent Nasser accepted the 
American s tra tegy in  the area by concluding the 1954 agreement w ith the United 
Kingdom on terms favoured by the West, even though i t  could have cost him his 
leadership i f  not his l i f e ,  as manifested in the attempt on his l i f e  by the 
Muslim Brethren in October 1954. For Nasser th is  was to be a t r i a l  period in 
his re la t io n sh ip  w ith  the West, espec ia lly  the United States.
Such a pro-Western a t t i tu d e ,  a t a c r i t i c a l  time in his career., was 
j u s t i f i e d  on two grounds: f i r s t ,  he f e l t  th a t by adopting such a po licy  he
would be able to  get American economic and m i l i t a r y  support, which would 
enhance his pos it io n  in Egypt as well as in the Arab world. Second, Nasser 
believed tha t by tak ing a more moderate stance towards the West , the US would 
reconsider i t s  previous h o s t i le  a t t i tu d e  towards Egypt's hegemonistic
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ambitions over the Arab world. However, Nasser's b r ie f l y  moderate a t t i tu d e  
in external po licy  did not bear f r u i t ,  fo r  the US re jec ted  Nasser's 
ambitions fo r  Egypt's leadership in the Arab world, s h i f t in g  i t s  p r io r i t ie s  
to the "Northern T ie r"  s tra tegy to counteract new world developments and to 
escalate the Cold War between East and West.
The American-Iraqi arms deal in A p r i l  1954 confirmed th is  new s h i f t  in 
American s tra tegy, convincing Nasser tha t the Americans were not much 
d i f fe re n t  from the B r i t is h  in th e i r  re la t ion s  w ith the Arab world. The 
American policy-makers -  l ik e  the B r i t is h  - had placed more weight and t r u s t  
on Nuri es-Said o f  Iraq and the t ra d i t io n a l  e l i t e  and less on the new 
n a t io n a l is t  leaders l ik e  Nasser. As fo r  the A ra b - Is ra e l i  c o n f l i c t ,  the 
Eisenhower adm in is tra t ion  influenced Nasser's p o l i t i c a l  p r io r i t i e s  by making 
i t  a centra l issue in re in fo rc in g  America's s tra te g ic  ro le  in the Arab world, 
an issue tha t had to be resolved through a peaceful settlement. Eisenhower 
and Dulles thought th a t  th is  new s h i f t  in fo re ign p o licy  in  the Middle East 
was the only way to l i m i t  growing Soviet in fluence in the area, meanwhile, i t  
would be formulating a m i l i t a r y  a l l ia n ce  o f a l l  the Arab countries in the 
Middle East under the auspices o f the West.
The main weakness in America's policy-making in the Middle East was 
th a t i t  t r ie d  to impose i t s  own views o f the g e o -p o l i t ic a l  r e a l i t ie s  o f the 
area, w ithout tak ing in to  account, fo r  example, Arab pub lic  opinion and i t s  
suspicion o f Is ra e l 's  t e r r i t o r i a l  ambitions. S im i la r ly ,  the American 
adm in is tra tion  could not comprehend the fa c t  tha t most Arab countr ies , 
espec ia lly  Egypt, saw no immediate th rea t from the Soviet Union and the 
communist bloc.
The events o f  1955, fo r  example, the formation o f  the Baghdad Pact and 
the Gaza ra id  by Is ra e l ,  introduced awesome problems in the power p o l i t i c s
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o f the Middle East, e spec ia lly  in  the re la t io n s  between Egypt and the US.
Nasser f i n a l l y  had to accept th a t h is moderate p o lic ie s  towards the West 
and Is rae l would have to be terminated and a more aggressive s tra tegy 
towards them would have to be in i t ia te d  as soon as possib le. He f e l t  
betrayed by the West, and rea lised  th a t he had been used as a too l fo r  
accomplishing Western s tra te gy , e spec ia lly  th a t o f  the US. He f e l t  he had 
to confront them on th e i r  own terms, in a more fo rce fu l and even rad ica l way, 
f in d in g  the Soviet Union a w i l l in g  partner to fu r th e r  his aims. Nevertheless,
Nasser s t i l l  l e f t  h is options open regarding his re la t io n s  w ith  the US. As
A llen Dulles stated a t the time, " I f  he [Nasser] can maintain his 
independence and prestige through an arrangement w ith  the West, he would p re fe r 
th a t to a close t ie -u p  w ith  the Soviets".'*'
This change o f  p o l ic y  by Nasser not only did not carry  any serious r is k  
o f r e ta l ia t io n  by the West, but i t  also raised him in the eyes o f the Arabs to the
status o f  the greatest Arab leader in modern times.
Nasser t r ie d  to k i l l  two b irds w ith one stone. He wanted to show 
American policy-makers, e sp ec ia lly  John Foster Dulles, th a t  the American 
decision to go w ith the "Northern T ie r"  stra tegy was not a workable so lu t ion  
to  American in te res ts  in the area; on the contra ry , i t  would create great 
disharmony in the loca l balance o f power. He was also keen to stress the 
po in t th a t Egypt should no longer be viewed as merely a minor s ta te ,  but 
as the embodiment o f  the Arab ideal o f the fu tu re . The Americans fa i le d  
to grasp Egypt's or Nasser's in te n t io n s ,  maintaining th a t i t  was the Is ra e l i  
ra id  on Egypt in Feburary 1955 th a t had undermined American-Egyptian re la t io n s .
1. Dwight D. Eisenhower L ib ra ry ,  Dulles papers, White House, memo, from 
A llen  Dulles to John Foster Dulles, undated.
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B a s ica l ly ,  the Americans came short o f no t ic in g  tha t there was a c o n f l i c t  
between Cairo and Baghdad, and tha t the balance o f Arab power was now 
s h i f t in g  towards Egypt and i t s  a l l i e s .  From 1955 onwards, Washington was 
to  face the hard fa c t  th a t the "honeymoon" w ith  Nasser and his regime was 
over and the time had come fo r  more r e a l i s t i c  and consequently tougher 
p o lic y .  This challenge was p a r t ic u la r ly  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  Secretary Dulles 
who had viewed the re la t io n s  w ith Egypt in terms o f East-West Cold War 
p o l ic ie s ,  and th is  can be e a s ily  a t t r ib u te d  to McCarthyist in fluence during 
th a t time and the great zeal o f  the r ig h t  wing o f the Republican Party to 
condemn communism wherever i t  was. Therefore, once Nasser had concluded an 
arms deal w ith  the Eastern bloc in September 1955, Secretary Dulles ' 
suspicions increased, viewing i t  as a communist conspiracy and not as 
Nasser's n a t io n a l is t  p r io r i t i e s  to maintain Egypt's national se cu r ity .
D u lles 's  narrow-minded in te rp re ta t io n  o f Nasser's moves made him adopt 
a new stance towards Egypt. Dulles had always t r ie d  to impose his own 
frame o f reference on Egypt, a f ixed  pattern  tha t would best serve America's 
in te res ts  in  the area. Yet no one could blame Dulles fo r  p o l i t i c a l  
misjudgment in such a p o l i t i c a l  context, since the US, l ik e  a l l  great powers, 
was accustomed to in te rp re t  p o l ic ies  o f  weaker states through th e i r  own 
prism o f p a r t ic u la r  in te res ts  and preferences. American policy-makers 
thought th a t vast economic aid to Egypt, espec ia lly  w ith  the f inancing o f 
the Aswan Dam, would e n t i t l e  them to in fluence Egyptian fo re ign  p o licy .  
Although th is  thes is  o f power p o l i t i c s  was b a s ica l ly  c o rre c t ,  i t  fa i le d  to 
take in to  account the extent to which Nasser fashioned Egypt's fo re ign 
p o licy  by his own views and ambitions.
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The fa i lu r e  o f  the Anderson Mission in March 1956 to s e t t le  the 
E gyp tian - Is rae li  d ispute as a p re requ is ite  to financing  the Aswan Dam, 
completely undermined the context o f  communication between Nasser and 
Dulles, a framework th a t assumed c o n f l ic ts  o f in te re s t ,  but kept them w ith in  
manageable l im i t s  so as to allow fo r  d ip lomatic  re la t io n s .
Before making a c r i t i c a l  decis ion, Nasser, as a p o l i t i c a l  leader - ra is  - 
used to assess a l l  i t s  im plica tions w ith  respect to Egypt and the res t o f 
the Arab world. Dulles, on the other hand, evaluated a l l  matters 
according to how they kept pace w ith American general s tra tegy in containing 
Soviet expansion. Consequently, Dulles saw Nasser as an extension o f 
Russian penetration in the Middle East, as well as an obstacle to a peaceful 
reso lu tion  o f the A ra b -Is ra e l i  c o n f l ic t .  Accord ing ly, the American 
adm in is tra tion  decided to contain Nasser's in f luence and to manipulate a l l  
possible means to weaken his pos it ion  as a p o ten t ia l Third World leader.
This p a r t ic u la r  American po licy  proved to be counterproductive, fo r  by 
withdrawing American economic support fo r  the Aswan Dam, the Americans did 
not only promote Nasser's na t io n a l isa t io n  o f the Suez Canal Company, but also 
enhanced his leadership in  the Arab world.
Contrary to what was widely expected, US-Egyptian re la t io n s  during the 
Suez c r i s is  improved, and there were signs o f  a re c o n c i l ia t io n  under way. 
However, Dulles seemed to waver between a desire to b e tte r  his re la t ion s  w ith  
Nasser and the b e l ie f  th a t Nasser was an extremely dangerous fa n a t ic .
Secretary o f State Dulles was caught on the horns o f a dilemma, fo r  ne ithe r 
recent experience nor re levant h is to r ic a l  analogies could resolve his scope 
o f choices. The ob jec t o f  the American stance during the Suez c r is is  was 
ne ithe r to enhance Nasser's prestige  nor undermine her a l l i e s ,  but to p ro tec t
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Western in te res ts  in  the long term as an ind ica t ion  o f i t s  dominant p os it ion . 
They rea lised  th a t any w ishfu l th ink ing  was not p ra c t ica l i f  corre la ted 
w ith  concrete h is to r ic a l  circumstances. Therefore, i t s  strong stand 
against i t s  a l l i e s '  ambitions fo r  the Suez Canal did not permit the Soviet 
Ulnion to e x p lo i t  the con trad ic t ions p o l i t i c a l l y .
Paradoxica lly , documentary and other evidence fo r  the research show 
th a t before and during the Suez c r i s i s ,  Nasser made endless e f fo r ts  to f in d  
a reasonable framework o f  communication tha t could lead to an improvement in 
his re la t ion s  w ith  the US. At the same time, Nasser did not comprehend 
th a t American fo re ign  po licy  in  the 1950s, and espec ia lly  under Dulles, 
viewed communist expansionism as the main th rea t to in te rn a t io n a l s t a b i l i t y  
and Western global in te re s ts .  S im ila r ly  he did not re a l ise  th a t ,  although 
American fore ign p o licy  was Dulles ' own p o l i t i c a l  domain, i t s  formulation 
was also g rea t ly  influenced by the American Congress, American public  
op in ion, and the various pressure groups w ith in  America's p o l i t i c a l  s tru c tu re .
U nfortunate ly, Nasser's n a t io n a l is t  aims fo r  Egypt and fo r  the Arab 
world d is to r ted  his image as a moderate a l l y  in the eyes o f  the American 
policy-makers, and e spec ia lly  o f John Foster Dulles. In the same context, 
Dulles ' lack o f understanding o f Arab p o l i t i c a l  th ink ing  and the r e a l i t y  o f 
Arab p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  fu r th e r  undermined any productive b i la te ra l  re la t io n s  
between the two sides. In  general, i t  could be said th a t the major fa c to r  
in the American fa i lu re  to maintain an adequate modus vivendi w ith  Egypt, 
which from 1952 to ea r ly  1955 was considered as a po ten tia l a l l y ,  was 
America's eagerness to impose her frame o f p o l i t i c a l  reference u n i la te ra l ly  
regardless o f the h is to r ic a l  or p o l i t i c a l  circumstances o f  Egypt. This 
American fa i lu re  turned Nasser from a local leader in Egypt in to  the 
charismatic leader o f the Arab world , and a leading p o l i t i c a l  f ig u re  in the 
Third World.
A l l  in  a l l ,  US-Egyptian re la t io n s  between the 1952 revo lu tion  and the 
Suez c r i s is  o f 1956, represented the epitome o f a c o n f l i c t  between the 
in te res ts  and needs o f a growing regional power - Egypt - and those o f an 
established Western global power - the US.
Nasser t r ie d  to diminish any fo re ign  influence in the area, be liev ing  
th a t the A rab^co llec tive  se cu r ity  system was the only v a l id  answer to the 
area defence problems, in which Egyptian hegemony could be assured. The 
Americans d id not perceive th a t by a ss is t in g  Nasser to achieve his regional 
aims, they would also serve th e i r  long-term ob jectives w ith  regard to 
East-West re la t io n s .
For the American policy-makers the lesson was not le a rn t.
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